Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jun 2026 · Home Office and Ministry of Justice · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to be able to respond to this estimates day debate considering the expenditure of the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office as it relates to criminal justice. I thank all Members who contributed. I especially thank the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), for opening the debate, and for his sponsorship of the application for debate, alongside the Chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee. I want to thank all the prison, probation and police officers, the staff that work in the relevant agencies, and the many workers and volunteers in the associated charities who work hard in our justice system. Whatever we debate, and whatever the Government decide around expenditure, they are the ones who have to go out and deliver the priorities of the Government of the day. I am afraid that, whatever the topic and whatever part of their activities and spending plans we are debating now, we are debating a shadow Government—a Government in name only. We are debating the spending plans of a Government who lost their Prime Minister a week ago. We are scrutinising the priorities of a Ministry of Justice whose Lord Chancellor serves at the pleasure of a Labour party that is, as we speak, sounding the fanfares and preparing a coronation for its newest MP to become Prime Minister—a Prime Minister whose team has briefed The Spectator that they are going to sack the Lord Chancellor. We have no idea who will be the Lord Chancellor in a few weeks’ time, nor even who will make up the ministerial ranks serving him. We have a Government in limbo, and however much they protest and tell us that it is business as usual, there will not be any sensible civil servant in any Government Department wanting to move forward policy and delivery work when they have no idea whether it will or will not survive contact with the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) and his new Ministers. This provides Labour with a welcome opportunity to change course. We have heard about the challenges facing these Departments, including prison education, the court estate, data, record levels of mistaken releases—at record levels—as well as legal aid and the IT hacking experienced earlier in the year. The Government are wrestling with many issues, but I will primarily focus on two. First, I will turn to Labour’s appalling plans to let rapists, paedophiles and seriously violent criminals out of prison early, which we were able to consider today through the urgent question. Many of our constituents have been receiving letters telling them that the person who was convicted of harming them is being considered for early release. Victims have already spoken publicly about the impact that has had on them, and this is before they are certain about what is going to happen; that is because, to make it even worse, the letters do not tell them if the prisoner will definitely be released, or when exactly, just that they might be. The Conservatives’ understanding, though, is that everyone who has been written to has a perpetrator who is serving a standard determinate sentence and therefore will automatically be released early. Labour has failed victims either way: either they are all being released, so why have the Government not told people whether they are and when; or some of them will not be, in which case, why are the Government causing unnecessary upset and distress to victims?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials. To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences. We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out: “Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.” That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions. Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say: “In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’” So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to have you with us, Ms Jardine, and I look forward to this first of many Committee sittings. I am pleased to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, beginning with clause 1 and the Opposition amendment tabled in my name. The clause is a helpful place to start our considerations because it cuts straight to the core of our concerns and criticisms, many of which are similar and run through our opposition to many of the other clauses. The clause will amend subsections (2) and (9) of section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to remove the requirement for the defendant to consent to their case remaining in the magistrates court for summary trial. In effect, that will remove the ability of a defendant charged with an either-way offence to elect trial by jury in the Crown court. This is one of the key changes that add up to reforms that represent an unprecedented erosion of our right to trial by jury, which is, without doubt, one of our oldest and most important traditions. It has been with us for hundreds and hundreds of years, bordering on the amount of time one might typically consider to make it an ancient right, as some people refer to it. No wonder that right has become so valuable when we compare it to what went before. For about 500 years before the beginnings of what became the jury trial system, we had trial by ordeal. Guilt was determined by God through his unseen hand in the outcome of events, unrelated to considering in any way what happened or what we might consider evidence. The two main forms this took were trial by fire and trial by water. For trial by fire, the accused had to carry a red-hot iron bar and walk 9 feet. If the wound healed within three days, they were innocent, but if it festered, they were guilty. For trial