Lewis Atkinson MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  May I check that the hon. Member’s understanding is the same as mine—that nothing in the Bill compels an organisation to participate in the way that he describes?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Richmond Park and I absolutely expect this information to be collected. My observation, as ever, is that I do not think we should put the exact details in primary legislation. The powers are clearly there for the Secretary of State to specify what information should be collected. I am struggling to find it, but I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley will move an amendment to require the Secretary of State, when they make provisions and issues guidance under the Bill, to consult the Equality and Human Rights Commission and others in respect of protected characteristics.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree that we need the data to ensure that we understand how assisted dying operates in relation to different protected characteristics and geographical distribution, but I am not sure that amendment 273 is the way to do that.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman says that he is clear that those actions are assisting suicide and that he thinks that they are illegal. Is it right that members of the public, in the instance to which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley referred, be investigated by the police on their return from trips to Switzerland?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does my hon. Friend agree that to keep the list of characteristics on which we have to collect information up to date, we need a level of flexibility—not in primary legislation? Would she comment on the fact that no information regarding sexuality or other protected characteristics is included in the Bill?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does the hon. Member accept the distinction that I made between an organisation choosing to provide assisted dying services and the instance he outlined of this being done in someone’s home that happens to be a care home? They are entirely different points, and I fear that, particularly with regard to hospices, he is conflating the two.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am afraid I cannot agree. The situation that I set out, in which a hospice makes an organisational decision that it does not wish to provide assisted dying services, is entirely legitimate under the Bill, as drafted. I do not, however, think it should screen which applicants have a certain view, which would be legal under the amendment. The example that the hon. Lady gives is rather different, because it relates to a particular protected characteristic. I am not an expert in the area, so maybe colleagues can help me, but this relates to specific services.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is entirely possible. Clearly it is up to the individual concerned to discuss how far they wish to share with neighbours or friends, in the home or elsewhere, but we must not get to a situation in which, as a policy default, someone’s intentions at end of life are broadcast within a certain radius. My hon. Friend is entirely right and helpful in making that point.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is entirely right. The response of public bodies such as NHS trusts is a slightly different issue. I would not want to speak for the Government or imagine what the Secretary of State might say, but it would be inconceivable to me for a quasi-independent public body to decide, on a vote on principle by some local governors, not to offer citizens choices that have been enshrined in law. That is a slightly different point, but I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire suggested yesterday that if someone chooses to have an assisted death, everyone in the care home or wherever would be part of it. That fundamentally misunderstands the point; I will go for “misunderstands” rather than doubting his intentions, but some would see it as scaremongering. No one is asking for the right to do it in a communal area, where staff or neighbours are forced to observe or participate in any way. Where people live in their own home, they should have rights and dignity at the end of life, whether that is in a care home or in a private residence. We cannot deny them the choice to access end-of-life options, as set out in the Bill. I therefore cannot support new clause 22.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In considering the offer of any health or care-related activity, the appropriateness and suitability of the place is always in people’s mind, and clearly that varies. As I mentioned yesterday, we already have a licensing regime under which the CQC specifically licenses places for particular activity. I think my hon. Friend is right, but this is a normal part of decision making in the provision of health services and I do not think we should try to constrain it in primary legislation. However, as I started by saying, I recognise that we must enshrine the rights of individual conscientious objectors, which I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is trying to do with amendment 480, and I hope that we can do that, through some route, with the Bill.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree that that is what the wording says, but my point is that it is moot. The hon. Lady herself states that the amendment is to prevent an employee from going against the policies of the employer. That power already exists. No healthcare professional says, “Even though I’m employed as a doctor today by such and such a trust, I’m going to do a set of procedures or practices that I want to do.” It is moot. I have no issue with subsection (3)(a) in amendment 481, although I think it is unnecessary. However, I think subsection (3)(b) is deeply problematic. It cuts across employment law protections by referring to selection when hiring employees. There is a reference to the Equality Act, but as others have noted, it is not clear what protected characteristics we are talking about. At a deeper level, if we accept that there is going to be mixed provision, I would argue—and I think this Committee, in a small way, has shown this—that there is some benefit to that. We should not get to a position where every medic of a certain viewpoint on assisted dying works for one organisation and every healthcare professional of a different viewpoint works for another. That is not to say, by any stretch, that organisations would be forced to offer assisted dying. Clearly they would not. If the Bill becomes law, however, I want a society that is relatively at peace with it in healthcare, recognising people’s ability to conscientiously object as individuals. Setting up a dichotomy from the start, in which where a medic decides to work is determined by their views on such and such a procedure, is not a road that we should go down. I also have serious concerns, in terms of employment law, about subsection (3)(b).

