Lewis Atkinson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 20 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  It strikes me that the judgment before us today is this: would permitting some terminally ill adults to choose an assisted death reduce suffering without inadvertently creating undue risks to others? I am clear, having worked in the NHS for 19 years, that the Bill absolutely can do that. I know the lengths that the NHS and our hospice movement go to when providing care at the end of life—the beloved pet coming in for the last cuddle, or the compassionate conversation in the middle of the night that calms fears. Some have suggested that our health service could not safely introduce assisted dying for patients who are already in regular contact with the health service because, by definition, they are terminally ill. I know not just the professionalism of NHS staff; I have also seen the thoroughness with which other medico-legal routes—for example, Mental Health Act tribunals, which in many ways are analogous to the provisions of the Bill—are implemented. The NHS has shown over decades that it can safely implement social and legislative changes passed by this Parliament. The Abortion Act 1967 was implemented safely by the NHS, as was the regulation and provision of in vitro fertilisation under the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990. The Bill has rightly been amended to allow up to four years for commencement to allow all the necessary preparations to take place. The chief medical officer reminded us that the NHS deals with life and death decisions every day. While the processes in the Bill are new, crucially they build on a solid foundation of existing practice. Currently, under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as others have said, a person with a terminal illness receiving critical care can say, “Doctor, I want to die. Turn off this machine.” We use a simple test under the Act to permit that. Under this Bill, there are rightly further safeguards, but the decision when someone says, “Doctor, I want to die; give me something to drink” is essentially the same. This is absolutely not about the state killing people—these people are dying at the moment. The CMO also gave us evidence, and he stressed that the secondary legislation powers are necessary to permit ongoing safe regulation. Those powers not only require the Secretary of State to ensure that codes of practice and regulation are in place; they also give him the opportunity to react post implementation should there be any concerning cases. It is right that we are thorough in our roles as legislators. I have seen at first hand my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) sitting with officials from the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice to ensure the workability and safety of these provisions. That is not the case for the status quo, with people dying lonely deaths of suicide or going to Dignitas. For those people, there are no checks on capacity or coercion; there is only trauma. I therefore commend the Bill to the House.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Humanist Marriage · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under you, Dame Siobhain. Like others, I commend the hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo) and my hon. Friends the Members for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) and for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Lizzi Collinge) on securing this debate. In 2009, I got married in the National Glass Centre in my constituency, in a humanist ceremony. Because, as other hon. Members have mentioned, that ceremony was not legally binding, we had to get legally married two days earlier in Sunderland Civic Centre. Choosing a humanist married reflected the shared values of my wife and me. With our humanist celebrant, we thoughtfully worked through what we wanted to say, and the commitments that we wanted to make to each other. I would love to say that every marriage ends in a “happily ever after”. The hon. Member for South Devon (Caroline Voaden) was right to draw attention to the lower divorce rates statistic. Unfortunately, my marriage has resulted in a separation. That is a cause of sadness for me, but the shared humanist values that we committed to when we embarked on our marriage still provide an enduring basis for a positive relationship between my wife and I to co-parent our children. Even if, unfortunately, “happily ever after” is not possible in every marriage, humanist values and celebrations have significant value in bringing children up, as other hon. Members have stated in this debate. I intend to do further work in this Parliament on positive parenting in separated families. For the meat of my contribution, I will highlight how society has changed over the last 12 years, since the Government first gained the power to enact legal recognition of humanist marriages. Others have mentioned the steps made in nations of the UK other than England and Wales. I highlight the ongoing growth in the number of census respondents who are humanist or non-religious. The share of people ticking “no religion” in the census rose from 25% in 2011 to 37% in 2021—a significant rise. Around two thirds of people who get married are between the ages of 25 and 39, and among that group 48% of people ticked that they had “no religion” in the census. The current law essentially means that around half of people of normal marriageable age are being denied the choice of having a legally binding marriage that conforms with their beliefs. More widely, we have seen other advances for humanism in the last 12 years. Humanism is increasingly becoming a recognised part of the school religious education syllabus. Humanists are now officially included in national moments, such as the service of remembrance and Holocaust Memorial Day. They provide input into the moral and ethical issues of our time. I worked in the NHS during the covid pandemic, and humanists were officially consulted on, and contributed to, some of the advice that we received from the Department of Health and Social Care’s moral and ethical advisory group. A lot has happened in 12 years, yet humanist marriages are still not legally recognised. As others have said, it is overdue that we change that. The order is drafted and ready to go. We have had to wait far too long for this already. I look forward to hearing how we can get this done as quickly as possible.

