Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  The challenge we have at the minute is that not only do we have a shadow Opposition, but we have a shadow Government—a whole set of Ministers who will soon be in place. We have someone who is potentially about to become Prime Minister, but we know almost absolutely nothing about his priorities on defence, on the strategic challenges or on welfare. Does it concern my hon. Friend that we are going to get somebody new, when we know very little about his position on these incredibly important issues?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  Shameful!

• 15 Jun 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  The former Defence Secretary knew what was in the defence investment plan, thought it was inadequate and resigned as a result. I am sure the Minister would not be so shameless and disrespectful to the House as to spend an hour defending that plan if he himself had not seen it in full, so I have a very easy question for him: has he seen the defence investment plan in full, yes or no?

• 15 Jun 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  Have you seen it?

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My new clause 24 and new clause 18 in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester seek to achieve a similar outcome. Although there is broad agreement that the backlog is a challenging issue that must be addressed, we believe that any measure that curtails jury trial rights in such a significant—and, I would say, unprecedented—way should be proportionate to the problem it seeks to solve and be used only for as long as absolutely necessary while we are presented with this problem. Therefore, we propose a sunset clause to ensure that the powers expire once the court backlog has returned to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period. A sunset clause is a measure in a statute that provides for a law or specific provisions to cease to be effective after a predetermined date, or once a specific condition is met, unless Parliament takes further action to renew them. Although they have experienced a resurgence in recent decades as a tool for managing extraordinary or controversial measures, sunset clauses have been employed by Parliament since at least 1500. Historically and in contemporary practice, they serve vital democratic functions. They are used to facilitate the passage of controversial legislation by assuring critics and the public that the measures are temporary, rather than a permanent erosion. They act as a safeguard for democracy, particularly when emergency legislation is required, by preventing the normalisation of extraordinary powers. Furthermore, sunset clauses create a more formal trigger for post-legislative scrutiny, forcing both the Executive and the legislature to revisit their assumptions and evaluate whether a law has been effective before deciding whether to prolong its life. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 both utilise sunsetting or recurring renewal requirements to ensure ongoing parliamentary oversight. More recently, sunset clauses were used in covid-19 legislation to ensure that restrictive measures did not extend longer than necessary. The UK Coronavirus Act 2020 contained a two-year sunset clause and a requirement for six-monthly reviews to determine whether temporary provisions should expire early. When considering radical changes to our trial system during a time of crisis, we should look to our history for a more direct precedent. During world war two, a period when our continued existence as a free nation was genuinely uncertain, the Government of the day did not choose to radically cut down the use of jury trials or erode the right of the citizen to elect to be judged by their peers. Instead, they reduced the number of jurors from 12 to seven. Importantly, that was a temporary adjustment. As soon as the Nazi threat was defeated, the Government of the day restored the number of jurors to 12. That demonstrates a principled understanding that emergency measures taken in response to a temporary crisis should be reversed once that crisis is resolved. In contrast, the measures before us today regarding the erosion of jury trials and the abolition of the right to elect are drafted as permanent changes to our statute book, with no built-in mechanism for their reversal once the backlog is managed again. As I have said, that is a significant departure from the most closely related historical example of what we did during even the darkest days of the 1940s. Our sunset clause would tie the duration of these reforms to the very problem they are intended to fix. The Government’s case is that these are necessary, backlog-driven measures, and it is entirely consistent to state that they should expire once that backlog is brought down to a more historically normal level, which we define as the pre-pandemic level—a level that the system was able to manage sufficiently, if not perfectly, without the need for structural erosion of the right to a jury.

• 27 Apr 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles Bill (Carry-over) · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State will have to work extremely hard to secure the trust of veterans on both sides of this argument. If he cannot clearly condemn what are clearly outrageous remarks about our armed forces personnel, how does he expect them to trust him?

• 27 Apr 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles Bill (Carry-over) · Hansard source

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  Does my hon. Friend agree that any Government Member, including Ministers, who wants to be taken seriously by armed forces personnel needs to condemn the remarks of Lord Hermer and the disgraceful disparaging of our armed forces?

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand. Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past. To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court. Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice. Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests. I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial? The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly. The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system. Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years. The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision. The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before. This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them. The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective. There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before. Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high. Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise. I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak. The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient. The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom. The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias. A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe. There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it. We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved. We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument. Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This happens all the time. We point out deficiencies in the Government’s position, so Members get their Whips’ handouts with suggestions to “just point out to them what they did on x, y and z.” But the public do not care. That is a zero defence of their position— [ Interruption. ]

