Louie French MP: speeches

Speeches

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator. Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed? If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size? Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states: “The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”. However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence. We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert— “ Agents fees 11A (1) An agents fees condition is a condition requiring a club employing an agent to cap their fees. (2) The agents fee cap will be set by Regulations subject to approval by both Houses.” My amendment proposes that clubs regulated by the Government’s new regulator should be required to cap the fees paid to agents, because, as many fans know, an ever-increasing amount of money is leaving the football pyramid to agents. The level of the proposed cap would be set through regulations, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and determined following consultation with clubs and leagues. Let me set out why we believe the measure is necessary—not as an attack on agents or their role in the game, but as a proportionate, reasonable step towards a more sustainable, transparent and responsible football ecosystem. If we are serious about football reform and safeguarding the long-term financial health of clubs up and down the pyramid, we must be prepared to tackle the excesses and distortions that have taken root in the sport. Few are more obvious or pressing than the spiralling sums paid to agents. According to the Football Association, in the year from February 2024 to February 2025, Premier League clubs alone paid more than £409 million in agent fees and intermediaries. That is more than the total broadcast revenue of a number of Championship clubs in 2022-23; or more than double the commercial revenue of several clubs for that season; or almost three times the matchday revenue of a number of Championship clubs in the same season. This is not wages or transfer fees, nor is it investment in the matchday experience for fans—it is money paid out purely for representation costs, often for work done on both sides of a deal. To put that into context, it is more than the entire annual income of many Championship clubs combined, and this is not just a Premier League problem. Although the sums are relatively smaller further down the pyramid, the pressures are arguably even more acute for clubs with less budget. My amendment seeks to introduce a straightforward principle—that there should be a fair and proportionate limit on the fees that clubs can pay to agents, and that the limit should be set by regulations made by the Secretary of State subject to affirmative procedure. This would help to ensure full parliamentary oversight and allow future Governments to adjust the cap based on changing market conditions, evidence from the Government’s regulator and broader economic factors in football. There is already a strong precedent for this kind of intervention. For example, FIFA’s agent regulations now attempt to impose limits on the commissions payable to clubs and players alike, but those rules remain subject to legal challenge and uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. In the absence of effective international enforcement, there is an opportunity for this to be included in the scope of the Government’s regulator as a core part of the financial sustainability of English football.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee. The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first. What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership? Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club. It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable? Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions. There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario? Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine? Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant. Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated. The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made? Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful. Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I discussed that consideration with a number of people in the game before we tabled the amendment. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the French, who already cap agents’ fees at 10%. With this amendment, we are not seeking to say what the level should be—that should be determined by the game in consultation—but we are looking for the game to help to set the cap at a level that does not have the impact that he talks about. But it is a fair challenge. We must remember that the Bill is fundamentally about sustainability. Financial discipline is not just a boardroom concern, but a matter of public trust. Football clubs are more than private enterprises, as we have discussed. They are community institutions. They are the social glue in towns such as Bury, Scunthorpe and Southend, all of which have suffered financial distress in recent years. The idea that hundreds of millions of pounds can leave the game each year in opaque payments to third-party agents while clubs struggle to pay wages, maintain facilities or invest in their academies is becoming increasingly indefensible. Let us be clear: no one is saying that agents do not have a role. Many provide important professional services, such as legal advice, contract negotiation and logistical support, but the current system lacks transparency, consistency and limits. There are countless examples of agents receiving commissions from both buying and selling clubs on the