• 12 May 2025 · Income Tax: Personal Allowance · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the right hon. Lady for that intervention. Of course, it was the previous Government who harmonised the income tax thresholds for pensioners and those of working age alike, the situation having previously been different. I absolutely recognise the stress felt by pensioners around the land. That is why such a debate is difficult without wider consideration of pension incomes and in particular the maintenance of the triple lock, which is not the subject of this debate, but which strikes me as important to consider. As I was saying, there is a disparity between the potential benefits of a significant increase in the personal allowance for those with different levels of income, with those earning the most benefiting the most from such an increase. Members may also wish to know that there would also be significant geographic differences in the impact of any changes. The places with average lower levels of income—for example, Sunderland—would lose out relative to places with higher average incomes, which are disproportionately in London and the south-east. Were such tax changes funded by cutting public services, regions such as the north-east would lose out even more. I hope those matters of context will help inform the debate this afternoon. I will end where I started, with a reflection of public sentiment on living standards. As other Members have mentioned, there is undoubtedly a strength of public feeling on these matters. We have to be frank: it is our job to improve the incomes and lives of the people that we serve. When I am out in Sunderland Central every week, that is the key issue that people raise with me, because for years they have been no better off and, in many cases, they are struggling to make ends meet. I get it. Putting more money in people’s pockets so they can do what they want is the public’s top priority. A key part of that is managing the public finances well. We all saw what the Liz Truss mini-Budget and unfunded half-baked tax plans did to living standards.

• 12 May 2025 · Income Tax: Personal Allowance · Hansard source

  More

  No, I will make progress. The public expect us to do better than that and they expect us to do more. They want wages and pensions to go up faster than inflation, as is now starting to happen. They want to the personal allowance to rise. I pay tribute to Mr Frost again for calling for those measures, and to all those who signed the petition. We should be hugely thankful to have citizens who are engaged in our parliamentary democracy, as the 250,000 people who signed the petition are. I look forward to an interesting, and I hope informed, debate.

• 12 May 2025 · Income Tax: Personal Allowance · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That this House has considered e-petition 702844 relating to the Income Tax Personal Allowance. It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart, and it is a privilege to open the debate as a member of the Petitions Committee. All colleagues from all parties will recognise the priority that the public place on improving living standards, as our conversations with constituents, polling and the facts of the matter tell us. The reality is that average disposable incomes after tax fell from 2019-20 to 2023-24 —an unprecedented and shocking situation in which people were left poorer at the end of the last Parliament than they were at the start of it. That is the key context for today’s debate, which has been triggered as a result of more than 250,000 citizens signing the petition on income tax personal allowances. It also speaks to wider and entirely understandable public frustration about living standards. In preparation for the debate, I had the pleasure of talking to Mr Alan Frost, the creator of the petition and a constituent of the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox). Mr Frost, who is in the Gallery, explained that he has recently retired, having worked his whole life. He feels a sense of injustice that his state pension is considered as income for tax purposes, and that the tax thresholds he faces are not increasing. The events that led to that situation are as follows. In the 2021 spring Budget, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), who was Chancellor at the time, announced that the income tax personal allowance threshold of £12,570 would be frozen until April 2026. In the 2022 autumn statement, the Chancellor at that time, the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), announced that the freeze would be extended for a further two years until April 2028. Following the change of Government, the current Chancellor announced in her autumn 2024 Budget that the freeze would not be extended any further, and therefore income tax personal allowances are expected to next rise in April 2028. Although Mr Frost is a pensioner and his petition reflects a desire to boost pensioner incomes, he also believes that significantly increasing the personal tax allowance would benefit those in work, boosting incomes and reducing the need for benefits. That belief reflects the reality that less than a quarter of the 37 million income tax payers in the UK are over the age of 65. The vast majority of those paying income tax are of working age and are not receiving the state pension. In their written response to the petitioners, the Government highlighted that making the suggested changes to the personal allowance would cost “many billions of pounds”. I am sure that the Minister will say more about that when he responds, but cost is a key element to discuss in our debate. It is Parliament’s responsibility to agree the ways and means of any policy it makes—that is, how to pay for what we decide to do. I gently suggest that the events of the last Parliament remind us how serious that responsibility is. The mini-Budget of September 2022 announced tax cuts costing around £45 billion without explaining how they would be funded, and the market reaction to that announcement left ordinary people paying the price. An emergency reversal of those tax changes followed, but not before high inflation and interest rates hit the standard of living. I therefore urge our debate to be conducted in full consideration of the cost and funding of any tax policy changes. Were income tax personal allowances to rise in the way suggested by the petition, there would be several other linked tax policy choices to be made, and those choices would determine the full cost of the change. For example, would the size of the tax bands above the personal allowance be maintained? Currently, the basic rate of 20% is levied above the personal allowance and up to about £50,000 of income. Would the size of that band be maintained if the personal allowance were increased by £7,500? If so, the point at which the higher rate of tax takes effect would, in turn, increase to almost £58,000, at further cost to the Exchequer. Similarly, the additional rate of tax is currently levied on incomes above £125,000, so if the personal allowance was to rise, would that level rise proportionately too? Finally, the income tax personal allowance is aligned with the level at which people start making national insurance contributions; should that level also rise to £20,000, or would we return to a more complicated tax system in which income tax and national insurance thresholds were no longer harmonised?