by water, the accused was plunged into a pool of water on a rope with a knot tied in it a long hair’s length away from the defendant. If they sank to the depth of that knot, the water was deemed to have been accepting of them and their innocence, but if they floated, the water was rejecting them, rendering them guilty. There was of course also trial by combat, or wager of battle, a fight between the accused and the accuser, which was introduced by the Normans in 1066. Although they were invested in the wisdom of God and the Church, it was actually the gradual withdrawal and ultimate banning of the participation of the Church that brought an end to such practices. But that is not to say that even within those practices there was not some sense of allowing the views of others to play a role. Dr Will Eves, a research fellow at the University of St Andrews’ school of history, said that the key to the ordeal was the interpretation of the result. The community would probably have had some idea whether someone had actually committed the crime and would interpret accordingly. He said: “In trial by hot iron, the issue wasn’t if the iron had caused a wound but rather how it had healed. So that’s a much more nuanced issue, much more open to interpretation. Whether the wound was festering was a judgment which could be influenced by the community’s knowledge of the individual involved and their awareness of the broader circumstances of the case.” The wider involvement of the community then took the form of testaments to character, rather than a careful examination of the facts, as a basis for determining guilt. On 26 January 1219, King Henry III issued an edict, and trial by petty jury was born in England, but it was its precursor that introduced the idea of 12 individuals that is still with us today. In 997, King Æthelred issued the Wantage code, which determined that 12 noblemen—of course, it was just men—be tasked with the investigation of a crime. It is an extraordinary testament to the legacy and enduring nature of such proposals that a core element of that kernel of an idea, with 12 individuals at the heart of the system, remains more than 1,000 years later. Prior to the petty jury reforms, there were other forms of jury—for example, to investigate land disputes—but guilt was still determined by trial by ordeal. The reforms made by King Henry III are rightly considered one of our most important cultural, and we might even say civilisational, inheritances. The concept and approach has, in some form, been spread around the world to more than 50 countries. In 1956, the legal philosopher Patrick Devlin said: “For of all the institutions that have been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to be called…the privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom”. Committee members may have noted that the 1219 edict came after the often quoted Magna Carta declaration of 1215. That declaration was a precursor to the fundamental idea behind what became jury trials and the 1219 edict: the idea that the judgment of an individual should be made by their peers. The barons had in mind the importance of protecting people from the heavy hand of the King, but their instincts are reflected neatly in all those who now have concerns about the power of the state in all its forms, including the judicial system that collectively holds the power that then sat with the King. The Bill asks us to consider reforms to ideals and protections hard fought and won for us, for very good reason, many hundreds of years ago. That fact alone should give us reason to tread carefully. Of course, as we have heard in earlier debates and the Committee’s evidence sessions, the use of jury trials is not absolute. The form a jury trial takes varies across the countries that adopted it, and our system has undergone reform. It is fair to say that the debate is not absolute or black and white. The majority of criminal cases in this country are decided by magistrates, whose role and importance were solidified in the modern era by the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Although the Government and their supporters might say it, we are not arguing that we should turn back the clock, or that all those currently seen by magistrates should be seen by jury trials instead, but let us consider the nature and manner of the reforms made in the modern era that remain in place today. Changes were made during world war two. At a time when our nation faced one of its greatest threats, when our continued existence as a free state was uncertain and when every effort was turned toward winning the war, what did we do? Did we radically cut down on jury trials? No. The number of jury trials and what cases would or would not be considered by them remained completely unchanged. The change was made to the number of jurors, which was reduced from 12 to seven. What did the Government of the day do as soon as the Nazi threat was defeated? They put it back up to 12. In more recent memory we had the covid pandemic, a challenge sometimes equated in seriousness to world war two. When every aspect of our society, public life and freedoms were massively curtailed in a way that was completely unprecedented, did we permanently get rid of jury trials? No. There was cross-party consensus that we should do everything we could to maintain jury trials. We invested millions of pounds in Nightingale courts, alongside other measures, to allow jury trials to continue as soon as they could, without making any permanent change to the law and individuals’ right to access jury trials. Labour Members will no doubt point to the changes on triable either-way offences, similar to the proposals in clause 1, that were made in the 1980s, but done differently, via offence reclassification. The changes covered common assault