Lewis Atkinson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 20 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  It strikes me that the judgment before us today is this: would permitting some terminally ill adults to choose an assisted death reduce suffering without inadvertently creating undue risks to others? I am clear, having worked in the NHS for 19 years, that the Bill absolutely can do that. I know the lengths that the NHS and our hospice movement go to when providing care at the end of life—the beloved pet coming in for the last cuddle, or the compassionate conversation in the middle of the night that calms fears. Some have suggested that our health service could not safely introduce assisted dying for patients who are already in regular contact with the health service because, by definition, they are terminally ill. I know not just the professionalism of NHS staff; I have also seen the thoroughness with which other medico-legal routes—for example, Mental Health Act tribunals, which in many ways are analogous to the provisions of the Bill—are implemented. The NHS has shown over decades that it can safely implement social and legislative changes passed by this Parliament. The Abortion Act 1967 was implemented safely by the NHS, as was the regulation and provision of in vitro fertilisation under the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990. The Bill has rightly been amended to allow up to four years for commencement to allow all the necessary preparations to take place. The chief medical officer reminded us that the NHS deals with life and death decisions every day. While the processes in the Bill are new, crucially they build on a solid foundation of existing practice. Currently, under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as others have said, a person with a terminal illness receiving critical care can say, “Doctor, I want to die. Turn off this machine.” We use a simple test under the Act to permit that. Under this Bill, there are rightly further safeguards, but the decision when someone says, “Doctor, I want to die; give me something to drink” is essentially the same. This is absolutely not about the state killing people—these people are dying at the moment. The CMO also gave us evidence, and he stressed that the secondary legislation powers are necessary to permit ongoing safe regulation. Those powers not only require the Secretary of State to ensure that codes of practice and regulation are in place; they also give him the opportunity to react post implementation should there be any concerning cases. It is right that we are thorough in our roles as legislators. I have seen at first hand my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) sitting with officials from the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice to ensure the workability and safety of these provisions. That is not the case for the status quo, with people dying lonely deaths of suicide or going to Dignitas. For those people, there are no checks on capacity or coercion; there is only trauma. I therefore commend the Bill to the House.

• 27 Mar 2025 · Prevention of Drug Deaths · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under you, Dr Murrison. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for securing this debate. As colleagues have said, 5,448 drug-related deaths in England and Wales is truly a public health crisis, and we need a response that meets the urgency of that crisis. When the last Labour Government came into power, we were approaching 2,000 drug-related deaths a year, and that was considered serious enough at the time to implement a new national drug strategy, with funding, and to set up a national treatment agency to provide evidence-based treatment. That was at almost 2,000 deaths a year. The effect of that intervention was that drug-related deaths, which had been inexorably rising for a decade or more, levelled out and stopped rising. Thousands of lives were saved and improved. I know a little bit about that, because it was the privilege of my NHS career to manage NHS drug treatment services in the north-east of England for three years when that strategy and system were in place. A harm-reduction approach was key to treatment, as other colleagues have said. Drug deaths are horrific, and so are the wider harms, including the impact on crime. The amount of acquisitive crime in this country that is driven by addiction is really significant. The Government are focused rightly on tackling crime as well as wider health themes. This is an intervention that meets a lot of the Government’s missions. The harms around children are also significant. Many children are taken into care as a result of parental drug use. A prevention approach would reduce costs for the state by ensuring appropriate drug treatment. Treatment, particularly for opiate use, must focus on substitution therapies. It was disappointing that in the last decade ideology against opiate-substitution treatment trumped the evidence base for it. There are people who could still be alive today if it were not for that ideology. The scale of the treatment gap is significant. In Sunderland, in my constituency, adult mortality from drug causes is about twice the average in England, but around 60% of opiate and crack users are not in treatment today. That must change, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on that. Under the last Labour Government, the policy and health landscape was rather different. As well as the policy urgency, there were clear national levers to pull, with a primary one being the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse. Since then, we have moved to a more diffuse system that is not at the centre of Government but commissioned by each council individually through the public health grant. The provider landscape has fragmented. Whereas NHS treatment services used to be the norm, now there is a significant pattern of commissioning—in some cases there is competitive tendering every few years. That has not helped to tackle this issue with the urgency it needs. I look forward to hearing from the Minister. I do not think legislation is required to improve treatment. This issue requires clear political will and focus, and I hope we will hear a lot more of that from the Government today and in the coming months.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Gentleman says that he is clear that those actions are assisting suicide and that he thinks that they are illegal. Is it right that members of the public, in the instance to which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley referred, be investigated by the police on their return from trips to Switzerland?

