Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 1 Jul 2026 · Draft Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Legal Aid: Anti-social Behaviour and Prevention and Investigation Measures) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2026 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to speak on behalf of the official Opposition in support of this statutory instrument. Over a million anti-social behaviour incidents are recorded by the police every single year in England and Wales. That is not a statistic that should wash over us; behind every one of those incidents is a pensioner who is afraid to walk to the corner shop, a shopkeeper who has been harassed and threatened, or a community that has been slowly ground down. When the Government brought forward the Crime and Policing Act, we supported the creation of respect orders; in fact, we wanted them to go further. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) tabled amendments in Committee that would have lowered the age of eligibility from 18 to 16. We argued for a fine on a second order, for a maximum prison term of five years for repeated breaches and for those who receive repeated orders to be deprioritised on social housing lists. The Government did not accept all those amendments; I still think they were right and the legislation would have been stronger, but we are where we are, and what matters now is that the respect order regime works as intended and in line with our other measures. What makes respect orders different from what came before is simple: a breach is now a criminal offence and police can arrest immediately. There are no more long waits for civil contempt proceedings and no more watching someone breach their order again and again with no immediate consequences; when someone is made subject to a respect order, they face serious consequences if they breach it. Their liberty is at stake, and it is right that people in that position can access legal advice in line with our criminal norms, not because we are soft on anti-social behaviour, but because a fair system is a stronger system, and an order made appropriately with appropriate legal process is an order that will stick. This instrument, as the Minister explained, extends the legal framework for access to criminal aid not just to respect orders but to youth injunctions and housing injunctions under the Crime and Policing Act. We support that. Young people facing injunctions and residents facing housing injunctions deserve clarity on their rights. Although the position of the official Opposition is to support the SI, where we feel the intent and the legal aid provision are right, the Government must ensure that the police and court can handle what follows in the operation of these orders. Those of us who have been involved in policing and politics have heard various iterations of attempts to get anti-social behaviour under control over various Governments and many decades, and this is just the latest version of it. We need something that will work; communities across this country are tired of tolerating anti-social behaviour. Respect orders can be part of the answer, and the official Opposition will keep pressing to ensure that they are delivered as intended.

• 29 Jun 2026 · Home Office and Ministry of Justice · Hansard source

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  If you will forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am talking about a major issue that relates directly to the estimates: the prison building programme, the need for that programme and what the Government are doing to manage the prison population. I believe it is directly related to the estimates in that regard. I repeat, sincerely, that multiple Governments of different parties have let prisoners out of prison early in order to manage prison crises, but they have never let rapists and child groomers out early. Government Members are therefore backing a totally unnecessary way of managing prison capacity. They really do not have to do it. They are being forced into doing so, and I feel very sorry for them as a result. It is difficult to understand how the Government can lay these estimates before the House and put forward a proposal for changes to sentencing if they do not even know how many people they are letting out of prison and for what reason. I cannot believe that the Minister thinks that that is acceptable, and it will be difficult for her to justify. But, to be fair, she may also struggle to answer a basic question about her own responsibilities—about her plans to erode our right to jury trial and to abolish our right to elect. The Conservatives will oppose any erosion of the right to jury trial. It is a constitutional protection that belongs to people, not to the convenience of a Government. The evidence does not support the case that jury trials are the cause of the backlog; empty courtrooms are. We are awaiting a date for Report stage of the Courts and Tribunals Bill. Given the political situation, and considering the Minister’s planned capital and revenue expenditure in this area, I think it is entirely legitimate to ask whether the proposal on jury trials is even still Government policy. When the legislation that is meant to address the central crisis in our criminal justice system is dependent on who wins an internal party election in the next few weeks—if there even is one—that is not a functioning legislative programme; it is chaos dressed up as reform. Are the Government laser-focused on what will actually work to bring the backlog down? No. Instead, they have been laser-focused on driving through unnecessary vandalism on one of our oldest constitutional rights. While the backlog is still much too high, the backlogs in Crown courts are stabilising and even coming down in some areas. The Government have announced uncapped Crown court sitting days for 2026-27, and we absolutely welcome that, even though it took much too long. It is exactly what we have called for consistently, and I give credit where it is due. We have seen the first quarterly decline in Crown court backlogs across England and Wales in three years in the most recent data. The Criminal Bar Association points out that in particular areas of the country, the reductions are more significant. In the south-east of England, the backlogs in courts are down 3.1% over three months and 4.2% over six months. In the north-west of England, they are down 2.3% over three months and 3.3% over six months. In the north-east of England, they are down 2.9% in three months. In Wales, they are down 2.4% over three months. Meanwhile, the figure for magistrates courts shows an all-time peak of more than 370,000 cases at the end of March this year, up 2% on the previous quarter—and the magistrates courts are where the Government want to send more cases. We heard again and again in the first stages of the Courts and Tribunals Bill that the workforce, whether it be in the courts, judges or legal representatives, can bring the backlogs down, but that the jury reforms were an unnecessary distraction. According to the X feed of the monitoring account Idle Courts, recently as many as 123 out of 516 Crown courtrooms—nearly a quarter—were standing empty on working days. We know that that was not because there were no cases to hear, no juries or no defendants. It was because of issues such as listing challenges, staffing shortages and the underutilisation of available court space. To date, the Government have not listened and have refused to drop those parts of the Bill that are, as the hon. Member for Chichester said, clearly unwelcome to so many in the workforce. I hope we learn today that what we are told about the views of the right hon. Member for Makerfield is correct and that this unacceptable plan to erode our jury rights will be dropped. Let me turn to the Home Office elements of this debate, because the two Departments are inextricably linked. Members will understand that it is not the day-to-day responsibility of the Minister or I, but we both know that what happens at the front end—policing, charging, and bail—flows directly into the courts, with probation and prisons at the back end. Police officer numbers fell by more than 1,000 in just one year under this Government, from September 2024 to September 2025, and the total number of people involved in policing fell by 3,000. The National Police Chiefs’ Council said in response to this year’s funding settlement and the estimates that we are debating that many forces are planning service reductions, with consequences for officer numbers, staff capacity and overall resilience. The Government cannot simultaneously claim to want swifter justice and a safer society while allowing the frontline workforce who investigate crime, make arrests and build prosecutions to continue to shrink. The Conservatives’ plan would put 10,000 extra officers on the streets, triple the use of stop and search, and introduce facial recognition technology in the worst crime hotspots. On asylum, the Home Office estimates that there are more than 400,000 illegal migrants in the UK—people in this country illegally—but nearly half cannot be removed because of outstanding asylum and human rights claims. Total spending on asylum support remains at over £4.5 billion, and the decision of the Government to put even more asylum seekers in more expensive locations such as Crowborough in Wealden in the constituency of your fellow Deputy Speaker, Madam Deputy Speaker, is going to cost more money than if they were to be kept in their original places. Let me close with this. The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee said that the focus of the debate can be distilled to concerns about the risks to public safety and trust, and he is right. We are spending more than ever before on our criminal justice system—billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money flow through the estimates we are debating—but reoffending is rising, rape gang survivors are being told that their abusers may be freed early and police officer numbers are falling. The Government may be about to change their Prime Minister, and with that the MOJ will more than likely welcome a new Lord Chancellor, so policies announced with great fanfare may quietly disappear over the summer, but the people waiting for Crown court hearings and the victims seeing criminals walk free will still be there. We will not oppose the estimate, but we will not let the Government off the hook, either. They have had nearly two years and the numbers are not getting any better. The public deserve better. The Opposition will hold them to account for every one of these figures, whoever happens to be sitting in Downing Street when we do it.

