Louie French MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I have woken everyone up there. Clause 37 is an important safeguard, but without amendment 110, it lacks a clear and necessary line in the sand. Parliament has already determined that proscribed organisations represent a threat to public safety and national order. That same logic must apply here. I urge the Government to accept this modest but essential amendment and, in doing so, to help to ensure that our clubs are not just well run and financially sustainable, but led by people whose values are consistent with the country, communities and traditions that they are entrusted to serve.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 38 is one of the most consequential provisions in the entire Bill. It gives the Government’s football regulator the power to disqualify an individual not only from being an owner or an officer of a specific club, but from holding such a position in any regulated club going forward. That is an extraordinarily wide-ranging power, which amounts to a professional ban from participation in the administration or ownership of an English football club. That power must be exercised with the utmost care on the basis of clear evidence, robust procedural safeguards and fair opportunities for representation. Under subsection (1), the regulator may issue a disqualification order if it is determined that a person is not suitable to be an owner of a particular regulated club. Subsection (2) extends that same power to issue a disqualification order against officers. The clause in effect makes the Government’s regulator the gatekeeper of who may or may not participate in the leadership of English football. While the Opposition accept the rationale, particularly in the light of past controversies and failures of governance, we must be careful about vesting that level of authority in a politically appointed body. Three concerns arise. First, there is the question of proportionality. Not every failure of suitability in one club ought to trigger an automatic blanket ban from the entire football pyramid. A disqualification order is not a light matter in itself; it carries reputational consequences that may extend far beyond football. Will the Minister confirm what thresholds of seriousness must be met before a disqualification order is considered appropriate? How will the regulator ensure that such orders are not used disproportionately, particularly in cases where suitability determinations may be contested or borderline? Secondly, there is the question of due process. The clause appears to allow the regulator to act not only in determinations it makes directly, but on decisions it is deemed to have made by operation of law. That introduces a grey area where someone might find themselves disqualified without ever having had a clear and fair hearing. There must be a full right to representation, explanation and appeal before such a decision takes effect. Will there be an express duty on the regulator to provide reasons in writing to allow for full and fair challenge after a decision has been made? Will the affected individual have the right to appeal to a genuinely independent body—one that is outside the Government’s regulator’s own structure? Thirdly, there is a concern about consistency and transparency. The risk is of regulatory opacity. If a disqualification order is issued without published reasoning, or if standards vary from case to case, we will quickly see a collapse of confidence in the regulator’s impartiality. Will the Minister consider introducing a requirement for an annual report to Parliament listing the disqualification orders that have been issued in the preceding year, and for a publicly accessible register of disqualified individuals, with anonymised or redacted reasoning where appropriate, for transparency? Crucially, will the Minister confirm that this power cannot be used retroactively—that is, to punish individuals for matters known and previously tolerated under prior regimes, should there be a change of chairman, deputy chairman, chief executive or board members? English football needs good owners—as a Charlton fan, I can say that with a great deal of confidence and with sympathy for other clubs that have been in similar situations. It needs competent, honest and engaged officers, and there must be consequences when individuals fall short of the standards we all expect, but clause 38 must not become a tool of regulatory vengeance, nor of political interference. The power must be used sparingly, lawfully and accountably.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am intrigued by the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Similar sympathies apply to the situation at Reading, which is also still the case at Charlton’s Sparrows Lane training ground, which is owned not by the current owners but by two owners ago, as is the stadium. How would the hon. Gentleman’s amendments work with regards to the Everton example, where Goodison is now to be used for the women’s game? How would his amendments cover those kinds of properties? An owner might want to sell the women’s ground, even though the women’s game is technically outside the scope of the regulator.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will repeat my arguments, but I listened carefully to the Minister’s response and we remain concerned about various aspects of the clause. That is why we tabled not just one, but three amendments, to try to put some safeguards and guardrails around future powers of the IFR, as I said. Fundamentally, we believe that the ultimate responsibility for managing clubs should be that of the clubs themselves, while engaging with the fans, and we fear that without some of our amendments, the IFR will be too involved with the day-to-day running of clubs. That is why we tabled the amendments. We listened carefully to the Minister, but I am afraid that we are not fully satisfied, so we will press them to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport. Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced. The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that “Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”. That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that “new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality” also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified. The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime. Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified “as soon as reasonably practicable” after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong. Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion. Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means? What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today. Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners? Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers? Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important. There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that “the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).” In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required? Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible. I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 22, page 14, line 35, leave out subsection (a). This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to internal controls.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded. In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion. Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency. That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation. The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors. To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive. We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures. I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription. The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending. We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending. Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns. Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition. Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses. Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity. Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament. We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention. The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club. Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do. Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator. Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed? If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size? Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states: “The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”. However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence. We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert— “ Agents fees 11A (1) An agents fees condition is a condition requiring a club employing an agent to cap their fees. (2) The agents fee cap will be set by Regulations subject to approval by both Houses.” My amendment proposes that clubs regulated by the Government’s new regulator should be required to cap the fees paid to agents, because, as many fans know, an ever-increasing amount of money is leaving the football pyramid to agents. The level of the proposed cap would be set through regulations, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and determined following consultation with clubs and leagues. Let me set out why we believe the measure is necessary—not as an attack on agents or their role in the game, but as a proportionate, reasonable step towards a more sustainable, transparent and responsible football ecosystem. If we are serious about football reform and safeguarding the long-term financial health of clubs up and down the pyramid, we must be prepared to tackle the excesses and distortions that have taken root in the sport. Few are more obvious or pressing than the spiralling sums paid to agents. According to the Football Association, in the year from February 2024 to February 2025, Premier League clubs alone paid more than £409 million in agent fees and intermediaries. That is more than the total broadcast revenue of a number of Championship clubs in 2022-23; or more than double the commercial revenue of several clubs for that season; or almost three times the matchday revenue of a number of Championship clubs in the same season. This is not wages or transfer fees, nor is it investment in the matchday experience for fans—it is money paid out purely for representation costs, often for work done on both sides of a deal. To put that into context, it is more than the entire annual income of many Championship clubs combined, and this is not just a Premier League problem. Although the sums are relatively smaller further down the pyramid, the pressures are arguably even more acute for clubs with less budget. My amendment seeks to introduce a straightforward principle—that there should be a fair and proportionate limit on the fees that clubs can pay to agents, and that the limit should be set by regulations made by the Secretary of State subject to affirmative procedure. This would help to ensure full parliamentary oversight and allow future Governments to adjust the cap based on changing market conditions, evidence from the Government’s regulator and broader economic factors in football. There is already a strong precedent for this kind of intervention. For example, FIFA’s agent regulations now attempt to impose limits on the commissions payable to clubs and players alike, but those rules remain subject to legal challenge and uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. In the absence of effective international enforcement, there is an opportunity for this to be included in the scope of the Government’s regulator as a core part of the financial sustainability of English football.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee. The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first. What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership? Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club. It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable? Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions. There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario? Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine? Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant. Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated. The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made? Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful. Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I discussed that consideration with a number of people in the game before we tabled the amendment. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the French, who already cap agents’ fees at 10%. With this amendment, we are not seeking to say what the level should be—that should be determined by the game in consultation—but we are looking for the game to help to set the cap at a level that does not have the impact that he talks about. But it is a fair challenge. We must remember that the Bill is fundamentally about sustainability. Financial discipline is not just a boardroom concern, but a matter of public trust. Football clubs are more than private enterprises, as we have discussed. They are community institutions. They are the social glue in towns such as Bury, Scunthorpe and Southend, all of which have suffered financial distress in recent years. The idea that hundreds of millions of pounds can leave the game each year in opaque payments to third-party agents while clubs struggle to pay wages, maintain facilities or invest in their academies is becoming increasingly indefensible. Let us be clear: no one is saying that agents do not have a role. Many provide important professional services, such as legal advice, contract negotiation and logistical support, but the current system lacks transparency, consistency and limits. There are countless examples of agents receiving commissions from both buying and selling clubs on the same deal—a structure that would raise red flags in other regulated industries as a clear conflict of interest. Without a cap, there is little to stop the agents’ arms race escalating even further. Clubs are forced to pay inflated fees just to stay competitive in the transfer market. In some cases, they are backed into a corner by players who will not sign unless their representative is paid what they demand. That imbalance needs to be addressed, not with heavy-handed bans, but with clear, enforceable limits that ensure agent fees are grounded in reality and tied to the financial position of the English football pyramid. My amendment would allow for the cap to adapt over time, either up or down, depending on the financial context of the day. This debate also has a clear moral dimension. Football fans—the lifeblood of the game—see money flooding out of the system into offshore accounts while ticket prices rise, lower-league clubs fall into administration, as we have heard, and local facilities are left to deteriorate without needed investment. What message are we sending to those communities if we continue to turn a blind eye to this major issue? The problem is not new. Lord Sugar famously described agents as “ten percenters” during his time as chairman of Tottenham Hotspur. However, in recent years, that 10% has crept up; we now see cases in which agents walk away with fees amounting to 15% or even 20% of a transfer value, and in some instances with fixed payments that are totally unrelated to the value or complexity of the deal. That is not healthy, efficient or sustainable, and it is not a good use of fans’ hard-earned money. This amendment is about putting the interests of clubs, fans and the wider game first. In fact, we believe that clubs in the lower leagues would stand to benefit the most. Although some clubs in the top flight can absorb these costs through commercial revenues or broadcast income, those further down the pyramid often spend a disproportionate amount of their limited budgets on agents. That creates a vicious cycle: less money for youth development, community outreach and infrastructure, and more dependence on short-term deals brokered by intermediaries. By capping agent fees, we would take a meaningful step towards ending that cycle. We could help clubs plan more prudently, negotiate more confidently and operate on a fairer playing field. In doing so, we would strengthen the whole system, from the grassroots to the elite. Let us not forget that the purpose of the Government’s regulator is not to micro-manage football, but to restore public confidence and ensure long-term stability. Agent fees are a glaring blind spot in the current model. If we are willing to regulate ownership tests, financial reporting and fan engagement, surely we must also be willing to act on a financial outflow that directly threatens the viability of many clubs. This is a proportionate, sensible and timely amendment. It allows the Government to tackle one of the most visible and controversial financial issues in football; it helps preserve flexibility; it respects Parliament; and, most importantly, it places the interests of our clubs, fans and communities above those of unregulated market actors. We have an opportunity to help reshape the financial culture of English football for the better. Introducing a cap on agents’ fees is not only a necessary reform, but the right thing to do.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Planning and Infrastructure Bill · Hansard source

  More

