Louie French MP: speeches

Speeches

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, I am happy to and will come on to that point. Amendment 111 would require the majority of fans to approve any such changes to a club’s official name, its badge or its home shirt colours, not just to support them. “Support” can be vaguely defined. It can be skewed by a few loud voices or specific interest groups, rather than being a genuine exercise in democracy. While consultation is important, it is ultimately no substitute for consent. Football clubs are, by their very nature, multi-generational institutions. Most are older than the companies or corporate vehicles that now own them and some are even older than the Labour party that now seeks to impose this regulator. They existed before many of their current directors were born and will, we hope, outlast all of us. The badge on the shirt is not simply a badge: it is a symbol of place, of pride, of glory and heartbreak, of a historic past and a hopeful future. The name of a club is not simply branding: it is geography, history and memory all in one. And the home shirt, whether it is red, claret, blue or black and white, is more than a colour scheme—I apologise if I missed any; orange for Wolves, maybe, but I am sure hon. Members get the point. It is part of the club’s identity, part of the community’s fabric. When clubs change these things, particularly when they do so without the blessing of their supporters, they do more than upset tradition. They erode trust and sever the cultural connection that keeps that team and the English game alive. Let us not forget that when Cardiff City’s owner unilaterally changed their home shirt from blue to red, the backlash was enormous, because it was not Cardiff’s colour. Cardiff’s owners, much like the electorate, came to regret switching from blue to red pretty darn quickly. Will the Minister confirm whether clause 49 would prevent what happened at Cardiff or whether such a change could still be pushed through after a period of consultation, however superficial? The clause imposes a duty on clubs to consult fans before making changes to heritage elements. That is better than nothing, but is quite a low bar. We have all seen what consultation can look like in practice—a web form, a vague email or a one-off survey. Then the changes proceed regardless of overwhelming opposition, with clubs claiming that consultation has been completed. I think most hon. Members would agree that that is not meaningful engagement and it certainly does not reflect the degree of ownership that supporters rightly feel over the identity of their home club. That is why we support the amendment to move the requirement from consultation to majority fan approval—that is, in other words, a vote, or a similarly binding expression of fan will, overseen through whatever supporter representation structure the club has in place. Will the Minister set out what the Bill actually means when it states, “the club has taken reasonable steps to establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start-up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start-up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 56, page 46, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert— “(2) In this Part, revenue received by a specified competition organiser is ‘relevant revenue’ if— (a) it is revenue received as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, and (b) it is not revenue that the specified competition organiser distributes to a club by virtue of a team operated by the club being relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser.” Clause 56 introduces the framework for the resolution process, which is a formal mechanism through which the Government’s new regulator may intervene to help to resolve disputes between football authorities, competitions and clubs in certain prescribed areas. The clause is important because it sets the boundaries of when and how the Government’s new regulator may be invited, or, in some cases, compelled to step into the room on issues that until now have been managed internally within the football pyramid. We understand the intention behind this process. It reflects years of unresolved tensions in the game between different tiers of the pyramid, between governing bodies, and, most notably, between the Premier League and the EFL. Clause 56 and the following clauses in part 6 provide the bones of a system for dispute resolution, in the hope of reaching consensus where negotiation has failed. In principle, that has merit. However, we believe that the clause as drafted risks crossing a line—not into oversight, but into interventionism. It risks turning the regulator from a referee into a participant, and that risk becomes very real when we consider what types of decisions might fall within that process. That is why I have tabled amendment 124, which would exclude parachute payments to the regulated clubs from the scope of the resolution process, as was the case in the Bill that the Minister supported during the previous Parliament. Clause 56 is not procedural, but foundational. It defines who can apply to trigger the resolution process, namely certain governing bodies and competition organisers, and what is meant by the term “relevant revenue”. In subsection (2), this is revenue received “as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, or…from any other source specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.” In essence, the provisions allow disputes over financial redistribution to be brought before the Government’s new regulator, which may then facilitate a resolution or, in some cases, take further steps to impose one. The specific issue we have with the clause, which was introduced by the Government, relates to the parachute payments of financial support offered by the