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, fortified as I am now with a touch of breakfast. I wish to open my comments on this set of amendments by reiterating the importance of respecting people’s beliefs in healthcare and the contribution that people of different faiths, beliefs and positions make, no matter where they come from, in the context of the activities under the Bill. I accept and recognise that amendment 480, in the name of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, would do an important job in strengthening the Bill’s provisions. I obviously want to hear what the Minister says, and I note the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, but I would want to see this sort of expansion in the final Bill when it goes back to the House. If they may not be the exact right words today, I repeat the offer that my hon. Friend has made to work across the divide, as it were, to ensure that such provisions are included in the Bill. With the benefit of an overnight reflection, I feel that last night we got somewhat muddled around some of the objections on conscience, particularly when we go beyond the individual. Amendment 480 and equivalent amendments deal very clearly with individuals not having an obligation to carry out acts that would offend their conscience in the provision of these services. I think we can broadly agree on that. The remainder of the debate got rather muddled between organisations providing assistance under the Bill and the locations at which the final act of an assisted death may take place. I think those are importantly different. On organisations providing assistance, I want to reset things with a common-sense approach to how it will work in practice. The hon. Member for Reigate made the point that hospices should be under no obligation as organisations to provide specific services. I agree. The powers set out under clause 32 for the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the provision of these services, which we will come on to debate at some point, will operate as they do elsewhere across the health service. An NHS organisation or another organisation will say, “This is the set of services that we provide as an organisation.” I see nothing in this Bill that will compel them to do anything other than that. Healthcare organisations up and down the land now make decisions about what is appropriate for them to deliver, based on skills, expertise and demand and whether they think they are well placed to provide care. I agree with the hon. Member for Reigate, but it does not follow that the amendments are required to enforce that principle. As I understand it, because it is permissible, every organisation and every individual practising healthcare professional will be able to say, “On my own bat, I’m not going to participate in this, regardless of what my employer believes,” not least because of clinical governance and regulation. There is already a strong body of healthcare regulation around the acts and services that are provided. It is currently overseen by the Care Quality Commission. We do not need to reinvent that regime. I reassure Members that I think it entirely appropriate for hospices or other providers of palliative care to consider whether they want to participate, should the Bill become law. I imagine we will get to a situation in which some will and some will not, which is absolutely appropriate. Particularly in end-of-life cases, a patient will make a choice on the back of that. I am aware that some end-of-life care providers in my area are actively considering whether this is something that they will do; I am equally aware that there are others that think it is not for them. We heard in evidence that in Australia some providers of palliative care provide integrated, holistic care in which it is one of a number of options, whereas other providers do not. Amendment 481 would insert a new subsection (3)(a) into clause 23, which suggests that an employer has the power to veto an employee doing an act on their time. That is moot: it is not necessary. In the healthcare environments in which I have worked, a doctor may practise elsewhere, doing their own thing, but while they are employed in a certain NHS trust to do an NHS service, they cannot suddenly decide to do something else.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My instinct is that it would not. If the Bill becomes law, it would be a lawful choice. The hon. Gentleman may not characterise it as healthcare, but it would be part of healthcare and end-of-life services. We would not accept such stipulations on other healthcare services. I can see a sketch that some may choose to draw; someone mentioned housing supported by a religious institution. The reality is that people do not go out of their way to offend, and they try to live in harmony with those around them. If people are clear that they might actively explore assisted dying as an option, they will not choose to spend their last days in a community where others are ideologically opposed to their choice; it would be uncomfortable for the individual. They would, however, have the legal right to do so.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I just want to nail this point about employers and recruitment. We have said that no organisation will be obliged to provide these services, in exactly the same way as with abortion. The example I would give is this: a provider of women’s services says, “We are not providing abortion. But, in addition, we are going to ask staff members we are recruiting if they believe it is ever legal for abortion to take place.” That is exactly the same test of belief, although on a different medical procedure, that my hon. Friend is proposing in this instance.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will move on, because we have started slightly late and I am not sure that we are going to add anything on this point. There is a fundamental distinction between providing assistance and being the location in which people may self-administer an assisted death. In his speech on new clause 22, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire somewhat overlapped those two things, if I may say so. Having established that a hospice would be under no obligation to provide, an individual would clearly not be able to turn up and say, “Your staff must help me to do this.” However, that is different from a situation in which someone living in their own private home— that might include a room in a care home or sheltered accommodation—decides that they want their healthcare team to carry out entirely lawful and appropriate activities under the Bill. I therefore cannot agree with new clause 22. People are legally resident in these premises. They are registered to vote. In some cases, such as in warden-provided accommodation, they have a lease. It is not a landlord in absentia. I know that the hon. Gentleman has provided an opt-out for some situations, but what about warden and supported housing situations? We would not accept operators or owners policing what lawful activities should happen in someone’s own home within that environment. That is entirely different from the situation that the hon. Gentleman sketched out, in which everyone has to be involved. There would be no obligation whatever on any staff of that establishment to participate in an ancillary manner or otherwise, but in a private residence, such as someone’s room in a care home, we cannot allow that to be prohibited.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to finish on this point. On amendment 533, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, I suspect that, in dealing with a later clause, we will have a conversation about issues around hospices and care homes, but again I find the requirements under the amendment unduly onerous. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and others have said, often people’s preferred place of death is at home. Are we really saying that the Secretary of State would specify addresses or the nature of places where these procedures should take place?