same deal—a structure that would raise red flags in other regulated industries as a clear conflict of interest. Without a cap, there is little to stop the agents’ arms race escalating even further. Clubs are forced to pay inflated fees just to stay competitive in the transfer market. In some cases, they are backed into a corner by players who will not sign unless their representative is paid what they demand. That imbalance needs to be addressed, not with heavy-handed bans, but with clear, enforceable limits that ensure agent fees are grounded in reality and tied to the financial position of the English football pyramid. My amendment would allow for the cap to adapt over time, either up or down, depending on the financial context of the day. This debate also has a clear moral dimension. Football fans—the lifeblood of the game—see money flooding out of the system into offshore accounts while ticket prices rise, lower-league clubs fall into administration, as we have heard, and local facilities are left to deteriorate without needed investment. What message are we sending to those communities if we continue to turn a blind eye to this major issue? The problem is not new. Lord Sugar famously described agents as “ten percenters” during his time as chairman of Tottenham Hotspur. However, in recent years, that 10% has crept up; we now see cases in which agents walk away with fees amounting to 15% or even 20% of a transfer value, and in some instances with fixed payments that are totally unrelated to the value or complexity of the deal. That is not healthy, efficient or sustainable, and it is not a good use of fans’ hard-earned money. This amendment is about putting the interests of clubs, fans and the wider game first. In fact, we believe that clubs in the lower leagues would stand to benefit the most. Although some clubs in the top flight can absorb these costs through commercial revenues or broadcast income, those further down the pyramid often spend a disproportionate amount of their limited budgets on agents. That creates a vicious cycle: less money for youth development, community outreach and infrastructure, and more dependence on short-term deals brokered by intermediaries. By capping agent fees, we would take a meaningful step towards ending that cycle. We could help clubs plan more prudently, negotiate more confidently and operate on a fairer playing field. In doing so, we would strengthen the whole system, from the grassroots to the elite. Let us not forget that the purpose of the Government’s regulator is not to micro-manage football, but to restore public confidence and ensure long-term stability. Agent fees are a glaring blind spot in the current model. If we are willing to regulate ownership tests, financial reporting and fan engagement, surely we must also be willing to act on a financial outflow that directly threatens the viability of many clubs. This is a proportionate, sensible and timely amendment. It allows the Government to tackle one of the most visible and controversial financial issues in football; it helps preserve flexibility; it respects Parliament; and, most importantly, it places the interests of our clubs, fans and communities above those of unregulated market actors. We have an opportunity to help reshape the financial culture of English football for the better. Introducing a cap on agents’ fees is not only a necessary reform, but the right thing to do.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Planning and Infrastructure Bill · Hansard source

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  Residents in Bexley village in my constituency—it is one of London’s outer villages—are particularly concerned about the erosion of their green areas around the village. Does my hon. Friend share my concern and surprise that, when the outer London green belt issue was discussed in the London Assembly last week, Reform backed Mayor Khan in building over the green belt? Reform backed Khan against the interests of Bexley residents.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady makes. I am not aware of the financial example that she gives—genuinely I am not—so it would not be appropriate for me to comment, but the crossover between politics and football is one that we have to acknowledge, regardless of party allegiance. The vast majority of fans, when they go to the football at the weekend or midweek, go to watch football and in many ways to switch off from the harsher realities of life. I am personally a big believer in politics staying out of sport, as I have said on a number of occasions.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hear the argument that hon. Gentleman is making, and he will be able to vote on the amendment shortly. Again, I appreciate your time, Sir Jeremy. It is a shame that the Government would not accept our earlier amendment to ensure that fans know the true impact of the regulator on the price of their tickets. Football is not a normal business. It is a great national institution built on history, local pride and community loyalty. However, that does not mean it should be run by quangos. Clubs should be encouraged to improve their governance, not be coerced into uniformity. They should be supported to succeed, not strangled by red tape. Schedule 4 is one of the most important parts of the Bill, because it defines the gate through which every club must pass before they can be allowed to simply play football. We owe it to those clubs and their fans to ensure that the gateway is firm but fair, principled but practical, and clear, not vague. That is why we will be seeking further assurances from the Minister that the Government’s regulator’s use of these powers will be proportionate, transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Without that, we risk creating a regime that may prevent future failures, but at the cost of stifling ambition, independence and the very lifeblood of our national game.