Marie Rimmer MP: speeches

4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026

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Our reporting years run from 4 July to 3 July, starting with the 2024 general election. They are not official parliamentary sessions. Office costs keep IPSA’s April–March financial years. Records may cover only part of a year; a missing record does not mean no work was done.

Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.

5 published records · newest first.

Speeches

  • 18 Mar 2026 · Freedom of Religion or Belief in China · Hansard source
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    I beg to move, That this House has considered Government support for freedom of religion or belief in China. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Ms Jardine. I am grateful for the opportunity to lead this important debate on freedom of religion or belief in China. I would like to open with a tragic story. On a hot August day in 2022, in Shanxi, northern China, more than 100 police officers descended on a Christian family summer camp, surrounding the gathering, forcibly searching and detaining dozens of believers—over 30 adults and 40 children. The police were breaking up not a dangerous gathering or insurgency, but a family day out. The camp was organised by an unregistered church called the Linfen Covenant House Church, and was a harmless event aimed at building church community. In the months that followed, pastors Li Jie and Han Xiaodong were arrested and reportedly subjected to harsh interrogation, including sleep deprivation, humiliation and torture. Church member Wang Qiang was later detained and tortured for weeks after refusing to renounce his faith or fabricate testimony against the church leaders. It took three years for the court to process that case, but justice was nowhere to be found. Prosecutors did not accuse the pastors of violence or any threat to society—they could not. Instead, they charged them with fraud, arguing that the voluntary offerings given by members of their unregistered church were somehow illegal. Pastors Li Jie and Han Xiaodong were each sentenced to three years and eight months in prison and fined heavily, while church member Wang Qiang received a sentence of one year and 11 months. The community church insists that the three men had committed no crime, and that they had suffered simply because of their faith. We have all come here today because we believe that freedom of religion or belief is not a secondary liberty; it goes to the heart of human dignity. It concerns the right to hold beliefs, to change beliefs, to have no belief, to worship in public and private, to teach and to live according to conscience without fear of intimidation, criminalisation, imprisonment or torture. That is why Parliament cannot look away, and why the situation in China requires ongoing and determined scrutiny. What is taking place in China is not merely the sporadic mistreatment of a few isolated believers, nor is it the meddling of local officials. What we are seeing is the rolling out of a sophisticated system of repression, in which law, administration, surveillance, propaganda and coercion are all being weaponised to subordinate religion to the Chinese Communist party. The issue before us is not only persecution; it is the construction of an entire architecture designed to make genuine freedom of religion or belief impossible. China’s persecution of religion comes under the broad policy initiative of Sinicisation. That term is made to sound mild, as if it refers only to making religion compatible with Chinese culture, but that is not the case; instead, it is political domestication. It means that every religious tradition must first be made subordinate to the ideology, priorities and authority of the Communist party. The goal is not merely to make religion Chinese, but to ensure that religion is stripped of its independence and made to serve the party’s political project. Sacred texts can be reinterpreted, clergy can be screened and managed, venues can be monitored, publications can be censored, foreign links can be severed, and anything that escapes that framework can be branded illegal, extremist, fraudulent, subversive, or labelled as a cult. Religion must not simply co-exist with the party; it must be remade in the party’s image. Recent Sinicisation policies mean that all clergy must support the leadership of the Communist party, and must be evaluated and ideologically disciplined. All online or in-person religious activity requires a permit from Government. No child can be given religious education. Furthermore, the sad story of the Linfen community church, which I referred to in my opening remarks, demonstrates that in China the law is always secondary to the will of the Chinese Communist party. China’s constitution appears to protect so-called normal religious activities, but in practice that protection is a joke. The same is true of China’s legal system. The party retains overriding authority over state institutions, including the courts and legislature. In other words, rights exist only to the extent that the party permits them to exist. Evidence gathered by Christian Solidarity Worldwide takes us deeper. It shows how the law in China is drafted in deliberately vague terms to condemn believers, vaguely accusing them of “harming national interests”, “disrupting social order”, “resisting infiltration” or “extremism.” Such phrases are not carefully bounded legal concepts; they are instruments of selective enforcement. They create uncertainty by design and allow ordinary religious life to be reclassified as a threat. As we saw with the Linfen community church, the vagueness of the rules means that donation to an unregistered church can be reframed as fraud. Similarly, a Bible study can become an illegal gathering; publishing or sharing religious materials can become an illegal business operation; and a sermon can become incitement to subversion. This is not neutral law enforcement; it is ideological criminalisation. Then, when the full weight of the justice system is brought down upon a believer, the defendant themselves becomes subject to serious procedural abuses. Lawyers are denied access to defendants, cases are shrouded in secrecy, and detainees can be isolated from family and counsel for prolonged periods, placed in legal black holes where torture and coercion become far more likely. The case of the Linfen community church tells us a great deal. It tells us that family church life can be raided; it tells us that children are not shielded from the machinery of repression; it tells us that secret detention and torture remain live concerns; and it tells us that “fraud” is being used not as an honest response to dishonesty, but as a legal fiction to criminalise churches that refuse to submit to state control. The situation in Xinjiang illustrates one of the most severe forms of ethno-religious persecution in China today, and as chair of the all-party group on Uyghurs, this topic is very close to my heart. Since 2016, the Xinjiang region has been transformed into one of the most heavily policed areas in the world, under a so-called counter-extremism campaign, marked by pervasive surveillance, forced interrogation and mass incarceration. It is worth pointing out that not all Uyghurs are Muslim and that non-Muslim Uyghurs are also persecuted.

