Marie Tidball MP: speeches

Speeches

• 1 Jul 2025 · Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payment Bill · Hansard source

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  In March 2020, when the Conservative Government looked like an outlier in appearing to pursue a strategy centring on herd immunity, I felt raw, hot fear. Thinking of my toddler and what might happen if I caught coronavirus meant that I sobbed deeply. After 10 years of austerity, I knew then that disabled people would pay an enormous price, and they did: almost 60% of covid-related deaths in that first wave were of disabled people. I vowed then that I would do all I could to create a country that treats disabled people with dignity and respect. The social security system was broken by the Conservatives’ legacy of austerity and their monumental mishandling of the covid pandemic. I am now one of the only visibly physically disabled Members of Parliament. I am proud that our manifesto committed to championing the rights of disabled people, and the principle of working with disabled people to ensure that our views and voices are at the heart of all we do. My communities nurtured me growing up, and they taught me the values of fairness, equality and community. It is with a heavy, broken heart that I will be voting against this Bill today. As a matter of conscience, I need my constituents to know that I cannot support the proposed changes to PIP as drafted in the Bill. Since April, I have been engaging relentlessly with the Government at the very highest level to change their proposals, making clear that I could not support the proposals on PIP. PIP is an in-work benefit designed to ensure that disabled people can live independently. Low-level support such as PIP helps to build the bridge to the deinstitutionalisation of disabled people, keeping us out of the dark corners of hospitals, prisons and social care settings. The concessions that the Government have announced are significant, including that all recipients of PIP who receive it will continue to do so. While that will come as a relief to my 6,000 constituents who receive PIP, 4 million disabled people still live in poverty in the UK. The proposed changes to be made in Committee are still projected to put 150,000 people into poverty. I cannot accept that or a proposed points system under current descriptors, which would exclude from eligibility those who cannot put on their underwear, prosthetic limbs or shoes without support.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  In the UK, 2.9 million disabled women are of reproductive age. Tragically, disabled women are 44% more likely to have a stillbirth. As a disabled mother myself, I was devastated by the barriers that I faced at every point during my pregnancy. It was a pleasure to host Paralympians, disabled women and experts by experience at a summit here in Parliament to discuss what good, inclusive maternity care looks like. Can the Leader of the House advise on further opportunities to embed safer maternity care for disabled women in the Government’s women’s health strategy as part of the 10-year plan?

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to amendments 518 to 520, which respectively provide definitions of coercion, dishonesty and pressure for the purposes of the Bill. In my speech on Second Reading, I said I would want to ensure that the final stages of the Bill define dishonesty, coercion and pressure. I have sketched out the definitions based on oral evidence given to the Committee, and am grateful for the extremely helpful input from Laura Hoyano and Max Hill, after the witness sessions, in establishing the content and parameters of the definitions. We have spent a considerable amount of time in Committee discussing the safeguards against coercion, for example, but I felt we had not spent much time discussing the content and parameters of the concepts. Although I will not be press the amendments to a vote, for reasons I will outline, it is important to ensure that our discussions of the concepts are on the public record. I will not press the amendments to a vote as I am convinced, after discussions with legal colleagues and having considered the issues very carefully, that the risks of setting the parameters on the face of the Bill are too great. It would risk ossifying the courts rather than ensuring that they use the full parameters of the concepts to encompass scenarios for the offences under clause 26 in circumstances that the Committee may not currently conceive of. In other words, I am convinced that to limit the definitions of the concepts in statute would create the risk of excluding criminal behaviour where the threshold of the offence would otherwise be met under common law. I believe that instead, mirroring the approach to coercion taken in the Serious Crime Act 2015—a point I will return to—the Ministry of Justice must draw up details of the concepts and examples of their application in the context of the offences set out in clause 26. Doing so will be helpful for the medical practitioners, along with other professionals, who use the Bill if it becomes law, and in the training to be provided for them under the Bill to enable medical practitioners to evaluate whether each patient has been subjected to coercion, pressure or dishonesty by another person in applying for assisted dying. In criminal law, definitions of coercion, dishonesty and pressure are not placed on a statutory footing. First, on dishonesty, Ivey v. Genting Casinos is the lead case because there is no statutory definition of dishonesty. The case provides not a definition but a two-stage test. The courts are familiar with the legal elements of dishonesty from case law: for a long time the part-subjective and part-objective Ghosh test was applied. That was amended in 2020 by the Supreme Court in the Ivey case, which disapproved the former test but retained the question: “Was his or her conduct dishonest by the standards of an ordinary decent person?” Similarly, “pressure” does not have a statutory definition in criminal law, but essentially means forcing someone to do something against their will. Having looked at this issue carefully, I am satisfied that the wording in clause 26 is enough to signal to anyone involved in a relevant application to bring a criminal prosecution what they should look for in terms of acts and intent. The common law is thus well placed to further develop the concepts in the context of the offences set out in clause 26.