Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026

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Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.

55 published records · newest first.

Speeches

  • 29 Jun 2026 · Home Office and Ministry of Justice · Hansard source
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    If you will forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am talking about a major issue that relates directly to the estimates: the prison building programme, the need for that programme and what the Government are doing to manage the prison population. I believe it is directly related to the estimates in that regard. I repeat, sincerely, that multiple Governments of different parties have let prisoners out of prison early in order to manage prison crises, but they have never let rapists and child groomers out early. Government Members are therefore backing a totally unnecessary way of managing prison capacity. They really do not have to do it. They are being forced into doing so, and I feel very sorry for them as a result. It is difficult to understand how the Government can lay these estimates before the House and put forward a proposal for changes to sentencing if they do not even know how many people they are letting out of prison and for what reason. I cannot believe that the Minister thinks that that is acceptable, and it will be difficult for her to justify. But, to be fair, she may also struggle to answer a basic question about her own responsibilities—about her plans to erode our right to jury trial and to abolish our right to elect. The Conservatives will oppose any erosion of the right to jury trial. It is a constitutional protection that belongs to people, not to the convenience of a Government. The evidence does not support the case that jury trials are the cause of the backlog; empty courtrooms are. We are awaiting a date for Report stage of the Courts and Tribunals Bill. Given the political situation, and considering the Minister’s planned capital and revenue expenditure in this area, I think it is entirely legitimate to ask whether the proposal on jury trials is even still Government policy. When the legislation that is meant to address the central crisis in our criminal justice system is dependent on who wins an internal party election in the next few weeks—if there even is one—that is not a functioning legislative programme; it is chaos dressed up as reform. Are the Government laser-focused on what will actually work to bring the backlog down? No. Instead, they have been laser-focused on driving through unnecessary vandalism on one of our oldest constitutional rights. While the backlog is still much too high, the backlogs in Crown courts are stabilising and even coming down in some areas. The Government have announced uncapped Crown court sitting days for 2026-27, and we absolutely welcome that, even though it took much too long. It is exactly what we have called for consistently, and I give credit where it is due. We have seen the first quarterly decline in Crown court backlogs across England and Wales in three years in the most recent data. The Criminal Bar Association points out that in particular areas of the country, the reductions are more significant. In the south-east of England, the backlogs in courts are down 3.1% over three months and 4.2% over six months. In the north-west of England, they are down 2.3% over three months and 3.3% over six months. In the north-east of England, they are down 2.9% in three months. In Wales, they are down 2.4% over three months. Meanwhile, the figure for magistrates courts shows an all-time peak of more than 370,000 cases at the end of March this year, up 2% on the previous quarter—and the magistrates courts are where the Government want to send more cases. We heard again and again in the first stages of the Courts and Tribunals Bill that the workforce, whether it be in the courts, judges or legal representatives, can bring the backlogs down, but that the jury reforms were an unnecessary distraction. According to the X feed of the monitoring account Idle Courts, recently as many as 123 out of 516 Crown courtrooms—nearly a quarter—were standing empty on working days. We know that that was not because there were no cases to hear, no juries or no defendants. It was because of issues such as listing challenges, staffing shortages and the underutilisation of available court space. To date, the Government have not listened and have refused to drop those parts of the Bill that are, as the hon. Member for Chichester said, clearly unwelcome to so many in the workforce. I hope we learn today that what we are told about the views of the right hon. Member for Makerfield is correct and that this unacceptable plan to erode our jury rights will be dropped. Let me turn to the Home Office elements of this debate, because the two Departments are inextricably linked. Members will understand that it is not the day-to-day responsibility of the Minister or I, but we both know that what happens at the front end—policing, charging, and bail—flows directly into the courts, with probation and prisons at the back end. Police officer numbers fell by more than 1,000 in just one year under this Government, from September 2024 to September 2025, and the total number of people involved in policing fell by 3,000. The National Police Chiefs’ Council said in response to this year’s funding settlement and the estimates that we are debating that many forces are planning service reductions, with consequences for officer numbers, staff capacity and overall resilience. The Government cannot simultaneously claim to want swifter justice and a safer society while allowing the frontline workforce who investigate crime, make arrests and build prosecutions to continue to shrink. The Conservatives’ plan would put 10,000 extra officers on the streets, triple the use of stop and search, and introduce facial recognition technology in the worst crime hotspots. On asylum, the Home Office estimates that there are more than 400,000 illegal migrants in the UK—people in this country illegally—but nearly half cannot be removed because of outstanding asylum and human rights claims. Total spending on asylum support remains at over £4.5 billion, and the decision of the Government to put even more asylum seekers in more expensive locations such as Crowborough in Wealden in the constituency of your fellow Deputy Speaker, Madam Deputy Speaker, is going to cost more money than if they were to be kept in their original places. Let me close with this. The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee said that the focus of the debate can be distilled to concerns about the risks to public safety and trust, and he is right. We are spending more than ever before on our criminal justice system—billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money flow through the estimates we are debating—but reoffending is rising, rape gang survivors are being told that their abusers may be freed early and police officer numbers are falling. The Government may be about to change their Prime Minister, and with that the MOJ will more than likely welcome a new Lord Chancellor, so policies announced with great fanfare may quietly disappear over the summer, but the people waiting for Crown court hearings and the victims seeing criminals walk free will still be there. We will not oppose the estimate, but we will not let the Government off the hook, either. They have had nearly two years and the numbers are not getting any better. The public deserve better. The Opposition will hold them to account for every one of these figures, whoever happens to be sitting in Downing Street when we do it.

  • 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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    Thank you, Sir John. I just want to make a simple point. The Minister said that what the Government want to do does not require primary legislation, but in the same speech referred to primary legislation that we are considering today as part of introducing specialist rape courts. It is obvious to anybody that there is a requirement for primary legislation. We waited a year for Brian Leveson and we are two years into the Parliament. There are uncontroversial clauses that we have not opposed; the Government could have got on with those and passed them within six months, and they would be operating right now. I just do not think the Minister’s argument that nothing has been lost from progress on these issues because of the jury trial reforms stands up to scrutiny.

  • 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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    My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period. A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers. Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early. When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved. In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s. Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.

  • 27 Apr 2026 · Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Carry-over) · Hansard source
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    Let me say at the outset that the Opposition continue to support the broad aims of the Bill, as we have done throughout its passage. We recognise the importance of candour, transparency and accountability in public life and recognise the long and determined work of those campaigners, including the Hillsborough families and others who have fought for many years to ensure that where public bodies fail, evade, conceal or mislead, there are proper consequences. That principle remains an important one, and it is not a partisan principle. It is not owned by any one party or Government; it is a basic requirement of good government and of public confidence in the institutions of the state. As has been recognised throughout the passage of the Bill, legislation on its own cannot guarantee the cultural change that is needed. We have already introduced duties of candour in parts of the public sector—for example, the NHS—and have taken steps in recent years in policing to improve accountability, as well as creating the office of the independent public advocate, but questions remain about whether the system works as it should when it really matters. The lesson from Hillsborough, the infected blood scandal, the Post Office scandal and other serious institutional failures is that, yes, the legal framework matters, but so do culture and practice. For that reason, we want the Bill to progress and the areas of consensus to move forward, so we do not intend to oppose this carry-over motion. We have consistently taken part in proceedings in that matter. What I say next is not a criticism of the approach of campaigners, or indeed of the many Labour MPs who have been sincere and consistent in their campaigning on this issue over many years, including the hon. Members for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) and for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle). The Government have utterly mishandled this legislation from start to finish, which is why we are here today, six months on from Second Reading, with a Bill pulled at the last minute—and with broken promises. I do not expect Labour Members to relish joining me in that criticism. The Minister will, I am sure, say that the Government have at least brought a Bill forward, as if that were a blank cheque for the manner in which these proceedings have been conducted. I have some sympathy for her—she has been put into difficult situations—but trust has been damaged on all sides. Even though this Bill is about trust, candour and whether the public can believe what they are told by those who exercise power on their behalf, the process by which the Government have pursued the Bill has too often fallen short of the standards that Ministers say they want to impose on others through this legislation. The Prime Minister announced the Bill last September at party conference, and gave the clear impression that families and campaigners were content with the detail on the approach being taken. The House should remember that it had been widely reported several months earlier that a draft Bill had been rejected by campaigners. What else could we have reasonably assumed other than that those concerns had been addressed? It has since become crystal clear that campaigners were in fact not satisfied with the draft proposals, and that their support was conditional—as I understand it, they made that clear to the Government—but the Prime Minister wanted his big announcement and proceeded anyway. The Hillsborough Law Now campaign has explained its view: the delays since January have been caused not by the families or campaigners, but by disagreements within Government and by objections from the Cabinet Office, the security services and others. All that should surely have been dealt with prior to the drafting, publication and big announcement of the Bill, and the fact that it was not is why we are debating this carry-over motion. On more than one occasion, we were presented with a version of the Bill that the Government told us was the only possible approach to the inclusion of the intelligence services—until it was not. We were told that the balance had been struck, but then the Bill was withdrawn and there were reports of further changes. The issues relating to the security services could not be more serious. The Government cannot have it both ways; they cannot tell the House at one stage that the Bill they have published is the only responsible approach to the inclusion of the security services—and marshal the leaders of the security services to say the same thing—before moving away from that position without properly explaining what has changed, why, and whether the earlier assurances given to Members were sound. The Opposition have always accepted that national security raises real and serious issues; there will be material that cannot be handled in the same way as ordinary departmental papers, as well as operations, sources, methods and relationships with allies that require safeguards. Any responsible Government must take that seriously. It was a Conservative Member—my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty)—who asked how those provisions might apply to elements of the armed force, and those elements were then included in the Bill very late in the day. That is another issue that should have been properly thought through before the Government reached the point of withdrawing the Bill in January, which has led us to this carry-over motion. This is part of a broader pattern. We have seen a lack of candour from the Lord Chancellor when he has been asked about prisoner release, and tomorrow we will debate the candour and honesty of the Prime Minister. I have absolutely zero faith in this Government—zero. The Bill is literally about candour in public office, but this process has left campaigners, Members and the public unclear about the Government’s position from one month to the next. The Government should not be surprised, then, that we will not simply accept assurances about the Bill at face value. Assurances are not enough; the test will be the text of the Bill, whether Ministers can explain clearly and consistently how the Bill will operate in relation to our security and other services, and whether the Government can show that they have balanced transparency, accountability and national security in a workable, principled and robust way. I hugely respect the Hillsborough Law Now families and campaigners, but I am not afraid to say that they may well not be entirely satisfied by this law. A responsible Government must sometimes say that to campaigners, but this incredibly weak Prime Minister is not able to do so. The families and campaigners who have fought for this legislation deserve better than drift, confusion and mixed messages; they deserve frankness and candour. If the Government are not willing to do everything that the campaigners ask, they should just tell them so and get on with it. The public deserve legislation that is not merely well intentioned but clear, workable and effective. As I have explained, we will not oppose the carry-over motion, but we will scrutinise what comes next with the seriousness that the subject demands and the scepticism that the Government’s handling of the Bill has regrettably earned.