Premier League to clubs that are relegated to the EFL to help them adjust to the significant drop in broadcasting and commercial income. This is obviously an important point, given the wage bills and so on when clubs go down, but it is never far from being controversial. Some see the payments as being necessary to ensure financial continuity and competition in the Premier League on the way up, while others argue that they distort competition in the Championship on the way down, solidifying clubs as so-called yo-yo clubs that go up and down regularly. Bringing parachute payments within the scope of the regulator’s resolution process, as clause 56 does, takes a significant step towards Government involvement in revenue redistribution among private members of the competition. That is not regulation; it is reallocation. In our view, it is an inappropriate function for a state-backed regulator. The amendment does not oppose the resolution process in principle; it supports it, and in fact returns the Bill to what the Minister previously supported. Can she tell us what has changed, and why she felt the need to make the change when she previously had no issue with this part of the Bill? My amendment seeks to make sure that the Government’s regulator does not intervene in areas that are already managed by mutual agreement between competitions. Parachute payments are, by their nature, a Premier League solution to what is often a Premier League problem. They are not imposed on the EFL or funded by it, and although their knock-on effects may be debated—I have my own views on that—they should not be subject to arbitration by a third party. If we allow the Government’s regulator to adjudicate disputes over parachute payments, we risk setting a precedent that any form of commercial agreement, no matter how internal, can be referred for outside resolution. We believe that that would be a mistake, and would likely undermine the willingness of top-flight clubs to continue sharing revenue in any form at all. If the Minister starts this process off on the wrong foot with clubs and this is not done in the right way, we fear that resentment would set in from day one. With the top flight already questioning—

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  You’ve lost the room!

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 49 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to safeguard key aspects of what the Bill defines as club heritage. This specifically relates to changes in a club’s name, its badge and its home shirt colours—things that may seem cosmetic to the outsider, but which football fans know are part of the heart and soul of a club. Whether it is the famous black and white of Newcastle United or the immense history of Deepdale in Preston, these things mean more than just the colour of the top or where people watch football. They are integral parts of footballing communities. They symbolise membership of something bigger than oneself. The club colours, the club badge and the home ground are all ways in which fans identify themselves as being part of a footballing family. They must be protected. This clause is an important recognition in statute that football clubs are not just commercial entities, but cultural institutions, symbols of community identity and civic pride. As such, changes to these heritage elements should not be made casually or without due regard to those whose lifelong support gives clubs their very meaning, often across generations. We welcome the inclusion of clause 49, which we believe is essential, but we do not believe it goes far enough. That is why we tabled amendment 111.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I hope that everyone is appropriately refreshed after the lunch break. I will not seek to go to VAR to rehash any of the debates we had before lunch, but we have great sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We also believe that fans should have a strong say if clubs seek to move ground, as we have debated. The obvious questions, which we will come to in the next set of debates, are about what fan consultation and approval would look like. I know that that will be part of our heritage discussion in a moment, so I will not proceed on that now. In thinking about some of the hon. Gentleman’s examples—Wimbledon being the most obvious one—I recall that as a teenager, or a bit younger, I would watch Wimbledon play at Crystal Palace, at Selhurst Park. They were the Crazy Gang in south London at that point, and they would often play there. So I understand his point, especially about the move to Milton Keynes and the controversy that that caused. As he highlighted, thankfully, we have not had too many examples that are similar to the American franchise system, where, in the National Football League, the Raiders have moved a number of times over the years, to different cities, depending on the financial attraction of each state. Beyond the Man United and Everton examples, which we have discussed, there are other clubs who have moved. The one I first think of, which is closest to where I am from, is the Arsenal move a number of years ago from Woolwich Arsenal in south-east London to Islington. It is an interesting point, because a lot of the fans in south-east London are still strong supporters of Arsenal because of their generational links. For example, my brother-in-law’s grandfather was an Arsenal fan, so he is an Arsenal fan. The London example is probably not the best one, because it is simple to argue that fans can get across London fairly easily. It would be more dramatic if a club were being moved to the other end of the country, which is the point he is making—he is nodding in agreement. I will be interested to know how the Minister and the Government view the amendments and how this issue might impact the regulator’s operations. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not put the hon. Member for Sheffield South East at risk with his own side by talking too fondly about the comments he just made—I will not make it sound like we are trying to do a double act—but we have heard a lot of concern in our debates on the clause, and the amendments tabled to it, about how it will work. The hon. Member mentioned that some club owners—one would hope only a minority of them—would seek to expose loopholes in the Bill. That is why we tabled amendment 111, which would introduce a safeguard by requiring a clear vote and the approval of the majority of fans. There are a number of risks for the Government with this Bill, but one of the biggest is this: if it does not protect the things it is designed to protect—in this case, the heritage of a football club and a say for fans—what is its purpose at all? If one of the examples we have discussed plays out in future, that question will be asked of the Government. In our future debates on the Bill, perhaps they can provide more clarity about their thinking, and perhaps they will incorporate some of the arguments we have made today.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not sure how to answer that. How Members decide to use their time is a decision for them, but the hon. Gentleman has made the point well. Without wishing to put off Government Members, the argument behind my amendment is deeply Conservative in some ways; it is about tradition, continuity and community. It is about respecting the past while also securing the future. It is about recognising that football is strongest when it listens to the people who love it most. The clause is a step forward, and we think its inclusion in the Bill is important. Without our amendment, however, we are concerned that the clause will lack the legal bite required to safeguard the symbols that matter most to supporters. In truth, clubs that respect their fans would already seek that approval; the amendment would simply ensure that those who do not are held to the same standard. To be clear, no one should be able to change the name of Barnsley FC, the badge of Wigan Athletic or the home colours of Aston Villa without the backing of the very people who built the stands and carry the soul of the club every single week across multiple seasons. I urge the Minister and colleagues across the Committee to back the amendment. Football’s future must be modern and well run, yes, but it must also be anchored in tradition, and the tradition belongs to the fans.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert— “(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams. (6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).” This amendment requires the IFR to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury. The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self-sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start-up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self-funding through the industry levy. The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet. Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques. If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self-funding. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator. The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability. By requiring the regulator to repay its start-up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long-term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self-sustaining basis. That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self-funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income? I would be grateful, as would taxpayers across the country, for reassurances from the Minister that those issues are being addressed, and that the taxpayer will not be left to subsidise the industry without a clear exit plan. My amendment would protect the principle of independence. It would safeguard the public purse and ensure that those who arguably benefit from oversight are the ones who pay for it. Football is told that it will get a strong, credible and financially sound regulator, but taxpayers deserve clarity, discipline and fairness in how that regulator is funded. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment and make the regulator accountable to the industry it oversees, not dependent on the Government that created it. Let us build something that is self-sustaining, responsible, and fit for the future.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is my pleasure to speak to amendment 133. Clause 53 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to pay a statutory levy to the Government’s new regulator—a mechanism intended to fund its operations and ensure its independence from Government and industry influence. The principle is not unreasonable. If clubs are to be regulated, one could argue that it is fair that they should contribute to the costs of said regulation. However, we have two initial concerns. First, as the initial costs incurred are to be borne by the taxpayer, that does not ensure independence from Government—quite the opposite; it creates a reliance on the Government for funding and therefore for direction and sponsorship of activities. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the regulator will cost taxpayers around £106 million until the levy provided for by the clause is up and running. To put that in context, that money could fund the Lionesses futures fund, which the Government have scrapped, more than three times over. In what should be a fantastic and inspirational year for women’s sport, the Government are choosing to spend money on regulating men’s football instead of investing in the growth of the women’s game. I make that comparison with quite a lot of regret because I believe that it is the wrong decision by the Government, but I will stick to the Bill. Secondly, many clubs have not asked to be regulated, and they might ask why they should pay for a regulator that seeks to stifle their operations or interfere with their performance and make them uncompetitive in the competitive world of sport. I have asked the question the Minister in previous sittings what would happen if a club chose not to apply for a licence. I am a bit unclear how that would look. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the yearly cost to all regulated clubs in the English football pyramid will be up to around £142 million, with up to £1.2 million in one-off familiarisation costs, ongoing compliance costs of up to £35.8 million every year following the first year, and operational costs, which will be incurred every year. As I mentioned earlier, the operational costs will be funded initially by the taxpayer, before an industry levy is introduced. That is an extraordinary amount of money to be leaving the game, especially as the Minister has recognised that money leaving the game in agents’ fees, for example, is detrimental to the sustainability of English football. The costs that the Government are imposing on clubs through the regulator clearly threaten the sustainability of some clubs, as a stand-alone issue. Moreover, as the Minister’s own impact assessment states, the costs are not expected to fall equally on each club; proportionately, they will be greater, and felt more greatly, further down the pyramid. The impact assessment also states that factors such as “existing levels of compliance impact the level of activity required” by the regulator. We all know that that means more work and higher costs for lower-level clubs over the wealthiest. They will have more catching up to do than the big clubs in most instances, leaving them to bear the brunt of the Government’s regulator. It is vital that, as Opposition Members have said throughout this Committee, the regulator is not captured either financially or politically by any one interest group. However, that will now prove difficult with the appointment that the Government have made. Although we support the broad purpose of clause 53, we must interrogate its fairness, proportionality and impact on smaller clubs. That is why I tabled amendment 133, which would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees from the statutory levy. Regulators do not run on good will alone, and this one certainly will be no different. They need staff systems and legal support, but costs must be borne fairly and in a way that does not threaten the institutions that the Bill seeks to protect. Clause 53 allows the regulator to determine how much is paid, by whom and how often, subject to regulations approved by the Secretary of State. It is a wide power and an open-ended one. As it is drafted, the Bill does not place any cap on the amount or impose any statutory criteria on proportionality. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to introduce guidance or a statutory cap on the total amount that might be levied by the regulator, either per club or across the sector? Given that the proposed appointee to the role of chair donated to the Secretary of State, can the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State will not make any decision on how much money can be levied in the future? As it stands, the clause effectively allows the Secretary of State to write a blank cheque to a regulator run by a person who donated directly to her leadership campaign. That alone creates the perception of a conflict of interest, for which the current Secretary of State, as we all know, is under independent investigation. Although some Premier League clubs might be able to absorb the costs, the same cannot be said for smaller, lower-league or community-based clubs such as Barnsley, Bromley or Wigan. My amendment would create a simple, fair exemption. Any club with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees would not be required to pay the levy. That is not just an administrative fix; it is a recognition of football’s diversity and, in true footballing spirit, would champion the underdogs by allowing them to focus on their squads or stadium improvements that would benefit fans. A club with eight employees is not in the same universe, financially or structurally, as a Premier League club with a commercial team, global brand and multimillion-pound payroll.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, and that is the point that we were discussing earlier with the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We were seeking clarification from the Government on how that would affect the consultation of fans on the relocation of stadiums or a change in their ownership. I agree that it is crucial that fans have a say in the naming and history of their ground.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To add to the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, if a club—the Minister gave the example of Hull—decided that it wanted to go ahead and change its name to “Hull Tigers”, but the regulator felt that the fans had not been consulted thoroughly enough, could the regulator deduct points from a club?