  Residents in Bexley village in my constituency—it is one of London’s outer villages—are particularly concerned about the erosion of their green areas around the village. Does my hon. Friend share my concern and surprise that, when the outer London green belt issue was discussed in the London Assembly last week, Reform backed Mayor Khan in building over the green belt? Reform backed Khan against the interests of Bexley residents.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady makes. I am not aware of the financial example that she gives—genuinely I am not—so it would not be appropriate for me to comment, but the crossover between politics and football is one that we have to acknowledge, regardless of party allegiance. The vast majority of fans, when they go to the football at the weekend or midweek, go to watch football and in many ways to switch off from the harsher realities of life. I am personally a big believer in politics staying out of sport, as I have said on a number of occasions.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I hear the argument that hon. Gentleman is making, and he will be able to vote on the amendment shortly. Again, I appreciate your time, Sir Jeremy. It is a shame that the Government would not accept our earlier amendment to ensure that fans know the true impact of the regulator on the price of their tickets. Football is not a normal business. It is a great national institution built on history, local pride and community loyalty. However, that does not mean it should be run by quangos. Clubs should be encouraged to improve their governance, not be coerced into uniformity. They should be supported to succeed, not strangled by red tape. Schedule 4 is one of the most important parts of the Bill, because it defines the gate through which every club must pass before they can be allowed to simply play football. We owe it to those clubs and their fans to ensure that the gateway is firm but fair, principled but practical, and clear, not vague. That is why we will be seeking further assurances from the Minister that the Government’s regulator’s use of these powers will be proportionate, transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Without that, we risk creating a regime that may prevent future failures, but at the cost of stifling ambition, independence and the very lifeblood of our national game.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am going to try to make some progress.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I completely appreciate the hon. Member’s point. As he highlighted, clubs have done a lot of this good work themselves, so I do not believe that the Government or their regulator need to dictate on terms where clubs have that good practice already. My new clause tries to draw a line so that fans will have a say on any such issues and, in particular, on contentious ones. I do not personally believe that kicking racism out of football is a contentious issue. The vast majority of fans would absolutely support that, and have supported for many years the work that that campaign has done.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Amendment 104 would amend schedule 4 to insert “the club’s political statements and positions”, to ensure that clubs have to engage their fans on any political statements that the club might adopt. New clause 16 introduces a duty to consult fans on political statements and is an expansion of what that means in practice. As everyone can see the amendment paper, I will move on to my speech. Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements that a club must meet to be granted a licence by this Government’s regulator. In essence, those are the baseline criteria that every club must pass before the Government allow them to play football. Never before has a Government been involved in deciding who can play football. This is a huge moment for English football, its governance and, most importantly, its fans. On the face of it, few would argue against the principle of minimum standards, but as is so often the case with regulation, the devil lies in the detail. In this case, the sheer breadth and flexibility that the Bill hands to the Government’s regulator raise real and pressing concerns. I start with a central and unarguable point: clubs must be well run. No one disputes that, and thankfully, the vast majority of clubs in the country are. However, we have seen hard-working communities let down by reckless owners and weak governance—from Bury and Derby to the recent struggles at Reading, which the hon. Member for Newbury mentioned. The purpose of this legislation should be to help to protect footballing communities better and to ensure that all clubs are not only sustainable, but rooted, responsible and resilient. However, there is a clear difference between ensuring prudence and exercising control over a club. My concern, and that of many clubs and fans, is that schedule 4 risks crossing that line. Under paragraphs 2 to 7 of schedule 4, the Government’s regulator is empowered to set requirements for financial resources, suitable governance structures, appropriate corporate plans and the ability to comply with all relevant obligations. On the surface that might seem sensible, but the provisions are broad, vaguely defined and, in practice, leave almost every detail to be filled in by a politically led regulator at a later date via licence conditions. Let us take paragraph 4, for example, which sets out: “The fan engagement threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club has adequate and effective means by which— (a) the club consults its fans about the relevant matters, and (b) the club takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions”. However, it does not tell us what constitutes “adequate” or “effective”. Can the Minister tell us what those terms mean, or when we can expect to be told? Who defines those terms? Is this another instance of the regulator being able to set its own definitions, terms of reference and standards? Paragraph 3(2)(c) states that the Government’s regulator must have regard to a club’s “corporate governance arrangements”. I ask the Minister: what does that actually mean? We are not told, and again it is not clear. Does it mean formal board structures, independent non-executive directors and complying with the UK corporate governance code, or something else entirely? Could the Minister please clarify that for the Committee? We fear that this schedule hands a blank cheque to the regulator to determine how football clubs, from Premier League giants to National League sides, must structure their affairs, able to coerce them into restructuring their club to fit a narrow regulatory framework that has not been voted for by the fans of any club. This is a serious transfer of power from clubs and their owners to a Government body, and we must ask: is it proportionate? Is it justified?