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I am not going to pursue that exact line of argument. The point of discussion, and the point of the vote, is whether we think this proposal, which, to me, is robust—the panel “must hear” from doctors and “must…hear” from the patient unless there are exceptional circumstances, and three professionals are involved—is stronger than the previous draft that involved the High Court and had no such requirements. Even if the hon. Lady does not think the new clause is perfect, does she think it is a stronger set of safeguards—surely it is—and will she support it?

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Gentleman says that the way to proceed would have been to strengthen, through amendment, the existing High Court safeguard. I may have missed them, but I cannot see amendments in his name that do that, so will he explain what strengthening of the High Court safeguard he would prefer?

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for that point, but when someone cannot describe any version of safeguards that would be possible, and in the light of some of the other conversations we have had, one is led to believe, entirely respectfully, that some people are opposed to the Bill in principle in any instance. The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley made on Second Reading that this was the safest model in the world was not just about the fact that there was a judge, but about the fact that there was a third tier. That is not something that is in place in Oregon, or even in Australia, as we heard in evidence. Now, not only are we going to have a third tier of scrutiny, but we are going to have three professionals who must unanimously accept that the strict conditions for eligibility have been reached. I absolutely refute the suggestion that amending away from a High Court model and towards a panel model means that we have to recant any suggestion that this is the strongest model in the world.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I am afraid he is confused. It goes to the Court of Protection when the individual is not capable of making that decision and there is a dispute about what the best-interests decision may be for that individual. That is entirely different from the dying person saying, “Please turn off my ventilator.” In that case, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 applies, as we have discussed at length in the Committee, but there are no further checks for coercion, capacity or motivation in the way that has been described. With the three panel members, we will now have at least five professionals, who must all be satisfied that there is no coercion. How many individuals should there be? I see speculation, including on social media, about the number of people who might seek an assisted death and who may be subject to coercion. How many people who refuse treatment at the moment, without any of those checks, are subject to coercion? How many people who go to Switzerland, or who end their own lives, are subject to those checks? We do not know because we have no robust oversight of those instances. While I have absolute sympathy with the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who made a very thoughtful and personal speech, as he always does, the exact same instances that he described would be permissible right here and now. The hon. Member for Reigate shared some upsetting stories, I think from Canada, about the impact on family in speaking to the amendments on that subject. First, I point out that Canada’s system is nothing akin to the one that we are proposing, because it does not have the third-tier protections that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley proposes in the Bill. However, it is also important that we bring the debate back to talking about dying people here in the UK, and that we have some of their voices and experiences, and their families, in the room. We know that already, 650 terminally ill people end their own lives each year in the UK. Anil Douglas’s dad, Ian, took his life the day before his 60th birthday. He was in the terminal stages of multiple sclerosis, and he ended his own life without notifying his family, because he felt he had to protect them, due to the state of the current law. He managed to obtain opioids from the dark web and subsequently overdosed. In his final note, he wrote: “I would like to have to put on record that had we had more sympathetic assisted-dying laws in this country, in all probability I would still be alive today.” I will give one more example. On returning home from a trip to London, Peter Wilson discovered his wife, Beverly, dead in their home. She had terminal oesophageal cancer and had taken her own life, alone at their home in Nottinghamshire, when she knew that Peter would be 120 miles away. Even though Peter could prove that he was not present at the time of death, he was questioned by police for seven hours, and he was fingerprinted and photographed within hours of her death. That is the current situation that families—those we have discussed maximising care for—are facing in the UK. That is why we need a change in the law that includes robust, third-tier oversight.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I was not going to speak to this clause, but I feel I must rebut some of the points made, which are clearly incorrect. The hon. Member for Reigate asks how many further opinions there will be; the answer is clearly one, because that is what is set out in the Bill. The safeguards in amendment 459 mean that it is not just the second doctor who will be aware of the first doctor’s concerns; any subsequent decision maker will be. We are about to discuss significant amendments in clause 12. However, whether there is a panel or the decision remains with a High Court judge, it is inconceivable that, when presented with an initial assessment that the criteria are not met and a subsequent assessment that disagrees with it, that third-tier decision maker will not want to explore the issues in detail. I believe that all Committee members are trying to work together in a spirit of genuinely improving the legislation, but our arguments and discussions need to reflect the amendments that we have accepted. Clause 10, as amended, is significantly improved and strengthened. It continues to provide significant safeguards for the Bill, and I am happy to support it. Amendment 205 agreed to. Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Prison Capacity · Hansard source