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This is the final new clause of the Committee. As I said in support of new clause 25 and associated amendments last week, I want to strengthen the voice of disabled people in the Bill. New clause 35 would require the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to establish a disability advisory board that would report annually on the implementation and impact of the Act on disabled people. The new clause has been designed to ensure that disabled people have a voice at the heart of the Bill and an ongoing role in monitoring its impact. The disability advisory board model reflects a structure that was used at the Department of Health to implement the Autism Act 2009 and monitor the implementation of its provisions, statutory guidance and strategy. It was a highly effective body. Including a disability advisory board structure on the face of the Bill would entrench the board in the work of the commission, enabling a long-term and iterative structure in which disabled people could report on the reality of the impact of the Bill on disabled people across this country. This reflects comments made by Dan Scorer of Mencap in oral evidence. He said that if the Bill was passed, “We would want to see strong representation from patient groups…as well as from people who have been involved in the process, such as family members, advocates and clinicians, to make sure that if serious issues are being raised, they can be picked up early and addressed.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 280-81, Q367.] The board must therefore consist of “(a) people who have a disability under the Equality Act 2010, (b) representatives from disabled people’s organisations, and (c) other such persons or organisations as the Commissioner considers relevant to the impact of the Act on disabled people.” The commissioner would, within six months of being appointed, have to appoint a programme board to advise on the implementation of the Bill, and annually thereafter report on the impact of the Bill’s operation on disabled people. The clause reflects the learning of Dr Greg Mewett, the specialist palliative care physician from Australia who gave oral evidence to the Committee about the Australian implementation taskforce, which includes a strong disability advocate. My new clause would go further, by including a rigorous reporting process that requires the advisory board to report to the Secretary of State and the commissioner within six months of the commissioner being appointed, and annually thereafter. It also provides: “The Secretary of State must, within three months of receipt of any report under subsection (3), lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.” In the oral evidence sessions, I asked witnesses for their views on what structures or mechanisms could work to facilitate the opportunity to hear the voices of disabled people in monitoring the implementation and impact of the Bill were it to pass through Parliament. Dr Miro Griffiths said: “I think there needs to be further robust action around how to collect data and allow it to be analysed, to see the trends that are occurring in why people are pursuing this option and how that may play into broader political and socioeconomic issues, such as a lack of services elsewhere or frustrations for disabled people and their families in trying to access particular services…I would therefore encourage their representation on any form of advisory council. I would also request that disability studies scholars, who are often left out of the discourse around disability policy, are part of any form of mechanism to advise or scrutinise.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 145, Q183.] Subsection (2)(b) and (c) would provide for this. Professor Tom Shakespeare corroborated the benefits of such an advisory board, calling it a “very good idea.” Importantly, Fazilet Hadi, from Disability Rights UK, stated: “Should the Bill go through, it would be good to see a monitoring mechanism. I cannot say what that should be, but it would be good to see disabled people shape it. Some 45% of older people are disabled people, so disabled people are going to be very affected by the Bill.” Poignantly, she went on: “It is often our experience that we are the last people who are spoken to; maybe that is what is behind the question. We should of course be at the table now in respect of whatever mechanisms, and in the shaping of any implementation, should the Bill be passed.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 175, Q227.] There is, and there should be, nothing about us without us. As a disabled Member of Parliament, I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for inviting me to sit on this Committee. Through this new clause and my earlier new clause 25, I have worked hard to put together a structure that ensures that disabled people are firmly at the table in the process of monitoring the implementation and impact of the Bill. I urge members of the Committee to support new clause 35.