where no one was injured, joyriding and lower-level criminal damage, and research shows that they led to a 5% drop in the number of cases that headed to the Crown court. These are questions of gradation, and the reforms in the Bill are unprecedented in their impact and completely incomparable with those changes. The Government’s own analysis says that they will result in a halving of the number of jury trials. Who else might we turn to in support of our view that labelling the erosion of a right as a reform and realigning the dial further and further away from where we are now cannot be seen as a minor act? We can turn to many members of the Government, and the Prime Minister himself, to support our view. On limiting jury trials, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards) said: “Instead of weakening a key constitutional right, the government should do the hard work.” The Justice Secretary said: “The right of an individual to be punished only as a result of the “lawful judgement of his equals” was enshrined in Magna Carta of 1215. Yes, this right only extended to a certain group of men, but it laid the foundation of a principle which is now fundamental to the justice system of England and Wales.” He also said: “Jury trials are fundamental to our democracy. We must protect them.” Finally, he said: “Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.” That is what the Deputy Prime Minister, Justice Secretary and lead proponent of the reforms has said. Finally the Prime Minister has said that the “general and overriding presumption should be jury trial, with very, very limited exceptions”, and that “The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.” There we have it. They all understood that these are questions of balance. The Government are simply on the wrong side of that balance with the reforms in the Bill, including clause 1. That is not just because of the scale and gravity of the changes, but because of the other ways forward and other approaches, as yet untested but available to them. The Opposition’s approach in Committee, on this clause and others, is therefore straightforward. We will test whether the Government have correctly diagnosed the problem, whether the evidence supports the proposed solution, whether the safeguards being removed are proportionate to the gains claimed, and whether other options are available. Those are the fundamental questions. Of course, we will not forget that, despite everything else Government Members said previously, the reforms were born of necessity and that the Minister believes they are positive improvements to our justice system regardless. The Government have estimated that clause 1 and other clauses will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. They think the provisions will reduce the open Crown court caseload by around 14,000 cases, and cost £338 million between 2024-25 and 2034-35. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and models that the Government used to produce the estimates, particularly in respect of how much time jury-only trials would save. Cassia Rowland of the Institute for Government has said that the total impact of the Government’s proposals on court demand is “likely to be around a 7-10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom”. She therefore considered that improving court efficiency, “an alternative which enjoys broad support across the sector and which could begin much faster”, provided “opportunities for meaningful improvements”. She said that implementing such efficiencies “alongside more moderate proposals to handle some more cases in magistrates’ courts…would be less likely to provoke backlash.” I could not agree with her more. The Criminal Bar Association has criticised the “over-optimism” of the impact assessment, describing the Government statement that the Bill would only increase magistrates court demand by 8,500 days as “astonishing”. It says: “The assumptions are that magistrates will complete each of these trials within four hours and guilty pleas/sentences within 30 minutes. Is there is an expectation that magistrates will be dispensing rough justice when they have these more complex, more serious cases allocated to them? Or are the assumptions in the Impact Assessment simply wrong?” I think they are. Let us be clear: the Government would have us believe that 27,000 crown court sitting days can simply be converted into just 8,500 magistrates sitting days. Clause 1 represents a fundamental shift in the balance between the citizen and the state. At present, a defendant in an either-way case has the right to elect trial by jury. The clause removes that right entirely, with the decision resting solely with the magistrates court, depending on likely sentence length. We object to the clause in its entirety, but we have also sought to put forward meaningful changes through amendment 38, which would simply allow the defendant to demonstrate that, in the particular circumstances of their case, trial without a jury would breach the principles of natural justice. What current examples of violations of natural justice do we envision and hope this safeguard can protect against? Let us consider two theoretical cases of offenders, both facing trial for theft. This may be an opportune moment to point out that some of the examples used by Government Members to demonstrate the irrationality of Crown court time being frequently taken up by theft offences betray a lack of understanding of what happens in terms of the likely disposals in such cases. Nevertheless, as it seems such a popular example, I am happy to use it. In the first example, we have an accused who has never been in trouble with the law before. He or she has a clean record and the offence was not aggravated in any way. In fact, he or she gives an account of a