  • 27 Apr 2026 · Draft First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) Fees (Amendment) Order 2026 · Hansard source
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    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison, and to respond on behalf of the Opposition in this Delegated Legislation Committee. It might seem that this is a narrow measure, but, in reality, the draft order is part of a poorly implemented Act of Parliament. As the Minister explained, it introduces a £47 application fee for rent appeals, a £47 application fee for succession of assured tenancy rights and a £200 application fee, plus a £300 hearing fee, for financial penalty appeals, which are where landlords appeal civil penalties imposed by local authorities. That reflects the expanded scope of rent repayment orders under the Renters’ Rights Act, so it is clearly not an isolated change. The order is being introduced because, as the Minister described, Government legislation is creating new routes into the tribunal system, and Ministers need to introduce a fee structure to go with those routes. There are two immediate problems. The Government have not done an impact assessment for the order because, they say, no significant impact is foreseen, but that is hard to accept. The order introduces new fees into a system that the Government are making more widely applicable, and it is doing so in a sensitive area where access to the tribunal may matter a great deal to tenants and landlords alike. It simply does not look credible to say that there is no significant impact worth assessing. The Opposition have been clear for some time that the Government’s rental reforms will put more pressure on the courts and tribunals system before it is ready. Regardless of the changes that the Government make to the fee structure, such relatively minor, short-term changes in the income available to courts will not change that situation overnight. Our court system is simply not in a position to manage the influx that is likely to result from the Act, but Labour is pushing ahead without first showing that the wider justice system can cope. The Government are adding further operational pressures to the property chamber at a time when there are already problems across all elements of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. The Government should deal with those broader pressures first, not build new demand into the system and adjust the fee structure around it. There is also real concern about incentives. Geoffrey Vos, the Master of the Rolls, has warned that the rules under the Renters’ Rights Act could incentivise tenants to apply to the first-tier tribunal in respect of every rent increase, simply to delay its implementation. That is because even when a rent increase is upheld, it will take effect only from the date of the tribunal decision, not from the date of the notice being served, meaning that even unsuccessful challenges could delay higher rent payments for months. If that is the case, Ministers may be creating a much greater volume of tribunal work than they are willing to admit, and I would be grateful if the Minister would respond to that particular concern, which was raised by someone with significant credibility.. The broader truth is that Labour is failing to listen to those who understand the sector. No serious impact assessment has been done, there have been clear warnings about incentives and workload, and there are longstanding concerns that the wider Act will reduce supply and increase rents, yet Ministers are pressing on regardless. Our objection to the order is straightforward: it is not just a technical amendment, but part of a wider framework that places more reliance on a tribunal system that is already under strain. It comes without a proper assessment of impact, and helps to implement a wider Act that we believe will leave the rental market less, not more, stable. For those reasons, the Opposition cannot support the order.

  • 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source
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    As the Minister said, we are considering the next iteration of the question of admissibility, which addresses the evidentiary rules regarding previous false complaints in sexual offence cases. This is a sensitive area of criminal law where the pursuit of truth must be carefully balanced against the need to protect complainants from unfounded attacks on their character. The primary objective is to ensure that trials remain focused on the actual facts of the case at hand rather than being diverted by speculative allegations that a claimant has made false allegations in the past. The Law Society and Bar Council have indicated their support for this measure; they recognise that it brings clarity to the statutory framework governing bad character and credibility. The central feature of clause 10 is the introduction of a requirement for a “proper evidential basis” before any suggestion can be made that a complainant has previously fabricated an allegation of sexual offending. Currently, there is an ever-present danger that the defendant may attempt to undermine a complainant’s honesty by pointing to past allegations that simply did not result in a conviction. That is related to the challenges that we discussed in the debate on clause 8 regarding the difficulty of complainants when it comes to seeing a case through to the end—either because of the delays in the courts, which we are all concerned about; challenges with the police; or fears or concerns they might have about how their case was treated in the courts. There could be a whole series of reasons why a complainant does not pursue an allegation through to its fullest conclusion, none of which have anything to do with the allegation being false. Under the clause, the following factors are explicitly excluded from being used as sole proof of a false complaint: the fact that a previous allegation was denied; the fact that a previous case did not lead to a charge or result in an acquittal; any delay by the complainant in reporting the previous matter; and a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support prosecution in the past. By codifying those exclusions, the Bill aims to eliminate the use of unsupported assertions and ensure that the court does not rely on assumptions or stereotypes that are frequently used to imply that a complainant is untruthful. This is a helpful step in reforming the trial processes by ensuring that a defendant’s conduct and not the complainant’s history remains the focus of the jury. While the principle of clause 10 is sound, its success depends on how the courts interpret and apply the proper evidential basis test. We must ensure that this framework is robust enough to shield victims from speculative and prejudicial questioning while still being fair to the defendant. I have some questions for the Minister. Can she provide the Government’s thinking on what a proper evidential basis will look like? Do the Government envisage it requiring independent, objective proof of falsity, such as a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice, or will a lower standard suffice? Is the Minister confident that the current wording provides a road map clear enough to prevent judges from applying different standards? I want to address the gap in the data and understand how the measure will be implemented. In relation to previous complaints, very sadly there are victims of violence against women and girls who have been affected hundreds of times. Will the Minister explain what would happen if some of these “for exclusion” criteria had occurred at an extraordinary rate? If a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support a prosecution relating to a crime that happened hundreds of times, that could in itself be relevant. It would not necessarily be so—they may have chosen hundreds of times not to support a prosecution. However, unlike other elements of the Bill, the clause is highly specific in what it is excluding, so I want to check whether there is any flexibility for the judge so that, in extremis, they can still admit the evidence, or whether there is a hard no, regardless of circumstances.

  • 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source
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    I rise to speak in support of amendments 58 and 52; I will start with amendment 58. We find ourselves at a significant juncture in the history of our legal system, and the Government have presented us with a Bill framed primarily as a pragmatic response to the current record-breaking backlog of nearly 80,000 cases in our Crown courts. The central justification for their reforms, specifically the restriction of the right to a jury trial, is efficiency; the Government argue that by moving towards judge-led trials, we can streamline proceedings and reduce the demand on the Crown court by almost 20%. However, when we are asked to curtail a right that has stood as a cornerstone of our democracy for more than 800 years, we must move with extreme caution. We must ask whether this fundamental change is based on robust data or merely an intuitive sense of speed and individual opinions. It is not only reasonable, but essential to ask the Government to conduct an independent formal study into the actual time savings achieved by judge-only trials before they are implemented. Amendment 58 focuses on one of the more easily measured elements, which could be properly studied. The Government’s case for reducing jury trials is predicated on the idea that it means the trials will be 20% shorter, yet when we examine the source of this figure, its foundation begins to look unstable. Sir Brian Leveson, whose review informed much of the Bill, stated that the estimate of a 20% reduction is subject to “very high levels of uncertainty”. He further stated that “seeking to model how much time would be saved is extremely difficult.” That point is reinforced by the Government’s impact assessment. Their attempt to quantify the time saving found that it was likely to be in the range of 10% to 30%—potentially half the time saving that Sir Brian claimed—and even that figure is born of what we might call a light-touch engagement session with judges and others, rather than rigorous comparative data. If the primary justification for stripping away a constitutional right is a 20% efficiency gain, then Parliament is entitled to see clear, verified evidence that that gain is actually achievable. While the Government promise a transformation of the system, independent experts argue that the actual time saved will be marginal. The Institute for Government has analysed the proposals and suggests that the judge-only trials in the new bench division might save only 1.5% to 2.5% of total Crown court time. Furthermore, the Criminal Bar Association has pointed out that the Government’s impact assessment assumes that the average length of a trial in scope is six and a half sitting days when, in reality, these trials typically last closer to three days. By doubling the realistic length of those trials in their modelling, the Government have likely overestimated the potential savings. When we look at these figures, we must ask whether it is right to curtail a fundamental safeguard for a gain that may be as low as 1.5%, when today alone we have 10% of Crown courts sitting empty for no other particular reason than a lack of efficiency. The Government’s efficiency narrative is focused almost entirely on the front end of a trial, the time it takes to empanel a jury and deliver legal instructions, and the time they claim is taken up by what some have described in evidence as playing to the jury. It ignores the back end of the process, the delivery of the judgment. In a jury trial, once the evidence is closed, the jury deliberates continuously and provides an immediate verdict of guilty or not guilty. Importantly, in that time, a judge can be otherwise engaged, hearing other cases and doing other work. From their perspective, the fact-finding phase is over instantly. A judge sitting alone does not have that luxury. To satisfy the requirements of transparency and guard against appeals, a judge must produce a reasoned judgment that addresses every point of law and fact. In other jurisdictions, delivering a verdict and providing those judgments can be reserved, meaning that they are written weeks or even months after the trial concludes. Unlike a jury, a judge has a full docket of other administrative duties. We risk a situation where the time theoretically saved is then lost through another route. Without a comparative study of what I will refer to as the judicial deliberation gap, we are making systemic changes based on an incomplete set of metrics. Additionally, because a judge’s written reasoning provides a detailed map of their logic, we are likely to see a significant spike in appeals. A jury’s verdict is difficult to appeal on the facts; a judge’s written judgment invites scrutiny for any minor error in law or logic, further clogging the higher courts. The Government have spoken frequently about the lack of availability of professionals within the legal system to hear criminal cases, and it will be the same KCs and others who will be stuck in the Court of Appeal on these cases, instead of being in the Crown court hearing cases from the backlog. For those reasons, we propose a simple, pragmatic pause. We are asking the Government to commission an independent study of the length of time required for a judge sitting alone to deliver a judgment after conviction. This is a matter of sequencing: evidence first, implementation second. In any other field, be it medicine or engineering, we would never implement a change of this magnitude without a pilot study or a comparative dataset. We picked this element as something amenable to study; there is nothing preventing the Government from commissioning a series of either sitting or retired judges to sit in the public galleries of trials happening in the ordinary way and then to go away and consider what reasons they would present and how long that would take. The Government could then measure and study the reality of that. Of course, that would vary from judge to judge, but a study with sufficient statistical power, with enough people taking part, could give us a genuine insight into how long these things will take. If the Government are confident that this process will be short and sharp and able to save time, I see no reason why they would not want to know it for sure before proceeding on that basis. If that study showed that that 20% saving was a myth, and that the time taken on the back end cancelled out any gains made during the trial, of course the reforms should be paused or reversed. We should not trade a system that works for one that merely looks faster on a spreadsheet. Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. It is important that we gather the facts and measure the actual time it takes for a judge to provide a reasoned judgment. If the evidence does not support the Government’s assumptions, we must have the courage to stop these reforms before we permanently damage one of our most valued constitutional inheritances. I now move on to amendment 52. As I have mentioned, we are debating the important element of reforms that are historic in their reduction of our access to jury trials. They are predicated on the idea that that is the sole and only way that we can tackle the backlog in the Crown courts. If we are to accept the Government’s claim that trials without juries are a tool for efficiency, we must hold the system to that standard. For that reason, it seems sensible and necessary to require that, in any trial without a jury, the judge must provide their verdict and their reasons immediately. Allowing a judge to delay their reasoning is not just a procedural flaw, but a logical contradiction that undermines the very efficiency that the Bill seeks to achieve. The Government’s most frequent argument for restricting juries is that they waste time due to the need to go slowly through the evidence and the unpredictable length of deliberations. The Government promise that a judge, as a legal expert, will streamline the process. However, that argument collapses the moment that a judge says, “I will give my verdict, but you will have to leave it with me while I go away and write it up.” The goal is to save time but, if there is a separate process that requires significant enough time that it cannot be done as part of the trial, where is the saving? In written evidence, we were warned of what might be called a bottleneck shift, where we might clear courtroom space more quickly, only to move the delay into the judge’s chambers. As the Criminal Bar Association points out, the reasonable time provision is currently too vague. I understand that it is not unheard of in other jurisdictions with judge-alone trials, such as Canada and New Zealand, for parties to sometimes wait months for the full reasons to be given for the verdict. By contrast, a jury provides a benchmark of finality. They do not go home to handle other business for a month; they deliberate while the evidence is fresh and stay until the job is done. As I pointed out earlier, while they are doing that, the judge is free to carry on with other matters. A case awaiting a verdict is a frozen case. It hangs over the court’s docket. It prevents the defendant from moving to the sentencing or appeal phase and potentially requires the judge eventually to relearn and reacquaint themselves with the full details of the case, perhaps weeks later. We are told that judges are professional triers of fact and that, precisely because of that expertise, we should be able to expect a system that reflects it. A jury of 12 people must be taught the law from scratch, whereas a judge, who already knows the law, should be taking structured notes and filtering and identifying relevant and irrelevant information in real time. By the time closing arguments are finished, a professional judge has been living with the facts and the law for days or weeks. They are in the best possible position to explain their logic at that moment. When a judge delays a verdict and the reasons for it, they are forced into double-handling the evidence, re-reading transcripts and notes to recapture their original thoughts. That is not efficiency—it is a waste of judicial resources. The requirement for immediacy is also a vital safeguard of the integrity of the law. There is potentially a subtle temptation for a judge who announces an initial verdict on a Monday, but writes the reasons for it on a Friday, to reverse engineer the logic of their original conclusions, even if inadvertently. Instead of the reasons leading the verdict, the verdict begins to dictate the reasons. The judge may subconsciously highlight only the facts that make their decision appeal-proof, rather than providing a raw, honest account of why they believed one witness over another. Members may well be familiar with the idea of confirmation bias; it is something that we are all affected by. If we make a decision and then come back to it at a later date, we have an inherent human failing of tending to dwell on, have our attention drawn to and be more mindful of things that reinforce our decision, rather than things that take away from it. Therefore, immediate reasoning ensures that judges are ruling on the evidence as it was heard. If the Government claim bench trials are superior because they are reason-based, those reasons must be robust enough to be stated out loud at the moment of verdict, forcing a level of intellectual honesty that is the only acceptable substitute for the collective common sense of a jury. Critics may argue that some cases are too complex for an immediate ruling. However, as some of the evidence suggests, very good reasons to delay should be defined strictly and should not include a busy schedule or a desire to write at another time. A very good reason should be limited to genuinely unforeseen situations. Indeed, as amendment 52 provides: “The judgment must be given at the time of conviction, except where an adjournment is necessary” for specific and well understood purposes, such as preparing medical or psychiatric evaluation reports, victim personal statements that were not available or that they sought to amend, or further legal submissions. However, the substance of why must be given when “guilty” or “not guilty” is uttered. The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot strip away, to a great extent, the historical right to a jury trial in the name of streamlining the system and allow that system to grind to a halt while a judge reserves a decision for days, weeks or potentially even months.