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the support of my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It sounds that I may also have the support of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, which also makes me very happy at this stage of the evening! I tabled these amendments because I passionately believe in inclusive healthcare for disabled people, removing barriers to such healthcare where possible, and ensuring that disabled people have a strong voice in advocating for themselves and the healthcare they need or desire. I have tried to write the amendment and the new clause to ensure that access to an independent advocate operates across the functions of the Bill. I have been keen to ensure that this provision acts in conjunction with new clause 27, which I will speak about at a later stage. I hope, as I said in an earlier response to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, that that will provide a solid and robust opportunity to monitor the impact on disabled people of the Bill, if it does pass through Parliament, through its implementation and in practice. Taken together, the measures will create a solid foundation to enable disabled people to have a voice and will provide a strong structure for accountability in the Bill. I acknowledge the Minister’s comments, and will work with him and my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to ensure that it is watertight. Amendment 517 agreed to. Amendment made: 534, in clause 30, page 18, line 30, at end insert— “(da) the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of section 6.”— (Jack Abbott.) Amendment made: 523, in clause 30, page 18, line 31, leave out paragraph (e) and insert— “(1A) The Secretary of State may issue one or more codes of codes of practice in connection with any matters relating to the operation of this Act not required under subsection (1) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”— (Danny Kruger.) This amendment, which works together with Amendment 447, would clarify that the Secretary of State is not required to issue a code of practice under subsection (1)(e) but instead has the discretionary power to issue further codes of practice as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. Amendment made: 417, in clause 30, page 18, line 32, at end insert— “(1A) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue one or more codes of practice in connection with the arrangements for ensuring effective communication in connection with the provision of assistance to persons in accordance with this Act, including the use of interpreters.”— (Jack Abbott.) This amendment is linked to Amendment 416. Amendments made: 216, in clause 30, page 18, line 37, leave out subsection (4). See the statement for Amendment 188. Amendment 217, in clause 30, page 18, line 38, leave out “that procedure” and insert “section 39”.— (Kim Leadbeater.) See the statement for Amendment 188.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will make progress. In reply to a question from me about those who are seeking assistance, Dr Jane Neerkin, a consultant physician in palliative medicine, said: “For them, it is about trying to regain some of that control and autonomy and being able to voice for themselves what they want. That is what I tend to see that people want back at the end of life.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 201, Q263.] Importantly, amendments 183 and 275 would strengthen clause 4 to ensure that we avoid a situation that gives those with the most social capital more choice, while leaving those who might otherwise be unaware of all other options available to them without that choice. If the Bill is passed by Parliament without them, it will exacerbate health inequalities rather than abating them. Together, the amendments expound and elaborate on the need for discussion of all appropriate palliative and other end-of-life options available to someone with a six-month terminal illness. I commend them to the Committee.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Dr Graham, thank you for your written evidence, which was very helpful and stated your view that the strength of the clauses in the Bill make it compatible with the European convention on human rights in relation to article 2 on the right to life and article 14 on freedom from discrimination. Can you explain why you hold that view? What has been the view of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to assisted dying laws in other signatory states? Dr Graham: There are two main challenges to this legislation, and to legislation like it, in relation to the European convention. As you say, one relates to article 2 and one relates to article 14. The article 2 challenge can be dismissed fairly quickly, because we have authority from the European Court saying that “the right to life enshrined under Article 2 could not be interpreted as per se prohibiting the conditional decriminalisation of euthanasia.” As a matter of precedent, that is fairly clear. The trickier argument comes with article 14, which is the anti-discrimination right. There is an argument that goes something like this—I hope that those who hold this view think I am giving it a good airing. By allowing some groups to access assisted suicide, but not other groups—in this Bill, allowing terminally ill adults who meet the criteria in the Bill but not non-terminally ill adults who do not meet those criteria—you are treating two different groups in different ways, and that is discriminatory. There is an argument that, because of that, the courts would find that the Bill is unlawful and needs to be expanded—that groups outside of the terminally ill that meet the criteria of the Bill need to be given access to assisted suicide. I think that argument does not work for a few reasons, chief among which is that in our jurisdiction treating different groups differently is not unlawful. Treating different groups differently without good justification is unlawful. The question of justification, while it is for judges and the courts, is a question on which judges have deferred heavily to Parliament, especially in areas that involve difficult social, ethical or moral issues. If I may be forgiven for reading from a court’s judgment one more time, in the case of SC the Supreme Court said: “The ordinary approach…gives appropriate weight to…the primary decision-maker”— the primary decision maker being Parliament— “a degree of weight which will normally be substantial in…matters raising sensitive moral or ethical issues.” We can all agree that this Bill involves sensitive moral or ethical issues. My point is that when it comes to justification, courts are very deferential to Parliament. Courts think that Parliament should be deciding whether treating two groups in different ways is justified or not. That is why, in my view, there is no real truck to the argument that article 14—the anti-discrimination right—will be operative and cause the Bill to be declared incompatible with the convention in any way. I hope that is an adequate summary of my view.