misunderstanding. No harm came to the victim, and the value of the goods they are said to have stolen was considered to be medium—between £500 and £10,000. But the impact of a guilty finding on his or her life would be enormous, because the accused is a practising solicitor. It would almost certainly lead to the loss of their employment and significant damage to their reputation. The sentencing guidelines suggest that if the accused is found guilty, they might expect just over a year in prison. They are determined to have their case heard by a jury, because they believe their account of events would be believed by a jury, but under clause 1 as it stands, that would be denied them. Because they are clear of their innocence, they will not take a police caution, an out of court disposal, or make an early guilty plea. Let us consider another accused. They are very far from being a person with a clean record. They have been convicted of multiple offences of theft, and other offences alongside those in the past—for example, criminal damage and common assault. They have been convicted of theft more than a dozen times. Those of us who have had an interest in criminal justice for some time will know that those sorts of offenders regularly appear before the courts. The accusation the second person faces is of another order of seriousness. They are accused of having stolen a piece of jewellery worth more than £100,000. In fact, the loss of that item led to the collapse of a small business, as the owner was an elderly lone female, who is now living in constant fear and simply cannot face customers again. She trusted the accused on their visit to the business, and does not feel that she can trust anyone else. The accused faces up to six years in custody, so they will retain their right to a jury trial. They have no reputation to lose as a serial and convicted offender, and no employment to lose either.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Minister for picking me up on that; I meant that they are determining the guilt of individuals who can then face up to three years in prison. It undermines the veracity and importance of Sir Brian’s recommendations that the Government do not have the support of his report on this, the profoundest and most unprecedented change that they are making. That cannot be understated. The Bill makes clear that in all cases falling below the threshold sentence of more than three years, a trial must take place without a jury. That is not at individual discretion, but a hard and fast rule. The Committee should note that the threshold is assessed prospectively, on a likely sentence basis. That means that at an early stage, the court is being asked to make an evaluative judgment about the likely sentence before a trial, and to use that judgment to determine whether the oldest safeguards in our system are available at all. The Minister may, quite rightly, say that making estimates or anticipating likely sentencing outcomes is part of our system—but never in this way, and never with the consequences that will flow in terms of who determines an individual’s guilt as a result of that estimation. The consequences are profound. Yet for all the Government’s reliance on the three-year threshold, proposed new section 74D makes clear that a judge sitting alone retains the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose a sentence of more than three years where appropriate. That will allow a judge to determine guilt on their own, and potentially to sentence someone for many years—more than three—for an offence. Those two issues interact. The Minister was right to call me out for blending the two measures, but they are linked in the real world, and they certainly will be linked in the minds of defendants and the wider public. That relates back to the confidence issue. If a defendant sees that the person whom they think was inappropriately asked to determine their guilt is also then allowed to give them a sentence beyond what they were expecting to get, and beyond the thresholds that were designed for the imposition of a sentence, that creates real challenges for public confidence. There is a tension in the Government’s remarks around this issue, because they have emphasised throughout that all these reforms will not be used for the most serious cases. That is how they have described it. That is largely determined by taking into account the sentencing length that is available—it is not a direct read-across, but more serious offences inevitably have longer sentence lengths, so someone will potentially be directly affected by these reforms around the same sentence lengths that the Government say are not appropriate for different types of offences. The Government might say that they are not choosing certain types of offences with very long sentences, but someone could end up with exactly the sort of sentence that someone else might receive for something like a rape offence. The Government think that that is acceptable but, again, it is inherently contradictory. The Committee should also be concerned by the structure of the reallocation under proposed new section 74B. Cases can move from jury to judge alone and then from judge alone to jury following changes of circumstance or the emergence of new evidence. Such decisions may profoundly affect how justice is perceived, yet the Bill provides no right of appeal against them. What the Government are doing here is not simply adjusting or tinkering; they are creating a new mode of criminal trial in the Crown court by allowing a single judge to determine guilt in a substantial class of cases, allowing that decision to be revisited during proceedings, permitting it in some circumstances without a hearing and then insulating those decisions from appeal. The Government’s case for doing all that