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to speak in support of new clause 40. Given the implementation period that we are talking about, the repeated and routine reporting to Parliament on progress is essential, especially for those who want to see this Bill implemented safely and properly. Nevertheless, there are people—some of whom have joined us in the Public Gallery in recent weeks—for whom that needs to be done with deliberate speed, but without any compromise on the safety and thoroughness of implementation. New clause 40 achieves that, and I commend it. In a different world there would have been a way of us compositing new clause 28 with new clause 40, and I regret that the two are not compatible. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford makes good points around the earlier assessment of palliative care; I do not think that is something that divides the Committee. There have been amendments tabled by many Members over the course of the Committee that have sought to improve and strengthen palliative care as part of a holistic package at the end of life. I wonder if that is something that I could work on with my hon. Friend on Report, even if it is not possible to agree to new clause 28 tonight.

• 12 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Lady sketches out a very short exchange. Does she think that we should specify in primary legislation the exact nature of interactions in these sorts of matters elsewhere—in the High Court, employment tribunals and so on? In my understanding, we do not: we trust regulated professionals to have appropriate interactions. It is not for Parliament to say that a lawyer or doctor should ask x or y question. Does she agree?

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I have a question for Mr Malone. The Bill as drafted talks about the commencement period and how quickly it would commence in the UK if Parliament passed it. There have been some suggestions that we should delay the commencement in order for improvements to palliative care or other such things to be made. Could you speak to your experience on that and give your opinion? Pat Malone: I think that both my sister and brother had more than adequate palliative care. My sister, particularly—she was taken under the wing of the Macmillan nurses, even though she did not have cancer, and they were absolutely marvellous. Her GP was brilliant as well: behind her all the way for the whole year. She could not really have done it without her. The NHS was excellent. In fact, my sister was used as a diagnostic tool, or diagnostic test, by NHS surgeons who were teaching medical students. She would be put in front of medical students and they would be asked what was wrong with her. Given that MND is normally associated with young men with brain trauma and so forth, it encouraged them to widen their appreciation of these diseases. It meant that she met NHS specialists at a particular level. She really wanted for nothing. She had a stairlift put in her house in short order. She had the mobility scooters and all the gimcracks that you have in your bathroom to help you get out of the bath and so forth. Above all, from the Macmillan nurses in Blyth, she had moral support. These are no-nonsense people who will walk through a wall if there is something that you need, and that is wonderful to have. So there was no palliative care issue with my sister. She never needed any pain control. She had everything she needed. It did not change her mind one bit. I would like to see palliative care divorced from the idea of assisted dying. What she needed was assistance to die. What my brother needed was assistance to die. Palliative care was a side issue. It obviously comes into it, but if you could look at assisted dying on its own, I think that would be useful.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Professor Hoyano, the Bill would establish offences relating to coercion, pressure and so on. In the processes set out, there are a number of checkpoints, for want of a better term, at which a person seeking assisted dying may talk to doctors or others. What are your observations on how the criminal construct of offences is linked to the different opportunities for an individual seeking assisted dying to have conversations? In your view, is it likely to lead to the identification of those offences? How does that contrast with some of the considerations at the moment, where people are withdrawing treatment in a life or death situation, for example? Professor Hoyano: It is interesting that a number of Members of Parliament who are practising physicians pointed out in the debate that they have to evaluate freedom of decision making and absence of coercion in many different medical contexts. I point particularly to the withdrawal of medical treatment at the request of the patient, even if that will inevitably lead to death. It is considered to be a fundamental human right that lies at the heart of medical law that a patient has personal autonomy to decide what to do with their body and whether or not to accept medical treatment, provided that they have the capacity to do so and are acting without coercion from external sources. Doctors have to make those