  • 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source
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    In earlier sittings, I spent some time testing the basis on which the Government are asking the Committee to accept the changes proposed in the Bill, particularly in relation to the claimed benefits and how the system will work in practice. That is particularly relevant in the context of clause 4, where the justification for removing jury trials rests on the assessment of complexity and length, and therefore on how those judgments are made and revisited in practice. During evidence, I asked Sir Brian Leveson about the modelling underpinning the proposals. His report points to the need for further modelling, but when that modelling was discussed, it was clear that there is uncertainty about the figures and what the impact will be. That is important context for these amendments; if there is uncertainty about how the system will operate and what it will deliver, it becomes even more important that the framework we are putting in place is clear on how decisions are to be made and what factors will be taken into account. Throughout our discussions, I have also tried to focus on how the provisions will operate and what they will mean for people going through the system, particularly those who are not legally represented and who may find it difficult to navigate more complex procedures. The amendments are aimed at those practical questions. Amendment 50 relates to a point that is fundamental to how the framework will operate in practice. The Bill sets out conditions under which a judge-only trial order may be revoked, including where the case is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy. That reflects the Government’s central argument that a jury trial is displaced only because certain features of the case justify it. However, the Bill then provides that, even when those conditions are met, the court may none the less decide not to revoke the order if it considers that “it would not be appropriate to do so”. I want to be clear about what that means in practice. If the justification for removing the jury is complexity or length, what is the position when that justification falls away? What is the court expected to do at that point? Is the expectation that the case should ordinarily return to a jury or that, once the decision has been made, it should remain judge-only unless something else actively pushes it back? The Bill does not answer that question, and that matters because, throughout our debates, I have tried to emphasise that it is about not just what is written in the Bill, but how its provisions will operate day to day in real cases. As I set out in earlier debates, we have a whole range of factors here, and many of them must be weighed rather than applied as straightforward rules. That inevitably leaves a significant role for judicial interpretation. Judicial discretion in itself is not a problem, but when Parliament sets out a structured framework with specific conditions, it is important that those conditions actually do something and have a clear consequence. Otherwise, we risk creating a system in which the criteria exist on paper, but the outcome is ultimately determined by a broader and less clearly defined set of judgments, and that is precisely the concern here. We are told that if a case is sufficiently complex or lengthy, it may be tried without a jury, but we are also told that if it is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy, the court may nevertheless decide that it is still not appropriate to return it to a jury. The Committee is entitled to ask, “What weight are we really giving to those original criteria?” In earlier debates, I made the point that courts will look at the legislation, and indeed our debates, to understand what Parliament intends. If we leave this question too open, it is not clear what guidance the courts are expected to follow in practice. If a defendant is told that their case is no longer sufficiently complex to justify a judge-only trial, but that it will nevertheless continue without a jury because it is considered not appropriate to change it, the basis of that decision will not be clear to them. This amendment is relatively modest but important. It seeks not to remove judicial discretion entirely or create an inflexible system, but to ensure that, where Parliament has set out the conditions for revocation, those conditions have a clear and meaningful effect. If the basis for removing the jury no longer exists, that should carry real weight in the decision that follows. Otherwise, we are in danger of creating a framework in which the justification for removing the jury and the decision to keep the jury become disconnected. Amendment 48 relates to the factors that a court must consider when deciding whether to revoke a judge-only trial order. The Bill sets out a number of considerations, including delay, the interests of victims and the impact on court business. Those are clearly important issues. We have heard a great deal of evidence in Committee about the impact of delays, particularly on victims, and I do not think anyone would dispute that that is a serious concern. In my role as shadow Justice Minister, I have focused on the experience of victims in all different elements of the system, including the effect that long delays can have on them. Looking at the list of factors in the Bill, I am interested in what is not included. It is striking that, in the statutory list, there is no explicit reference to the interests of natural justice for the defendant. That omission matters. In earlier debates, we have been clear that these questions are, in part, about weighing exercises—balancing different factors—and that there are, in reality, more and less fair ways of doing things. We have also discussed that defendants are not all in the same position. The system already recognises that in other ways, whether through good character, prior convictions or the wider consequences that a conviction may have on someone’s life. We treat individuals differently, because fairness requires us to do so. That is why the framework matters. If the court is directed to consider certain factors, those factors will shape how decisions are made in practice. If fairness to the defendant is not explicitly part of that framework, there is a risk that it will not be given the weight it should be. That is particularly important in this context, because we are dealing with decisions about whether a person should continue to be tried without a jury. In debates on earlier clauses, I made the point that jury trial is, in some respects, a superior form of justice, even if we accept that it is not practical in every single case. That necessarily means that moving away from it is not a neutral step; it is a step that has consequences for fairness. When the court is deciding whether that position should continue and whether a case should remain judge-only or return to a jury, it seems entirely reasonable that fairness to the defendant should be part of that decision—not assumed or left to implication, but explicitly recognised. Amendment 48 would not remove any of the existing factors. It would not prevent the court from taking into account delay, the interests of victims or the impact on the wider system, but it would ensure that, alongside those considerations, the court was also required to consider the interests of natural justice. Given the nature of the decision, that seems to be an essential part of a balanced framework. These amendments are intended to clarify how this framework will operate in practice. They are about ensuring that the conditions set out in the Bill have a clear effect, and that the factors guiding courts’ decision making reflect the full range of relevant considerations.

  • 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source
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    Thank you, Ms Jardine, for taking the Chair as we continue this later sitting. Before we suspended, we were debating my amendment 53 to clause 6 in relation to the use of the negative procedure rather than the affirmative procedure to change sentencing powers. I was talking about the importance of considering the nature of the justice delivered in the magistrates court when making changes to the powers of that court. As I have said previously in Committee, the fact that we have some criticisms of elements of the magistrates court does not mean it should be got rid of—we accept that these must be balanced measures—but it is important for us to consider that when expanding its powers. Critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for what they describe as “rough justice”. The procedures in magistrates courts are streamlined. For example, the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that even these more serious trials will be completed in a matter of hours. Furthermore, there is a significant disparity in access to legal representation. The income threshold for legal aid in magistrates courts is much lower than in the Crown court. That means that a defendant who would have been eligible for a publicly funded lawyer in the Crown court might be forced to represent themselves in the magistrates court, even when facing a two-year prison sentence. If we are to allow a system where unrepresented defendants face longer custodial terms in shorter hearings, that decision must be subject to the highest level of parliamentary debate. It is also worth noting that the Government’s proposals depart from the recommendations of the very review they claim to follow. Sir Brian Leveson, in his independent review of the criminal courts, recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument of any kind should actually be repealed. He suggested that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent, rather than leaving it as a “variable” that the Executive can adjust. Crucially, when we have previously raised the question of the Government varying from Sir Brian’s recommendations, the Minister has prayed in aid Sir Brian saying that the Government could go further in some circumstances. This could not be further from that. He said that the reforms he recommended were “contingent” on the Government also introducing a power to cap the sentences that could be passed by magistrates. The use of Sir Brian as evidence of opinions across the board is reaching farce now. We have the Government disagreeing with Sir Brian on whether there should be a judge and two magistrates, disagreeing with Sir Brian over the maximum sentence for triable either-way cases in the magistrates court, and now they are directly opposing what he wanted them to do in relation to magistrates’ sentencing powers. It is important that we read what Sir Brian said: “My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months. Furthermore, I recommend that the legislation be amended so that the Lord Chancellor no longer has the power to reduce the maximum to six months via a Statutory Instrument. The 12-month maximum should be made permanent.” Here we have another example of the Government wanting us to set aside all our concerns about the erosion of jury trial rights on the basis of Sir Brian’s expertise and experience, at the same time as ignoring it themselves. If the Government intend to move in the opposite direction of expert legal advice, it is only reasonable that they be required to obtain explicit approval from Parliament through the affirmative procedure every time they seek to do so. We must look at the cumulative impact of the Bill. While clause 6 increases the power of the magistrates courts at the front end, clause 7 restricts the right to appeal those decisions at the back end. The Bill replaces the automatic right of appeal and full rehearing with a permission-based model. That creates a clear and troubling shift: more power is being exercised at the lower level, while the ability to challenge those decisions is being constrained. With around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts currently successful, it is clear that the system is correcting a meaningful level of error. Increasing sentencing powers while simultaneously narrowing the mechanisms for correcting those errors is a double blow to the rights of defendants. The combined effect makes it even more imperative that any increase in power is not snuck through via the negative procedure. As we have heard from other Members, there is a backlog in the magistrates courts of 379,000 cases. Anything that increases their workload will potentially have adverse consequences. In summary, increasing the maximum sentence in magistrates courts is a major constitutional change that affects the liberty of the citizen. It is not a matter of administrative convenience that should be left to the fast track of the negative procedure. If the Government are confident that increasing the maximum to 18 or 24 months is the correct solution to the backlog, they should have no objection to making that case openly and seeking a positive vote of approval from both Houses. We must ensure that our fundamental rights are not treated as administrative details to be checked off on a spreadsheet. For those reasons, I support the proposal that any future increase to magistrates’ sentencing powers must be subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as other amendments that seek to constrain the Government’s actions in this regard.