relies heavily on efficiency, but this is precisely where the clause remains weak. The wider criticism of the Bill has always been that the backlog is being treated as if it were caused by jury trials rather than case management failures, workforce pressures, poor productivity and court capacity. We talked a lot about the IFG’s criticisms of the modelling and the data that the Government put forward to justify their clauses, but the IFG is not alone in thinking that the Government’s claims around the benefits are unsubstantiated. The London School of Economics submitted in written evidence what it thought about the Government’s approach to modelling. It said: “Sir Brian Leveson stated that the modelling on which his recommendations were based is ‘uncertain and should be viewed as indicative’ and that the MoJ should ‘carry out more detailed modelling on the operational and financial impact of the recommendations’.” I brought that up in the evidence session with Sir Brian and put it to him that he had said that further work should be done; he did not feel that it was for him to comment any further than that. The LSE says: “Given the range of reforms suggested by the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, their complex interrelation, and the lack of rigorous modelling by independent research groups, we are not confident that the evidential basis for curtailing jury trial has been established.” Both the IFG and the LSE think that the modelling case has not been successfully made, so there are a number of different questions on that. This is important because Parliament is being asked to accept the removal of a fundamental safeguard, not because the Government have shown that jury trials are causing the delay, but because it has chosen to pursue structural reform before exhausting operational solutions. The real constitutional innovation here is not only that some cases may be tried without a jury, but that Parliament is being asked to enact a statutory presumption in favour of a judge-only trial for a broad range of Crown court cases, with very limited, if any, safeguards once that allocation has been made. The Committee should also consider the wider context in which these proposals are brought forward. Sir Brian Leveson’s review did not present the removal of jury trials as a stand-alone solution; it sets out a broader programme of reforms aimed at improving efficiency, capacity and case management across the system, and yet the Government have chosen to bring forward the most constitutionally significant elements of that review, those that limit access to jury trials, while leaving much of the operational reform agenda unimplemented. We have visited this point a number of times today: the Government have not done the things they say they will do that will make a difference. They cannot realistically claim that those things will not have the necessary impact if they have not tried to implement them.

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Thanks ever so much for coming, and for your patience with the parliamentary procedure. I know that these things are really challenging sometimes, so I want to thank you in advance for talking about difficult things. Also, rather than being dependent on what we may ask you, I want to give you the opportunity to lay out two or three points that you really want to get across to us today. Claire Throssell: Thank you for the question, and I have four points that I really want to get across this afternoon. First, I want to make it clear that presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety. Presumption has no place when it comes to children’s lives. Presumption has no place when it comes to our lives. What happened to Jack and Paul was based on a series of presumptions under practice direction 12J, and you have to ask the question: why did a professional working for CAFCASS, after being barricaded in her office, presume that Jack and Paul were safe to go on a visit? Why did she presume that I was exaggerating, despite me telling her and a court—let us be clear that I did—that he was capable of killing? Why was it presumed that it was okay to ignore my voice? Why did they presume that two children would be safe when they had clear evidence in front of them that they would not be? We are talking about presumption, and people say, “Yes, the practice direction is there in the Children Act 1989.” Let us be clear: there are 68 children who have died under that Act. There are 68 children who have died under practice direction 12J. I say again: presumption has no place when it comes to children’s safety. I am going to show some evidence now, and I show these pictures not to shock or upset people, but to show the reality of presumption of contact. I would like to show you two photographs, the first of which shows Jack and Paul. They were never child A and child B in a serious case review. They are child 18 and child 19 in a Women’s Aid report that looked into how many children have died at the hands of known perpetrators of domestic abuse. This 12-year-old boy, Jack, died believing that he had saved the life of his younger brother, because I never told him differently—I held both my sons in my arms as they died. Jack’s voice was never heard; the day he was supposed to have his interview with CAFCASS was the day that he died in my arms. The only time this boy’s voice was heard was on a landing, when he spoke to a fireman and a doctor. Although he was dying, he used as much of his strength as he could to tell as many people in that property, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose.” This was taken by the police as a dying testimony. Why did they not take his words in life? Why did they take his words in death? This second photograph of Jack is again evidence of what happens with