assessments all the time. I suggest that it is perhaps a convenient fallacy to say that pulling the plug on a respirator or stopping artificial nutrition and hydration is a negative act, whereas giving a patient a syringe to end their own life is a positive act. I realise that with the Tony Bland case it was convenient to say that, but there is no doubt that most people on the street would say that pulling the plug on a respirator is a positive act, and yet doctors and nurses are required to do that every day in the NHS, because that is the patient’s autonomy. If there is any question about either coercion or capacity, the Court of Protection steps in and has the jurisdiction to make those decisions. The Court of Protection should, I believe, be the court that is supervising this, not the High Court. Three levels of judges sit in the Court of Protection; I suggest that a High Court judge be specified, which would mean a statutory amendment to extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection. The Court of Protection makes decisions every day on whether a patient has the mental capacity to make decisions about their own medical treatment. It is accustomed to doing that, and one aspect of that analysis is whether the patient is being coerced externally. Generally speaking, when a patient says, “I don’t want to be on a respirator any longer; I know I’m going to die,” we do not ask questions. As I understand it, it is not part of the protocol to say, “Are you doing this because you are worried about being a burden on the NHS?”, because their personal autonomy is the overriding principle governing medical decision making in relation to the patient. I hope that that answers your question.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q My question is for Dr Price as well, please. We heard in the week from the chief medical officer earlier, who said that he was “relieved” that this Act based capacity on the Mental Capacity Act, noting that it already provides that “the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.] and that it is used in tens, if not hundreds, of life and death cases in the NHS every week. The example he gave was someone refusing blood products that they would need to continue their life. In the light of that, I suppose I am a bit confused about your evidence saying that the MCA is not suitable for life or death decisions of this type. Do you think the MCA is not fit for purpose for those current life or death decisions that are being made, or is there something about the life or death decisions that would be made in an assisted dying context that makes that different? Dr Price: The assumption that the Mental Capacity Act can translate neatly into this specific decision without a really clear sense of what that would look like in clinical practice is something that needs more careful thought. I was involved in research in this area, and one of the things that I did was to scrutinise the concept of capacity as discussed in a number of forums—for example, the Commission on Assisted Dying, discussions in the House of Lords, and also interviews with doctors in England and Wales and in Oregon. There is a broad sense of what capacity is. For some, it is a very tight, cognitive definition that would mean that in practice, in assisted dying, most people would be found to be capacitous. Those who advocate a much broader sense of what capacity is—these can be contained within the framework of the Mental Capacity Act—would advocate a much broader sense of what that is, thinking about values and the person’s life experience and making more judgments, really, about that person’s life in a general sense. What I do not think we have really pinned down is what concept of capacity is operating in the thoughts behind this Bill. Is it enough to say that we will essentially refer to the Mental Capacity Act, or do we need to be more specific about what is capacity for this decision? Is it sufficient to say, “We will refer out”, or do we need it on the face of the Bill so that anybody assessing capacity for this decision knows exactly what they should be doing and exactly how they should be having that conversation? Even though you may be operating within a legal framework, I think that the actual conversation —the actual content—will vary across practitioners. Is that good enough? Is that sufficient? Is that a good enough standard? When I do a capacity assessment, I have in mind that it may be appealed against—that is somebody’s right—and it should be available for scrutiny by a court. Essentially, that is the standard we are looking for, so it needs to be clear where the standard lies.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Could I ask Dr Mullock another question? I was interested in what you said about your involvement with citizens’ juries, both here and elsewhere. As we as a Committee and Parliament are weighing up some of these issues, such as the points on autonomy and safeguards, where do you think the public settle on those when they investigate them in depth? In particular, can you say a bit about the eligibility criteria being six months with a terminal illness? Dr Mullock: I am sorry; what do you mean by how the public settle on them?