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I know that certain players have sought to do that through advertising and other financial arrangements. We are talking about clubs at the lowest level, and we do not believe that is a particular risk of this amendment. One of the key failings of the football system in recent years has been the concentration of financial risk at the lower levels of the pyramid. Clubs overextend themselves chasing promotion, owners gamble recklessly to stay afloat, and supporters ultimately bear the costs when that does not work and when clubs collapse. The last thing we believe we should be doing is introducing a new statutory cost that could tip the balance for smaller clubs already running on the thinnest margins. This amendment is not about letting anyone off the hook; it is about recognising scale, and recognising the difference of scale in the football pyramid. Will the Minister please commit to publishing a full impact assessment of the levy’s distribution before regulations are laid? Without that, how can Parliament be sure that the burden will not fall disproportionately on those least able to bear it? One of the justifications for the levy is to secure the regulator’s operational independence, which is a principle that we support, but independence should never mean insulation from scrutiny. If clubs are paying the regulator’s bill, they should at least know where the money is going and have confidence that it is not being wasted. The Minister has maintained that football regulation cannot be one size fits all, and we understand that is her reason for leaving the wording of the Bill quite open-ended in places. Clause 53 is sound in many ways, but in practice it risks imposing an undue burden on the very clubs that the Bill is supposed to help—those rooted in their communities, run on small budgets and kept alive, more often than not, by volunteers, not venture capitalists. In that spirit, I will be pressing this amendment to a vote.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To be completely up front, I do not have that answer in front of me, but I will find out—the team has drafted this amendment. Without this amendment, clubs in both the Premier League and League Two could find themselves subject to the same regulatory levy. This risks creating a two-tier burden, where the most vulnerable clubs are saddled with costs that they cannot pay for a regulator that many of them do not want. Why have the Government chosen not to introduce an automatic exemption for the very smallest clubs, and has an exemption based on staffing levels or turnover been considered? We already accept differential treatment in other areas of public policy—for example, small businesses are treated differently from large corporations, and community amateur sports clubs benefit from separate tax and regulatory frameworks. We believe that the same logic could apply here.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, I will.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sure that the Minister will have heard that contribution from my hon. Friend and will be able to pick up on that in her comments. He is right to identify that such a distinction has been made in the Bill. What does this mean? For example, will an hour-long Twitter poll on what a club should do be sufficient? We have seen how clubs have sought to use X in some quite funny ways at times, but on something as serious as this, we need proper consultation. Instead, does the Minister expect that clubs will engage in a full, proper and open consultation with their fans, such as one that includes a call for evidence, votes on different proposals and genuine engagement from the clubs themselves? Otherwise, this all risks just being for show, rather than real consultation. Why stop at just consultation? If a proposed change is sensible, justifiable and supported by a club’s reasoning, why would the club not be able to win over the majority of its fans, if the fans agree it is in the best interests of the club? Why are the Government, in this Bill’s drafting, afraid of allowing fans to have a real and final say on these matters? This is not about allowing fans to micro-manage a club; it is about recognising that the symbols, colours and names of clubs are all held in trust, not owned in a transactional sense. Football club owners are, in truth, temporary stewards. Their role is not to reshape the soul of a club but to protect it and hopefully strengthen it before passing it on. Far too often we have seen the reverse: owners who arrive with branding ideas and marketing consultants, determined to reshape the club’s visual identity to fit a certain commercial strategy, often with little or no understanding of the local footballing tradition in that community. Supporters have had to campaign, protest and plead to get what should have been theirs almost by birthright: a say in the symbols of their club. Does the Minister agree that clause 49, if limited to just consultation, risks becoming just a tick-box exercise, particularly in clubs without strong fan representation models in place? There is a precedent for this kind of requirement. In Germany, the so-called 50+1 rule ensures that fans retain majority voting rights over key aspects of club identity and operation. In Spain, the socios model does so too. To be clear, we are not calling for full fan ownership, but we are saying that, on issues of identity, the final word should ultimately rest with the fans. Let us remember that this amendment would apply only to three specific heritage areas: the club’s official name, the badge—or crest, depending on how we want to describe it—and the home shirt colours. This is not about banning innovation or marketing altogether. It is simply saying that, when it comes to fundamentals, supporters should have a say.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not rehash the Minister’s description of the clause, but it raises a number of questions about the interpretation of the clause and the requirements on clubs. What guidance will be provided to clubs to determine what constitutes a “relevant” change in circumstances, because that is very open to interpretation? What might such a change look like? We are not trying to micromanage, but we think clubs might find it helpful to understand, even if it is via a list of frequently asked questions from the regulator, what constitutes a change of circumstances so that they do not accidently fall foul of well-intentioned drafting. Could the duty to notify a change in circumstances be accidentally disproportionate to lower league clubs? We have discussed at length that those clubs generally do not have the same administrative resources as the big clubs. Will the regulator look to have a more flexible approach to clubs lower down the pyramid that may not have the ability to notify as quickly as those at the top?