  More

  16. What steps her Department is taking to increase prison capacity.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Prison Capacity · Hansard source

  More

  The prison capacity crisis that this Government inherited has resulted in persistent offenders not feeling the deterrent effect of a custody option being realistically available. Can the Minister tell us how this Government’s prison building plans will restore a level of deterrence to the system and ensure that capacity is available in time to remove active offenders from the streets?

• 5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I take the hon. Lady’s point, and I was about to come to that. The Mental Capacity Act already explicitly states that “a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.” The language around an impairment in respect of the mind or brain is already set out in that Act. As has been acknowledged, the Court of Protection has repeatedly found that people lack capacity, and such people would therefore not be eligible under the Bill in some of the circumstances the hon. Lady set out. By introducing a new, undefined concept of “impaired judgment”, which as I understand it is not a term that exists anywhere else on the statute book, we would be clouding the Mental Capacity Act.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  No, I will make some progress. I feel that the amendment risks pressuring people to accept courses of intervention against their will, and I do not think it is consistent with the important principles of autonomy and consent. Because of the safeguards, approvals and reflection periods built into the Bill, going through the process of approval will clearly take in excess of a month. That is why amendment 282, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, which would limit the eligibility to one month, is fundamentally not compatible with the safeguards in the Bill, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley made clear. To me, six months is absolutely the right balance. It reflects people’s wish to put their affairs in order and allows for prognostic uncertainty on the downside—someone given six months may actually only have two or three months to live—but it still allows the operation of robust safeguards and reflection periods. I turn briefly to the other amendments. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe for the points she made. I share the concern that replacing “inevitably” with “typically” would risk weakening the definition of “terminal illness” and expanding access to other conditions. I fear that “typically progressive” is a weaker interpretation, so I cannot support the change, because I support a tightly drawn Bill with tightly drawn eligibility criteria. For the same reason, although I have sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, I think it goes beyond the scope of what the House discussed in November and the contours of the current debate. Amendments 9 and 10 refer to disease being controlled or substantially slowed. Those are not recognised medico-legal terms. What is the definition of “substantially slowed”? Who would define it? Is it something that takes 20%, 50% or 100% longer? We talk about the risk of inserting undefined terms and of court interpretation, and I fear that introducing such an amendment would give rise to that. The people best placed to make decisions about whether the treatment will suitably slow the progression of the disease are the dying people themselves. They are the only people who should do that—fully informed, of course, by their medical and clinical teams. Each of us, when the end is nigh—it will come to me, as it will to us all—has to make that decision ourselves, not on the basis of a recommendation mandated in law or some definition of “controlled” or “substantially slowed”. It feels that the legislature would be putting in primary legislation decisions that I should make about the treatment that I should accept, so I am not in favour of those amendments. I finish with reference to amendment 402. Although earlier I wanted to make progress, I do not want to rule out any further interventions, if my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West or others would like to come in. I recognise the concern, and we need to talk about people with anorexia with the respect, dignity and seriousness they deserve. I have heard it said—I think my hon. Friend said it—that there is nothing in the Bill to stop that being the case, and I fundamentally disagree for many reasons. First, as the Bill sets out, capacity is checked eight times. The Court of Protection has repeatedly found that people with anorexia do not have the capacity to make decisions about stopping eating. Although a best interest test may have been made, that is not relevant, as set out in the Bill. People have to have the capacity to request an assisted death, checked eight times. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has already set out that she is minded to accept—or will accept—amendment 6 to clause 9(3)(b), so that, if there is any doubt about capacity, a psychiatric opinion “must” be sought. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, I considered the written evidence saying that, in instances of a patient with anorexia, psychiatric input is absolutely necessary. Absolutely—in every case where someone has anorexia, under an amended clause 9, psychiatric opinion must be sought as to capacity. That is before we get to the further set of amendments to clause 12.