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert “cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”. This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively. We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process. Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness. The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined. There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals. There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts. On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here. The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously. This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view. Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say: “The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.” Those include “the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting” for a long time and “any other matters the court considers relevant.” Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us. The written evidence continues: “In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.” Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty. Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve. In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost. By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides. In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate. That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request. When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished. Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so. In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail. To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of my amendment 44 and related amendments, which brings us to consider the issue of reallocation in more detail for the first time. It was touched on briefly this morning in the discussion about allocation, but there are distinct differences in the processes. We must remind ourselves what the allocation process will be initially through proposed new sections 74A to D of the Senior Courts Act 1981. My understanding is that the reallocation provisions are intended to operate in the following way. First: “The court must, at the prescribed time or times, determine” in accordance with proposed new section 74A “whether the trial is to be conducted with or without a jury.” It is important to note that “prescribed time” is not defined in the Bill, but would be covered by the existing provisions in sections 84 to 87 of the Senior Courts Act, which refer to prescribed matters being specified in the criminal procedure rules. The explanatory note does not appear to provide any further detail on what the criminal procedure rules are likely to prescribe in terms of timing, so it would be helpful if the Minister could tell us what she expects that to be. Whatever the prescribed time is defined to be, the court must say that the trial is to be conducted with a jury if either the offence, or any of the offences, is triable only on indictment or if the court considers that the defendant, if convicted of the offence for which they are to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years. In any other case, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. We have covered this initial decision at some length, but the proposed legislation also says that if a trial is to be conducted without a jury but there is a relevant change of circumstances, the court may—and in some cases must—reallocate the case to a jury trial. A relevant change of circumstances is defined in proposed new section 74B(8), and will occur if either the defendants to be tried, or the offences for which they are to be tried, have changed since the court’s last determination on allocation, or it appears to the court that there is new evidence that would or might affect whether the condition in proposed new section 74A is met, and that condition relates to a likely sentence of imprisonment of more than three years. This is something to which we must give close consideration. The Bill does not define the term “new evidence”, and I am not aware of it being defined elsewhere in legislation. We can look to the explanatory notes to try to better understand what is meant here. In paragraph 206, the notes say: “This is intended to capture significant new material indicating that the offending is more serious, or less serious, than originally understood. It is not intended to require the court to redo the full allocation exercise each time new evidence emerges, but simply to note where new material might alter the earlier likely-sentence assessment so as to justify reconsideration under section 74B.” The explanatory notes are helpful, but we must remember that they are not legislation and that the courts are more likely to seek to interpret differently what may or may not be said in an explanatory note from something that is given clear direction in legislation. The explanatory notes actually leave us with not just one but two new terms. Again, as far as I am aware, “significant new material” is not defined in legislation; there is certainly no case law for it in these specific circumstances, as these courts have never operated before. I do not think we can know in practice how it would be obvious that something amounted to new evidence for the purposes of proposed new section 74B(8); the Bill, as I have said, is silent on this point. Do we have to assume that that will become a matter of judicial interpretation or discretion? I think we do. It might be evidence that was not already set out in the initial details of the prosecution case or in a defence statement. While the explanatory notes say they do not expect this process to be done on a rolling basis, I assume that the prosecution and defence would be able to invite the judge to consider whether evidence amounts to “new evidence” whenever it was brought to the attention of the court as part of the general conduct of the trial. Again, this is not specified in the Bill, but it is certainly not ruled out. If there has been a relevant change of circumstances meaning that the case involves an indictable-only offence—for example, if new evidence emerges that results in a charge of theft being recharged as robbery, or a charge of sexual assault recharged as rape—the judge must reallocate it to a jury trial. To be clear, that is in relation to offence-based things. If there has been a relevant change of circumstances, but the aforementioned process does not apply—for example, if there is new evidence that means a custodial sentence of more than three years is likely—the judge may reallocate that to a jury trial. The use of “may” is important, because may is not must. I draw Members’ attention to the wording of the initial process of allocation. Perhaps to the frustration of some, I took the time to read it, because it is important. The initial wording on allocation with regard to sentence times is “must”—if the court thinks a sentence of more than three years is likely, it must allocate a jury trial—but as I pointed out, on reallocation the court simply “may” reallocate. I hope it is immediately obvious to Government Members that that is a less stringent test, which creates an inherent unfairness. At the outset, if a judge thinks that a defendant or accused is likely to receive three years, that jury trial is guaranteed. Let us remind ourselves that the Government accept that that is a benefit or a right—although they do not accept it is an absolute right—if the outcome is potentially a sentence of more than three years, yet some people will not get that benefit, even though the Government accept that it is desirable, because the Bill states that the judge has discretion to continue conducting the trial without a jury despite the relevant change of circumstances. The judge has that discretion if any of the following applies. First, they have that discretion if the condition in proposed new section 74A—a likely custodial sentence of more than three years—is not met in relation to the defendant. Secondly, and this is the important bit, in proposed new section 74B(3)(b), they have that discretion if “the court considers that it would not be appropriate to reallocate the trial”, taking into account the matters set out in proposed new section 74C(6) and (7). Those include representations by the prosecution and defence; the extent to which the new likely sentence differs from the three-year threshold sentence; the interests of the alleged victim; the desirability of avoiding the need for witnesses to give evidence again; any delay to proceedings; any actual or potential wasted costs; the effect of reallocation on other court business; and any other prescribed matter set out in the criminal procedure rules. Thirdly, the judge has that discretion if, as proposed new section 74B(3)(c) states, “the prosecution and the defendant