• 28 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled in my name, and the amendments outlined by the hon. Member for Chichester, all of which enjoy our support. Our amendments seek to ensure that efficiencies and improvements to the system are made, increasing the maximum of sitting days to 130,000 and, in a different way, addressing the issue of sitting hours. We are debating the fundamental restructuring of our criminal justice system, and the Government’s central argument—the Minister has admitted that it is not the sole argument; even though most of the rest of the Government talk about this as a necessity, she thinks it should be done anyway—is that the Crown court is in a state of emergency with the backlog that we all agree is causing much distress to victims and innocent defendants alike. Amendment 59 asks the Government to take all reasonable steps to increase Crown court sitting days and address the other challenges in the system that are limiting our ability to tackle the backlog—the avoidable operational failures currently crippling our courts. We must remember that Sir Brian Leveson acknowledged that jury trials are the gold standard of our justice system. The Minister herself accepted that there was something special about them. Juries are not just a step in a trial; they are a democratic barrier between the individual and the overreach of authority. They are an important way in which citizens participate in our justice system. The Deputy Prime Minister has been one of the biggest cheerleaders of the value and importance of jury trials, describing them as a “success story” and comparing them less favourably with the magistrates courts—although I am sure he respects and understands the benefit of magistrates courts—because of the ability of 12 citizens to look at a case uniquely and without prejudice. Productivity in the Crown court has fallen significantly, and analysis shows that courts are hearing approximately 20% fewer hours per sitting day than they were less than a decade ago. In evidence to us, the Bar Council shared analysis showing that the average for which each Crown court judge sits in court each day has fallen to 3.2 hours. That is due to inefficiencies such as technological breakdown, prisoner transport delays and difficulties with interpreter services. Just getting back to the 2016-17 level of 3.8 hours would be an 18% improvement, far outstripping the much debated, but we think much fairer, figure of a 1% to 2% improvement in relation to the reforms to jury trials. If the Government were serious about efficiency, they would start by addressing the low-hanging fruit in respect of the logistical problems. Members will remember the evidence from the HMCTS civil servant tasked with running the system, asking for it to operate efficiently. He talked about listing, prison transport and sitting days as his priorities, and none of the things that he felt would make a significant impact required any changes to jury trials. Prisoner escort and custody services, as they are known, have been a strong theme of concern from a wide variety of witnesses. The figures that I have show that there were 713 ineffective trials in 2023 solely because the prison escort service failed to deliver a defendant to court on time. Reports from barristers indicate that, in a quarter of cases, their clients were brought to court more than five hours late, meaning that the trial day could not start on time or was lost entirely. That grit in the system causes thousands of hours of delays across our courts, yet the Government’s priority is to remove the jury trial rather than fix the transport contract. Another major drain on efficiency is the timing of guilty pleas. Sir Brian Leveson noted that defendants used to plead guilty at their first or second appearance, but we now see many examples of guilty pleas occurring at the fifth or sixth occasion. The Minister is right to raise that, and we accept that one element is delays in the court system that reduce the incentive for a guilty plea. We have heard evidence that defendants would say, “I just want to hold off my guilty plea until I have a last Christmas,” but that has now become, “I want another two Christmases.” So we understand the delays, but they are not the only reason and are not an insurmountable problem. Instead of removing the right to a jury, the Government should focus on improving access to early legal advice, which we know can make a big difference. We can also learn from courts such as Liverpool Crown court that have a laser focus on an approach to listing, which encourages early engagement by defendants and legal representatives alike. That has produced results with their Crown court backlogs that are nothing like the national figure. They are not alone in showing what can be done without the need to erode our jury trial rights. The Bar Council points to other successes in the system and says that blitz courts, established by Crown courts such as Preston, Liverpool, Nottingham and others, are effective. Preston Crown court’s listing of domestic abuse cases from the autumn of 2024 until this year has reduced the time between plea and trial preparation hearing, listing and trial by 16%. Ipswich Crown court’s backlog is down 28% since January 2024, and Derby Crown court’s fast-track courts are being run with a specific focus on cases with allegations of domestic abuse. That scheme has been successful, with those cases now being listed for trial sooner than when they might have been otherwise. We also received evidence that the circuit in Wales does not have a backlog that is anything like the rest of the country, which shows what can be done. The Government promise that judge-only trials will be 20% faster, but that figure is based on highly uncertain assumptions and anecdotal evidence. We have made the argument in Committee that there might be savings up front, but we could lose those savings in the time taken by judges to deliberate and provide their summation, which we should also weigh up. Amendment 59 relates to all the things that could be done to improve efficiency without necessarily having an increase in sitting days, but we cannot support the removal of constitutional rights while we have not even hit the maximum sitting days target that Sir Brian Leveson recommended. Amendment 35 would require the Government to demonstrate that they have funded at least 130,000 Crown court sitting days before they can commence their reforms. That figure is the target number that Sir Brian says the Government should seek to achieve if they want to bring down the backlog. Our amendment would require HMCTS to assess that those sitting days have, as far as possible, been fully utilised, and that ties in with amendment 59. It is no good the Government funding, in theory, a maximum number of sitting days if they are not able to utilise them for various reasons, some of which I have covered. Amendment 35 would also require the Lord Chancellor to make a statement to the House confirming that, even after those steps have been taken, the number of cases pending trial has not been reduced compared with the start of the financial year. We are essentially putting forward a litmus test. If the Government want to say that they have no other options and that there is no other way to do this, they should at least take the steps recommended by Sir Brian in terms of efficiencies, reforming how the system operates and having the maximum number of sitting days, which they have to get to at some point anyway if they want to argue in support of Sir Brian Leveson’s report as a litmus test for what is sufficient. If the Government are confident in their analysis, they should have no difficulty meeting that test. I know the Minister will talk about the time it will take to reach that point, but the dial can be pushed both ways. I do not think the Government are seriously suggesting that the jury trial element of the reforms will make a drastic difference to the backlog in the next one or two years. As we have discussed, the time saving of the jury trial element on its own is not that significant. Amendment 36 has a different approach, but seeks to make the same point as new clause 4, tabled the hon. Member for Chichester, which relates to having two court sittings a day. Our amendment 36 asks the Government to approach another possible alternative reform of the operating hours of our courts—specifically, the potential for extending court sitting hours and introducing weekend sittings. If we are in a state of emergency, as the Government claim, our response should focus on maximising the use of our existing infrastructure, rather than dismantling the rights of the citizen. At present, our Crown courts often operate typically between 10 am and 4.30 pm. It is difficult to justify a policy that removes the right to a jury trial—a move estimated to save perhaps as little as 1.5% to 2.5% of court time—when we are leaving so many hours of the working day and the entirety of the weekend completely unutilised. Working normal business hours such as 9 to 5, or even utilising Saturdays for specific types of hearings, could provide a far more substantial reduction in the backlog than the structural reforms proposed in the Bill. We recognise that