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Professor Hoyano, the Bill would establish offences relating to coercion, pressure and so on. In the processes set out, there are a number of checkpoints, for want of a better term, at which a person seeking assisted dying may talk to doctors or others. What are your observations on how the criminal construct of offences is linked to the different opportunities for an individual seeking assisted dying to have conversations? In your view, is it likely to lead to the identification of those offences? How does that contrast with some of the considerations at the moment, where people are withdrawing treatment in a life or death situation, for example? Professor Hoyano: It is interesting that a number of Members of Parliament who are practising physicians pointed out in the debate that they have to evaluate freedom of decision making and absence of coercion in many different medical contexts. I point particularly to the withdrawal of medical treatment at the request of the patient, even if that will inevitably lead to death. It is considered to be a fundamental human right that lies at the heart of medical law that a patient has personal autonomy to decide what to do with their body and whether or not to accept medical treatment, provided that they have the capacity to do so and are acting without coercion from external sources. Doctors have to make those assessments all the time. I suggest that it is perhaps a convenient fallacy to say that pulling the plug on a respirator or stopping artificial nutrition and hydration is a negative act, whereas giving a patient a syringe to end their own life is a positive act. I realise that with the Tony Bland case it was convenient to say that, but there is no doubt that most people on the street would say that pulling the plug on a respirator is a positive act, and yet doctors and nurses are required to do that every day in the NHS, because that is the patient’s autonomy. If there is any question about either coercion or capacity, the Court of Protection steps in and has the jurisdiction to make those decisions. The Court of Protection should, I believe, be the court that is supervising this, not the High Court. Three levels of judges sit in the Court of Protection; I suggest that a High Court judge be specified, which would mean a statutory amendment to extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection. The Court of Protection makes decisions every day on whether a patient has the mental capacity to make decisions about their own medical treatment. It is accustomed to doing that, and one aspect of that analysis is whether the patient is being coerced externally. Generally speaking, when a patient says, “I don’t want to be on a respirator any longer; I know I’m going to die,” we do not ask questions. As I understand it, it is not part of the protocol to say, “Are you doing this because you are worried about being a burden on the NHS?”, because their personal autonomy is the overriding principle governing medical decision making in relation to the patient. I hope that that answers your question.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Professor Owen, can I probe a little more something that you raised before—the interaction of potential impairment, potential family dynamics and so on in a way that is not malign, but that you think is a consideration? We have heard some evidence in the course of this week about whether there would be any benefit from a more multidisciplinary approach that could make a more rounded, psychosocial assessment of someone’s situation. That would be less about the clear test of whether there is capacity under the Mental Capacity Act and more about the wider considerations of those interactions. I just wonder whether the inclusion of, say, social workers or mental health professionals as part of a multidisciplinary approach would give you any reassurance on those points that you made. Professor Owen: Good question. On the point about that interaction issue, it is not just me picking it up; it is the courts and the Court of Protection particularly. If you are interested, it is footnote (11) in the written submission from the Complex Life and Death Decisions group. The point that you make is well taken from my point of view. You have two doctors, essentially, doing the assessment. Some doctors can be very good at assessing social circumstances; some are not so good. I think it would be preferable to try to get a law that gets sight of social circumstances; one way of doing that may be to insert a requirement that a suitably experienced social worker is involved, so that there is some sensitivity to those contextual, relational, interpersonal effects, which, as I know you are aware, can be very subtle. A lot of these things are extremely difficult to pick up. They are easy to miss and, even when you are aware of them, there can be dilemmas about what to do with them. Professor Hoyano: Might I add a postscript to that? A model that we could consider in this context is CAFCASS—the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service—in the family courts. It is a body of experts—civil servants, in effect—but they are independent and they are accustomed to dealing with specific context with social workers, for example. They investigate what should happen to a child in public law or private law proceedings. It occurs to me that something like that—a report from an equivalent body to the solicitor’s office, which I mentioned before—could be a very good way of building that in, because I completely agree that social workers are likely to be more professionally attuned, by virtue of their training and experience, to looking at the wider context.