  • 18 Mar 2026 · Freedom of Religion or Belief in China · Hansard source
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    I do agree, and I will come to that later. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has said more than I was going to say—I thought I was saying too much. Yes, he is absolutely right, and it is dangerous for us all. The situation in Xinjiang illustrates one of the most severe forms of ethnoreligious persecution in China. It is worth pointing out that not all Uyghurs are Muslim, and not all Muslim Uyghurs are persecuted. Independent estimates suggest that between 1 million and 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities have been detained in camps and prisons, with many later transferred into long-term sentences. Alongside that, Uyghur imams, scholars and religious leaders have been systematically targeted, with many detained in prisons for decades or dying in custody, underscoring the deliberate dismantling of religious leadership and community life. Uyghurs have been punished for everyday religious practice, including praying, fasting during Ramadan, teaching the Quran or even using traditional greetings, while mosques and shrines have been demolished and altered, children separated into state-run schools, and homes subjected to constant monitoring. At the same time, ordinary expressions of the Islamic faith have been criminalised, and the wider system of repression has expanded beyond detention into forced labour, cultural destruction and enforced assimilation. Coercive labour transfer programmes have expanded across multiple sectors, with significant global implications for supply chains. The trajectory is now being further entrenched through new legislation, including the 2026 ethnic unity law, which promotes a single national identity, expands ideological control over religion and culture, and introduces broad penalties for behaviour that is deemed to undermine ethnic unity, effectively formalising a system that has already devastated the Uyghurs’ religious and cultural life. Thanks to many hard-working advocates —such as Rahima Mahmut, Benedict Rodgers and Lord Alton, to name a few—the Uyghur tribunal has concluded that a genocide is taking place in China, including through the sterilisation of Uyghur women. That finding was echoed by the UK Parliament, which voted to recognise the atrocities as a genocide in April 2021. Evidence from human rights organisations describes the regulations governing Tibetan Buddhist temples, reincarnation and monastic education, including the prohibition on allowing children of compulsory school age to study scriptures in temples. Ordinary religious expression is recast as a threat to state security. Falun Gong practitioners have also faced extreme persecution, including arrests, torture and deaths in custody, with figures suggesting that more than 2,800 were arrested in 2024 alone. A mounting body of evidence presented in 2019 at the China tribunal chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice KC—the same person who chaired the Uyghur tribunal—pointed to the conclusion that Falun Gong practitioners have been the victims of a state-run programme of forced organ harvesting. It is unbelievable what went on there. It is clear now that religious persecution in China has two aspects: the careful controlling of a narrow, politicised form of religion, and the outright repression of all other expressions of that faith. We see that clearly in the systemic persecution of Chinese Christians. First, we see the careful controlling of a narrow and highly politicised form of Christianity. The so-called Three-Self Patriotic Movement, a state-sponsored form of Chinese Christianity, is presented by the authorities as the legitimate framework for Protestant worship. This is not simply a matter of registration; it is a matter of subordination. In regulating the churches, the state claims the right to decide which churches may legally exist, which pastors may lawfully preach, which cameras are installed above the doors, what theology may be taught and what children may hear. Registration does not guarantee safety; even registered churches have still been raided. That shows that the issue is not merely whether a church is registered, but whether it remains sufficiently obedient to party priorities. Secondly, we see the outright repression of all those who refuse to conform to that limited model. While local government officials might be able to turn a blind eye to small house church gatherings, they can crack down in a flash on congregations that risk growing too large, too noticeable or too direct in their political messaging. Unregistered churches are pressured to join the state system, and refusal can trigger raids, detention and prosecution. Even the smallest acts of worship, such as organising a bible study in a home, can be labelled as illegal gatherings, leading to detention and imprisonment. When preaching is treated as a political crime, and when ordinary worship becomes a criminal offence, freedom of religion or belief is not merely restricted, but effectively denied. What binds all these examples together is not a single denomination or doctrine, but the party’s insistence that no independent moral, spiritual, communal or transnational authority may exist outside its control. Why should the United Kingdom care? First, because freedom of religion or belief is universal. It is not diminished by geography, and it does not become negotiable because the offending state is economically powerful. Secondly, because the United Kingdom has long claimed a role as a defender of human rights and the international rules-based order. That claim rings hollow if, when confronted with a sophisticated system of ideological repression by a major power, we choose caution over candour. Thirdly, because the evidence before us shows that China’s repression is becoming more systematic, more legalised, more normalised and more exportable. A model in which freedom of religion or belief is hollowed out through licensing, digital surveillance, patriotic indoctrination, vague criminal law and selective prosecution is not only a domestic tragedy for China’s believers, but a profound challenge to international human rights norms. Let me conclude with several clear points. The United Kingdom should state plainly that China’s Sinicisation programme is incompatible with genuine freedom of religion or belief. We should call for the release of prisoners of conscience who are detained on account of religion or belief, including Christian leaders, Uyghur and Hui Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners and others. We should condemn the persecution of Uyghurs as what it is—a genocide. We should press for transparency in administrative and criminal detention, an end to secret detention practices, proper access to lawyers and families, and due process consistent with international standards. We should support international efforts to establish a robust, independent UN mechanism capable of investigating China’s serious human rights violations, including against freedom of religion or belief. We should work with international partners on targeted sanctions against those responsible for gross abuse. We should ensure that UK trade engagement does not proceed as though forced labour, religious persecution, cultural erasure and ideological criminalisation are somehow separate from the overall character of the state with which we are dealing. China’s believers are not asking this House to solve every problem in one debate, but they are entitled to expect a democratic legislature to tell the truth.