a possible move towards extended or weekend hours must be handled with extreme care. That is why we proposed amendment 36, which would require the Lord Chancellor to undertake a comprehensive consultation on the potential introduction of extended sitting hours before the reforms can commence. Operational changes of this magnitude cannot be mandated from a desk in Whitehall without understanding the impact on the human beings who keep the system running. The consultation would address the practical realities that will determine whether such a system is viable and sustainable, including the availability and wellbeing of HMCTS staff, who are already under significant pressure; the level of fees and remuneration required for legal professionals and court staff to work non-standard hours; and the impact on legal aid practitioners, many of whom, as we have discussed, find the challenges of working in criminal legal aid difficult. We must ensure that those who would be asked to work in this way—judges, barristers, solicitors and court staff—believe that any such plans are appropriate and supported by proper resourcing. To impose extended hours without their consent and without addressing the current crisis in retention and recruitment would potentially be counterproductive, rather than a benefit. Where could we look for an example of how this can be done in a way that is welcomed by staff who want to increase their income in a fair way? I was glad that the Minister raised the example of the NHS, which has an equivalent issue with waiting lists as we do with Crown court waiting times. The NHS uses weekend operating as a core part of its elective recovery strategy. To be clear, the NHS has always been a 24 hours a day, seven days a week service for urgent and emergency care, but it specifically uses additional, elective, planned operations. By opening facilities 7 days a week, the health service aims to maximise the use of expensive equipment and theatre space that would otherwise sit idle. I am sure that every Committee member can see the direct read-across. The Crown court is an expensive space with expensive equipment that sits empty and unutilised in what the Government describes as a crisis. A national programme in 50 hospitals runs what is called a weekend hitlist once a month. That approach focuses on one type of procedure a day, such as 24 endometriosis surgeries in a single weekend. It was pioneered by Guy’s and St Thomas’ foundation trust—the trust that looks after many of us when we are not well—and it is now being scaled up nationwide. The approach uses high staffing levels, rigorous pre-op assessment and enhanced theatre utilisation. Again, the read-across could not be more direct. We could have courts with trained staff to consider particular types of cases that had been assessed in advance as suitable for such sessions. Those courts could be set up to make the most of that, whether it is a Saturday or an evening. It is not just in those approaches that we see the Government and the NHS thinking more innovatively about how to make use of resources. Many of us now have community diagnostic centres in our constituencies. I know from when I was a junior doctor that, previously, it was extremely difficult to organise certain types of scans out of hours. The NHS have reformed the whole approach so that such tests, which had typically been restricted to just the working day, can now take place seven days a week to maximise capacity.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, we are considering the next iteration of the question of admissibility, which addresses the evidentiary rules regarding previous false complaints in sexual offence cases. This is a sensitive area of criminal law where the pursuit of truth must be carefully balanced against the need to protect complainants from unfounded attacks on their character. The primary objective is to ensure that trials remain focused on the actual facts of the case at hand rather than being diverted by speculative allegations that a claimant has made false allegations in the past. The Law Society and Bar Council have indicated their support for this measure; they recognise that it brings clarity to the statutory framework governing bad character and credibility. The central feature of clause 10 is the introduction of a requirement for a “proper evidential basis” before any suggestion can be made that a complainant has previously fabricated an allegation of sexual offending. Currently, there is an ever-present danger that the defendant may attempt to undermine a complainant’s honesty by pointing to past allegations that simply did not result in a conviction. That is related to the challenges that we discussed in the debate on clause 8 regarding the difficulty of complainants when it comes to seeing a case through to the end—either because of the delays in the courts, which we are all concerned about; challenges with the police; or fears or concerns they might have about how their case was treated in the courts. There could be a whole series of reasons why a complainant does not pursue an allegation through to its fullest conclusion, none of which have anything to do with the allegation being false. Under the clause, the following factors are explicitly excluded from being used as sole proof of a false complaint: the fact that a previous allegation was denied; the fact that a previous case did not lead to a charge or result in an acquittal; any delay by the complainant in reporting the previous matter; and a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support prosecution in the past. By codifying those exclusions, the Bill aims to eliminate the use of unsupported assertions and ensure that the court does not rely on assumptions or stereotypes that are frequently used to imply that a complainant is untruthful. This is a helpful step in reforming the trial processes by ensuring that a defendant’s conduct and not the complainant’s history remains the focus of the jury. While the principle of clause 10 is sound, its success depends on how the courts interpret and apply the proper evidential basis test. We must ensure that this framework is robust enough to shield victims from speculative and prejudicial questioning while still being fair to the defendant. I have some questions for the Minister. Can she provide the Government’s thinking on what a proper evidential basis will look like? Do the Government envisage it requiring independent, objective proof of falsity, such as a previous conviction for perverting the course of justice, or will a lower standard suffice? Is the Minister confident that the current wording provides a road map clear enough to prevent judges from applying different standards? I want to address the gap in the data and understand how the measure will be implemented. In relation to previous complaints, very sadly there are victims of violence against women and girls who have been affected hundreds of times. Will the Minister explain what would happen if some of these “for exclusion” criteria had occurred at an extraordinary rate? If a complainant’s decision not to pursue or support a prosecution relating to a crime that happened hundreds of times, that could in itself be relevant. It would not necessarily be so—they may have chosen hundreds of times not to support a prosecution. However, unlike other elements of the Bill, the clause is highly specific in what it is excluding, so I want to check whether there is any flexibility for the judge so that, in extremis, they can still admit the evidence, or whether there is a hard no, regardless of circumstances.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of clause 20, which is a technical and geographic provision necessitated by the significant infrastructure developments currently under way in the City of London. As new law courts are developed, specifically at the Salisbury Square site—we mentioned the specialist fraud court earlier in the Committee, and I do not know if that is included in the site—the law must be updated to clarify how historical designations, sitting rights and traditional roles are to be maintained in a changing physical landscape. The clause is a matter of ensuring that our legal terminology catches up with the physical reality of the court estate. The primary objective of the clause is clarity and the avoidance of ambiguity. It ensures that the prestigious and globally recognised designation of the Central Criminal Court remains attached exclusively to the historic Old Bailey site. “Old Bailey” is a phrase that many people will be familiar with, and it acts as a tourist draw for our visitor economy. It is important to ensure that the title is not diluted or confused as additional Crown court capacity is brought online at other locations within the City boundaries. Simultaneously, the clause ensures that the historical sitting rights of the Lord Mayor and aldermen of the City of London are maintained and extended to any Crown court site within the City. That is a respectful preservation of the unique judicial heritage of the City of London Corporation, ensuring that ceremonial traditions and historical roles are not inadvertently extinguished by modern building projects. The Opposition support clause 20 as a necessary administrative measure. It is a fundamental principle of good lawmaking that technical clauses should be explained clearly to the Committee so that their practical effect is well understood. I thank the Minister for doing that today.