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q My question is for Dr Price as well, please. We heard in the week from the chief medical officer earlier, who said that he was “relieved” that this Act based capacity on the Mental Capacity Act, noting that it already provides that “the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.] and that it is used in tens, if not hundreds, of life and death cases in the NHS every week. The example he gave was someone refusing blood products that they would need to continue their life. In the light of that, I suppose I am a bit confused about your evidence saying that the MCA is not suitable for life or death decisions of this type. Do you think the MCA is not fit for purpose for those current life or death decisions that are being made, or is there something about the life or death decisions that would be made in an assisted dying context that makes that different? Dr Price: The assumption that the Mental Capacity Act can translate neatly into this specific decision without a really clear sense of what that would look like in clinical practice is something that needs more careful thought. I was involved in research in this area, and one of the things that I did was to scrutinise the concept of capacity as discussed in a number of forums—for example, the Commission on Assisted Dying, discussions in the House of Lords, and also interviews with doctors in England and Wales and in Oregon. There is a broad sense of what capacity is. For some, it is a very tight, cognitive definition that would mean that in practice, in assisted dying, most people would be found to be capacitous. Those who advocate a much broader sense of what capacity is—these can be contained within the framework of the Mental Capacity Act—would advocate a much broader sense of what that is, thinking about values and the person’s life experience and making more judgments, really, about that person’s life in a general sense. What I do not think we have really pinned down is what concept of capacity is operating in the thoughts behind this Bill. Is it enough to say that we will essentially refer to the Mental Capacity Act, or do we need to be more specific about what is capacity for this decision? Is it sufficient to say, “We will refer out”, or do we need it on the face of the Bill so that anybody assessing capacity for this decision knows exactly what they should be doing and exactly how they should be having that conversation? Even though you may be operating within a legal framework, I think that the actual conversation —the actual content—will vary across practitioners. Is that good enough? Is that sufficient? Is that a good enough standard? When I do a capacity assessment, I have in mind that it may be appealed against—that is somebody’s right—and it should be available for scrutiny by a court. Essentially, that is the standard we are looking for, so it needs to be clear where the standard lies.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Pat, if the Bill, as it is currently drafted, had been in place in your family’s situation, what difference would that have made to your family’s experience? Pat Malone: In all three cases, it would have improved their lives and their deaths. My father died at the age of 85 from pancreatic cancer. He asked me to help him kill himself while he was in hospital in the last three or four weeks of his life. Obviously, I was not able to do so. He suggested that I put poison in his water, which I had no idea how to action. I spoke to his consultant and asked whether he could do anything to hasten his end, and he said, “No, no, no, I can’t.” After that, he lasted another three weeks and he had a horrendous death. It has scarred our family to this day. My brother contracted the same disease, pancreatic cancer, and having seen my father die, he—having gone to six doctors and asked them whether they could help him end his life; he was under home hospice palliative care at that time—contrived his own suicide. Unfortunately, he asked his wife to sit and hold his hand while he died, as a result of which there was a police investigation into collusion. She and her daughter, who was also in the house at the time, were not cleared for eight months, during which they were interviewed repeatedly about anomalies and what they did or did not know. It was absolutely unconscionable to pile that on top of their grief, at a time when they had just lost their father and husband. My sister’s death, having seen those two deaths, was much easier. She got motor neurone disease and was not really suffering in the way that my father and brother had been. She knew that her end was going to be as a live brain in a dead body, and that was the horror that she faced. From the beginning, she was fixed on going to Dignitas, which she did. It was not easy because, after the example of my brother’s family, she would not allow anybody in her family to have anything to do with the arrangements that she had to make, which were quite complicated and became ever more difficult for her. First, she could not drive a car any more and was going around on a mobility scooter, gathering endless documents and having all the tests that you need to have. Ultimately, she said, “This is my golden ticket.” When she was accepted by Dignitas, she said that it was the greatest relief of her life. She said, “I know I am not going to get cancer or dementia. I’m going to die painlessly at a time and place of my choosing.” That is exactly what she did, but she died 1,000 miles from home. She should have died in her house with her family, and her dogs on the bed. She should not have been denied that. Had this Bill been enacted in her time, it would have been a much easier operation. The problem with this legislation mainly is that it is so long overdue. There are people now who are in that position. You may think our family is star crossed because we have had three deaths like that, but I think we are just a normal family. It is happening all the time. Chris Whitty talked on Monday about how we should not rush into this. We are not rushing into it; we are at the back of the queue, really.