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am still unclear on that point, but I am happy to have the answer in writing. Who will pick up the bill when the levy cannot be charged to clubs, and what will that bill look like? I am not at all clear about how that will play out in practice. I am not sure whether I am misunderstanding the Minister, and I am happy to have it in writing, but I am not clear what it means.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert— “(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.” This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a few questions. How will the regulator assess whether a club has sufficiently fulfilled its duty to keep fans informed? Could the requirement to disclose information during insolvency proceedings create additional reputational or financial risks for clubs? How will the clause be applied consistently while respecting confidential obligations to creditors? We have spoken a lot about insider information. If the Minister does not have the answers today, it would be helpful to get them in writing in order to understand how some of these complex legal matters might work.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause sets out the consultation process that the Government’s new regulator must follow before introducing or amending the rules governing the industry levy that clubs will pay to fund the regulator’s operations, as we discussed on clause 53. The clause is designed to ensure that any such changes are not made in a vacuum and that the regulator consults the right people, provides a draft of the rules and gathers feedback before finalising anything. On the face of it, this is a welcome safeguard, but, as is so often the case with this Bill, the detail deserves much closer scrutiny. Let us be clear: the industry levy is not a trivial matter. It is the mechanism by which clubs will fund the regulator, and the amount of levy and the method by which it is calculated or collected could have serious financial consequences, especially for clubs operating on tight margins, as we have discussed. We are talking about a compulsory statutory payment, not a voluntary contribution or a negotiated fee. Any change to the rules governing the levy must therefore be subject to robust scrutiny, proper stakeholder input and full transparency. The clause requires the regulator to consult a named list of stakeholders as well as any others it considers appropriate. It also requires a draft version of the proposed levy rules to be published as part of the consultation. So far, so good. But—this is a significant but—the clause also includes a major loophole. The clause states that the Government’s regulator does not need to consult at all if it considers the proposed changes to the levy rules to be “minor”. Crucially, the regulator itself is to determine whether such a change is minor. Why is the regulator being permitted to define what counts as minor without any external check, threshold or approval? That creates a dangerous conflict of interest where the Minister’s regulator becomes the judge and jury in its own process. What is minor to the Government’s regulator may be highly significant to lower league clubs, such as a League Two or National League club trying to manage a tight budget. Once again, the Bill has a significant risk of regulatory mission creep. We must consider the cumulative effect of so-called minor changes: one small rule adjustment may seem harmless, but several such changes made without consultation could over time significantly alter the levy framework, placing new burdens on clubs without ever facing proper scrutiny. That is how regulatory creep begins, and that is precisely what the clause should be guarding against, but, as drafted, it does not. Would the Minister consider amending the clause to define “minor” changes more clearly, perhaps by setting out objective criteria or requiring approval from the Secretary of State, Parliament or an independent panel? Alternatively, would she consider a threshold mechanism where changes with a financial impact above a certain level must trigger consultation regardless of her own regulator’s view? I suspect that the answer to those questions will be no, which is why I tabled amendment 102, which would remove the regulator’s power to skip consultation when it determines a change to be minor. The intent behind the exemption may be practical and be—to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy—but in reality it gives the Government’s regulator unilateral power to decide whether stakeholders should be consulted on changes that could have material financial consequences. Crucially, the definition of “minor” is left entirely to the regulator’s own judgment, as I have said. There is no objective test, no threshold and no review. Will the Minister explain why the Government believe it is acceptable for a statutory regulator to decide, on its own authority, when it is allowed to bypass the requirement to consult clubs and stakeholders that will be legislated for by Parliament? In every other walk of regulated life, such exemptions would be expected to come with clear limits or external oversight, yet in this instance we are effectively giving the Government’s regulator the ability to mark its own homework. Let us not forget that the levy is not an optional contribution but a statutory obligation. Clubs will have no choice but to pay whatever is