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is by no means clear that doctors would not go out to people’s homes, but my hon. Friend asks whether doctors would have to do that—there are no powers of compulsion anywhere in the Bill, because the entire model is an opt-in model at every stage, including the example he gave in respect of hospices. It is a matter between the resident of the home and the treating medical practitioner. In reality, healthcare procedures do not happen ubiquitously: they happen in appropriate places with appropriate cultural sensitivity. We do not specify in primary legislation for that to happen. Health professionals, and those involved in the management and commissioning of health services, currently have ample opportunities to co-ordinate and consider such matters.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is exactly right. That will quite possibly include people’s individual homes as well as not in their homes, in places of appropriate care and peace and tranquillity.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I disagree. As clause 9 makes clear, the doctor will have had a conversation with the patient about their wishes in advance, in exactly the same way as a surgeon would have a conversation with a patient in advance of high-risk surgery—

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to take any further interventions; I am going to answer this point and make some progress. The surgeon would say, “If this procedure fails, would you wish me to attempt resuscitation? Would you wish to be put on a support system?” The hon. Gentleman misunderstands current practice on consultation with patients, in advance of procedures, about their wishes, which is where there is significant established evidence.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the Bill is very clear on the legal parameters. A doctor may not act, in terms of administering the substance, in a way to hasten death. Within that, we are back into the realms of normal medical practice, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud set out. I am sure that there will be legal guidance, whether that be from the GMC or elsewhere, if and when the Bill were to pass. The Secretary of State would have the powers anyway under clause 30, but for the avoidance of doubt, amendment 430 strikes the right balance in giving backstop permissions to the Secretary of State to clarify anything if needed.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I will cover a few of the amendments, and follow on from my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, whose points I broadly agree with. When it comes to the location and, actually, a lot of the elements, I fear we are trying to over-specify practical matters. As in so many cases, this is not about capacity, coercion, assessment and so on; it is about the practicalities of death, and it is right that we allow the healthcare team for dying people and their families to operate with the professional skill with which they currently operate. On amendment 429, on the doctor being in the same room, I can think of many instances in healthcare in which a healthcare professional is in an adjoining room, potentially even with a door open so there is a line of sight, and that is entirely appropriate. I think of observations, for example, in various settings. That provision is absolutely necessary and allows an appropriateness of proximity without intrusion. I am sure the doctor will be in the room at the point at which the substance is taken, but if someone then goes into unconsciousness fairly quickly, as would happen in the vast majority of cases, and then takes half an hour or so to die, it is entirely unnecessary for a doctor to be standing there in the same room, towering over the family, when they could be near at hand. I just do not think we need to specify that in the Bill. I have some sympathy with amendments 532 and 533, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, on the Secretary of State setting out regulations, but I fear the hon. Member for East Wiltshire did an excellent job of persuading me that they should not be accepted, because when a “must” is included in that way, we get into saying, “The Secretary of State must tell a doctor exactly what they must do in every situation.” The legal parameters are clearly set out in the Bill as drafted. There is no administration by a doctor on a person’s behalf; it must all be self-done. Additionally, we have not yet mentioned the existing provisions in clause 9(2)(c), which requires, at the point of assessment, a conversation between the assessing doctor and the patient about their wishes in the event of complications or any sort of delay.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Could the hon. Gentleman help us by giving some more examples of when the new clause would apply? For example, would it apply to supported housing schemes or nursing homes that are a person’s normal place of residence and, indeed, home?

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I cannot speak for the Bill’s promoter or for others, but a significant number of people wish to die at home.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To me, amendment 430, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, strikes the right balance. Under clause 30 the Secretary of State “may” make provision for codes of practice on these matters if that is required; I am uncomfortable with saying that the Secretary of State “must” do so, when it is likely that it will be more appropriate for the GMC or some other body to make those regulations. We get into a difficult precedent if the Secretary of State must specify the reaction in certain medical circumstances but we routinely leave that to medical regulation and practice more widely. I think a “may” power, as set out in amendment 430, would allow that backstop provision, but would not get into the issue of “must”. It is also likely to be more respectful of the conversations as outlined in clause 9.