  • 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source
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    I rise to speak to my amendment 53 and to amendment 13, tabled by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. Clause 6 includes a provision that seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s power to vary the maximum custodial sentence that may be imposed by magistrates courts for triable either-way offences. At present, the general limit for such sentences stands at 12 months, having been increased from six months in 2022. The Bill proposes that we allow that limit to be further increased, by way of regulations, to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government frame that as a necessary tool for operational flexibility, it represents a significant extension of the custodial powers of our magistrates courts. The central question we must address is not merely whether the powers should be increased, but how such a decision should be scrutinised by Parliament. The Bill allows the changes to be made under the negative procedure. Through amendment 53, we propose that any future exercise of the power be subject instead to the affirmative procedure, requiring the explicit approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I have said, I also support amendment 13 from the Liberal Democrats, which says the powers should not be increased full stop. Increasing the maximum custodial sentence a court can impose is not a minor or technical adjustment; it is a substantive change in the fundamental balance of our criminal justice system. When we discuss the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, instead of one, we are discussing one of the most serious powers the state can wield. Magistrates courts are designed for summary trial, which is a process intended for the swift disposal of less serious, low-level cases. Allowing that framework to pass two-year sentences is a major shift. As laid out by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, the evidence we heard explained that such an expansion will mean that more serious and complex cases will be dealt with by lay justices. For a change of this magnitude, the negative procedure provides an inappropriately low level of scrutiny. To understand why the affirmative procedure is necessary, we must look at the mechanics of parliamentary oversight. Under the negative procedure, a statutory instrument is usually made by a Minister and becomes law immediately upon being laid before Parliament. It remains law unless either House successfully votes to annul it, through a process known as praying against an instrument, within a set 40-day period. In reality, the power to object is rarely used and even more rarely successful. I understand that the House of Commons has not successfully prayed against a negative instrument since 1979, and the House of Lords has not rejected one since 2000. The procedure essentially relies on the absence of objection to grant legitimacy to a change in law. In an area as fundamental as the power to imprison citizens for extended periods, Parliament should not rely on a lack of noise to signify consent. It must require explicit, recorded approval. The affirmative procedure provides a much more robust safeguard. Under that route, a statutory instrument is laid in draft and cannot become law until it has been actively debated and approved by both the Commons and the Lords. That ensures that the Government must stand at the Dispatch Box, in the same way the Minister has been doing all week, in a Committee Room just like this, and openly justify why the increase in sentencing powers is necessary and proportionate. That level of scrutiny is essential, because the Government’s current justifications are contested. The Government argue that the powers will allow more cases to be retained in magistrates courts, thereby reducing pressure on the Crown court backlog. However, independent bodies such as the Institute for Government have noted that assumptions about time savings in magistrates courts are highly uncertain. There are serious concerns that magistrates courts, which already face their own peak backlog of over 370,000 cases, simply do not have the capacity to absorb that work. Although the provision in clause 6 will not lead to an immediate increase in sentencing length, it is reasonable to assume that the Government would not have introduced it if they did not have some intention, at some future point, to increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and therefore to retain more cases in the magistrates courts. We must also consider the differential quality in justice administered under the expanded powers. As we have heard, critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for— [ Interruption. ]

  • 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source
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    I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place. Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing. There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress. We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will. We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial. We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

  • 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak in support of amendment 43, tabled in my name, and to amendments 25 and 12. Again, on this issue the Opposition and the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden have alighted on the same challenge or issue—the same thing we think is unfair. We have gone about our amendments in different ways, but we recognise the same issue. As we heard, the amendments address the retrospectivity built into the Government’s approach. The Bill makes it clear that the new allocation regime will apply not only to future cases, but to existing Crown court cases that are due to begin on or after the specified day on which the measures are implemented. In other words, cases that are already in the system, in which defendants may have made decisions on the basis that they expect a jury trial, could be reallocated to a judge-only trial. Our amendment 43 would prevent that by ensuring that the new regime applies only to cases in which the first magistrates court hearing takes place after the change, and not to cases already in the pipeline. The Government say the change is merely procedural and can therefore be applied to ongoing cases, but that understates what is happening. To change the allocation part-way through proceedings would not simply be technical; it would alter the ground beneath the defendant’s feet. In written evidence, JUSTICE shared our concerns, saying: “The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.” It pointed to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s legislative standards, which state: “Retrospective legislation is unacceptable other than in very exceptional circumstances” and “must have the strongest possible justification”. It is worth considering that legislative guidance, which states, first, that enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be avoided. Secondly, provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible. Thirdly, individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was, at the time, a valid legal requirement. Fourthly, laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake. Fifthly, laws should not deprive someone of the benefit of a judgment already obtained. Sixthly, laws should not prevent a court from deciding pending litigation according to its merits on the basis of the law in force at the time when proceedings were commenced. Seventhly, retrospective legislation should be used only when there is a compelling reason to do so. Eighthly, a legislative power to make a provision that has retrospective effect should be justified on the basis of necessity and not desirability. Having heard those points, we can immediately see the issues. On the principle that laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake, it is clear that that liberty is absolutely at stake in these matters. On necessity, we have repeated throughout the debate that the Government, in our eyes, have completely failed to make the case successfully that the measures in the Bill are the only way to drive down the backlogs. This morning, we debated the fall in backlogs in some areas seen in the latest published data; that happened without the measures in the Bill, and without other measures that we all think are necessary to help to drive down the backlogs. To our eyes, the retrospective element clearly does not meet the test of exceptional circumstances or necessity. JUSTICE says that, given that the curtailment of jury trials will have a marginal effect on the backlog, it cannot see how retrospective applications can be justified, and I agree. It argues that it is deeply unfair for defendants who elected for a Crown court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not even exist when they made that choice. Defendants who have opted for a jury trial may be incarcerated on remand awaiting trial by jury. Had they known that this would never materialise, they may well have opted for a magistrates trial and already been released. There is, then, a risk that the reallocation of cases that are already in the Crown court caseload to the bench division will be subjected to judicial review. There is clearly no ouster clause in the provisions. How do we know whether many of those affected might decide that they should challenge the decision in the courts? JUSTICE suggests that it could happen with each and every case in the backlog that is allocated to trial without jury. This would require additional hearings and the preparation of representatives for every affected case already in the backlog, creating further delays and placing unnecessary burdens on the defendants and the prosecution who, as we have all accepted, are already under significant pressure. What did the Prime Minister say about retrospective measures? We have already covered what the Prime Minister previously thought about the importance of jury trials, which he seems to have forgotten, but what did he say about retrospective measures? He said that “they are usually a very bad idea”. That is a direct quote from our Prime Minister. He said they were usually a very bad idea, yet here is his own Government enacting one. Of course, we know what the Deputy Prime Minister thought about this issue. He appeared before the Justice Committee on Tuesday 16 December last year. He was asked about this issue by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), who said: “There are currently in the region of 17,500 prisoners on remand in this country. Will these reforms apply retrospectively?” What did the Deputy Prime Minister say? He said: “No.” The Committee must have to assume that that was his view of the right thing to do at the time. Why else would he have said no? It is reasonable for us to ask the Minister to explain why the Deputy Prime Minister has changed his mind. Of course, the Minister herself has already been asked about this in the Justice Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) pointed out that a defendant committed to trial in the Crown court will expect a jury trial. He said, “you will relook at cases that have been committed for trial at the Crown court and push some of them through the swift court—that is what you are telling me.” The Minister replied: “I think that is something we have to look at.” My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said to her: “So when the Lord Chancellor said it will not be retrospective, that was not a wholly accurate answer.” The Minister replied: “I think the answer he was giving was in the context of a question around the impact on remand hearings; I think that was the context in which he may have addressed that.” My hon. Friend replied: “No, he said the changes would not be retrospective, and now you are giving me a slightly different answer. If someone elects to go to the Crown court at the moment, it is on the assumption that there will be a trial by jury. What you are saying is that it might not be; they might be diverted to the swift court.” The Minister agreed with that, saying: “That is right, yes.” That can be interpreted only as a suggestion that there was no difference with or without a jury as they are still in the Crown court—an extraordinary response. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said: “Minister, if you have been committed to trial in the Crown court at the moment, you are expecting to have a jury trial, and what you are telling me is that once these changes take effect, you will divert those people committed but whose trial has not started into the swift court.” The Minister agreed, saying: “Yes”. My hon. Friend said to her: “That is not what the Lord Chancellor said before Christmas.” The exchange concluded with the Minister making this point: “It is a change in relation to the procedure that applies to those cases. They are still getting a Crown court trial under the new proposals.” We are back to an argument that we have revisited a number of times. When the Minister is pressed on a disadvantage in one form or another of having a trial without a jury, she insists that it does not make much of a difference as they will still get a trial that, in her view, has all the merits of a trial with a jury, to some extent. We made some progress on that earlier today, when the Minister acknowledged that there is something special about a jury trial. If there is something special about it, she must surely accept that those people who do not get one are missing something special and are therefore in some way disadvantaged. JUSTICE is not alone in its criticism of the retrospective element of the proposals. As I have said previously, Mr Robertson, the founder of the chambers that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Attorney General all practised at—someone they surely give some weight and credibility to—is critical about this. He writes: “Those charged by police with offences currently carrying a right to elect a jury trial will go through newly devised ‘allocation proceedings’ where they will lose that right if it appears to the court to be more suitable to have a non-jury trial or if it appears to the court that the value of the property involved exceeds a sum to be set by the government.” By that, I think he means in relation to the severity of the case. Mr Robertson goes on: “This means, for all 80,000 cases in the backlog, more time—days perhaps—will have to be set aside for novel pre-trial proceedings featuring arguments about suitability and value of stolen property. There will be legal challenges to the government’s proposal that such legislation should apply to defendants who have already been charged or are awaiting trial. Applying these changes retrospectively amounts to a fundamental injustice, undermining legal certainty and the long-standing principle that individuals should be tried according to the rules in place at the time of the alleged offence.” He is right, is he not? Mr Robertson is not alone. The Bar Council says: “The application of this proposal retrospectively inevitably will face a constitutional challenge. The Criminal Bar Association estimates that up to 30,000 cases will be affected. Not only is this extraordinarily unfair to those who have already elected the Crown Court, understanding that it is a jury trial, it interferes with legal certainty and runs the risk of tying the courts up in appeals, further increasing the backlogs.” I hope that the Minister can reflect, as always, on those clear views, as well as the views of thousands of other legal professionals, academics and former judges, that provisions in the Bill are not necessary to bring the backlog down, and therefore should not be enacted retrospectively. They are fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional and against the usual practices of this place when it comes to retrospective legislation. I hope the Minister will support our amendment to make sure that the measures are not applied retrospectively.