presumption of contact. The first photograph of Jack was taken in the July, and this second photograph shows Jack in the October. CAFCASS and a court presumed that this boy would be safe. Social services presumed that this boy would be safe. This boy died believing that he had saved the life of his brother, and more importantly, he thought of everybody else but himself. When people should have protected him, he went back for his brother. He gave his brother his hand. He gave his brother his strength. He was there for his brother, but who was there for him at 12 years old? Not the court that ordered contact because of the culture in the family courts that contact is in the best interests of the child—that they should see both parents. Jack had nobody, and he thought about me—he made sure that everybody in the property knew that I was not to blame. As a parent, I am ashamed of that, because it was my role to protect them. Let us be clear that I have to live with the fact that they died only because a domestic abuser wanted to punish me. A family court allowed him to do that, but these two beautiful boys only lost their lives because of me. When we talk about repealing presumption of contact, let us look at it: over 30 years, children have died. In 2014, Jack and Paul were child 18 and child 19. Let us face the fact that, in 2026, we are at 68 children. That is not good enough, because every child deserves to live. Every child deserves to have a childhood, and their childhood should not be allowed to be torn apart piece by piece by seeing a perpetrator of domestic abuse—by seeing a person who just wants to hurt them, humiliate them and punish an ex-partner. Children have one childhood. Children at risk of harm only have today; they do not have tomorrow. You have a chance—a lifesaving opportunity—right here, right now to make a difference to children’s lives, not just today, not just tomorrow, but for generations of children to come. It is no surprise that there are many people in their 20s with mental health issues. Mental health has never been as bad as it is right now in young people. And why is that? It is because they are made to see a parent who is hurting them. They are made to see a parent who is harming them. It might not be physical, and it might not be the ultimate act, like it was for Jack and Paul, but if a child comes back from a visit and they are different from how they were when they went on the visit, let us be clear: that is child abuse. Children are supposed to have a voice. Children are supposed to have opinions. But all too often there are too many other voices in this complex system that are louder than the child. We hear about parental rights all the time, but around children’s rights there is a deafening silence. We have an Act that protects them: the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. They are supposed to be seen as victims in their own right, and yet, up and down our country, their rights are still being walked over—not only their rights under the Domestic Abuse Act, but their human rights too. They have the same rights as we do. They are people; they are humans; they are themselves. Their basic rights—to live, to thrive, to live in privacy, to live in peace—are being broken in courts up and down the country. That is not good enough. They are the future of this country, and if we get this wrong, what does the future of our country look like? What have we got for the future? They are not being allowed to live as they want to live. They are not being allowed to be free. They are certainly not allowed to thrive. If you go to school, college or university and you have suffered that morning, how are you going to learn? How is that conducive to achieving in life and being who you could be? I used to tell the boys, “Be the best that you can be today.” They only had today. Right now, with this Bill repealing presumption of contact, we can give every child in this country the tomorrow that not just Jack and Paul, but 66 other children will never see. This issue is bigger than Jack and Paul, but they were my reality. They were my children. They were the better parts of me. But 66 children are anonymous. Successive Governments have made them a child A or a child B in a serious case review, to gather dust in a file in Whitehall or around here, just brushed under the carpet. Serious case reviews—lessons must be learnt. I can ask everybody in here, “What lessons have we learnt?”, because every year we are losing more children, and we are losing more children because of practice direction 12J, because of presumption of contact. There should never be presumption—not in law, not when it comes to safety, not when it comes to lives. You would not go in a court and presume that somebody is guilty.

• 12 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  On a recent visit to St Richard’s Catholic college in my constituency, students told me that they face paying an astonishing extra £400 a year in bus fares. How can the Minister justify to those students and others in my constituency the cutting of our bus service funding by £2.5 million?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Medical Training (Prioritisation) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  The Secretary of State is essentially talking about postgraduate training. I wonder what thought he has given to new clause 2 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). I have spoken to students who worked really hard all the way through medical school to get the best exam results and perform highly but then ended up in an allocation system that pays no attention whatsoever to that. Merit has been entirely removed from the system. I think it was wrong for us to make that change. Does he have any sympathy for returning to a merit-based system?