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We now go to the other end of the spectrum and look at this from a different direction by addressing how courts handle evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit domestic abuse. The provision acknowledges that domestic violence is rarely a series of isolated, vacuum-sealed events; rather, it is often characterised by established patterns of coercion, control and escalation over time, repeated across relationships, although potentially in different ways. When thinking about the precedent in our system, it brings to mind Clare’s law, which we brought in for the very purpose of allowing members of the public to know someone’s domestic abuse history, because we recognised just how common it was for abusers to move from victim to victim. The primary function of clause 11 is to clarify the rules regarding admissibility in respect of past domestic abuse offending. It establishes that a defendant’s previous conduct can be used to demonstrate an inclination to commit similar crimes, even in instances when the earlier and later offending take different forms. That ensures that the law recognises the underlying reality of abusive relationships, where the specific method of harm may change while the dynamic of power and intimidation remains constant. As we have discussed previously, the prevalence of such behaviour is so great that we have to do whatever we can to support victims. The Bar Council has noted that while much of such material might already be admissible under existing bad character provisions, clause 11 provides statutory clarity for judges. Of course, the court’s duty is to ensure that a jury does not convict a defendant for a specific charge simply because they have behaved poorly in the past. The evidence has to remain relevant and fair, and to be assessed within the unique context of the case. Nothing about introducing that information stops that from happening, as the jury or judge can weigh it up as they see fit in that regard. How do the Government intend to ensure that propensity is defined narrowly enough to prevent juries from using a defendant’s past as a shortcut to a verdict? Given the Bar Council’s view that that might already be covered, what did the Minister see as the key gaps between how the law operates at present? What are the direct benefits of clause 11 beyond how things currently operate? I am personally more hard-line when it comes to bad character admissions and previous convictions. I think the whole system should be much more flexible. We have a tough, rigorous way of finding out if someone is guilty, and we know that previous offending is a massive indicator, across many offence fields, of a propensity to offend again. It is part of natural justice. We all understand that if someone has been found to have done the wrong thing on other occasions, it is quite natural and reasonable for people to give that considerable weight when determining that person’s credibility and reliability, and if they can be trusted. A lot of court cases come down to the likelihood of something happening—how probable it was that someone did something. The fact that someone has done something similar before is clearly going to weigh heavily on any reasonable opinion former’s mind when deciding whether that person has done the same thing again. We support the clause, which has great merit.

• 23 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Clause 7 and schedule 2 represent a fundamental and troubling departure from the way that our justice system corrects error. As the Minister said, we have tabled a number of amendments, which essentially form two groups. The first group seeks to reconstitute the existing right of appeal, and amendment 37 aims to stop the Government’s proposal until we have a more substantial and better understanding of how to drive the appeal success rate down, which is our primary aim. As the Minister outlined, at present a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court, where the case will be heard as a full rehearing before a judge and two lay magistrates. The Bill proposes to replace that long-standing framework with a permission-based model, whereby the defendant must first prove that their appeal is reasonably arguable before a single judge, often based only on written papers and transcripts. I rise to oppose that restriction on access to justice. I will argue that, where an appeal is successful, justice is best served by providing the option of a retrial before a jury. I will reflect on the Minister’s remarks about how our amendments would operate. I always listen very carefully to what she says and, as I will explain, I think there is some merit in some of her points, so we can reflect on those. The Minister has pointed out the difference between the magistrates court and the Crown court, and processes elsewhere, but my contention is that that is not an accident or happenstance; that is by design, because the magistrates court is very different in many other ways from those other elements of the courts. That is why there is a difference there—for very good reason. Because efficiency must be balanced with accuracy and fairness, the current automatic right of appeal is not simply a source of unnecessary delay; it is a vital check on a part of our system that others have described as being, to some extent, “rough justice”—a forum in which decisions are swift but carry a higher risk of mistake. The evidence—because let us look at the evidence; this is not just what people might say about it—is that the current system is performing a very necessary function. Around 40% to 42% of appeals against convictions from the magistrates court are successful, and roughly 44% to 47% of appeals against sentences are also successful. That is an extremely high rate of successful appeals. These are not marginal or trivial figures; they indicate, I am afraid, that the lower courts are making meaningful errors in nearly half of the cases in which they are challenged. The Law Commission actually considered this issue in detail. It rejected the proposals that a permission stage should be introduced and highlighted a number of key points in relation to that. On the importance of correcting error, as I have mentioned, it emphasised the critical role that those appeals are playing. It also highlighted the low volume of appeals. The Minister talked about 4% of receipts in relation to one element; I think 1% of the total number of magistrates court cases are being appealed, so that demonstrates that this measure will make a transformative difference to the backlog. We can talk about receipts, but the other thing to keep in mind is how long the actual appeals take. Although receipts are one way of looking at it—on a numbers basis—that is also distortive, of course, because appeals are much shorter hearings than the ordinary business of the Crown court. The Law Commission pointed out that it found no meaningful evidence that this process was being abused, even without that permission stage in place. As we have talked about previously in the Bill, legal representatives cannot support an appeal that is completely without merit. As I have said, due to a combination of the low volume of appeals and the shorter hearing times, our contention is that there would be minimal efficiency gains to weigh against this erosion of an existing right. Actually, the introduction of a permission stage is something that we welcome, but the work that will have to be done to support it, with the introduction of recordings and making available transcripts, will probably—or could—cost significantly more than will be saved. By introducing a permission stage, the Government are creating a multi-stage system that is complicated and potentially more inefficient than the current situation. We know that many of those facing imprisonable offences in magistrates courts are currently unrepresented. The Bill simultaneously increases sentencing powers in clause 6 while narrowing the ability to challenge those decisions in this clause. The Bar Council has described this as a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards”. An unrepresented defendant, potentially facing up to two years in prison, will now be expected to navigate the practicalities of reviewing transcripts and preparing permission grounds for appeal without professional help. The legal aid gap means that many defendants who would have qualified for a solicitor and legal aid in the Crown court will be ineligible in the magistrates court due to the different low-income thresholds—£22,325 versus £37,500. Requiring those individuals to purchase costly transcripts just to ask for permission to appeal is a significant barrier that risks entrenching injustice. If the error rate in the magistrates court remains high, restricting access to the remedy is a recipe for uncorrected miscarriages of justice. I will move on to our amendments about the case for retrial by jury. If we accept that the current appeal system exposes weaknesses in the original summary trial, we must also look at what happens after a successful appeal. As the Bill stands, if the Crown court quashes a conviction and determines that a retrial is necessary, the case must generally be returned to the magistrates court. We believe that that is a rigid approach that ignores the complexity, which does not exist at present, of what might have been revealed by the appeal. Because we are introducing a new system of allocation and decisions around allocation, that is a new area of the law that could be contained within appeals. A successful appeal may demonstrate that the case was too complex, or the evidence too sensitive, for a summary disposal in the new division. Returning cases to the same level of court that originally fell into error will do little to restore public confidence.