  • 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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    Just so we are really clear, I have met Supreme Court judges and they tell me that they go back through discussions and debates about legislation to understand the intent or will of Parliament. The Minister said there will not be a separate route of appeal and referred to existing and ordinary rights to appeal. Does she therefore think that it is the will of Parliament that people at the point of conviction should be able to raise questions of allocation, or that judges at the point of conviction should not consider questions of incorrect allocation?

  • 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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    We are now being asked to vote in a totally unsatisfactory situation when it comes to the facts of how this legislation will operate in two very important regards. I put it to the Committee that there will be an erosion of the right to judicially appeal an allocation decision that currently exists in respect of magistrates. The Minister said she thinks that that is wrong, but we will have to vote one way or the other on the basis that either the Minister is correct or I am correct. A Member said from a sedentary position—this is not a criticism of him—that the Minister will come and correct the record, but we will have already voted when the record is corrected. The Minister has given a view that there will be a right of appeal through judicial review to an allocation decision in the Crown court, and that is a fundamentally different scenario to one where someone does not have that right. However, we will be asked to vote on that today, without having absolute certainty, and we will perhaps be told afterwards, “Oh no, you don’t actually have that right.” I am not sure how Labour Members are comfortable or confident voting against a right that we are seeking to give people, without having absolute clarity about what the Minister has said and whether she is correct. It is extremely unsatisfactory for this Committee to be asked to vote on that matter without absolute clarity. Secondly, similarly, the Minister did not clearly answer whether, as a consequence of that, people would be able to pick the issue up in an ordinary court of appeal. To another point raised by Opposition Members, the Minister said that we are not talking about errors in the law or where judges have clearly strayed outside of legislation. How does she know that? How does she know what future mistakes a judge might make? A judge may do exactly that, and allocate a decision completely and utterly incorrectly, outside of the law and what Parliament intended, and the Minister will not tell us whether that could be picked up in a court of appeal. That, again, has important consequences, not just for the rights of the person who may be subject to that kind of egregious mistake in a legal proceeding without any route of recourse; it will also undermine the whole system if people are appealing and challenging these decisions and there is all this uncertainty.

  • 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source
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    I rise to speak in support of amendment 40 in my name and to consider other related amendments. At this point, we are considering in more detail the allocation decisions, how they work in practice and the likely legal risks and pitfalls inherent in the new process. I will begin by laying out the process that will exist. The Bill will introduce a Crown court bench division where cases are tried by a judge alone. To ensure that jury trials remain in place for certain crimes, only triable either-way cases that are assessed as likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less will be allocated for trial in a bench division. Indictable-only offences cannot be tried there. To determine whether a triable either-way case should be allocated for trial in a Crown court bench division, a Crown court judge will assess whether the offence or offences to be tried are likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less. That decision will be taken at the first opportunity for the defendant to enter a plea in the Crown court using a plea and trial preparation hearing. If cases involve multiple defendants, judges must assess eligibility based on the highest likely sentence of any one defendant. Offences to which defendants have pled guilty are not included in the assessment of a likely sentence, and youth defendants are not exempt from the bench division. The bench division will operate as a lower tier in the existing Crown court—that is important. The Bill will not create a separate jurisdiction or intermediate court. The usual Crown court procedures will apply in the bench division, including the appeal route from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. Judges sitting in the bench division will also retain the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose sentences of more than three years where appropriate, even if the allocation was initially based on the likelihood that they would not do that. The Bill and explanatory notes are clear that no new appeal route is created for decisions to allocate a case to the bench division. It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if these proposals are passed. There are some elements of allocation decisions at present that we would all agree are not subjective, but based on offence classifications. I may be wrong, but I do not imagine there remains much debate about allocation decisions in those scenarios. Summary and indictable-only offences will be heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court based on that classification, though there are some exceptions that I will ask the Minister to clarify later. Under the Government’s proposed reforms, there are similar black and white scenarios, with summary-only remaining with the magistrates and indictable-only going before a judge and jury. However, we will continue to have decisions on either-way offences, which consider the subjective—the not black and white—consideration of what the likely sentence length is. The consequences for defendants are entirely new territory for criminal defendants for the offences concerned. Of course, defendants may disagree with allocation decisions at present, and may want to stay in the magistrates court, but the court may decide that they must be heard in the Crown court. However, importantly, as I understand it, a defendant cannot actually legally challenge that decision through judicial review. I am not a legal expert, and if the Minister receives advice that that is wrong, I would welcome that clarification, but as I said, my understanding is that judicial review would not be possible in that scenario. I also understand that it would not be the case in relation to the Crown court where the allocation would take place. Importantly, as I pointed out at the start, this will be taken in the Crown court, not some new or different court, so we should read across the rights and procedures that already exist in the Crown court. As I understand it, triable either-way offences, if heard in the Crown court, are then in legal terms considered to be a trial on indictment. If a triable either-way offence is tried in the Crown court, it becomes a trial on indictment as if it were an indictable offence as per the other offences that are always indictable. Again, I am happy for the Minister to say whether that is the case, but that is my understanding of it. Why is it important? Because there are constraints on the use of judicial review in relation to a Crown court trial on indictment. Under sections 28 and 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, no appeal by way of case stated or judicial review is possible in respect of matters relating to trial on indictment, so it will not be available with regard to any decision relating to the conduct of a Crown court trial on indictment. These measures, in this important way, are specifically taking away an existing legal right: the right to challenge an allocation decision. That cannot be right, fair or reasonable, and I am not even confident, as it is not mentioned, that I have seen in any of the Government publications related to this that it is something the Government have recognised they are doing. It is also potentially a mistake in another way: in relation to the efficiency and smooth running of the courts that the Minister is seeking to achieve. At conviction, the defendant can apply for leave to appeal in the Crown court. At that stage, is the proposal that the defendant will be prevented from appealing the allocation by the judge, so a defendant might argue that a judge could act unlawfully on allocation with no appeal safeguard? I have not had my attention drawn to an ouster clause. More generally, there is the provision that there is no specific appeal to the decision in isolation, but not an ouster clause in terms of the appeals that are allowed in the Crown court. I am confident that there will be legal arguments about that, at least to start with, until common law settles the matter. It would be extraordinary for the Government to introduce such a clause. We might find examples where a judge in the Crown court has completely incorrectly and legally unjustifiably allocated a case, and when that is brought up as part of the appeal at the point of conviction, be told that that is not a matter on which the court can have an opinion. I think that would be extraordinary. Does the Minister think it would be right, if it forms the basis of an appeal against allocation happening after conviction, for the Court of Appeal to be constrained from having the power to return the case for trial by jury if it agrees the allocation decision was unlawful? I cannot believe that she would think that was right. Therefore, we create the exact opposite effect of what we are seeking to do—to make the best possible use of Crown court time—particularly in relation to barristers and other people working across the courts, by not allowing an earlier appeal. That is with regard to both appeals that take place and, more importantly, where a whole new trial may have to be ordered before a jury because it is found that the initial allocation decision was wrong. Consider the scale on which that may happen—hundreds of cases may suddenly have to be retried. If, for example, the measures are in place for seven, eight or nine months, there is no onus or expectation regarding at what point a defendant—a convicted criminal at that point—might seek legal advice and then successfully choose to challenge an allocation decision. That would then be heard by a court, and then that court of appeal will make a ruling as to whether the circumstances under which that person was allocated were unlawful and a retrial with a jury is required. If any other case has been allocated under those same circumstances that the appeal court determines are unlawful, every single one of those who had been convicted would have the right to say that the precedent has been set that the way they were allocated was unlawful and has to be retried. That could happen six months, a year or two years in. We are talking about a huge potential reallocation and retrial of all cases if the Minister insists that there should not be an appeal on the right of the allocation decision. A separate initial safeguard—an appeal against allocation at the stage that it happens—is not only the right thing to do to ensure that an existing right is not eroded, but the more efficient way to approach these things. The amendment is sensible, rational and will provide greater confidence in the new court that the Minister is insisting on creating, and its processes. I ask the Minister to clarify an important matter of law in relation to the allocation decisions in the first place—just the sort of thing that might be appealed if it is not clarified by the Minister during the passage of the Bill or through amendments to the legislation. We are clear about the idea of summary offences that go to the magistrates court. Indictable-only offences will have a trial with a judge and jury. In a number of cases, however, the offence is triable either way, but provisions that this House has introduced mean that in particular circumstances it can be tried only on indictment. Some examples of that are three-strikes class-A drug trafficking offences, three-strikes dwelling burglary offences, dwelling burglaries involving violence or threats of violence, and the minimum mandatory sentences for firearms offences. Those were decisions taken by Parliament to say that, while the offence more generally could be tried either way, these cases in those circumstances are too serious to be heard by a magistrates court; they must be heard by a judge and a jury. What are the consequences of the Bill on those scenarios? Will the Government respect the will of Parliament in relation to considering those cases to be more serious, as the Government accept for those cases that retain a jury trial, and that they should therefore remain with a jury trial? It is important that we have clarity on this issue specifically because, as I said, it is something that would almost certainly be subject to appeal if clarity is not provided. I finish by reiterating the point that, if the Government refuse to accept our amendment, they will be actively legislating away a right to appeal allocation decisions that currently exists in our system. They will be actively choosing to do that if they are unable to insert a similar right through other means, such as through our amendment or an amendment at a future stage. I think it is important that the Committee reflects on that, and I hope the Minister can agree.