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Sir Chris, you mentioned having time to ensure that people are appropriately trained, and the Bill includes provisions for the Secretary of State to make orders around required training. Could you say a little bit more about that? If Parliament decide to pass an Act of this nature, what training would be helpful and required—in particular around skills, and the assessment of capacity and coercion? Professor Whitty: I will give my view, and it might be useful to get Duncan’s view on the nursing side, because nurses will often be heavily involved in these discussions. I would divide the kind of training that is needed into two broad groups: training that is essentially normal medical practice but may need some variation, and things that are clearly specific to this Bill. Issues, for example, around mental capacity—as determined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005—are dealt with every day, in every hospital up and down the country; every doctor and nurse above a certain level of seniority should be able to do that normally. It may require some slight adjustment. There is an absolute expectation within the Act, for example, that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. That is already built into the principles of the Act and the way that things are done. I would extend that to the management of end of life, which should be a normal part of medical and nursing practice—we will all die eventually, and that has always been part of medicine, and always should be. That training should be generic, but may need some adaption. There will then be some specific things that will be necessary for people to understand the legislation, including, in some cases—if this Bill is passed—if they are to take part in the final part of prescribing drugs to patients. It is much more likely that a very large number of doctors and nurses may get involved in the very earliest stages, because someone may raise an issue with their GP, nurse or consultant, who will need to have the basic understanding for that. In my view, the more detailed later stages will require some specific training. I think there will be a gradation of doctors: those who are happy to have the general, initial conversation; those who are happy to have the structured conversation that follows; and a minority who will be happy to go on to take part in the final stages. It is very important that the wishes of the patient are respected. That is the central point of this. We must start with what is good for someone in their last six months of life, and for their immediate family, but we must also make sure that the wishes of healthcare professionals around this area are absolutely protected, when it comes to conscience and to choice. Duncan Burton: I am mindful that there are two groups of staff who would potentially be working in this service, if the Bill is passed, but also of the wider workforce. At 2 o’clock in the morning, when a patient wants to have a conversation with somebody about end of life, it is going to be a nurse with them, or a nurse in a care home, or a specialist nurse providing cancer care, so we have to think about the training and support that is required for them, be that around signposting or explaining where they can go to access more information. There is an important part about the entire wider workforce that we need to think about. Clearly, for those people who are working in such a service, we need to think about the safeguarding elements, and how we make sure there is support through safeguarding training and confidentiality—particularly mindful that some patients may choose not to tell their families about this. We need to think about how we enable and support staff in managing those kinds of circumstances and navigating the legal requirements through the Bill. We need to think ahead about what we need to do in undergraduate training for doctors and nurses, and in the curriculum.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Moving on to the next issue, you have both spoken fairly clearly about—or advocated against—having an absolute ban on doctors discussing or raising the issue. I want to tease out whether there is a difference between raising it and recommending it. Dr Green, you suggested that it might be appropriate for a doctor to recommend that someone seeks further information from an independent source, for example. If Parliament so wished, would it be appropriate for Parliament to be clear that no doctor should recommend assisted dying as a course of action? Dr Green: I do not think I ever suggested that doctors should recommend assisted dying. If I did, I apologise—

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Clause 35 introduces a duty on the Secretary of State to report on a periodic basis to Parliament on the accessibility and quality of palliative care. As I understand it, that would be a new duty that we are pioneering. What is your reaction to that? Will it be helpful in continuing the momentum to make improvements to palliative care? Are there any further reporting requirements as part of that assessment—for example, around equity of access, which some have mentioned—that we could think about when considering amendments? James Sanderson: I welcome the provision in the report. What is necessary is a benchmarking of the current position. Rather than waiting a significant period of time to do a review, we need to benchmark the current state of palliative care and then base subsequent reviews on any changes. As I mentioned before, we also need to look at the wider context. If we look narrowly at the provision of palliative care, we will not properly see what goes on across the whole environment of the health service and social care. We have mentioned the fact that district nurses and general practitioners are providing a huge amount of palliative end-of-life care, so it may not just be what goes on inside hospices and in palliative care teams in hospitals. I agree that that needs to look at the demographic information so that we are collecting details on who is accessing palliative care and where, and the certain types. All that is necessary as part of the review. Dr Cox: I agree completely that we need to be doing reviews now and in the future regularly on palliative care aspects. I also think there is an opportunity to write into the Bill other monitoring that would be really helpful in ensuring safety on an ongoing basis. That includes monitoring in terms of decision making—how often assessing doctors refer to others, how often they disagree and what happens after the declaration. In the Bill there is, as far as I could see, no limit to the delay between the declaration and the request for the substance. That would be an interesting thing to look at in the future, because somebody could delay for six or eight months. Do we do another capacity assessment then? That is a tricky question. What about the taking of a substance? We have not talked about that. There are a lot of things we could look at in future that would be really helpful to monitor.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Children’s Social Media Accounts · Hansard source