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sure we will get to hear from the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington shortly. The proposal in clause 3 is being framed as a mere administrative adjustment—a common-sense fix for a system under strain. The Government’s plan to introduce a Crown court bench division, where a judge sits alone without magistrates to decide the fate of those accused of either-way offences, is being sold to the public as a remedy for the backlogs that currently paralyse our courts. But we must be clear from the outset that the crisis in our courts is not the result of the jury system. The backlog, which sees tens of thousands of cases waiting for a hearing, is the result of long-term challenges and the unprecedented impact of covid on our justice system. Eroding a defendant’s right to a trial by their peers is not a fix; it is a fundamental reconfiguration of the English legal system. Across the Bill, we see a pattern emerging: a shift away from what we are clear is the gold standard of justice towards a swift model. The evidence supporting it is dangerously thin, and we must resist the permanent eroding of a right that has stood for hundreds and hundreds of years. The right to a jury trial is often described as fundamental. It is not merely a traditional quirk of our system; it is an important constitutional safeguard. The core of the Government’s plan, as outlined in their impact assessment and the Second Reading briefings, is to remove the right to elect. Currently, if someone is charged with an either-way offence—crimes like theft, assault or certain drug offences—they have a right to choose whether they are tried by a jury in the Crown court or by magistrates. The Government’s plan to strip away that choice in clause 3, under a new bench division model for when the sentence outcome is likely to be three years or less, will remove even the role of lay magistrates from the decision. The briefing provided by the organisation JUSTICE, which I have referred to several times, makes a compelling case against that. JUSTICE points out that the right to elect is a long-standing protection that ensures that a defendant can seek the judgment of a diverse group of citizens when they feel the state’s power is being unfairly applied. By removing that right, we are effectively saying that the state knows better than the citizen how they should be judged. This is not unheard of, as we have talked about before, but clause 3, combined with previous clauses, represents it being done at a scale never seen before. This is a dangerous path. When we move cases from juries to a bench division, we are moving from a system of community participation to a system of professionalised adjudication. The jury is the part of our constitution where the greatest number of ordinary citizens have a direct, hands-on role in the administration of justice. It is the primary way that the public grant their consent to the upholding of criminal law. If we remove the public from the process, we risk the law becoming something done to people, rather than something that belongs to them. The Government’s narrative suggests that a judge-led bench division will be just as fair as a jury, only faster. But it ignores the fundamental and unique aspect of fairness delivered by a jury trial, which they acknowledge by continuing to maintain jury trials for what they describe as the “more serious” offences. A jury is, by definition, balanced. It consists of 12 people from different backgrounds, with different life experiences and different biases, in the crucible of the jury room. Their diversity is its greatest strength; a single judge, no matter how well intentioned, cannot possibly replicate that breadth of perspective. There is also the phenomenon of being case-hardened: when a professional judge or magistrate hears 50 similar cases of theft or assault in a year, there is a natural human tendency to begin seeing patterns rather than individuals. Evidence that might seem fresh or potentially exonerating to a jury can seem like the usual excuse to a professional who has heard it hundreds of times before. Juries bring fresh eyes; they are not jaded by the grind of the system. They are instructed to look only at the facts of the case before them. That is why juries are considered—by the Opposition, at least—to be the gold standard. The evidence submitted to the Committee warns that we lack clarity as to why the Government are so eager to discard this standard. If the jury is the best way to ensure an accurate and fair verdict, the burden of proof for removing it must be exceptionally high. Furthermore, the bench division model threatens to undermine the lay element of our justice system. Originally, as recommended in the Leveson review, the idea was that a judge would sit with two magistrates. That was intended to maintain at least some form of community involvement. However, clause 3 moves towards judge-only trials for many cases, discarding even the judge-plus-two compromise. I will now address the primary argument made by the Minister in her opening remarks. The Government claim that moving to the bench division will significantly reduce the backlog. However, the Institute for Government has produced an insightful analysis, which we have referred to frequently, suggesting that the evidence for those savings is incredibly weak. The IFG points out that the vast majority of Crown court time is not actually spent on the types of trials that the Government want to move to the bench division. The cases being targeted are the less serious ones, which already take up less time than more complex cases such as murder, which will remain subject to jury trial. According to the IFG’s modelling, if judge-only trials are 20% faster than a jury trial, the total impact on the overall Crown court backlog would be a reduction of 2%. When we consider the constitutional cost of us losing, at this unprecedented scale, the right to access a jury, that is simply not sufficient. The backlog is not caused by juries being slow; it is more often caused by ineffective trials that are postponed because witnesses do not show up, because solicitors or barristers are unavailable, or because courtrooms are not fit to operate in. These are systemic failures, and moving a trial from a jury to a judge does not make a witness appear or fix a broken courtroom. The Bill proposes a threshold of cases likely to attract a sentence of up to three years being diverted to the bench division. Predicting a sentence before a trial is never an exact science, and that is something that magistrates actually have more experience of than judges. That unprecedented scenario—without the safeguards that we sought to add through a right of appeal, which the Government rejected—will create huge questions of impartiality and bias. A three-year sentence is not a minor matter. Three years in prison is a life-altering event. It can mean the loss of a home, a career and a family. To suggest that a person facing such a consequence does not deserve what they consider to be the fairest possible trial betrays that principle of fairness in our justice system when the consequences are so severe. There is also the issue of the absence of a sunset clause. If these measures are truly a temporary response to tackle an emergency backlog, they should include a sunset clause that ensures that rights are restored once the crisis has passed. As I have said previously, changes were made during world war two and then reversed when the war was over. The fact that the Government have resisted such a clause suggests that this is not a temporary fix, but a permanent land grab by the state. Once the right to a jury is surrendered for either-way offences, it is highly unlikely that any future Government will be in a position to restore it. We must see the Crown court bench division for what it is: a policy of convenience, not a policy delivering justice. It is a policy that ignores the findings of the IFG, which would require us to focus more heavily on other elements of the system. It is a policy that ignores the warnings from JUSTICE, which highlight the erosion of the defendant’s right to elect and its impact on public confidence and fairness in the judicial system. It is a policy that even ignores the original, more balanced recommendations of the Leveson review, which at least sought to keep lay magistrates involved. We are told that we must modernise and that we must be efficient. The purpose of a criminal trial is not to process cases as quickly as possible; it is to arrive at the truth through a process that the defendant, the victim and the public have trust in. If we allow the Government to erode the jury system in the name of the backlog on this occasion to this extent, we are sending a message that this constitutional right is highly conditional, and that it can be traded away whenever the state finds it too expensive or too cumbersome to maintain. As the Minister frequently points out, lots of countries do without it; “Why shouldn’t we?” will be the next argument. Instead of stripping away rights, the Government should be more focused on the areas that we can all agree on: prisoner transport, early legal advice, more efficient listing, Crown Prosecution Service reviews of cases in the backlog, facilities that work and IT that works. We do not fix a house by tearing it down to its foundations because the roof is leaking; we fix the roof. Jury trials ensure that our laws remain grounded in the common sense of ordinary people. Let us apply some of that common sense to tackling this issue. Common sense will lead us to oppose clause 3.