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to try to make some progress.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I completely appreciate the hon. Member’s point. As he highlighted, clubs have done a lot of this good work themselves, so I do not believe that the Government or their regulator need to dictate on terms where clubs have that good practice already. My new clause tries to draw a line so that fans will have a say on any such issues and, in particular, on contentious ones. I do not personally believe that kicking racism out of football is a contentious issue. The vast majority of fans would absolutely support that, and have supported for many years the work that that campaign has done.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 104 would amend schedule 4 to insert “the club’s political statements and positions”, to ensure that clubs have to engage their fans on any political statements that the club might adopt. New clause 16 introduces a duty to consult fans on political statements and is an expansion of what that means in practice. As everyone can see the amendment paper, I will move on to my speech. Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements that a club must meet to be granted a licence by this Government’s regulator. In essence, those are the baseline criteria that every club must pass before the Government allow them to play football. Never before has a Government been involved in deciding who can play football. This is a huge moment for English football, its governance and, most importantly, its fans. On the face of it, few would argue against the principle of minimum standards, but as is so often the case with regulation, the devil lies in the detail. In this case, the sheer breadth and flexibility that the Bill hands to the Government’s regulator raise real and pressing concerns. I start with a central and unarguable point: clubs must be well run. No one disputes that, and thankfully, the vast majority of clubs in the country are. However, we have seen hard-working communities let down by reckless owners and weak governance—from Bury and Derby to the recent struggles at Reading, which the hon. Member for Newbury mentioned. The purpose of this legislation should be to help to protect footballing communities better and to ensure that all clubs are not only sustainable, but rooted, responsible and resilient. However, there is a clear difference between ensuring prudence and exercising control over a club. My concern, and that of many clubs and fans, is that schedule 4 risks crossing that line. Under paragraphs 2 to 7 of schedule 4, the Government’s regulator is empowered to set requirements for financial resources, suitable governance structures, appropriate corporate plans and the ability to comply with all relevant obligations. On the surface that might seem sensible, but the provisions are broad, vaguely defined and, in practice, leave almost every detail to be filled in by a politically led regulator at a later date via licence conditions. Let us take paragraph 4, for example, which sets out: “The fan engagement threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club has adequate and effective means by which— (a) the club consults its fans about the relevant matters, and (b) the club takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions”. However, it does not tell us what constitutes “adequate” or “effective”. Can the Minister tell us what those terms mean, or when we can expect to be told? Who defines those terms? Is this another instance of the regulator being able to set its own definitions, terms of reference and standards? Paragraph 3(2)(c) states that the Government’s regulator must have regard to a club’s “corporate governance arrangements”. I ask the Minister: what does that actually mean? We are not told, and again it is not clear. Does it mean formal board structures, independent non-executive directors and complying with the UK corporate governance code, or something else entirely? Could the Minister please clarify that for the Committee? We fear that this schedule hands a blank cheque to the regulator to determine how football clubs, from Premier League giants to National League sides, must structure their affairs, able to coerce them into restructuring their club to fit a narrow regulatory framework that has not been voted for by the fans of any club. This is a serious transfer of power from clubs and their owners to a Government body, and we must ask: is it proportionate? Is it justified?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, okay.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the clarity provided by the Minister in outlining what she believes the regulator should or should not do. On quotas, can we be absolutely clear that the Government’s intention is not for there to be a mandated quota for clubs to have certain elements and different parts of the community on the board? Is that the clear intention in what the Minister is saying?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am trying to get clarity. Again, I will happily accept it in writing if the Minister does not have the answer today. Waiting until the end of the season before revoking a licence is entirely sensible, but what would that mean for relegation and promotion? For example, if a club is mid-table and the regulator decides its licence should be revoked, that will have a direct impact on the competitive nature of the league. Has any thought been put into whether, for example, that may mean only two teams are relegated that season, because one has lost its licence? How might it work in practice?