or defendants each consent to the trial being conducted without a jury.” Therefore, if the defendant is happy to carry on without a jury, even though they risk the higher sentence, the trial can continue—and similarly for the prosecution. Some of those examples set out in proposed new section 74C(6) and (7) could legitimately deny a defendant a right that they would otherwise have had if the evidence had been available at the start of a trial. It could be something that has nothing to do with them—for example, a witness might not give the same evidence in their statement as they do at trial. Another example is the effect of reallocation on other court business—so simply because it would be challenging for the court to allocate or reallocate the case, a right that the Government deliberately set out to preserve for those people at initial allocation could not be exercised at that point. Again, in essence, those are all new legal tests. We have a whole range of factors, many of them subjective matters that must be weighed, rather than objective ones. They may all be factors that we might reasonably agree should be given weight, such as—to go back to some of the factors—the interests of the alleged victim. If an alleged victim has had a traumatic experience of giving evidence, it is not unreasonable for people to consider that. That does not mean, however, that it will not lead to circumstances in which a defendant is substantially disadvantaged. Let us take, for example, a case related to injury. In a case of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the sentencing range for this offence, triable either way, can include a sentence of up to four years. That is a good example of where we might see a change in circumstances, based on the evolving medical consequences of an alleged assault. A more concrete and simple example than a medical injury that might evolve from an assault, which is complex, is a person who is originally on trial for grievous bodily harm or attempted murder, but the victim dies during the trial or at a much later date, which can happen, and the person can be retried for a further offence. We know that the medical consequences can take time to materialise and can make a material difference to the charge. There are other borderline cases where the likely sentence at the point of the initial allocation decision was considered to be just under three years. To give another example, the sentencing guidelines for the most serious harm or culpability form of theft suggest a starting point sentence of three years and six months, with a suggested range of two years and six months to six years. That is absolutely within the scope of not being allocated a jury trial, but if the medical consequences were to evolve, that would change and push it to a sentence of up to six years, which would require a jury trial. As the hon. Member for Amber Valley, with her expertise and experience of the CPS, pointed out in relation to things that already happen in a magistrates court, we know that magistrates have to undertake this sort of intellectual exercise. They must be mindful that if the circumstances change, the trial must move to the Crown court. I understand that is quite unusual, however, and as we have talked about before, the stakes are likely—not always—to be lower when we are talking about a potentially much wider gap in possible sentence length. Strangely, this may be an example of something that magistrates do but, as I understand it, Crown court judges do not normally do; Crown court judges do not have to have it constantly in their mind throughout a trial whether their view has changed on the likely sentencing outcome. As I have alluded to, the legislation therefore risks creating a whole raft of legal challenges over potentially many years until there is a settled common law understanding of how all the different measures interact, and until higher courts set out the methodical tests and boundaries that are absent from it. The obvious test will arise when someone does actually end up receiving a longer sentence, and the obvious challenge will be that the judge should have realised and reallocated the case because of something considered materially new. That will be highly arguable. Let us say, for example, a complainant, when giving evidence, identifies a more profound psychological impact of a crime on them that was apparent from the initial statements disclosed—something that is to some extent subjective. The judge might listen to the evidence being given and not consider it to be materially different from the statements on which they based their initial summation, but I can absolutely imagine a defendant and their legal representatives feeling that a witness did say something that indicated something materially different. That is another more complex decision than the one made by the magistrates courts in a different way. As we have heard again and again, although magistrates court trials can be long, they are often shorter. Weighing up the impact of restarting that trial, of discounting the work that had been done and of re-sending it to another court, is very different from making that decision after weeks and weeks of a Crown court trial. There is also another risk in terms of public confidence in the process. As we have touched on before in relation to the initial allocation and sentencing, the judge will have already made a decision and given a view on initial allocation. There would be a risk that a defendant feels that their right to a jury trial, if the circumstances are such that they would have been concerned that the sentence would be greater than three years, might inhibit a judge from reallocating in the way that they would have ordinarily wanted to. As we have covered, the judge will be able to pass that higher sentence, which is another important difference with the magistrates, who, as I have talked about before, are constrained in their ability to go beyond that initial judgment. There will be no constraints, so it would be perfectly possible for a judge who had an initial view to end up passing a sentence much higher than they had anticipated and much higher than the defendant was advised would be the likely outcome. Again, that would give serious impetus for a defendant and their legal representatives to make the point that the judge had erred in their reallocation. It is not just a question of the fair thing to do. I explained earlier in relation to other allocations that I do not think it is the fair thing to do, but again it is a matter of efficiency and process. If we end up with repeated appeals over, as I have said, many different factors that will all individually need to be clarified in case law, that will again take up the time and energy of court staff, and particularly legal representatives, who work between all the different courts in a way that judges do not. Amendment 44 would help to balance that by opening up the widest possible interpretation of whether a reallocation is the right thing to do. We think talking about it in the interests of justice will give the maximum possible room to defendants to be sure that the trial they receive without a jury, and the decision taken to deny them a jury, are as fair as they possibly could be.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the opportunity to speak to amendment 19, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, this one of those challenging situations; we will not vote for the amendment, because it would indicate that we support or endorse a judge trial with two magistrates as opposed to a jury trial, which is not the case. But it is an extremely helpful probing amendment to point out the broader challenges and weaknesses with the Government’s proposal and the differences we would have seen had they followed the proposal by Sir Brian Leveson. The amendment also draws close attention to a matter that I have spoken about frequently: the Government’s willingness both to say that great credibility should be placed on the reforms that they are proposing because they have come about as a result of the work of the independent review by Sir Brian Leveson, and at the same time to reject proposals by Sir Brian. When we discussed this matter before, the Minister argued that our concern was not valid because Sir Brian had said in his report that the Government could go further. In my view, it is quite the leap to say of our criticisms that specific proposals lack the authority that Ministers claim because they were not recommended by Sir Brian that the proposals would in fact, in some way, be recommended by him anyway. While I think it is a weak point, it is probably stronger in relation to the decision by the Government to set the test for removing the jury from a Crown court trial at a sentence length of three years rather than Sir Brian’s