  More

  I agree that social media companies rightly face regulation; I will talk a little more about that later. There is, rightly, debate and campaigning in the media and elsewhere—we saw some of that over the weekend—about the level of regulation of online content that children may access online, whether that is illegal content or legal but harmful content. Although the regulation of content itself is not the focus of today’s debate, as a concerned parent myself, I am impatient for online services to take proper responsibility for what our children see. Social media companies must not shy away from their responsibilities to protect children, either because of misguided free speech concerns or out of concern about their levels of profit. It is important to note, as context for today’s debate, that the law does not allow online services to collect or store the personal information of children under the age of 13. As a result, most popular services require users to be at least 13 years of age, but enforcement of that requirement has historically been lax. The age-assurance requirements in the Online Safety Act must be implemented without delay. I know that hon. Members will want to touch on various elements of the approaches to social media regulation, but in parallel to the wider debate about content regulation, the petitioners are clear that there are specific issues about parental access that warrant a response in their own right, from both social media companies and the Government, so I want to focus my remarks, and I hope this debate, on those specific questions. First, the petitioners call for parental access to social media when children are alive. I understand the instinct behind this call—the instinct to directly monitor what a child is doing online in order to protect them from the harms to which I have referred. However, in the course of preparing for the debate, I heard clearly from multiple perspectives, including children’s charities such as the NSPCC, that broad, overarching parental rights to children’s social media would not be appropriate. Of course, given that the minimum age of use should be 13, we are talking about teenagers. Children—teenagers—do have long-established rights to privacy, as set out by the UN convention on the rights of the child, and established UK law and practice in a range of areas reflects and recognises that. Such rights are important not just as abstract concepts but because, as I have heard, older children sometimes need private online spaces to help them to explore the world—for example, a teenager understanding their own sexuality before they wish to share it with their parents. We also know that, sadly, in some horrible cases, parents are themselves perpetrators of abuse against their children. Establishing a blanket right to access children’s online activity would remove an important safe route for children to seek support and alert others in such cases. The petitioners themselves have reflected on such matters, and although they remain determined to support parents to keep their kids safe online, there is a recognition that establishing an overarching parental right to access the data of living teenagers is unlikely to be the appropriate way forward. Instead, it appears to me that parental oversight of a child’s social media use should rather be achieved through strengthening and significantly increasing the uptake of parental controls and other specifically designed arrangements that children and their parents agree to together, as part of the sign-up processes for online services. It is clearly the responsibility of online services to implement and expand such measures, and I hope for rapid progress in that area as a key part of online services’ work to improve children’s safety online in partnership with parents. I now turn to the issue of bereaved parents’ access to social media data, which is the specific issue for which Ellen has been campaigning, because she is still not able to access data about Jools’ use of online services before his death. I cannot begin to imagine the anguish of losing a child and, even more so, not being given information that might help a parent to understand the circumstances of their child’s death. We rightly talk about laws, protections and rights, but we do not talk enough as a society about the right—indeed, the need—to grieve a loss, especially one as painful as the loss of child. In preparing for this debate, I spoke with SLOW, or Surviving the Loss of Your World—a charity that offers bereavement support for parents following the loss of a child. The charity emphasised to me the absolute necessity, as part of the grieving process, of establishing an understanding of what led to death. By being denied data about Jools’ online activity before his death, Ellen has been denied the ability to grieve as she wishes. The petition recognises that it cannot be right that a grieving mother is forced to go through years of campaigning and investigation to try to get answers about her son’s death. I urge everyone—especially those working in social media companies—to reflect on the evident injustice of the situation, and to commit to finding a way to do the right thing: to give Ellen the information and answers she needs. The Online Safety Act 2023 made important provisions for Ofcom and coroners to access social media in relevant cases following a child’s death, in turn helping bereaved families. It is welcome that the current Government’s Data (Use and Access) Bill, which is making its way through Parliament, strengthens those powers and the requirements for data retention so that the risks of data loss in such cases are reduced. However, the provisions do not have retrospective mechanisms, and are therefore not sufficient for historical cases, such as Jools’, where the coronial process has already concluded. As a result, Ellen is in the situation where she has to try and crowdfund a significant sum of money for legal action to get Jools’ inquest re-run, so that the coroner can use the powers now available in law to access Jools’ social media data. It cannot be right that this is necessary. Some online services say that without a change in the law, they cannot legally release data to bereaved parents like Ellen, but what has struck me in preparation for the debate is that there is not a consensus on the current legal situation. The online safety and data protection expert, John Carr, told me that he did not believe that the general data protection regulations necessarily limited the release of children’s usage data to bereaved parents. Snap, the provider of Snapchat, told me that it already, on a case-by-case basis, discloses usage data to a parent who is the successor to a deceased child. Other online services—including some of the most prominent social media services used by young people, such as TikTok—seem to take a different interpretation of the law. They state that data protection legislation prohibits them from releasing any data they hold that would give parents like Ellen the answers they deserve. I find this inconsistency of interpretation from online services at best troubling and at worst suspicious, given the historical behaviours of some social media companies that were involved in minimising—and indeed covering up—evidence of the impact of online harm. I believe it is incumbent on all online services to use their considerable resources to push the existing law as far as they can, and to find a way to release data to bereaved families.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Children’s Social Media Accounts · Hansard source