set, which means that even small changes could have big consequences, particularly for those lower down the pyramid. What may seem minor to the regulator may not seem so minor to a National League club balancing its books. Does the Minister recognise that cumulative so-called minor changes could, over time, significantly increase the regulatory burden on clubs without ever triggering a formal consultation? That is the risk of leaving this loophole in the Bill. It is not just about what the Government’s regulator might do today; it is also about what a future regulator—possibly a more activist regulator, although I hope not—might decide in years to come. We need to close the door now before that risk becomes reality. If clubs are to have confidence in the new regulatory regime, they must feel that major financial decisions will not be made without their involvement. Even the perception that the Government’s regulator could tweak the levy regime unilaterally using the exemption for minor changes could erode trust, particularly among the smaller clubs that are already concerned. Consultation must not be seen as optional; it must be the default, not the exception. That leads me to amendment 103, which aims to improve the clarity of the Government’s regulator’s approach to any levy that it seeks to impose. The specific issue that it seeks to correct is that, under the Bill as drafted, the regulator must publish details of the levy as soon as is reasonably practicable before the start of a chargeable period. My amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to publish the levy rules at least six months before the beginning of the chargeable period to which they apply. It is about financial certainty, about clubs being able to plan and about not changing the rules on the eve of a new season. We know that many clubs, especially further down the pyramid, operate on tight annual budgets. They finalise player contracts, ticketing strategies and community programmes months in advance. A late change to the levy rate or calculation method could throw all that into confusion. The amendment would help to give English football clubs the clarity that they need to prepare. It would ensure that levy changes are not imposed at short notice and it would enforce a principle that reasonable regulators should provide advance notice of costs. What safeguards, if any, will the Government establish to ensure that levy changes are communicated to the affected clubs in good time? If the answer is that it will be left to guidance or good practice, that will simply be not good enough. Good intentions are no substitute for legislative certainty. Both amendments are modest, reasonable and—we believe—entirely consistent with the Government’s stated ambition to build a trusted and transparent regulator that works with clubs, not over them. We must get the process right. Clubs must know when a charge is coming and how much it will cost them and their fans, and they must be given a chance to respond. That is what the amendments would provide—nothing more and nothing less. Removing the minor change loophole would ensure that no future regulator could bypass scrutiny at its own convenience, and the requirement to provide six months’ notice would guarantee that clubs are not left scrambling to deal with cost changes with no time to prepare. This is about good governance, fair process and fiscal discipline. Clause 54 provides the procedural backbone for how the Government’s regulator will engage with the industry when amending leverage rules.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation of these amendments, which have been introduced at a fairly late stage. I hope she can provide some clarity on a number of questions. First, was it always the Government’s intention to have these separate streams of funding, as she has described, or is this a way of expanding the IFR’s powers to charge the levy? I am unclear about why the change has happened now, because we have obviously been through a lot of consultation and the Bill has been in the other place for some time. It is not necessarily clear why these changes have come about at this stage, so I would appreciate an answer. Lastly, when the Minister described the charges as non-leviable, the natural question was, “Who picks up the bill?” Are we talking about taxpayers, and if we are, what are those costs? Exposure to risk would obviously be a major concern for taxpayers and, I suspect, a number of Government Departments following the spending review. I appreciate her comments about how the Government believe that the functions may not be used or required, but there needs to be an answer about the risk of those non-leviable payments and what that might look like in the future.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co-ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged. I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated. In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule-making processes of English football competitions. This is not a light-touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non-interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states: “Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.” Article 9 goes on to state: “A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory”. It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference. Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule-making processes of the football pyramid. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow. We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97. “UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”. Those are not my words. Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library? If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy? This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.