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that lengthy response. To be blunt, I disagree, and rather than delay the Committee any longer, I will press the amendment to a Division. Question put , That the amendment be made.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In my previous career, I headed up sustainability on ESG, so I understand the hon. Lady’s point. If she will let me continue, I believe my points will answer her question. This country’s football clubs are not arms of the state. They are private institutions, many of which are more than a century old, with proud identities shaped by the local community’s traditions and values. Their job is not to issue corporate platitudes on diversity but to serve their supporters, compete on the pitch and conduct themselves with financial integrity. Mandating EDI reporting risks turning the regulator into a cultural enforcer rather than a steward of good governance. Importantly, however, we must also consider the burden it will place on clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues. Our amendments go to the heart of an argument that has served us time and again during the scrutiny of the Bill: the risk of regulatory overreach and overburden. Clubs in League One and League Two, National League outfits and even some Championship sides already struggle with the administrative requirements expected of them, from audit processes to licensing compliance. Adding more politically motivated reporting requirements, particularly in controversial and contested areas such as EDI, risks deepening the strain without any justification related to the Bill’s primary purpose: football. Some may argue that football has a responsibility to lead on matters of social justice, but cultural change should not be imposed by statutory mandate. Real change, where needed, comes from within; from clubs taking action because it is right for them and their supporters, not because a regulator demands it as part of its governance tick-box exercise. We can see that with Forest Green Rovers, a club that chose, of its own accord, to take a distinctive approach to sustainability, ethics and inclusion not because a regulator told them to, but because it aligned with their leadership values and the identity they wanted to build. Whether or not one agrees with their choices, the point is that they were made voluntarily. That is the right way to foster progress in football—through leadership and initiative, not through regulatory coercion. As we discuss schedule 5 and the role of corporate governance statements in football clubs reporting, it is important to recognise the significant work already underway in the game on EDI—work that is being driven voluntarily and effectively by the FA, Premier League, EFL and National League without an overzealous and politicised regulator interfering. The Premier League has developed its own EDI standard, known as PLEDIS. It provides clubs with a clear, structured framework to improve inclusion both on and off the pitch. It is not a mere tick-box exercise, as we fear the Government regulator will be. It is a rigorous programme of three levels: preliminary, intermediate and advanced. Clubs must earn all of those levels for evidence-based progress and independent assessment.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will make some progress because I am conscious of the Chairman’s time. The new clause would ensure that where a club proposes to adopt a political stance not directly related to football or the club’s commercial interests, it must first engage with its supporters through an appropriate consultation mechanism. This is about strengthening the bond between club and community, not weakening it. New clause 16 would be a simple safeguard to protect the cultural neutrality of our national game, and to ensure that football remains a source of unity, not division. The cumulative effect of the Bill’s provisions, as they stand, is that they give the Government’s regulator enormous latitude to impose an ever-growing set of compliance obligations on clubs with little oversight or scrutiny from Parliament or fans. It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that clubs could find themselves constantly revising governance arrangements, redrafting financial documents and hiring compliance staff simply to keep up with the regulator’s demands—demands that are funded by the clubs. That is a concern for the entire football pyramid, but it is a particular burden for the lower leagues, where administrative budgets are tight and every pound spent on compliance is a pound not spent on the pitch or in the community. Let us be clear: good regulation is about balance. It is about ensuring standards without stifling initiative, protecting clubs without disempowering them and learning from the past without writing off the future. There are a number of ways in which the Government could help to strike that balance. First, we ask the Government to publish a clear definition of what each of the threshold requirements entails. It is not good enough to provide for “appropriate” arrangements. The regulator should be guarded by Parliament’s intent, not left to interpret sweeping language. Secondly, we must ensure transparency and account-ability. If the regulator decides to change the threshold requirements—say, by requiring new climate disclosure standards or mandating support or representation on the board—that is a major policy shift. We believe that, as a sovereign Parliament responsible for passing this legislation, we should be able to scrutinise and, if necessary, prevent the Government’s regulator from making law by regulation. It should come back to the House, not be slipped through in the shadows. Finally, we must keep a watchful eye on the cost burden. As we argued in previous debates, the Government’s regulator will not be cost-free. It is expected to fund itself through levies and fees imposed on clubs, so every layer of compliance—every extra form, every extra process —has a price tag. That price will ultimately be paid by the very fans we are trying to protect.