  More

  I agree that legislative action has been necessary, as the Online Safety Act shows, and indeed, there are provisions on this in the current data Bill. The issue is that there is a lack of clarity; under the existing law, some social media companies seem to be finding a way of doing the right thing while others are not. I will come to the hon. Member’s point when I ask a couple of questions of the Government. I can assure the social media companies—in the event that they carefully do the right thing, on a case-by-case basis, and then face data protection questions from regulators in response—that they will find allies across Parliament in defending their actions. I ask the Minister and the Government: what scope is there for stating clearly in law that, so long as due care is taken on a case-by-case basis, the release of data to bereaved parents is permitted? Could the data Bill be amended to include a clarification to remove, once and for all, the claim of some companies that they are prohibited from giving parents like Ellen the data and answers they deserve? Are there any other steps the Minister believes could be taken to right this injustice? I look forward to hearing the perspectives of colleagues and the Government’s response to this important debate.

• 13 Jan 2025 · Children’s Social Media Accounts · Hansard source

  More

  I thank Members from across the House for their contributions to this well attended and powerful debate. We have demonstrated significant consensus across the House about the need to continue to strengthen and evolve online regulation, which, as the petition shows, is a matter of significant public concern. I think it is fair to say that the public expect Parliament to work on a cross-party basis on these issues, and I hope that in future months we can continue the debate in the spirit in which it has been conducted today. I thank the Minister for her response. I particularly welcome her indication that the Government will give consideration to any potential changes to the forthcoming data Bill to put it beyond doubt that, in historic cases such as Jools’, parents have rights to access data following bereavement and that the powers that have been set out to coroners can be applied without undue financial penalty or campaigning by parents like Ellen. Of course, the people that we have not heard from today are the social media companies, although I am sure they are listening to us all. I invite them to demonstrate that they genuinely want to do the right thing—to get in touch and do the right thing for bereaved parents like Ellen; not to hide behind data protection regulations; and to actively engage with policymakers and families to get this right, to allow children to be protected and, in tragic cases when a child has died, to give parents the opportunity to grieve properly. I thank the Petitions Committee staff for their assistance in organising and preparing the debate, which it has been an honour to lead. It is right that I use the final words of the debate to pay tribute to the 126,000 petitioners, and in particular to Ellen Roome: may Jools’ memory always be a blessing, and I sincerely hope that today’s debate helps you and other bereaved families get the data and the answers that you need. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered e-petition 661407 relating to children’s social media accounts.

• 6 Jan 2025 · NHS Backlog · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Gentleman worked in the NHS before covid, as did I. He mentions the impact of covid, but does he not recall that in December 2019, before covid hit, standards had already fallen, and only 84% of patients were being treated within the 18 week target? Why was that allowed to happen under the previous Government?

• 14 Oct 2024 · Reporting Ministerial Gifts and Hospitality · Hansard source

  More

  On the Prime Minister’s first day in office, he prioritised meeting the independent adviser on ministerial standards. Does the Minister agree that that stands in stark contrast to the approach of the previous Government, which saw two independent advisers on ministerial standards resigning and the post sitting vacant for six months?