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Mr Amin, given your expertise in representing these cases in the court, can I ask you for your view around the Mental Capacity Act issue regarding eating disorders and other disorders? Obviously, we have heard one version of that. Given your experience of working with UK law to the highest level, what is your assessment of this? Yogi Amin: I have worked in a range of medical treatment cases over many years, covering different illnesses and conditions, and clause 2 reads fine to me. It works. It is clear. I do not consider that it needs any additional words. I can understand, when we go to court, that cases will come through and they will fall within those definitions, and it will be clear. I do not consider anorexia to come under a terminal illness unless it is right at the end of life, and that does not really fit within the parameters of the Bill, because we are not talking about right at the end of life. We have section 63 of the Mental Health Act, which deals with anorexia, and there is force-feeding that clinicians consider. That is my view on the anorexia side of things. Doctors will provide the evidence on terminal illness. You heard from the chief medical officer yesterday, and they will provide guidance around all of that. Subsequent to the Bill, there will be secondary legislation and then the guidance. They will provide clear guidance that will then feed into this and the evidence that will be before a judge that says, “Yes, it is a terminal illness, and this is the prognosis” and so on. It is nothing different from what we produce in medical treatment cases before the court at the moment, where the doctors produce expert reports and give evidence. They explain the condition, the prognosis and their decision on capacity, and they explain what is in the best interests of an individual if they lack capacity. As I understand it, the Bill is crafted to produce the evidence as you go along the path here, and then eventually to the judge. Chelsea Roff: May I add one sentence, because it is related to eating disorders? I would refer to a 2012 Court of Protection case, where a 29-year-old with anorexia was described as being in the terminal stage of her illness and multiple physicians described her death as inevitable. I would also refer to a 2023 case seen at the Court of Protection, which said, “I recognise with deep regret that it will probably mean that she will die.” She was also described as being at the “pre-death stage”. Again, that young woman is still alive and still fighting for services. Although I respect what Mr Amin is saying, and I agree with his interpretation, we have case law in the UK where people with anorexia are being found to be terminal. We have to take that reality into account. Yogi Amin: I do not think they were found to be terminal. They were described by a doctor in a case as being terminal, and that doctor may not have described it properly. Chelsea Roff: Indeed, but a judge will be relying on doctors.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q We have heard from two witnesses—you, Sir Nicholas, and Dr Ahmedzai from the earlier panel—on the question of judicial oversight. While we have you here, Sir Max and Mr Ruck Keene, what are your observations on the proposals from those two witnesses that an alternative to a High Court judge overseeing the process would be some form of panel or tribunal, potentially multidisciplinary? What is your view on that and the legal implications for that? Sir Max Hill: I would say two things. First, it bears weight that, looking at all the provisions in the Bill, the additional level of scrutiny currently being called judicial scrutiny or approval is absent in all the comparative examples around the world. That already makes this a tighter pre-legislative model than we see in other countries that have gone down this route. That is worth remembering. Secondly, while I am not a family lawyer—I was, but a very long time ago—I think that the family division of the High Court would be very well-placed to perform the sort of exercise enshrined in current drafting, which is not a rubber-stamping exercise, but a substantive consideration of heavily objective medical opinion arrived at by not one, but two doctors, one of whom is not the treating doctor. I listen to and accept the question of pressure on the justice system generally. That is something the Committee will be concerned about because, if the Bill passes, we want something workable. I heed what Sir James Munby said. The sitting judiciary, for good constitutional reasons, is highly unlikely to say anything. But there is therefore merit in looking at clause 12, under the heading, “Court approval”, and performing quite a simple exercise, which for me would be going through subsections (1) to (6) inclusive and, where it says “High Court”, replace that with something else. Personally, I have an aversion to the word “tribunal”, which indicates a right and wrong or some kind of fault-based system—that is not what we are talking about here. But a panel, as Nick said, is the way to go— Sir Nicholas Mostyn : A panel appointed by the Official Solicitor. Sir Max Hill: Whether appointed by the Official Solicitor or not. Dare I say it—because I am sitting next to a very distinguished one—I do wonder about the recently retired members of the judiciary and the role that they could play under a replacement panel system. Sir Nicholas Mostyn: That is what I had in mind—the Official Solicitor looking at the retired judges. Sir Max Hill: Yes, so there is legal professional capacity among the retired judges—not that they would sit alone on a panel. It would bring with it the extra benefit of having suitably qualified medical professionals, like the Spanish model. So yes, I think that could be done. That is not the same thing as saying that the High Court approval model is fatally flawed and could not be introduced, but I do think there is a viable alternative, which is worth looking at. Alex Ruck Keene: I have only one observation, and I said this in my written evidence but I also want to say it out loud. You have to think very carefully about what purpose any form of this oversight is actually serving societally, if the oversight panel, whether that be a judge or a panel, cannot decline to approve an application if it considers that the reason the individual is seeking assistance in dying is because of service provision failures by the statutory bodies responsible for meeting their health and social care needs. That is a question of principle, and I want to make sure that that is squarely before you.