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 106, in clause 19, page 13, line 19, at end insert— “(c) inviting the club to make representations about the proposed revocation, and (d) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, such representations must be made, which must be a period of not less than one month beginning with the day on which the notice under subsection (3) is given.” This amendment allows clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence . Clause 19 concerns the revocation and cessation of an operating licence granted to football clubs. That is understandably a crucial provision that goes to the heart of how the Government’s new regulator will exercise its most serious power, the ability effectively to remove a club from the regulated football pyramid by taking away its licence to operate. Let me clear from the outset that we support an independent regulator that can intervene when standards are seriously breached but, as with all powers of this kind, the devil is in the detail. Our task in this Committee must be to ensure that the regulator’s powers are proportionate, transparent and accountable. Clause 19 provides that the regulator may revoke a licence if the club in in breach of licence conditions or if there are grounds to believe that the licence should never have been granted. In principle, that is entirely reasonable, but the consequences of revocation, for clubs, fans and communities, are potentially devastating. This is not the revocation of a licence to sell alcohol or to host events late into the night; it is the revocation of a licence to participate in the life of a community—in many cases, the cultural soul of a town or city. That power should not be exercised lightly, so I must raise several matters with the Minister. First, what thresholds and safeguards are in place to ensure that revocation is used only as a last resort? Will the Government’s regulator be required to consider less draconian alternatives—such as conditional compliance periods, fines or a change in ownership—before resorting to the total revocation of a licence? Secondly, what procedural protections exist for clubs facing this threat? As it stands, there is no right of appeal, which is why I tabled amendment 106, which would allow clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence. These are serious matters. The Government’s regulator is empowered to act in the interests of the game and to uphold high standards of governance, transparency and financial responsibility. But with such powers must come robust safeguards, and that is where the clause as drafted falls short. As it stands, there is no explicit requirement for the regulator to notify a club of its intention to revoke the licence, or to invite the club to make representations, before such action is taken. In effect, the regulator could move straight to revocation, without a formal process that allows the club to defend itself, explain its actions or offer remedial steps. That is not due process, it is not natural justice, and in any other regulated sector such an approach would be wholly unacceptable.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I have made clear, we believe that some of these issues are important, but we believe that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis, which is what has driven progress in the game. We do not believe that it should be mandated in statute at arm’s length by the Government. I have been clear in making that distinction in my comments. Requiring clubs to report annually on their EDI action is not a proportionate or effective way to achieve those broader aims. It amounts to moral licensing, encouraging clubs to go through the motions rather than to take meaningful steps to foster a welcoming culture in ways that make sense for them. My amendments would restore clarity to the regulator’s remit. They would ensure that schedule 5 is focused on what really matters: clear lines of accountability, proper oversight of directors and owners, and a robust governance structure that protects clubs from the kind of catastrophic mismanagement that we have seen in the past. Football has always been about community; it is in the dressing rooms, on the terraces and in the shared heritage of our towns and cities that the game’s values are lived. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that they can be legislated for by line item in a regulator’s reporting requirements. It is for that reason that I tabled these amendments. I urge the Minister to reflect seriously on whether this part of schedule 5 is truly consistent with the aims of the Bill and the traditions of our national game, which is inclusive by default.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 104, in schedule 4, page 99, line 31, at end insert— “(f) the club’s political statements and positions.” This amendment ensures that clubs have to engage their fans on the political statements a club might adopt.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you for your guidance, Sir Jeremy. You will be pleased to know that I am coming on to why my example is relevant to the amendment. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dartford for raising the example of Dartford football club—a rival of one of my other local clubs, Welling United, which also do great work in the community. In the light of your words, Sir Jeremy, I will move on to the amendment. Clubs do such amazing work around the country, and the amendment would ensure that that is recognised properly in the Bill. I hope the Minister agrees that work that such community trusts are delivering around the country, particularly in youth engagement, public health and crime prevention, should form part of a club’s social responsibility and how it is reported. Why does that matter in the context of the Bill? Because we are legislating for a new governance framework for football, and the Government have decided that this Bill must reflect football clubs’ wider social responsibilities and recognise the real value of institutions such as the trusts, which deliver on the responsibilities in practice. As the Bill is drafted, there is a risk that such work will be seen as separate from clubs’ corporate governance responsibility, and there is a risk that a club will have to wind up its charitable organisation—God forbid—and bring it fully in-house to meet the requirements of the Bill. Allowing a club’s charities or community trusts to count towards that will allow the good work to continue growing while trusts benefit from their charitable status. The Bill is a slight own goal, but I believe the drafting can be corrected. We believe it represents a missed opportunity for communities across the country, and our amendment would correct that by making it clear that clubs can include the work of their associated community trusts as part of how they meet their governance targets. That does not mean giving clubs an easy ride or allowing them to paper over poor performance elsewhere, but it does mean taking a more holistic, grounded approach to what good governance looks like in the real world. When we are considering how best to shape football regulation, I believe the example set out by the Charlton trust should give us something to aim for across the country and across the football pyramid. It shows what football at its best can do when it is rooted firmly in its community and takes its social obligations seriously. Charlton Athletic may not be in the Premier League at the moment—give them another season—but through the community trust, they are leading the way in community impact. I understand that it is up for another national award this year. That is why I believe the amendment is not only proportionate and practical, but in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. If we are serious about building a more sustainable and responsible football pyramid, we must also be serious about recognising clubs that take their community obligations very seriously, not through a statement of intent but through long-standing, properly resourced partnerships. In Bexley, it does not matter whether you are an Addick yourself; you can come along to a Premier League Kicks session and be part of something bigger. The same is true of neighbouring Millwall, who do lots of great work in the Lewisham borough. We want this to be more than a box-ticking exercise. There is a real risk that clubs will scale back some of that work if it is brought under the scope of the Government’s regulator. I am sure the Minister would agree that that would be an unintended consequence. Does she agree that allowing clubs to include their trusts’ work in their corporate governance statements would incentivise long-term investment in high-quality community programmes, rather than short-term or superficial schemes? We hope that any new regulatory framework, including the establishment of the Government’s regulator, will recognise and protect the kind of local partnership work that I have described today. Will the Minister therefore tell us whether she believes that when it assesses a club’s performance, the regulator will be equipped to distinguish between high-impact, properly evaluated community work, such as I have described, and less substantive activity? Will she issue guidance that the regulator must have regard to outreach delivered through a club’s trust when assessing corporate governance? The Chair adjourned the Committee without question put (Standing Order No. 88 .)

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. The Minister argues that this does not need to be addressed through the regulator, but will guidance be published for those fan groups who are keen to ensure the long-term future of their grounds? What guidance will be published to ensure that any fans in this situation have clear advice from the Government on the best routes to protect their ground?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are not suggesting a referendum. We are saying that fans should be involved in the decision-making process. There is a debate around Pride and other issues, but that is not the point we are trying to make. We are trying to make sure that football clubs, wherever possible, stick to the game and that fans have a say. I have already said that we are not trying to bind clubs and prevent them from addressing initiatives that are often taken by the leagues rather than just individual clubs, but we are trying to ensure that fans have a say.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hear your words and I appreciate them, Sir Jeremy. I was just going to finish by saying that we would like to see some clarity around that. I am sure that we can pick that up again in the later debate.