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    Indeed. I hope that the Minister can start to address the figures from the Criminal Bar Association, in particular, and to articulate whether she agrees or disagrees with them. If she disagrees, why? As the Criminal Bar Association makes clear, if the Government had sight of that data—they would have known ahead of the Committee’s evidence sessions, and potentially some of the earlier stages of the Bill, that those figures were coming down—why did they choose not to make such potentially important information available to those of us considering the Bill? It is not helpful for Members to quote waits of four or five years for people to get to trial when, in fact, those figures can relate to the delay between the alleged offence and sentencing. Yes, waits for trial from the point of charge are too long, but that is just part of the picture. Of course, the obvious weakness in the Government’s arguments that this is a measure to tackle what we should all consider to be a temporary problem—getting back to our historical court waiting times—is that these measures are permanent, without any plan to reverse them when the backlog is down to pre-pandemic levels. As I have said, we have precedent for that. During world war two, when we made changes to the number of people sitting on juries, we reversed those changes when the crisis was resolved. The Government have announced an intention to recruit and train a further 2,000 magistrates in the next financial year. That is welcome, but recruiting and training magistrates takes time, and, in fact, the delays in the magistrates courts themselves loom over us. On the other hand, the Bar Council rightly points out how many barristers have left the profession. Those are trained, ready-to-go professionals, choosing not to practise criminal law, who could quite easily return to criminal practice, compared with having to train a magistrate from scratch. What is missing from the Government’s approach is any serious attempt to make the most of the capacity that we already have. Court sitting days are still being wasted. Yesterday alone, 58 out of 515 Crown courtrooms sat empty—that is 11%. I am sure that, as we go through the day and proceedings move forward, we will get the figures for today. I imagine that those will be in line with every other day that the Idle Courts X account, which I think those of us following this debate have become great admirers of, shows day in, day out: Crown courtrooms sitting empty. Trials also still collapse due to basic administrative failures. None of the problems are solved by curtailing the right to elect. As I have said, only a few years ago the Justice Secretary described jury trials as fundamental to our democracy—a sentiment that every Member of this House must share—yet now, in office, he appears willing to curtail them in the name of expediency. This proposal also was not in the Labour manifesto at the election. A change of this nature—an unprecedented erosion of a fundamental right that we have all enjoyed for hundreds and hundreds of years—was not in that manifesto. I think that makes it extremely difficult for the Government to insist, particularly in the Lords, where I am sure very many Members will have serious concerns, that they have any kind of democratic mandate to push through these reforms. Of course, we have been here before. In what will come as little surprise to many Members, just as with Labour’s current proposals to fatally weaken the punitive elements of our justice system by letting serious violent and sexual offenders out of prison earlier, Jack Straw, the then Justice Secretary, also proposed removing the right to a jury trial in either-way offences when Labour was last in office. As is the case today, Members across the House and stakeholders fought against, and successfully defeated, those proposals. We can therefore do away with the pretence that this is entirely the workings of an independent figure in Sir Brian Leveson. Although I have no doubt that he came to his conclusions independently, I imagine that those old proposals had been sat in the Ministry of Justice, waiting for the right Minister for civil servants to press this idea on, and they found that in our Justice Secretary and our Prime Minister. We would be right to fear that it is the thin end of the wedge. Often such arguments are hypothetical: we say, “Well, we think this is the thin end of the wedge; some future Government or future Minister will want to go further.” Thanks to the plans being leaked, we know what the current Justice Secretary wanted to do. He wanted to go much further than even the proposals we see before us by removing jury trials for offences carrying sentences of up to five years—five years! Where will the Government go next if they succeed with these proposals? Sir Brian Leveson’s review made clear that the estimate of a 20% reduction in trial times is subject to what he described as “very high levels of uncertainty”. That uncertainty reads across to the other measures, including clause 1, which we are considering today. He said that it was very important that the Government undertook further detailed analysis before moving ahead with those proposals. When I put that to him during evidence, he simply said—I am paraphrasing but I think it is a fair and accurate description—that that is now a matter for the Government, and he was not willing to be drawn on whether they had actually done that further detailed analysis. I brought up the main additional piece of analysis that the Ministry undertook, which was a stakeholder engagement exercise—not a typical one that seeks to measure and come up with firm outcomes. It found that the time saving was between 10% and 30%, so there is a huge variation in what the Government may or may not achieve, and, fundamentally, it is potentially very different from what even Sir Brian recommended. Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. They ensure that the most serious power that the state holds—the power to convict and imprison—is exercised, where possible, with the consent and involvement of the public. If we allow that safeguard to be weakened, we should not be surprised when public trust in the justice system continues to erode. The answer to a justice system in crisis is not to strip away centuries-old protections; it is to make the system work as it should. That is why the proposals are wrong and should be opposed. If the Government are serious about reducing backlogs, there are obvious steps they could take that do not involve weakening constitutional safeguards. I will come back to those at further stages, but I draw Members’ attention to the evidence given by the operations director in His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—the civil servant in charge of making our courts run more smoothly, efficiently and productively. I asked him what he thought were the priorities for bringing down the Crown court backlog. He mentioned lifting the cap on sitting days. He welcomed that and said it made a big difference. The other examples he gave were improvements to prison transport and to listing. None of those priorities had anything to do with jury trials. The man charged with making our system run more efficiently, when asked to list his key priorities, did not say anything to do with jury trials in his first four points. As I have said, a second report from Sir Brian goes through a whole range of measures that will improve the efficiency and productivity of our courts. We have some further amendments for later stages to tease out some of those, and I look forward to considering them. Let us be clear. The burden on this Government is extremely high, as it should be, to make the case for unprecedented changes to halve the number of individuals able to have a jury trial. The Government could have spent time—two or three years—hammering the uncontroversial things that have political consensus and are able to make a difference. They could have looked at Liverpool Crown court, which does not have a historical backlog. As Sir Brian said in his evidence, to some extent, every court has a backlog of cases waiting to be heard, which is helpful for managing those cases, but there are normal levels of waiting time that are accepted without people having to go back to the judge and ask for more time. As I understand it, the Minister has not visited Liverpool Crown court in the last 12 to 18 months. She can correct me if I am wrong. I do not think the Deputy Prime Minister has visited Liverpool Crown court either.

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    Absolutely. I have been very careful in writing my speech to not say that and to be clear about that. Again, when we have had debates about people causing the backlog and holding up justice for other victims, there is an inherent assumption that everybody who has been accused is guilty. Of course, we know that is not the case. As I said, Members should think about the two cases I cited and decide whether it would be fair and just for the individual who has so much more to lose to lose their ability to seek the mode of trial that we have articulated—the mode that Members of the Government are articulating is the fairest way of deciding things—when the person with the repeat record, who does not have a reputation or job to lose, gets to continue doing all the things that the Government have said are wrong, such as holding up trials in other, more serious cases. Members who have read ahead may think that there is some overlap between our amendment and the way in which I have articulated it and amendment 24, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, and they would be right. Our thinking is the same. Our intention and the issues we are trying to elucidate are the same. Of course, we know that we are joined politically in our views on this issue, not by the Ministers in their former articulation of what is important to them, but by 37 Labour MPs who signed a letter in opposition to the erosion of our jury trial rights by clause 1 and other similar clauses. I will name just a few of them: the Mother of the House and the hon. Members for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey), for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) and for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald). They are very far away from me on the political spectrum—some of them could not be further away—but, along with their other colleagues, they are clear that the proposals are wrong, and I wholeheartedly agree with them on that. Those Members—Labour Members—rightly say that these proposals are “madness” and will cause more problems than they solve and that the public will not stand for this erosion of a fundamental right, particularly given that there are numerous other things that the Government can do more effectively to reduce the backlog. I guess that where there are 37 Labour MPs willing to put their name to a letter, there are many more concerned in private, and I am sure that various Members were allowed to be absent from the estate for some of our earlier votes. I ask Government Members to think about their colleagues and the difficult position that they will put them in if clause 1 and associated clauses are passed. The Government have quite simply failed to articulate why these proposals are the only way forward. The Government might have received a more sympathetic reception had they truly exhausted all the other options—if they had stretched every sinew since their election to tackle this issue.

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    The Minister put that question very succinctly, in exactly the same way, to members of the criminal Bar, who know much more about this than me; they were very clear that they did not accept her point. She is contrasting a magistrate or a police officer, who must be trained from scratch, to barristers, who practise in all different parts of the law, and they have clearly pointed out that the welcome changes that the Government have made around sitting days are seeing people coming back. They have not stopped being barristers because they have not practised over the last few years; they are practising other types of law. I was on the Justice Committee in the previous Parliament, and we discussed in detail the challenges around the criminal Bar strike action and so on, and they were very clear that these people had not gone anywhere—they were the same people, but they were choosing not to practise criminal law. I would lean heavily on their view that these people want to come back. If the Government want to put forward an analysis and tell us the figures for all the people who are out there who could be practising criminal law and are choosing not to, and if they produced a gap analysis showing how many they think they need on top of that, then we would have a different discussion. However, I do not know that the Government have produced any analysis or figures for how many practitioners are due to come back, or likely to come back, or what we need to get them to come back and so on. The Minister may well be right to just say, “They’re not there, we can’t do it,” but we keep coming back to the same point: where is the basis for making such strong decisions?

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    I rise to speak in support of amendment 39 tabled in my name. As I touched on earlier this morning, along with amendments 23 and 24—which are driving at the same point, but in slightly different ways—we are revisiting the discussion that we in the Opposition framed as a broad categorisation of principles of natural justice. We do so with the hope that it allows flexibility and expandability for the courts to interpret and give weight to that clause in a common-law system. However, it is also perfectly legitimate to approach the issue in a more defined way, as amendments 23 and 24 do. Every one of those examples is something we would agree with. Amendment 24 states that the relevant conditions would be met in relation to a defendant if: “the defendant, if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years” or if “the defendant is of good character”. It was helpful for the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden to use her expertise to explain that that is not just an idea of someone’s character; good character has a very specific meaning in law and exists for a reason. It exists because the judicial system, in various ways, thinks that that is important and it has a material impact on how someone should be treated within the legal system. Amendment 24 also specifies that the conditions would be met if “the defendant has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence”, or if “the defendant would be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974”. Again, we go out of our way to put those provisions in place to say that rehabilitated offenders, as defined by the 1974 Act, should be treated differently from other types of offenders. We are building on the already established idea that we do not all experience the judicial system in the same way in relation to our previous convictions and offences—in both directions, because if someone has convictions, but they have moved past those convictions, we would seek to treat them differently again. Amendment 24 would also apply to a defendant who, “if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected”. I talked about that issue this morning, and I welcome the hon. Lady’s references to Members of Parliament. Surely we can relate to that in a very profound way when we face a conviction. MPs are one such example, but there are many others. I gave the example of a solicitor this morning, and there are also doctors—my professional background—and police officers; there are a whole range of people who would suffer a very particular and specific set of consequences because of their job. That would perhaps not be universal, and we would have to tease out whether someone might want the magistrates’ sentencing restrictions or the Crown court’s route to guilty—we will probably have to separate those two things. Some people might prefer a magistrates court, not because of the plea but, as they are likely to be found guilty, because of the sentencing restrictions. However, I agree with the hon. Lady that—if not universally, certainly overwhelmingly—people would want their guilt to be determined by a jury, even if they might prefer a magistrate’s restricted sentencing powers. Finally, amendment 24 would apply to defendants where “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity of the case may increase; or…other exceptional circumstances pertain to the case.” Those examples fit neatly with the aims of Opposition amendment 39. As I said earlier, of all the provisions in the Bill, clause 3, which these amendments would alter, probably represents the profoundest and most unprecedented change to our legal system. We had a debate this morning about other changes that have been made, such as changes to which offences are summary, triable either way or indictable. Although it is true to say that there have been variations, and there has been that narrowing, I was very clear that the scale and unprecedented nature of these changes stand apart. What we are talking about here is a completely different approach to determining guilt for adults in criminal cases, entirely removing the lay element. Again, we debated this morning about the fact that we cannot fairly describe magistrates as being entirely distinct from the local population; we very clearly heard all the reasons why they are not the same as having 12 ordinary members of the public on a jury, but they are not professionals. What we are talking about here, with the introduction of this new bench division, is removing every possible element of lay involvement. On Second Reading, when we had a broader debate about the Bill, Government Members criticised the fact that the debate was dominated by white, older male barristers—maybe they did not say older, but certainly white and male. The criticism was, “This debate is being dominated by white, male barristers. This isn’t fair. This isn’t reflective of all the voices and different views we need to hear.” But what will these changes do? They will give more power and influence to people who are white and male and who, historically, have almost certainly been barristers. We are doing the exact opposite of addressing those Government Members’ concerns, including their concerns about who has a say in all these issues compared with ordinary members of the public. Clause 3 removes those ordinary members of the public. Under proposed new section 74A to the Senior Courts Act 1981, any case sent to the Crown court must be tried without a jury unless one of two things applies: either an indictable-only offence is involved, or the court considers that, if convicted, the defendant would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. In all other cases, the default becomes a judge-alone trial. We are introducing a whole new idea that an individual person—a magistrate, not a jury—can sentence someone to six to 12 months. We are introducing the idea that a single person, on their own, can sentence someone to three years’ imprisonment, without any involvement of the wider public. The question for the Committee is not whether the jury trial remains available in some cases, as we have discussed—we absolutely accept that it should. Instead, the question is whether Parliament is content to create a new statutory presumption that, for a wide range of classes of Crown court cases, the citizen will no longer be tried by a jury of their peers, but by a judge sitting on their own. Again, as we talked about this morning, this is not what Sir Brian recommended—he was specific in his recommendation. This morning, the Minister talked about going further, which I would interpret as referring to what offences and timelines are used. I am not sure that we can extend that suggestion of going further to creating an entirely new set-up that Sir Brian did not recommend. He did not recommend that a judge sit on their own and sentence someone to up to three years in prison.