  • 15 Dec 2025 · Jimmy Lai Conviction · Hansard source
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    The use of foreign lawyers by both prosecution and defence is a long-established tradition in Hong Kong, yet Jimmy Lai has been denied that right, even as judgment has been passed. This is about justice, not rigged justice. This verdict is not only devastating for one British citizen and his family; it represents a brutal attack on free speech and the rule of law in Hong Kong. It confirms that the national security law is being used to silence critics, to destroy independent media, and to dismantle the freedoms that were promised to the people of Hong Kong. According to the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, “Jimmy Lai is guilty only of his unwavering belief in freedom for the people of Hong Kong. Contrary to Beijing’s intentions, the verdict today highlights Jimmy Lai’s courage and integrity and sends a clear message around the world that Hong Kong’s once proud judicial system is severely tarnished and under Beijing’s authoritarian control.” The Foreign Secretary, and many Ministers whom she has quoted today, have raised the case of Mr Lai and spoken to people including our international colleagues, and we must continue to do so, but it is evident that that is no longer sufficient. The Prime Minister must raise the case with the Chinese regime at the highest possible level. Jimmy Lai is a British citizen, and I ask our Prime Minister to consider carefully what action we will now take to protect this citizen and many, many more. After all, the British Government’s first duty is to protect their citizens at home and abroad.

  • 5 Nov 2025 · Financial Transparency: Overseas Territories · Hansard source
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    It is a pleasure to work under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) for securing this important debate, and for his excellent introduction to it. There is one particularly alarming case that we cannot overlook in this debate: that of Roman Abramovich. His activities epitomise how opaque offshore structures undermine UK financial integrity and global trust. In a letter to the Chancellor dated 10 September, the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and I, as co-chairs of the APPG on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West, as chair of the APPG on anti-corruption and responsible tax, warned that Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich may owe HMRC up to £1 billion on profits from his multimillion-pound hedge fund investments. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that these hedge funds, although registered offshore, were being run from the UK. Under UK law, they should have been paying UK taxes. This investigation revealed that Abramovich benefited from a fraudulent scheme designed to evade €14 million in VAT due in Cyprus on his fleet of superyachts. Cypriot tax authorities have since filed criminal charges to recover more than €25 million in tax. As our letter pointed out, HMRC has yet to respond to these findings. Even when journalists offered to brief HMRC’s permanent secretary, their offer went unanswered. That silence has raised serious concerns about the Government’s willingness to act decisively against those who use offshore networks and shield vast sums from scrutiny. The Government’s reply, sent in October, insists that “everyone should pay the tax that is legally due”, and highlighted new enforcement measures, including 5,500 extra compliance staff and the creation of a complex cross tax and offshore team. Those steps are welcome, but they do not answer our central question: why is there still no visible enforcement action in this case? This is not just about one oligarch; it is about ensuring that our own financial system and the jurisdictions linked to it cannot be used to hide wealth, evade tax or escape sanctions. That £1 billion would build the 500 schools so badly needed in our poorest areas.

  • 27 Oct 2025 · Victims and Courts Bill · Hansard source
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    This takes me back to speaking with the family and father of young Violet-Grace, who was killed in 2017, at four years old, by someone who was going 80 mph in a 30 mph zone and then went missing. During the court case some years later, the family wanted to read out their victim statement fully in court. The defendant’s barrister objected, and the judge accepted that objection.

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4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained.

View as listCommunities and local government: 6Communities and local government6Culture, media and sport: 2Culture, media and sport2Defence and foreign affairs: 5Defence and foreign affairs5Democracy and constitution: 5Democracy and constitution5Economy and business: 6Economy and business6Education and skills: 1Education and skills1Environment and energy: 2Environment and energy2Health and care: 5Health and care5Justice and policing: 5Justice and policing5Social security and pensions: 1Social security and pensions1Transport: 1Transport1
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4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained. Published records do not measure effort or effectiveness. Methodology.
Department or topicPublished records
Communities and local government6
Culture, media and sport2
Defence and foreign affairs5
Democracy and constitution5
Economy and business6
Education and skills1
Environment and energy2
Health and care5
Justice and policing5
Social security and pensions1
Transport1

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