recommendation of two years. I do not know whether he would support that—one might think he would have said so if he did—but there are what we might call matters on the continuum, where the prospect of Sir Brian’s suggestion of going further on a continuum of sentence length as the test is somewhat understandable. I do not think that argument is at all viable in relation to the measures relating to amendment 19. There is a distinct, what we might call, category difference between the recommendation to have a judge sit alone and to have a judge sit with two magistrates. We have discussed a number of the drawbacks of a judge sitting alone compared with having a jury. I will take them in turn. First, there is the question of bias—of concerns raised in relation to different outcomes, for example for women or ethnic minorities. We have discussed this before, but I want to draw attention again to the comments of Geoffrey Robertson KC. He said: “The determination, by 12 citizens of evidence tested by prosecution and defence, is a surer guide to the right result, reflecting common sense and common values, than the personal view of a judge”. He also said: “A diverse jury, usually with a few representatives of ethnic communities, serves as some guarantee of fairness and non-discrimination in dispensing justice.” We have been leaning very heavily on the Bar, but the Criminal Law Solicitors Association says: “Jurors, drawn from all elements of society, take jury service very seriously. Our Vice-Chair sat on a jury last year and saw his fellow jurors, without exception, treat the process with the gravity and respect that it deserves. Limiting jury trials reduces public engagement in the process and weakens democratic participation in criminal justice.” Sir Brian was not the only person tasked to consider in detail proposals for a reform of the courts who has settled on similar views about the decision to reduce jury trials, which, as I have said, we do not support. They have also agreed that a judge with two magistrates is the way to do it. Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 independent review of the criminal courts in England and Wales recommended the creation of a new district division, with a unified criminal court structure designed to handle either-way cases that were too serious for the magistrates but did not require, in his view, a full jury trial. He proposed that the court would consist of a professional judge sitting with two experienced magistrates. He said in his report that there is a “middle-range of cases that do not warrant the cumbersome and expensive fact-finding exercise of a trial by judge and jury, but which are sufficiently serious or difficult, or their outcome is of such consequence to the public or defendant, to merit a combination of professional and lay judges”. That was a specific choice to say that there was merit in lay as well as professional judges taking part.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Those aspects link directly, because I am discussing particular disclosure issues occurring in the magistrates court. As I will go on to explain, these are specific problems that Jonathan Fisher has identified as being a particular problem in the magistrates court rather than the Crown court—yet we are going to send more cases to the magistrates court. We have to be clear eyed about exactly what we are doing. The issue is relevant because every time Opposition Members say, “Things are not the same in the magistrates court. You do not get quite as fair a trial; it is not comparable to a jury trial”, Government Members say, “That’s nonsense—they are all the same. If you believe that, get rid of magistrates courts.” It is important to understand this clear example of where the magistrates courts are delivering a less fair service than the Crown courts. I will carry on. HMCTS data suggests that in 2023, a total of 311 magistrates court cases were ineffective because the prosecution explicitly failed to disclose unused material. In the same year, 746 magistrates court cases were deemed ineffective due to defence disclosure problems. Between October 2014 and September 2023, disclosure accounted for almost 7% of all ineffective trials in magistrates courts. The issue is also extremely important from a victims’ perspective. The debate today has been about the defendants, but if we take the argument that in some of these cases the defendant would have been found guilty, who loses out the most if we send a case to the magistrates court and it collapses because of particular challenges with disclosure? The victim loses out, because it is over and done with and they do not have the opportunity to recorrect.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, and I will be writing to the CPS about that, because commenting in the way that it has was extremely unusual. I would hope that it has a very clear explanation as to how it has been able to formulate that position, because, of course, the CPS is just articulating a particular viewpoint. As has happened, when a Government-funded agency does that, it gives it a certain weight that is not necessarily appropriate. That is why ordinarily non-departmental Government bodies are not expected to do that sort of thing. It is something we should think about more carefully. We also talked this morning about public confidence among members of minority communities, as was raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington. The group JUSTICE has put forward its views and concerns about this. It notes that the equality statement for the Bill also notes that black, older and female defendants historically elect for a Crown court trial at higher rates. In 2022, 26% of black defendants elected for a Crown court trial, compared with 15% of white defendants—a very significant gap. In 2017, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) also concluded that many individuals from ethnic minorities opted for trial in the Crown court whenever possible, as they had more confidence in the fairness of jury trials compared with magistrates. As the Bill is written by the person advocating for those changes, we should consider what the right hon. Member said very carefully. He said: “Juries are a success story of our justice system. Rigorous analysis shows that, on average, juries— including all white juries—do not deliver different results for BAME and White defendants. The lesson is that juries are representative of local populations—and must deliberate as a group, leaving no hiding place for bias or discrimination.” Would Government Members put it to the right hon. Member for Tottenham that he was in any way denigrating magistrates in making that point, or that he was saying magistrate trials were not fair? I do not recall any Labour MP making that point at the time that his report was published. The review found that BAME defendants often had lower confidence in the fairness of magistrates courts and, as I have said, therefore opted for a trial in the Crown courts. Because of that lack of trust, BAME defendants were also thought to be more likely to plead not guilty in magistrates court and push for a Crown court trial, which resulted in them missing out on the one-third sentencing reduction offered by early guilty pleas. These things have real-world consequences for the individuals concerned. While the report found that BAME defendants were not disadvantaged compared with white counterparts at the jury trial stage, they faced harsher outcomes elsewhere in the system. I want to quote again from the Lammy review: “The way that juries make decisions is key to this. Juries comprise 12 people, representative of the local population. When a jury retires to make a decision, its members must consider the evidence, discuss the case and seek to persuade one another if necessary. This debate and deliberation acts as a filter for prejudice—to persuade other jurors, people must justify their position. In the final decision, power is also never concentrated in the hands of one individual.” What did the right hon. Member have to say about magistrates courts? He said: “This positive story about the jury system is not matched by such a clear-cut story for magistrates’ verdicts. The relative rate analysis…commissioned for this review found that decisions were broadly proportionate for BAME boys and girls. However, there were some disparities for adult verdicts that require further analysis and investigation. In particular, there were some worrying disparities for BAME women.” As a table in the report showed, “of those women tried at Magistrates’ Court, Black women, Asian women, Mixed ethnic women and Chinese/Other women were all more likely to be convicted than White women.” Again, would Government Members say that the right hon. Member was therefore advocating for the abolition of magistrates