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My next question is to Fazilet Hadi and Baroness Falkner. First, I am passionate about ensuring that the Bill creates the opportunity to hear the voices of disabled people in monitoring the impact of its implementation, should it be passed by Parliament, and the treatment of disabled people in the NHS as a result. What structure or mechanism could work to facilitate that? Secondly, would that be applicable to all protected characteristics under the Equality Act, or do disabled people have a specific status that needs special treatment? Fazilet Hadi: We have a principle in the disabled people’s movement: “Nothing about us without us”. I suppose a simple answer to that question is that whether it is the discussions on this Bill and the voice of disabled people in shaping it, or in monitoring, disabled people must always be at the table. As you all probably know, Disability Rights UK and other disabled people’s organisations oppose the Bill, and I hope I get a chance to say why later. Should the Bill go through, it would be good to see a monitoring mechanism. I cannot say what that should be, but it would be good to see disabled people shape it. Some 45% of older people are disabled people, so disabled people are going to be very affected by the Bill. It is often our experience that we are the last people who are spoken to; maybe that is what is behind the question. We should of course be at the table now in respect of whatever mechanisms, and in the shaping of any implementation, should the Bill be passed. But as I said, we are opposed. Baroness Falkner: Can I touch on clause 26 and the earlier question, as well as article 2 rights? Parliament should appreciate that coercion or pressure is not necessarily something that is applied directly by other individuals. The UN published an open letter in advance of the Canadian legislation that pointed out that people with disabilities, older people, and especially older people with disabilities, may feel subtly pressured to end their lives prematurely due to additional barriers, as well as the lack of appropriate services and support. Article 2 goes to the heart of appropriate services and support, as well as the general right to life. It is important that all practical social conditions, support, care and services are in place so that people with serious or terminal illness can decide how and when to end their life freely and without coercion. On coercionary pressure, we have heard recently about social care provisions. Social care is an integral part of this story, because the data shows that it is older disabled people—disabled across a spectrum including mental health, dementia and so on—who are likely to be in care or to require social services. If we are not going to get the result of those reforms until 2028, we are told, with potentially no legislation in place for another couple of years after that—say, 2030 or 2031—then all of you in Parliament need to think about whether this is putting the cart before the horse. In deciding on these provisions, which are integrally linked to the other aspects of disability and access to care—I hope we will come on to the variable treatment of palliative care later—you need to think about whether this is the right order of things. I will leave it at that and pick up other related points later.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q With respect, my question was about whether you think that, should the Bill go through Parliament, there should be some kind of body, possibly an advisory council, that disabled people in particular should be involved with. Your other point speaks to some evidence that we heard yesterday and earlier about the anchoring, where there is assisted dying in the legal system, of the quality and level of provision of palliative care. I would be grateful if you could speak to the point of my original question, which was about the need for some kind of advisory body that includes disabled people, should the Bill pass. Baroness Falkner: Had there been a Public Bill consultation on the Bill, you would have heard from the different players that need to be consulted. We do not have an opinion on the kind of advisory body, because we would find it difficult to see where it would fit in with the provisions of this particular Bill, but a public consultation in advance of the Bill being written would have been the way to deal with that.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This question is for Professor Tom Shakespeare and Dr Miro Griffiths. One of the amendments I am backing would establish an advisory council on the impact of the Bill on disabled people, because I am passionate that we monitor the impact on that group of people, should the Bill pass through Parliament. What structure or mechanism do you think could work to facilitate that? Dr Griffiths: This plays into a broader issue around the reporting mechanisms associated with the Bill. I think there needs to be further robust action around how to collect data and allow it to be analysed, to see the trends that are occurring in why people are pursuing this option and how that may play into broader political and socioeconomic issues, such as a lack of services elsewhere or frustrations for disabled people and their families in trying to access particular services. This goes back to a point that Tom made. While we may see popular opinion within disabled people’s communities, it is worthy of note that no deaf and disabled people’s