• 2 Dec 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Thank you for that further clarification, Sir Roger. These issues are absolutely live and happening all the time—this week alone, we have seen examples of it—and we need to understand the implications of the Bill. I am far from alone in recognising the difficulty in defining terms such as “candour” and “public interest”. John Coggon, professor of law at the University of Bristol law school, writes: “The public interest has no single, fixed definition. Even as a technical term of art its sense varies both for being context dependent and for being a question that may be settled by different sorts of institutional actor. It may, for instance, demand consideration of national security, national economic interest, protection of health, maintenance of a justice system, protection of fundamental rights. And determinations may be made by courts, politicians, legislators, executive agencies, and so on. Each can and will bring different forms and ranges of consideration to the process of determining what the public interest demands, and whether those demands are compelling.” Anyone who has spent any time inside a public body—a police force, a regulator or a Government Department—knows that the public interest can mean very different things to different people. It is shaped by context, role, circumstance and sometimes professional norms. What one official believes to be in the public interest, a Minister, senior civil servant or statutory body might see very differently. That is not mere theory; it is the daily reality of modern governance. Questions were raised during the evidence sessions about how the public interest might be used inappropriately in defence of an allegation of misconduct in public office. As new clause 2 points to, paragraph 1(8)(b) of schedule 1 specifically allows for the withholding of information in the public interest. Failing in that area could lead to both those we would wish not to be prosecuted being prosecuted and those we want to see prosecuted escaping justice. It is an important area of how the Bill will operate. I am not so ambitious as to suggest that through the Bill the Committee will be able to create a perfect definition of public interest, but I speak in support of the new clause in an attempt to ensure that the Government recognise that they need to properly engage with that issue if the Bill is to be successful. A definition of the public interest need not be exhaustive, as I have said, but the wide-ranging ramifications of the Bill place an onus on the Government to ensure that the frontline civil servant of any kind has somewhere to look and turn to when wrestling with these matters—a starting point that might help them to structure their thinking and make decisions. By failing to define the term at all, even in the most basic way, the Bill risks giving us a duty that is challenging to operate for a junior civil servant. It risks more uncertainty about compliance, inconsistency between institutions and even potential litigation where prosecutors or courts are left to decide after the fact what Parliament must have meant. The obvious challenging scenario is when officials need to consider situations where there are competing public interests—national security versus transparency, value for money versus speed of delivery, or personal privacy versus public accountability. Without more assistance for thinking those matters through, how does an official protect themselves from the—possibly criminal—allegation that their judgment call was not in the public interest among competing interests? The new clause does not attempt to dictate exactly what public interest must mean; it simply requires the Secretary of State to set out a structure or framework in regulations, subject to approval by both Houses. Ultimately, if this legislation is to achieve the cultural change that the Government claim it will, the foundations must be clear and easy to understand. Public officials should not be left purely guessing what Parliament might have meant, or how we expected them to weigh these issues—Parliament should tell them. New clause 2 offers the Government the opportunity to do exactly that, and I hope they will take it.