hearings? Of course not, and neither are we. We are simply making clear the trade-offs for such an unprecedented shift in their use—for such a significant curtailment of the use of the system of juries that is so well regarded and trusted by our constituents—and are arguing that the case has not been made. JUSTICE also raised concerns about unrepresented defendants. My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate made that point in relation to legal aid. The equality statement for the Bill acknowledges that if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates court, a greater proportion of defendants may be ineligible for legal aid compared than if their case were heard in the Crown court. That is because the income eligibility threshold in the magistrates court of £22,325 is significantly lower than that in the Crown court, where it is £37,500. An increase in unrepresented defendants risks undermining fairness. For example, defendants may receive harsher sentences if they do not know how to effectively offer mitigation. This is especially concerning where expanded magistrates’ sentencing powers will leave defendants facing trials for offences carrying a sentence of up to two years unrepresented. Additionally, the Institute for Government has highlighted that unrepresented defendants in magistrates courts are also likely to prolong hearings and therefore erode any of the anticipated efficiency gains. It estimates that, for every additional hour in the average length of a trial, estimated savings will fall by more than one percentage point. I also want to address the issue of youth courts, which was debated this morning. Government Members posited the fact that these courts hear more serious cases such as rape as some form of proof that curtailing jury trials in a similar adult case could be acceptable. That ignores the fact that each court and each setting has its own balances and goals and its own weighing exercise, with different considerations, where different conclusions will be reached. Youth court trials generally do not have a jury because they are designed to be less formal and more focused on rehabilitation than punishment, with cases heard by specially trained youth magistrates rather than ordinary magistrates alongside district judges. These courts prioritise specialist knowledge and child-friendly proceedings over public proceedings, and aim to ensure that a child understands what is happening, with less intimidating atmospheres than adult Crown courts. Youth courts are closed to the public, which is not possible with a jury trial. This is the trade-off we make, but these are trade-offs that, for decades and decades, we have not considered suitable in adult courts. We have considered the extra, additional vulnerabilities and the need to focus on rehabilitation in youth courts, so we carry out a different balancing exercise and make a different trade-off. That does not mean that we can read that across to an adult court without considering the benefits, the conclusions and the additional factors that we seek to mitigate—that we can just say, “Well you can just do the same for adults as you do in a youth court.” Different scenarios have different tests. We also know that the choice of trial by jury is not the only reason some defendants elect for trial by jury. In fact, there are important procedural differences in the two courts. An application to dismiss is a legal request made by the defence to have some or all of the charges thrown out before the trial begins. This application is available only in Crown court cases and applies to indictable offences or cases that have been sent from the magistrates court to the Crown court. An application to dismiss in the Crown court is a pre-trial request to throw out charges, according to rule 3.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, and earlier versions. It must be made in writing after the prosecution serves evidence but before arraignment, arguing that a reasonable jury could not convict. It is true that formal applications to dismiss are relatively rare compared with other ways in which a case might end, mainly because the legal bar for success is very high. While specific numbers for rule 3.2 applications are not always separated in basic reports, wider court data gives a clear picture of how often cases are dropped or stopped before a full trial. In recent quarters, up to late 2025, the figures available to me show that approximately 17% to 18% of defendants in for-trial cases had their cases dropped by the prosecution or stopped by the court before a verdict. Why are formal dismissals that are available in the Crown court less common? The Crown Prosecution Service knows it is legally required to keep cases under constant review. If the evidence is truly weak enough to be dismissed by a judge, the CPS will usually discontinue the case or offer no evidence to avoid a wasted hearing. We know that is a very common occurrence. Are we confident that we know how much of that happens because of the availability of that legal test? The CPS knows that if it does not do that and if it does proceed in an inappropriate manner, it will face the legal test that it does not face in the magistrates court. If the Government have access to evidence that can reassure us, they should present it, but I could not find anything that leads me to be confident that cases dropped in the Crown court might proceed in the magistrates court, and perhaps they should not. The provision of disclosure in the Crown court is much more robust. We have all seen cases where trials collapse because of exchanges related to disclosure. Crown court disclosure is strictly governed by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which requires formal staged disclosure. In magistrates courts, disclosure is often more streamlined, focusing on the initial details of the prosecution case. In the Crown court, a defence statement is mandatory. In the magistrates court, a defence statement is generally voluntary, although recommended. Once the prosecution discloses unused material, the defence has 28 days in the Crown court to serve a defence statement. In the magistrates court, the time limit is 14 days. Crown court prosecutors must provide schedules of all unused material. Magistrates courts typically use, as I have said, streamlined disclosure certificates, which are not as extensive. We know there are problems with disclosure at times. The independent review of disclosure and fraud offences was officially announced by the UK Government on 23 October. Led by Jonathan Fisher KC, the review was commissioned as part of the fraud strategy launched in May 2023 to address the digital age challenges in criminal cases. It is the first of its kind since the 1986 Roskill report. Jonathan is a leading King’s counsel in financial crime, proceeds of crime, fraud and tax cases. He has been a visiting professor in practice at the London School of Economics and he holds a PhD, which was awarded by the LSE following his research into money laundering cases and the relationship between the obligation to report suspicious activity and corporate rights. Clearly, this is someone who speaks with a great deal of authority and experience in relation to the operation of criminal law. Part one of the review, on disclosure, was published on 21 March 2025. It is helpful for us to reflect on it, given some of the exchanges we have had during debates. As I have said, Government Members sought to dismiss any suggestion that the magistrates courts were less fair or a less appropriate place to hold a hearing and suggested that everything is rosy in the magistrates court, so there is no possible reason why someone might not want to go to a magistrates court. They wanted to frame this as a purely binary choice between fair and unfair. As I pointed out to the Minister, every time we point out some of the unfairnesses, the Minister says that everything is fair and it is all fine. But then when we ask the Minister to articulate why, if everything in the magistrates courts is just fine and dandy, we therefore keep jury trials for more serious cases, there is literally no rational or logical conclusion. The Minister says this is not a debating chamber, but the Minister is presenting a Bill with underlying political and legal principles, and if she cannot come up with a consistent set of those principles as a basis on which to articulate the arguments she is making, that is not a great advert for the Bill. I can happily say that I think Scotland’s legal system is less fair, and I think the magistrates courts are less fair. I am perfectly happy to say that, but that does not mean that I want to get rid of them or curtail them. It is just part of the reality, and I am consistent in that regard. So let us talk about what Jonathan Fisher can do to assist us.