organisation—these are organisations that are representative of disabled people who engage critically with the issues facing disabled people’s communities—has been in support of this. I would therefore encourage their representation on any form of advisory council. I would also request that disability studies scholars, who are often left out of the discourse around disability policy, are part of any form of mechanism to advise or scrutinise. Professor Shakespeare: I think the council is a very good idea. It should reflect the range of views, as Miro says. In Oregon, disabled rights advocates have not, as I understand it, opposed the Act that they now have. Of course, it is mixed, but some disability groups are definitely in favour. There is a difference between organisations of disabled people and disabled people on this. Politically, the disability rights community are against assisted dying—they always have been. That does not mean that they reflect what ordinary disabled people want, and that is what is important. I think you should be interested in what people want, and they want this.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I have a question for Sir Max Hill and Alex Ruck Keene. Your insight on clause 12 has been helpful. What procedures would you recommend be adopted for testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence as part of an evidentiary process linked to the panel that you set out? Alex Ruck Keene: This is, for the moment, predicated on the fact that we are still in the High Court, as opposed to slightly making up policy on the fly about a panel. Assuming it is the High Court, it seems to me the Court has to be discharging a properly inquisitorial jurisdiction, which means it has to be armed with the tools to do that, which includes arming it with the tools to call for its own evidence. It also seems to me that the High Court would have to be armed with its own ability to not just receive evidence from one side and have someone testing it. That then brings you to the only player in town who could possibly do that, which would be the Official Solicitor as advocate to the Court. I do not want to emphasise too much the question of resources, because if Parliament thinks this is sufficiently important, the resources will be voted through. But it is vitally important to note that the Official Solicitor is completely overloaded, and we would be asking the Official Solicitor to act as advocate to the Court in every single one of these cases. You could not have it be optional; you cannot say that it is some and not others. If it is going to be inquisitorial, the High Court has to have the ability to say, “This is one-sided; someone needs to tease it out,” so the Official Solicitor would have to be funded to be advocate to the Court and, if necessary, instruct lawyers in every single case. Sir Max Hill: The model that I was espousing would not necessarily involve the Official Solicitor at all. It would make no draw on the administration of the Court or any officer of the Court, still less full-time judges. It would allow the appointment of recently retired judges, as we have in a number of scenarios—surveillance commissioners, for example—and a fresh administration. With that, as with the High Court model at the moment, there is the primary set of provisions, which Parliament must impose, and it is important that that is sufficient for what Alex called an inquisitorial function. Those are in part mandatory—those things that the panel must be satisfied about, which are set out in clause 12(3). Then there are those that are discretionary, which are set out in clause 12(5). What sits between the two is very important. That is currently expressed as “Rules of Court”, but it would be the rules of the panel, or the commission that appoints the panels. In a court scenario, we are all familiar with criminal procedure rules and civil procedure rules; that is the secondary stage that is reached once the primary legislation has been fixed. That, too, would apply to the commission or panel process, but I do not necessarily think that it would involve using existing, paid judicial resources at all.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I want to follow up, because this is really important in strengthening the Bill. Based on your prosecutorial experience, what key elements should be present in the definitions of coercion, pressure and dishonesty? I also have a bit of a technical question, if I may. Do you think they would be better placed in clause 26 or in clause 40, under interpretation? I am asking what more you can say on the key elements of coercion, pressure and dishonesty, and I am asking about their placement in the Bill to make them as accessible as possible to medical practitioners and patients who will want to rely on it. Sir Max Hill: My inclination is that clause 26, which is part of the full body of the Bill, is the right place for this. As with the interpretation clause, clause 40, and as with the way we interpret statute as a matter of course, there are aspects of other statutory offences or Acts of Parliament that help us when we are seeking to determine what coercion is. The creation of the offence of coercion and control, now very commonly used in domestic abuse investigations and prosecutions, has brought us into this territory. It is not beyond the wit of anybody who seeks to use and interpret this Bill to also look for other parts of statute that deal with coercion. I make the same point about capacity. What is in the Bill is very slender, one might say, because clause 3 simply invites the reader to look across to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But that Act is very clear on what mental capacity is and how it is defined. I think what I am saying is that it is a drafting point, and I am not a parliamentary draftsman, but I do not have a problem with the definitions of dishonesty, coercion and pressure being in clause 26, where they are. It is not the only place one would look, though; there are other sources.