• 27 Nov 2024 · Engagements · Hansard source

  More

  Q9. Antisocial behaviour involving modified and off-road bikes is a menace, and has a huge impact on communities such as mine in Sunderland. Although I welcome the work that Northumbria police does in partnership with our council, they need stronger powers and more resources. Can the Prime Minister outline how he will back the police to tackle the misery caused by intimidating and downright dangerous antisocial behaviour on bikes?

• 20 Nov 2024 · Police Reform · Hansard source

  More

  To deliver effective policing, we need reform, but police officers also need to feel that they have our support. Does the Minister agree that agreeing the recommendations of the pay review body is a key part of delivering that support? What view does she have about those, including Conservative Members, who would prefer not to agree those recommendations, and on the impact that would have on police morale?

• 2 Sept 2024 · Violent Disorder · Hansard source

  More

  My constituents were appalled by the criminal disorder that we saw on our streets at the start of August, which was in no way representative of our city. The contrast between thugs who preferred destruction and the decent law-abiding majority was clear in our community’s response—be it Northumbria police officers standing up and protecting our communities in the face of attacks; the hundreds of residents of every race and religion turning up the day after to sweep away not just the shards of glass, but the shards of hatred that had been sown the night before; or the Sunderland citizens advice bureau refusing to let the arson attack prevent it from providing services. Will the Home Secretary join me in praising the response of the people of Sunderland and of similar communities across the country, and does she agree that we should build upon their example as we look to strengthen community cohesion in the future?