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Oh dear! Dame Vera Baird: Kieran, you are not listening to what Claire says—she is right. The women’s movement is very disappointed with the Bill because it does not tackle the issue of criminalisation of women. They think that dealing with delays in the list is a very poor substitute, and they will not have it. They want to stand up at last for a proper defence of coercively controlled women who are put into crime—goodness knows it has been long enough coming—but that does not appear in the Bill. The women’s movement is very upset about that, and in my view that has driven this. I do not doubt—

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any lessons that could be drawn out for the rest of the country? You have given us some that you think cannot be. Sir Brian Leveson: Yes, and I have made recommendations. It is critical that the systems join up: the police, the CPS, the defence community, the courts, the judiciary, and the prison and probation services. They all have their own budgets, their own problems and their own priorities. One of the recommendations I made in part 2 of my review—which is not considered in the Bill, obviously—was the creation of a criminal justice adviser whose only responsibility was co-ordinating the work of each of the agencies to try to make them work together. That is where it has worked in Liverpool. But doing that on its own would not be sufficient.

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To be frank with you, I was unhappy with the acquittals in all the cases that you have given examples of, so I am not necessarily sympathetic to the aim that you are putting forward. How important do you think it is that the system allows someone like me to be frustrated and not agree with what the jury end up doing or with what the judges and the establishment might think is right, versus what ordinary members of the public do, as a check and balance against people like me? Tim Crosland: It is a vital component of democracy. The classic example that comes up a lot is Clive Ponting. This is going back few decades—I remember it. In the 1980s, he was a civil servant who heard an account of what happened to the General Belgrano being presented to the public and Parliament that he knew was not true. He knew that the Belgrano was driving away from the British forces when it was sunk, so he leaked that information and was prosecuted for breach of the Official Secrets Act. The judge said, “You have no defence in law.” If it was down to the judge, Clive Ponting would have been convicted as a criminal and jailed. The jury saw somebody who had acted to get good information to the public, so they disregarded the judge’s ruling—a principle known as jury equity—and Clive Ponting was acquitted. That sent a powerful message to politicians about the standards that the public expect: standards of honesty and integrity. If we do away with the principle of jury equity, we do away with a vital democratic safeguard.