• 29 Nov 2024 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Today’s decision has been one of the hardest that I have had to make. In my career in disability law and policy, I chose not to focus on debates about whether disabled people should be born or whether we should die. Instead, I focused on enabling disabled people to live better, more fulfilling lives. Today, I find myself voting in a way that I thought I never would. I will vote in favour of moving the Bill to the next stage of the legislative process. That has been a difficult journey for me. I have arrived here by looking at the evidence, reflecting on my own lived experience and listening to the many, many constituents who have written to me in support of the Bill, sharing their compelling and tragic stories of death—death which did not come with dignity or respect. In reflecting on my own life, one moment from my childhood stood out. When I was six years old, I had major surgery on my hips. I was in body plaster from my chest to my ankles, and in so much pain and requiring so much morphine that my skin began to itch. I remember vividly laying in a hospital bed in Sheffield Children’s hospital and saying to my parents, “I want to die. Please let me die.” I needed to escape from the body I was inhabiting. That moment has come back to me all these years later. That moment made it clear to me that if the Bill was about intolerable suffering, I would not vote for it. I have subsequently had a good life, a fulfilling life, a life where I have worked towards ensuring disabled people are valued by our society. But that moment also gave me a glimpse of how I would want to live my death: just as I have lived my life, empowered by choices available to me; living that death with dignity and respect, and having the comfort of knowing that I might have control over that very difficult time. For so often, control is taken away from disabled people in all sorts of circumstances. In order to ensure that there is compassionate choice at the end of life, it is right that the Bill is tightly drawn around the final stage of terminal illness for adults and includes the strongest safeguards. The choice of assisted dying as one option for adults when facing six months’ terminal illness must be set alongside the choice of receiving the best possible palliative and end of life care, or it is no choice at all. Having analysed the Bill closely, therefore, there are changes I would want to see in Committee to strengthen those options and ensure the way that choice is presented by medical practitioners is always in the round. People deserve dignity in death, and for those who do not choose to end their lives in this way, they and their loved ones should feel reassured and safe in the knowledge they will receive the very best of care. I would also want to ensure that the final stages of the Bill properly define “dishonesty”, “coercion” and “pressure”. I think it is necessary to embed mandatory language in the Bill around the need for a code of practice on palliative care, as well as improving the regulations on training for medical practitioners. I trust my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) to champion those amendments and to continue to diligently listen to Members, as she has throughout this process. However people vote today in this House—a decision of conscience—it is incumbent on all of us to commit to improve palliative, end of life and adult social care. It must be the start of the work that we do in this place to ensure the very highest standards in these areas. That will be a very great legacy indeed: giving people the dignity they need in the moment of death. For many of us across the Chamber, considering these issues has been extremely hard and upsetting. We have had to go to the very depths of our selves to understand what choice we will make today. While we may enter different voting Lobbies, we leave this Chamber shoulder to shoulder. I know we will all work in our own ways to make systemic change to improve the lives of our constituents, and people up and down this country.