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Gloucester pointed to what the Bar Council said, but let us be fair and talk about what it said in its completeness. It may well have said that the people currently practising dropped out, but the Minister quite directly asked how it was going to train these people up and get back to that point, and it made the point that the people who have dropped out of practising criminal law have not evaporated into thin air. They are still there; they are just practising in other areas of law, and when the situation is right for them, they can just come back into practising criminal law.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister can probably anticipate what I am going to say: this situation is highly unsatisfactory, considering that we will again be asked to vote—not have a view or give an opinion, but be asked to vote—on the system of allocation and reallocation in relation to complex and lengthy trials. Members may have seen the evidence provided by the Bar Council, which makes absolutely clear its view that the Minister was wrong in her assessment that the decision to allocate will be subject to judicial review. That was my view, the view of the Bar Council and the view of the hon. Member for Wimbledon, with his expertise. It is not satisfactory to be told we will vote again later today not knowing what the Government’s clear position is. What the Minister said is now surely under very significant doubt, given what the Bar Council has told us. The Minister should have been able to come here today—rather than writing to us later—to give us the facts. We have had a big gap between Thursday and today, and we should not be left in the position of being asked to vote without the full facts.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid. This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed. This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system. The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is “clearly naïve in the extreme”. Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise. One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500. JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence. We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a “success story of our justice system”, because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women. We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them. Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities. The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes, “transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.” Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as “a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take. It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further. If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way. There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted? We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position. The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning. In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days. If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in opposition to clause 4 and in support of amendment 51 in my name. I remind the Committee that this is not a new debate. As the Minister touched on, it is an idea that has been postponed, debated and largely rejected several times over the last few decades. Each time, the conclusion has been that the jury is not the problem in fraud cases, but a vital component of the solution. The Government’s current justification rests on two pillars: that fraud causes are too complex for ordinary citizens, and that removing the jury will create significant efficiencies to help clear the record-breaking court backlog. Although we all acknowledge the severity of the backlog, we must ask whether these specific measures are evidence-based or merely an attempt to appear tough on administrative delays at the expense of the right to trial by one’s peers. The Bill will allow a judge to order a trial to be conducted without a jury if they are satisfied that the complexity or length of that trial would make it a heavy burden on a jury. As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, it would be good to get clarity on whether a judge may make such a determination on the basis of complexity or of length individually, or whether they must do so on the basis of both complexity and length—that was a fair question. Complexity is highly subjective. For one judge, a case involving intricate cryptocurrency ledgers might seem manageable for a jury, but for another, it may seem impenetrable. By making the right to a jury trial contingent on a judge’s personal assessment of what a typical citizen can understand, we introduce an element of judicial lottery. Furthermore, fraud is fundamentally about honesty and dishonesty, which are concepts that ordinary people are well placed to judge. When we professionalise the verdict in fraud causes, we move away from a community-based standard of morality towards a technical, legalistic one that may lack the public’s moral buy-in. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence provided by the City of London Law Society, which points out: “The government’s rationale for judge-only trials in ‘complex or lengthy cases’ rests on two assumptions: that juries struggle to understand complex fraud cases, and that judge-only trials will be significantly more efficient. Neither assumption is adequately supported by evidence. There is substantial research and practical experience demonstrating that juries, when properly directed and assisted with appropriate case management, are capable of understanding and deciding complex fraud cases. Modern trial techniques have been brought in to address issues that arose in the past, significantly enhancing jury comprehension. Juries have been involved in many hundreds of fraud trials, following the evidence and reaching rational decisions. The Leveson Review noted that in the Jubilee Line case (one of the longest running in British legal history and one which pre-dated many of the changes that have been introduced to help improve the jury’s understanding), jurors reported ‘a very good understanding of the evidence’, with ‘some commenting that it was not all that difficult’. More recently, in R v Hayes & Palombo , the Supreme Court opined that a properly directed jury would have no problem assessing dishonesty in the context of a complex financial service-related case. The assumption that juries cannot cope with complexity is unproven and patronising. It fails to recognise that juries regularly include individuals with professional expertise, financial literacy and analytical capabilities, and that issues of intent and dishonesty are familiar and well understood by the jury.” The society states that we should also note “that the cases that have been preserved for jury trial under the Bill are also likely to include complex expert evidence (such as forensic medical or science-based expert evidence or statistical analysis), which undermines the argument that complex trials should be left to a judge alone. The hypothesis that judge-only trials are more efficient also relies on the assumption that time will be saved by counsel not having to simplify evidence when presenting to a judge rather than a jury. However, this fails to take into account that, without the requirement to simplify charges and evidence, this is likely to encourage increased charging by the prosecution and increased applications for more complex evidence to be presented to judges.” While judges are experts in the law and legal matters, there is nothing at all to say that they are any more or less expert in cryptocurrency or complex financial matters than a member of a jury. In total, the society continues: “This will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of and time to produce written judgments.” In total, this will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of time to produce written judgments.