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    I will move on to a more directly relevant point. When we talk about the challenges in the courts and what was inherited, the Government would do themselves a much greater service and reflect accurately the debate and the challenges if they more regularly sought to speak fairly and freely about what actually happened in relation to Crown court backlogs, and the reason why the amendment was tabled. Prior to the pandemic, Crown court backlogs were lower under the Conservative Government than they were under the previous Labour Government. Every time the Government highlight the real challenges with the Crown court backlogs and omit to recognise that the historically unprecedented level of the backlogs was almost entirely driven by the covid pandemic, they do a disservice to the complexity and reality of what went on in our court service. Every time they talk in isolation about a lack of investment in the period of 14 years, they fail to understand that Members on Labour’s side, who have been highly critical of the Conservative party, actually recognise that over many decades, prior to the Conservative Government, as other Labour Members said on Second Reading, there has been a lack of investment—an investment lower than I would want—in our court service. I have been clear since taking up the position of shadow Justice Minister that I would have wanted a higher degree of protection for the justice system than that in the decisions taken at the time. The Opposition have not been afraid to say that or to own the responsibility for it, as we have in a number of other areas where we wish things had been done differently. I have explained that, for me, courts and the criminal justice system is one of the reasons—if not the main reason—why I sought election to Parliament, so I am always going to say that we should invest more strongly in the justice system. Just last week, I did an interview on Times Radio about our work on whole-life orders, after I successfully appealed a case in which someone had not got a whole-life order; the Court of Appeal gave them a whole-life order. The presenter asked me why we do not have more whole-life orders, and why more is not done about it. I explained that, in reality, as a politician I might have my priorities, and other individual MPs might have their own priorities, but inevitably the decisions of the Treasury, what goes into the manifesto and what the Government commit to are a matter of the public’s priorities. As someone who campaigns strongly on behalf of victims of crime, I understand the enormous impact that crime has. I also must accept that most people, most of the time, are not victims of any crime, let alone serious crimes, so convincing the public at large to vote for parties that will invest seriously in and improve our criminal justice system is difficult. In polling, the criminal justice system is not at the top of the list of the public’s priorities, as much as I might wish it were. The Government and Labour Members would do better to more accurately reflect the history of what has happened in the criminal justice system, and particularly in relation to Crown court backlogs. I do not recall that when Labour were last in government—I have looked through Hansard for this—Labour MPs got up and complained about Crown court backlogs that were higher than those we delivered in Government, prior to the pandemic. That is the reality of what happened: the pandemic had an unprecedented impact on our criminal justice system. The vast majority of the historically unprecedented situation that we are dealing with is directly related to the pandemic. If, every time they talked about this, hon. Members made that point, the Opposition would be able to take their criticisms of our record more seriously. To pick up on some remarks, I welcome those of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, who drew attention to the issue that we considered in the evidence hearings about the not guilty pleas that some of us are uncomfortable with. As I said, I strongly objected to some of those. On the Colston statue, behind the scenes I was one of the MPs lobbying for the Attorney General to do as she did—to seek clarification from the Court of Appeal to stop that from happening again. I very much resent some of those things—but is that not the point? We have a system that allows for that, that allows for MPs to have a view, to be unhappy or to criticise something that a judge sitting on their own would say, “Look, this is obvious. This is absolutely a guilty—no question”, but a jury might find a different outcome for reasons of their own. I have to admit that, before this debate and the Bill coming before the House, I had only ever viewed this issue through the prism of frustration, wanting to understand how it works and how we might even curtail this, supporting the Court of Appeal declaratory ruling on that judgment. This whole process, however, has made me reflect on the broader role of juries in civil liberties and in curtailing the power of the state. Even if Parliament wants something done in a particular way, a jury of ordinary people retains the right—as frustrating as that might be, but it has been clarified repeatedly in case law—to say, “Look, we understand all the facts, and we might even agree privately that the law has been broken, but for this reason or that we are going to offer that as not guilty.” Our system has been asked explicitly whether that is something that should happen, and we have been told explicitly that that is something that our system deliberately holds on to. On the balancing, every time we shift more cases into the magistrates court, again we are minimising that, reducing it as an important part of what we might call an informal constitutional settlement. I welcome the remarks by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, who helpfully drew our attention to the gaps between what Sir Brian recommended and what the Government are doing. That is another major hole in the Government’s argument. The example that the hon. Member articulated was about his suggestion of two years going back to magistrates ending up as the Government’s three years. We will also discuss the issue of a Crown court bench without any magistrates, so in two major ways, the Government are not doing what Sir Brian recommended. In evidence, the Minister even put to some of the witnesses from the Bar Council: “What do you know that Sir Brian…does not?” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 43, Q81.] That question, I am afraid, can be turned right back around to the Minister, who is also not doing what Sir Brian recommended. What does she know that Sir Brian does not? If it is so important that we listen carefully to Sir Brian, because he has done such an exhaustive piece of work and put so much time into developing detailed, specific and concrete proposals, why are the Government happy just to disregard the elements of that that they do not agree with? We cannot do the same. We cannot say, “Actually, we don’t think the evidence is there. We don’t think the case has been made”, but the Government can. They want to say that about a fundamental element—this is not a minor element—which is whether a judge sits on their own or with two magistrates. That is a major difference. In fact, the most radical element of the proposals is the judge sitting on their own in those types of cases, but the Government do not agree with what Sir Brian said about it.

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    I thank the Minister for picking me up on that; I meant that they are determining the guilt of individuals who can then face up to three years in prison. It undermines the veracity and importance of Sir Brian’s recommendations that the Government do not have the support of his report on this, the profoundest and most unprecedented change that they are making. That cannot be understated. The Bill makes clear that in all cases falling below the threshold sentence of more than three years, a trial must take place without a jury. That is not at individual discretion, but a hard and fast rule. The Committee should note that the threshold is assessed prospectively, on a likely sentence basis. That means that at an early stage, the court is being asked to make an evaluative judgment about the likely sentence before a trial, and to use that judgment to determine whether the oldest safeguards in our system are available at all. The Minister may, quite rightly, say that making estimates or anticipating likely sentencing outcomes is part of our system—but never in this way, and never with the consequences that will flow in terms of who determines an individual’s guilt as a result of that estimation. The consequences are profound. Yet for all the Government’s reliance on the three-year threshold, proposed new section 74D makes clear that a judge sitting alone retains the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose a sentence of more than three years where appropriate. That will allow a judge to determine guilt on their own, and potentially to sentence someone for many years—more than three—for an offence. Those two issues interact. The Minister was right to call me out for blending the two measures, but they are linked in the real world, and they certainly will be linked in the minds of defendants and the wider public. That relates back to the confidence issue. If a defendant sees that the person whom they think was inappropriately asked to determine their guilt is also then allowed to give them a sentence beyond what they were expecting to get, and beyond the thresholds that were designed for the imposition of a sentence, that creates real challenges for public confidence. There is a tension in the Government’s remarks around this issue, because they have emphasised throughout that all these reforms will not be used for the most serious cases. That is how they have described it. That is largely determined by taking into account the sentencing length that is available—it is not a direct read-across, but more serious offences inevitably have longer sentence lengths, so someone will potentially be directly affected by these reforms around the same sentence lengths that the Government say are not appropriate for different types of offences. The Government might say that they are not choosing certain types of offences with very long sentences, but someone could end up with exactly the sort of sentence that someone else might receive for something like a rape offence. The Government think that that is acceptable but, again, it is inherently contradictory. The Committee should also be concerned by the structure of the reallocation under proposed new section 74B. Cases can move from jury to judge alone and then from judge alone to jury following changes of circumstance or the emergence of new evidence. Such decisions may profoundly affect how justice is perceived, yet the Bill provides no right of appeal against them. What the Government are doing here is not simply adjusting or tinkering; they are creating a new mode of criminal trial in the Crown court by allowing a single judge to determine guilt in a substantial class of cases, allowing that decision to be revisited during proceedings, permitting it in some circumstances without a hearing and then insulating those decisions from appeal. The Government’s case for doing all that relies heavily on efficiency, but this is precisely where the clause remains weak. The wider criticism of the Bill has always been that the backlog is being treated as if it were caused by jury trials rather than case management failures, workforce pressures, poor productivity and court capacity. We talked a lot about the IFG’s criticisms of the modelling and the data that the Government put forward to justify their clauses, but the IFG is not alone in thinking that the Government’s claims around the benefits are unsubstantiated. The London School of Economics submitted in written evidence what it thought about the Government’s approach to modelling. It said: “Sir Brian Leveson stated that the modelling on which his recommendations were based is ‘uncertain and should be viewed as indicative’ and that the MoJ should ‘carry out more detailed modelling on the operational and financial impact of the recommendations’.” I brought that up in the evidence session with Sir Brian and put it to him that he had said that further work should be done; he did not feel that it was for him to comment any further than that. The LSE says: “Given the range of reforms suggested by the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, their complex interrelation, and the lack of rigorous modelling by independent research groups, we are not confident that the evidential basis for curtailing jury trial has been established.” Both the IFG and the LSE think that the modelling case has not been successfully made, so there are a number of different questions on that. This is important because Parliament is being asked to accept the removal of a fundamental safeguard, not because the Government have shown that jury trials are causing the delay, but because it has chosen to pursue structural reform before exhausting operational solutions. The real constitutional innovation here is not only that some cases may be tried without a jury, but that Parliament is being asked to enact a statutory presumption in favour of a judge-only trial for a broad range of Crown court cases, with very limited, if any, safeguards once that allocation has been made. The Committee should also consider the wider context in which these proposals are brought forward. Sir Brian Leveson’s review did not present the removal of jury trials as a stand-alone solution; it sets out a broader programme of reforms aimed at improving efficiency, capacity and case management across the system, and yet the Government have chosen to bring forward the most constitutionally significant elements of that review, those that limit access to jury trials, while leaving much of the operational reform agenda unimplemented. We have visited this point a number of times today: the Government have not done the things they say they will do that will make a difference. They cannot realistically claim that those things will not have the necessary impact if they have not tried to implement them.