• 27 Nov 2025 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Professor Waters, first I want to acknowledge the circumstances that bring you here today, which is not something that any of us would want to experience. Condolences on your loss. What was your experience of applying for legal aid, and what difference did it make to you that you did not get representation? Professor Waters: It was two years ago exactly on this day that the inquest into my sister’s death started. We found out four days before the commencement of the inquest that our application for legal aid had been refused—four days. In preparation for that and the possibility that we might have to go into the inquest not represented or foot the bill ourselves, or the lawyers have to do it pro bono—why should they?—I read over 2,000 pages of disclosure evidence. It was very traumatic, as you can imagine, to read some of the details of what my sister went through and some of the medical reports and so on. That alone was traumatising. A freedom of information request recently found out that Ofsted, which is one of three public bodies—interested parties—that our family were up against, spent £68,000 on external counsel alone and could not provide us with the figures for how much it had spent in its internal legal department. Ofsted has its own legal department—but it still spent £68,000 of taxpayers’ money on external counsel. Presumably, the other interested parties, Reading borough council and Berkshire NHS trust, will have spent similar amounts of money and also have their own internal legal departments. My family, as taxpayers, were indirectly paying the legal fees of the three bodies that had done harm to my sister. That just speaks volumes on the imbalance of power in this system. It is really retraumatising that at your absolute lowest—and I really hope that no one in this room has been where I was—it is at that point that you suddenly have to navigate this entirely alien system. You do not have lessons at school on what an inquest is, where you find an inquest lawyer, what a prevention of future deaths report is, what kind of coroner you want or what kind of inquest you are going to get. But suddenly, when you are absolutely traumatised by a terrible and preventable death of a loved one, you have to find this stuff out. I am here speaking to you. I have been speaking publicly about what our family has been through and continues to go through—but for every person like me and the other witness, how many hundreds of people are there who are crushed by that system and are unable, for whatever quite legitimate reason, to stick up for themselves and inform themselves? Parity of arms is absolutely crucial and it cannot come soon enough.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Social Media Posts: Penalties for Offences · Hansard source

  More

  That is a good example of the sort of question we cannot answer. We have had to rely on a media organisation putting forward FOIs to get some information. If the Government took ownership of the issue and published proper data, which might be able to pick out the nuances, we could have a more realistic debate. The hon. Gentleman is right that that could be the explanation, but we are none the wiser. We cannot simply blame this spike on rank-and-file officers. They are often only following orders from their superiors, who point to guidance from the NPCC and the College of Policing. Another key issue is that many people I have spoken to who perhaps thought that people such as Lucy Connolly had done the wrong thing and should be punished, but were concerned about the length of the prison sentence. At the same time as the Government will not budge on this issue, they are passing legislation that will let thousands of violent sexual offenders out of prison early. Very many thousands of them will serve only a third of their sentences. The Government say that there is not enough prison space, yet their proportionate response is to say that we have plenty of prison space to arrest other people.

• 11 Jul 2025 · Secure 16 to 19 Academies Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to express the Opposition’s support for the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Cramlington and Killingworth (Emma Foody) for bringing it forward. I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) was not so keen for me to make the most of the time available, so I do not intend to. As was noted during the earlier stages of the Bill, this legislation largely mirrors a previous Bill introduced before the election by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson)—my office neighbour, as it happens. Although the previous Bill did not complete its passage, I pay tribute to her dedication and clear commitment to improving outcomes for children in custody. She laid the ground work for the Bill we are debating today, and I have no doubt that she will be pleased to see it return to the House with the support of the hon. Member for Cramlington and Killingworth. Secure 16 to 19 academies, also known as secure schools, are a new form of custodial provision, with education and rehabilitation at their core. They represent a much-needed shift in how we support and care for young people in custody. The last Conservative Government introduced the first secure school, Oasis Restore in Medway. The evidence shows that smaller units that focus on education, health and the root causes of offending are the most likely to reduce reoffending. By helping these children—and they are children—to turn their lives around, we can make sure that everyone is safer in the long run. Secure schools are not typical educational institutions, and it is both appropriate and necessary that different legal and procedural requirements apply to them. The Bill makes a number of changes to funding and consultation requirements, which are all eminently sensible. Although we agree with the Bill’s provisions, we would welcome reassurance from the Government that the schools will be properly funded and supported, and that appropriate steps are being put in place to ensure that young people in custody are properly supported to reduce their reoffending. If secure schools are to succeed where other parts of the youth estate have historically struggled, they must be properly resourced, effectively led and rooted in strong local partnerships. We would be interested to hear more in due course about the Government’s long-term vision for the youth estate. What further plans do they have, if any, to open any new secure schools? What future role do they see young offender institutions and secure training centres playing? How will the Government ensure that partnerships with health and education providers are strengthened to maximise the impact of this reform? I would be grateful if the Minister could make some remarks along those lines. This is a practical and proportionate Bill. The Opposition support it and look forward to seeing its progress.