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned. We have had some discussion in private, and I think it will be helpful, while not revealing what was said in private, to illustrate the Opposition’s thinking on the matter. As I explained during our previous sitting on Thursday—there has been a significant length of time since—I was of the understanding that moving the allocation decision away from the magistrates court to the Crown court would lead to a substantial reduction in access to judicial review of allocation decisions. This is not about appeal—we argued separately for appeal. Rather, the point of contention is about the right to judicial review. In that debate, the Minister, I am sure inadvertently, potentially misled the Committee by suggesting that that was not true, and I was called patronising by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, the Parliamentary Private Secretary sitting behind her, when I suggested that that was the case. The Bar Council has submitted evidence to the Committee that supports my argument that there would be a substantial change in access to judicial review. That is directly relevant, not just to clause 3, which we are being asked to vote on, but to the next clause. The Minister accepts that she needs to write to us with further clarity on this issue, so she is conceding that it is not clear, but we are still being asked, by the Government Whip and the Minister, to vote on this measure. That is highly unsatisfactory. I want us to vote with a shared understanding of what the implications are. If the Minister agreed that there would be a significant reduction in access to the right to judicial review, we would have that shared understanding, but I do not believe that she is willing to concede that point. On the basis that it is unclear what we are voting on, I am afraid that it is simply not appropriate for us to be asked to vote on clause 3. That was not my intention; I was of the understanding—I accept incorrectly—as I think the Minister also was, that we could shelve the vote and continue the debate, so that progress on the Bill was not curtailed. However, the Clerks have advised us that we cannot shelve the vote, so if this is the only available option to prevent us from voting without the full facts, I think it is appropriate that we adjourn the debate until such time as we get them. To reiterate, this was not my intention; I had expected that we would continue the debate and then have an option— [ Interruption. ] Does the PPS want to say something? No. On that basis, I think that we should adjourn.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place. Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing. There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress. We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will. We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial. We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view. Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say: “The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.” Those include “the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting” for a long time and “any other matters the court considers relevant.” Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us. The written evidence continues: “In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.” Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty. Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve. In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost. By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides. In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate. That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request. When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished. Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so. In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail. To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, absolutely. In the NHS, I worked on what we might call change and improvement programmes or quality improvement programmes. We worked hard to replicate the best clinical practice everywhere, but it is simply not possible to directly replicate everything that goes on in every unit, although that is not to say that we cannot do some of what goes on. As the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden pointed out, we are not talking about a single court; that is why I was clear about looking at this on a regional basis. I do not think that the data in any of these regions is getting better because of one court that has specific circumstances that cannot be replicated. That is why we have to show a high degree of interest in understanding what can be replicated and in trying those measures. As we heard from the representatives of the criminal Bar and the circuit, we should give them a chance to try some of these things before we do something so unprecedented that will lead to a curtailment of rights. Nobody thinks that the other, positive parts of the Bill, or the measures that do not even require legislation, take away from anything else; they are just exceptionally positive things we could be doing where we do not pay some kind of price. Surely, we should try those before taking the step proposed in the Bill. Whether or not we think this step is reasonable—Labour Members have made it clear that they do—I doubt they think it will not lead to a loss in relation to jury trial rights.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak in support of amendment 43, tabled in my name, and to amendments 25 and 12. Again, on this issue the Opposition and the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden have alighted on the same challenge or issue—the same thing we think is unfair. We have gone about our amendments in different ways, but we recognise the same issue. As we heard, the amendments address the retrospectivity built into the Government’s approach. The Bill makes it clear that the new allocation regime will apply not only to future cases, but to existing Crown court cases that are due to begin on or after the specified day on which the measures are implemented. In other words, cases that are already in the system, in which defendants may have made decisions on the basis that they expect a jury trial, could be reallocated to a judge-only trial. Our amendment 43 would prevent that by ensuring that the new regime applies only to cases in which the first magistrates court hearing takes place after the change, and not to cases already in the pipeline. The Government say the change is merely procedural and can therefore be applied to ongoing cases, but that understates what is happening. To change the allocation part-way through proceedings would not simply be technical; it would alter the ground beneath the defendant’s feet. In written evidence, JUSTICE shared our concerns, saying: “The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.” It pointed to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s legislative standards, which state: “Retrospective legislation is unacceptable other than in very exceptional circumstances” and “must have the strongest possible justification”. It is worth considering that legislative guidance, which states, first, that enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be avoided. Secondly, provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible. Thirdly, individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was, at the time, a valid legal requirement. Fourthly, laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake. Fifthly, laws should not deprive someone of the benefit of a judgment already obtained. Sixthly, laws should not prevent a court from deciding pending litigation according to its merits on the basis of the law in force at the time when proceedings were commenced. Seventhly, retrospective legislation should be used only when there is a compelling reason to do so. Eighthly, a legislative power to make a provision that has retrospective effect should be justified on the basis of necessity and not desirability. Having heard those points, we can immediately see the issues. On the principle that laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake, it is clear that that liberty is absolutely at stake in these matters. On necessity, we have repeated throughout the debate that the Government, in our eyes, have completely failed to make the case successfully that the measures in the Bill are the only way to drive down the backlogs. This morning, we debated the fall in backlogs in some areas seen in the latest published data; that happened without the measures in the Bill, and without other measures that we all think are necessary to help to drive down the backlogs. To our eyes, the retrospective element clearly does not meet the test of exceptional circumstances or necessity. JUSTICE says that, given that the curtailment of jury trials will have a marginal effect on the backlog, it cannot see how retrospective applications can be justified, and I agree. It argues that it is deeply unfair for defendants who elected for a Crown court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not even exist when they made that choice. Defendants who have opted for a jury trial may be incarcerated