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, Tim. I am Kieran Mullan, the shadow Justice Minister. To pick up on your final remark, what was it that made you think this issue could be coming down the track? Tim Crosland: There had been a pattern of jury acquittals in protest cases. In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads. It goes on, and we were seeing the reaction to that. It was nothing to do with the efficiency of the courts; it was the reactions from companies like Shell and Elbit, the meetings with Ministers, and the call, “How do we stop this happening because this is deeply embarrassing?”

• 23 Mar 2026 · Court and Tribunal Transcripts · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) for opening the debate on behalf of the Petitions Committee. He is proving himself to be a consistent and doughty champion of victims and the issues that they raise with him. I also acknowledge the long-standing campaigning of the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) in this area. I welcome today’s opportunity to discuss this issue as part of our wider debate about transparency in the justice system. Sadly, I think that I can predict to some extent what the Minister will say: the phrase “14 years” will make an appearance; there will be lots of rhetoric about how terrible the previous Government were; and there will be a complete absence of any idea of how the current Government would have managed differently the challenges that the previous Government faced. I can also be pretty confident about what the Minister will not say. There will be no real engagement with what the challenges of covid presented to our justice system, even though they truly were unprecedented. However, that is the standard that Ministers and Labour have set, not just for justice, but across the Government on issues such as inflation and energy bills. There is no acceptance of the challenges that the previous Government faced and no exceptions made for things outside their control. It therefore should not be any surprise when the present Government are held to exactly the same standard. In reality, this issue is a good example of what more fair-minded commentators accept as a multi-decade failure to give the justice system and those involved in it the priority and resources they deserve. I am sure that if the Minister and I were to design the justice system from scratch together, we would agree that free access to transcripts was important and, indeed, should just be the default. However, we are where we are. Sadly, I am realistic about what success we will achieve on the issue of transcripts today, even when a petition has been signed by an impressive 200,000 people. After all, this is the Government who tried to delete the Courtsdesk archive, which has been one of the biggest steps forward for transparency in our justice system in recent years. I raised that issue in the main Chamber because I was deeply concerned about the decision to delete a unique archive of corrected and correlated court listings. In the absence of retrospective access to court transcripts, the work of journalists is absolutely vital, and Courtsdesk had become a valuable tool for journalists, campaigners and others seeking to identify patterns in offending and to expose failings in our justice system. Rather than seeking to preserve that transparency while dealing constructively with any data protection concerns, the Government moved towards deleting the archive altogether. Of course, the Government’s defence of that decision did not hold up to scrutiny. When the Minister for Courts and Legal Services came to the House and said that there were serious data protection concerns with Courtsdesk, she did not tell us that the Government’s internal processes had found the incident she cited to be low-risk, not even warranting referral to the Information Commissioner’s Office. At a time when confidence in the justice system depends on greater openness, the Minister for Courts and Legal Services was going to deliver the exact opposite, and that is part of the context for today’s debate. It relates to the broader question of whether the Government are approaching transparency in the justice system with sufficient urgency and seriousness. The petition speaks to the basic principle that access to justice should not depend on the ability to pay, and open justice is not an optional extra to be considered only once the administrative convenience of the system has been satisfied. The petitioners are right to identify transcript fees as a paywall. For too many people, they are exactly that: a barrier to understanding what happened in court; a barrier to considering making an appeal; a barrier to holding the system to account; and, in some cases, a barrier to justice itself. That matters not just for journalists and campaigners, but for victims, bereaved families and ordinary members of the public who are trying to make sense of a justice system that is supposed to work for them. There is clearly public demand for greater transparency in the system, which was why the previous Conservative Government started moving in that direction, including through the pilot of making sentencing remarks available free of charge to victims of rape and other sexual offences. That was a start, although I now think that we should have moved faster and further while we were in government. I find it hard to think of any other walk of life in which we would expect a member of the public who is part of such an important process—it is important for them, for their friends and family, and for the wider justice system—to be asked to remember key things that may or may not have been said in court, and to be asked to be in court every single day if they want to understand the full process, although that might not necessarily be appropriate. What disappoints me in particular is the Government’s resistance not just to making full transcripts available, but on the much narrower and more readily resolvable issue of making transcripts of sentencing remarks available. The Government have refused to accept our proposal—it has been voted on in the Lords—to have such transcripts produced within 14 days and free of charge. They will accept doing that only from spring of next year and not necessarily within 14 days. As we have heard, given the unduly lenient sentence scheme, people need those transcripts quickly if they are to be able to make good use of them. It is particularly clear that there is public interest in sentencing remarks. I look forward to the Labour Members who spoke today backing amendments that the Conservatives, with cross-party support, are attempting to pass so that transcripts of sentencing remarks are made available. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller), pointed out, similar amendments have been proposed to allow victims to have even more made available to them, including the route to verdict and bail decisions. Those amendments have cross-party support, so I hope that Labour Members and others will support them when the House considers them this week. My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay) showed his ministerial experience through the well-articulated questions that he put to the Minister. I will add my own questions to his. It is all well and good for the Minister to talk in warm words about access to sentencing remarks and court transcripts, but do we have an actual date for when the Government will deliver that? What cases will it apply to at first, and what barriers are preventing us from implementing this much more quickly than the Government have committed to? I pay tribute to everyone who signed the petition, particularly those campaigners such as Fiona Goddard, who my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley mentioned and focused on grooming gangs. That has been a key driver of the demands for greater transparency in our justice system. The Government resisted an inquiry on that matter in a similar vein to how they are resisting transparency in our justice system. I look forward to the Minister giving us concrete answers about how we will make progress, rather than just warm words.