  • 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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    I will take this opportunity to address some of the points raised in this morning’s debate, and to expand on areas that were points of contention. There was healthy debate about the record of the issues that were inherited by this Government. One reason why this Government have got so quickly into so much difficulty is the way they seek to frame the challenges they inherited, and how the Labour party framed those challenges during the election. That applies across several issues, including inflation and global economic shocks. [ Interruption. ] This is relevant because the Bill is part of a consistent practice and approach—to reassure hon. Members, I will not spend long on this point. In opposition, the Labour party clearly sought to blame the Conservative Government entirely for those issues, but now that the same issues are affecting the Labour Government, they do not get credibility in saying the issues are broader and outside their control. Labour said the doctors’ strikes were entirely our fault—

  • 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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    Let me think of a directly relevant example that shows just how important and meaningful that distinction is, in a way that the Minister is seeking to blur. We all follow political polls that are based on models. Those models are probably all sound, but they are all different and produce completely different results based on the assumptions—on voter turnout, for example. I might speak to some Government Members and say, “Look, we have this poll that shows you’re going to smash it at the next election. You’re under no threat from Reform or the Lib Dems.” However, I might also say, “As part of that poll, we have assumed that 99.9% of the people who intend to vote Labour are going to come out and vote Labour.” Would Government Members then say, “Oh, great news! Absolutely, I’m going to smash the next election.” No. They would say, “Well, that assumption is fundamentally flawed.” The model may be correct, including the factors being considered, but inserting the assumptions into a model is what actually counts. That is what actually determines the outcomes, and the IFG is very clear about that. Again, the Government are asking us to erode the important right to a jury trial, based on assumptions that the IFG says are highly uncertain. The Opposition’s position is quite clear. What is not uncertain is the fact that improving prisoner transport will help deliver improvements; that improving case management will deliver outcomes, which nobody disputes; or that improving access to early legal advice by reforming legal aid will help reduce the backlogs. There is a whole slew of things that are not uncertain. Surely, the sensible and balanced thing to do is to get those things done first. Then, if the Government show that they really have done everything they possibly can, there could be a different discussion with MPs and the public about why they had chosen to erode and curtail an historic right that we have had for hundreds of years. The reason why the data from the CBA is so important—the Minister accepts this—is that it is showing an improvement into the input. If the input is improving, then in theory the output will improve; I have not heard the Minister say that we will not get an improvement in the outlook at some point. If fewer cases are coming in, then surely there will be less of a backlog down the line. That is happening already—prior to the changes on jury trials and, more importantly, prior to all the other things having embedded in, as the Minister has herself admitted. We have not even touched prison transport and we are getting an improvement; we have not even touched legal aid and we are getting an improvement—I could go on and on. The point was powerfully illustrated, in terms of priorities, by the representative from the HMCTS. I asked him about his priorities for reducing the backlogs and improving the situation. Jury trials did not even come close to the list of things that he thought were important. Surely we need to deliver on those elements successfully and consistently, but we all know that that is going to be extremely hard work. I made the point to the Minister this morning. I do not doubt her sincerity on this, but being a Minister is about driving through major reform and change while having to manage day-to-day improvement in the system. She might think this an unfair comment, but I asked her this morning about what was happening with the inputs into the Crown courts. She is the Minister in charge of our backlogs, but when I asked for a clear answer about some of the statistics in regional variation, the Minister did not have them, did not know or was not able to answer. She had to go away at lunch time to answer a question about those key statistics. That is a bit like me asking the Health Secretary what is happening with regional variation in waiting times and the Health Secretary saying, “Well, I know overall waiting times are going down, but I don’t know the answer to that. I will have to go away and look and see what is happening in different parts of the country.” It is a giveaway.

  • 26 Mar 2026 · Prison Officers: Mandatory Body Armour · Hansard source
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    It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) on securing this important debate. I also thank the hon. Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson) for the work that she has done in relation to her constituent. I pay tribute to Claire. She has taken what must have been a horrific experience and, rather than letting it overwhelm and subdue her, used it to empower herself to have a voice on this issue for the benefit of others. I record my thanks to prison officers and prison staff across the country. They go to work in difficult, dangerous conditions, doing a job that most of us would struggle to imagine. I come from a public service background—I was a doctor, I volunteered as a policeman, my mum was a nurse and my dad was a policeman—and I have always been struck by the contrast in our public discourse. It is interesting that we have an awareness of, and give our recognition to, those sorts of public emergency service workers but we do not do the same for prison officers. Prison officers do a job that is just as important, if not more important, and under more difficult circumstances. I know that multiple Secretaries of State for Justice have tried to address that with initiatives to change the public’s perception and help them recognise how important that work is. I absolutely recognise it, and I think that prison officers should be held in exactly the same esteem as other emergency service workers, because that is what they are. In discussing violence, to some extent this debate has focused on blades because of what happened to Claire, but we have seen violent assaults that have used whatever was to hand. Only two weeks ago, we had reports of an offender who attacked a prison officer with a plastic knife, so it does not matter what the particular weapon is. In recent months, we have seen assaults across the estate using boiling liquids and makeshift implements. There are much broader issues around the safety of officers. After the appalling attack in April last year on three officers at HMP Frankland—the same place where Claire was attacked—Ministers commissioned a snap review and announced, in June last year, that protective body armour, meaning stab-proof vests, will be mandatory for officers working in close supervision centres and separation centres, with segregation units in the high security estate also benefiting from the roll-out. I welcome any sensible steps to make it more likely that officers will go home safe. In September 2025, the Minister for Prisons, Probation and Reducing Reoffending told Parliament that “stab-and-slash-resistant” protective body armour “will be made and issued as quickly as possible” and that it was expected to be issued “by autumn 2025”. Later that month, the Government announced £15 million of investment, increasing the number of vests available to staff from 750 to 10,000, including 5,000 to equip every officer working in long-term and high security prisons. That announcement also stated that prisons had already begun to receive kit that week, “ready to be worn”. Those are great and welcome commitments. The problem is that when Parliament has asked very simple questions, namely how many of those vests have actually been issued, Ministers have not been able to answer. In October, the Government said that the roll-out across the long-term and high security estate was expected to begin during 2026. In February this year, when asked in the Lords specifically how many of the 5,000 stab-proof vests for high security prisons have been issued, Ministers again did not provide a number but just said they “expect to begin implementation across the estate” this year. My first set of questions to the Minister is straightforward and factual. How many stab-proof vests have been procured since September? How many have been delivered to prisons? How many have been individually fitted to officers? What proportion of the long-term and high security estate is now operating with every officer equipped as the Government promised? Secondly, will the Minister set out clearly what “mandatory” means? We know that protective body armour is mandated in close supervision centres, separation centres and high security segregation units. We also know, from a September 2025 written answer, that body armour is already issued for Operation Tornado deployments and for operational response and resilience unit deployments, and that it is required for planned use of force or high-risk prisoner management. We also know, however, that the question of routine issue across other prison categories is very much alive. In Justice questions, a Labour Member told the House, “Unlike in category A prisons, prison officers at HMP The Verne and HMP Portland are not routinely issued with protective body armour”, —[ Official Report , 17 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 750.] and they asked for appropriate armour for officers regardless of category. I ask the Minister: are the Government now considering the provision of appropriate body armour for all prison officers irrespective of the category of prison in which they serve? Will the Minister provide a clear and comprehensive statement following this debate—as I appreciate he will not be able to go through all the details now—on where body armour is mandated on a unit-by-unit basis, where it is mandated by activity, and where it is available to officers if they want it, but is not required? That level of transparency is essential for the House, given the promises and pledges that the Government are making. We welcome them, but they do not seem to be transparent about what they are actually delivering. The point was made that it is not about just saying, “Here’s some armour—get on with it.” We need detail on the weight of the armour, the heat burden, the cover design, and what in-life monitoring and replacement cycles are in place. Those are also important, as is how the Government ensure proper fitting and equality of provision, particularly in relation to female staff. I am afraid the Government have a lot of work to do. I know the Minister will be critical, as others have been, of our time in government, but if we look at their record in government when it comes to prison officer numbers, they are down. In March 2025 there were 22,737 full-time equivalent band 3 to 5 prison officers in post. As of December, that was down by around 700 to 22,067, and that builds on drops from their earlier time in government. Although the previous Government took steps to equip officers by rolling out body-worn cameras and introducing safety tools alongside a clear emphasis on training and de-escalation, I recognise we should have gone further on the provision of body armour and other equipment where officers in the POA felt it was in prison officers’ interest, and I regret that we were not able to. As the Minister knows, we have worked together on the change to the law for whole-life orders for people who murder prison officers on duty or off duty. We worked together on that successfully on a cross-party basis. We support the Government on measures that are helpful. I want to finish with Claire. The offender who attacked Claire is currently held in HMP Frankland in a separation centre and is subject to isolation. We have already discussed the attacks that took place at that centre where people were gravely injured. Sadly, we have seen the Government give thousands of pounds of compensation to people who have been responsible for vile crimes in isolation centres because of a breach of their human rights. That is on the record and we know that that has happened. The Mirror reports that the same person who attacked Claire—the person I am sure the Minister will get up and condemn; I am sure the Minister will pay tribute to Claire and say how fantastic her campaigning is—will get compensation from the Government for having been in an isolation unit. That would be a disgrace and deeply insulting to Claire and all the other prison officers who would see that as an insult after what Claire had gone through. I ask the Minister to write to Claire’s MP, the hon. Member for Washington and Gateshead South, to tell her very clearly—if he cannot tell us now—whether the Government have paid or are going to pay compensation to the man who so brutally attacked Claire? He does not deserve a penny of taxpayers’ money. When will the Government bring forward their promised plans to review the legal framework through which these vile people get taxpayers’ money because apparently we have breached their human rights? In the response to the independent review of the isolation units, the Government promised to bring forward a review of the framework. They still have not done that. Can the Minister tell us, following the cases in the public domain, whether there have been any further claims lodged by offenders because of the time they have spent in isolation? I think we deserve to know that, and we deserve to know for certain that the person who attacked Claire, who we are all here paying tribute to, will not get a penny of taxpayers’ money.

  • 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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    Q You talk about a judge and two magistrates as something you favoured, and that is what Sir Brian recommended, but it is not what the Government are proposing. They are proposing a judge sitting on their own. Can you see any disadvantages to that proposal versus the one that you supported? Lord Burnett of Maldon: Again, the Government well know my view on this—I see the Minister nodding. It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates. They take very little time. Both Sir Richard and Judge Goldstone are much more experienced, over many more years, in what happens in the Crown court than I can pretend to be, but those cases take very little time and the judge, on behalf of the court, gives an immediate judgment, just as in the Crown court generally the judge gives an immediate summing up. That struck me as being a much better course.

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