• 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, at the heart of this is the question of whether our enemies and malign actors fear the consequences of hostile acts against us. That question is why many of us say that the embassy should be paused. Why would the Chinese be worried about consequences of spying, when this week, another malign actor attempted to kill British armed forces personnel and attacked sovereign territory, but suffered no consequences? What lesson does the Minister think China will take from our failure to defend our own territory from military attack?

• 4 Feb 2026 · Lord Mandelson · Hansard source

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  I think some Labour Members do get it, which is why we are seeing furious activity with the usual channels at the moment. I think there is a whole movement of those Members who are not going to be willing to support the Government in voting for their own amendment today. I think some of them get it, and the rest of them need to catch up quickly. Those first movers who spoke out and were clear that they were not going to support it will be able to hold their heads up high. Let us also be clear about Mandelson’s disrespect for this House. We have heard from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry). She has now left the Chamber, but I will refer to her remarks. She gave a pretty poor account of why she wholeheartedly endorsed his appointment. As Chair of that Committee, she is supposed to be independent and to act on behalf of the House. She was happy to explain all the reasons why she felt that the vetting was not complete and the processes were not up to scratch. Why, then, did she not say at the time that this person should not have been appointed? We know that other members of the Committee said the same thing, and they were similarly thrown under the bus by the Chair of the Committee, who endorsed the appointment. I think that is also a disrespect to this House.

• 4 Feb 2026 · Lord Mandelson · Hansard source

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  Does the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee regret describing the appointment of Peter Mandelson as “inspired”, and did she know of his ongoing relationship with Epstein prior to his appointment?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  It is not just the WTO; the Chinese are supposed to follow the jurisdiction of international maritime courts, for example. The Government point to that as a reason why we should comply with them, but the Chinese break those rulings all the time, as we discussed in relation to the South China sea. They could not care less; they are restrained only by their strict self-interest. They pretend and play up the idea that they might follow the rules—when it does not suit, they do not follow them—yet we are supposed to follow the rules, because the aim is to get the Chinese on side. That is never going to happen. Let us look at the membership of the ICJ and the people who made the ruling. The vice-president was Xue Hanqin, who ruled that the UK should give the islands over to Mauritius. She is a former Chinese Communist party official who served as the director-general of the department of treaty and law in China’s foreign ministry—the same ministry that is overseeing the violation of the agreement in Hong Kong. It makes absolutely no sense to see it as a neutral arbiter. In 2022, she was one of two judges who voted against an ICJ ruling that Russia should suspend its invasion of Ukraine. Would our country slavishly adhering to those rulings, against our own national interest, bring onside wavering countries that are making their own strategic calculations about who they want to support when it comes to challenges such as Ukraine and, if it happens, Taiwan? Of course it will not. The historical argument for that approach has been to suggest that we will bring other countries over to our way of doing things—the rules-based order—but I am afraid that that is not happening. Countries across the world are actually looking at which bloc and which sphere of influence would be best at defending their interests if they seek to align with it. This surrender deal will make it very clear that they should think twice about supporting the western democracies and instead point their finger towards the autocratic states that will benefit so enormously from the deal. Surrendering the Chagos islands will simply strengthen those countries that want a more disorderly world. We should seek to use the rules-based order—we should not abandon that long-term goal, and we should continue to make it clear that that is our preference for how we run the world—but not with our eyes and ears closed to what is actually happening, and not at huge cost to our own interests. This is not diplomacy or pragmatism; it is weakness, and weakness has consequences. Britain is not just losing a territory; we are losing credibility. Our allies are watching as Labour surrenders key strategic ground without so much as a fight. Our adversaries are taking note and seeing a Government who lack the resolve to defend their own interests. This deal is a sell-out and a catastrophic misjudgment, and it must not go ahead. I urge every Member of this House to stand firm for Britain’s interests, our national security and our place in the world. We must reject this reckless agreement and demand that our Government defend British sovereign territory, rather than bargaining it away behind closed doors.