on remand awaiting trial by jury. Had they known that this would never materialise, they may well have opted for a magistrates trial and already been released. There is, then, a risk that the reallocation of cases that are already in the Crown court caseload to the bench division will be subjected to judicial review. There is clearly no ouster clause in the provisions. How do we know whether many of those affected might decide that they should challenge the decision in the courts? JUSTICE suggests that it could happen with each and every case in the backlog that is allocated to trial without jury. This would require additional hearings and the preparation of representatives for every affected case already in the backlog, creating further delays and placing unnecessary burdens on the defendants and the prosecution who, as we have all accepted, are already under significant pressure. What did the Prime Minister say about retrospective measures? We have already covered what the Prime Minister previously thought about the importance of jury trials, which he seems to have forgotten, but what did he say about retrospective measures? He said that “they are usually a very bad idea”. That is a direct quote from our Prime Minister. He said they were usually a very bad idea, yet here is his own Government enacting one. Of course, we know what the Deputy Prime Minister thought about this issue. He appeared before the Justice Committee on Tuesday 16 December last year. He was asked about this issue by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), who said: “There are currently in the region of 17,500 prisoners on remand in this country. Will these reforms apply retrospectively?” What did the Deputy Prime Minister say? He said: “No.” The Committee must have to assume that that was his view of the right thing to do at the time. Why else would he have said no? It is reasonable for us to ask the Minister to explain why the Deputy Prime Minister has changed his mind. Of course, the Minister herself has already been asked about this in the Justice Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) pointed out that a defendant committed to trial in the Crown court will expect a jury trial. He said, “you will relook at cases that have been committed for trial at the Crown court and push some of them through the swift court—that is what you are telling me.” The Minister replied: “I think that is something we have to look at.” My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said to her: “So when the Lord Chancellor said it will not be retrospective, that was not a wholly accurate answer.” The Minister replied: “I think the answer he was giving was in the context of a question around the impact on remand hearings; I think that was the context in which he may have addressed that.” My hon. Friend replied: “No, he said the changes would not be retrospective, and now you are giving me a slightly different answer. If someone elects to go to the Crown court at the moment, it is on the assumption that there will be a trial by jury. What you are saying is that it might not be; they might be diverted to the swift court.” The Minister agreed with that, saying: “That is right, yes.” That can be interpreted only as a suggestion that there was no difference with or without a jury as they are still in the Crown court—an extraordinary response. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said: “Minister, if you have been committed to trial in the Crown court at the moment, you are expecting to have a jury trial, and what you are telling me is that once these changes take effect, you will divert those people committed but whose trial has not started into the swift court.” The Minister agreed, saying: “Yes”. My hon. Friend said to her: “That is not what the Lord Chancellor said before Christmas.” The exchange concluded with the Minister making this point: “It is a change in relation to the procedure that applies to those cases. They are still getting a Crown court trial under the new proposals.” We are back to an argument that we have revisited a number of times. When the Minister is pressed on a disadvantage in one form or another of having a trial without a jury, she insists that it does not make much of a difference as they will still get a trial that, in her view, has all the merits of a trial with a jury, to some extent. We made some progress on that earlier today, when the Minister acknowledged that there is something special about a jury trial. If there is something special about it, she must surely accept that those people who do not get one are missing something special and are therefore in some way disadvantaged. JUSTICE is not alone in its criticism of the retrospective element of the proposals. As I have said previously, Mr Robertson, the founder of the chambers that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Attorney General all practised at—someone they surely give some weight and credibility to—is critical about this. He writes: “Those charged by police with offences currently carrying a right to elect a jury trial will go through newly devised ‘allocation proceedings’ where they will lose that right if it appears to the court to be more suitable to have a non-jury trial or if it appears to the court that the value of the property involved exceeds a sum to be set by the government.” By that, I think he means in relation to the severity of the case. Mr Robertson goes on: “This means, for all 80,000 cases in the backlog, more time—days perhaps—will have to be set aside for novel pre-trial proceedings featuring arguments about suitability and value of stolen property. There will be legal challenges to the government’s proposal that such legislation should apply to defendants who have already been charged or are awaiting trial. Applying these changes retrospectively amounts to a fundamental injustice, undermining legal certainty and the long-standing principle that individuals should be tried according to the rules in place at the time of the alleged offence.” He is right, is he not? Mr Robertson is not alone. The Bar Council says: “The application of this proposal retrospectively inevitably will face a constitutional challenge. The Criminal Bar Association estimates that up to 30,000 cases will be affected. Not only is this extraordinarily unfair to those who have already elected the Crown Court, understanding that it is a jury trial, it interferes with legal certainty and runs the risk of tying the courts up in appeals, further increasing the backlogs.” I hope that the Minister can reflect, as always, on those clear views, as well as the views of thousands of other legal professionals, academics and former judges, that provisions in the Bill are not necessary to bring the backlog down, and therefore should not be enacted retrospectively. They are fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional and against the usual practices of this place when it comes to retrospective legislation. I hope the Minister will support our amendment to make sure that the measures are not applied retrospectively.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Dualling of the A21 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to have secured this Adjournment debate on the dualling of the A21 in my constituency. I thank the House authorities for giving me this opportunity, because the condition of the A21—the key strategic route serving the constituency of Bexhill and Battle—is incredibly important. The A21 is not a just local road; it is the principal strategic road network connection between East Sussex’s coastal communities and London, the M25, international airports and the wider national economy. It is the backbone of access to employment, freight, tourism and business investment across the Bexhill-Hastings corridor, yet today, the A21 is failing to perform that strategic role. Its lack of capacity, safety and resilience, particularly south of Pembury, has become a structural barrier to growth, opportunity and reliable access to work for the communities along the route and for the towns of Bexhill and Hastings, which lie at its southern end. South of Pembury, the A21 is still predominantly single-carriageway, yet it carries long-distance traffic volumes entirely unsuited to the road’s original design. Large sections are characterised by tight bends, multiple junctions and direct access from homes and farms. The contrast between the dualled and undualled sections creates an inconsistent route standard that undermines reliability, increases risk and erodes confidence in the network for both residents and businesses. Several villages in my constituency, including Flimwell, Hurst Green and Whatlington, sit directly on the A21. Around 1,500 residents live with a strategic trunk road carrying around 20,000 vehicles a day, including a high proportion of HGVs, exposing them to constant noise, pollution and risk. Their communities are effectively divided by a busy trunk road. That has profound consequences for daily life. It affects whether children can walk safely to school, whether older residents feel confident crossing the road and whether communities function as places to live, rather than corridors to pass through. Hurst Green is a particularly acute example at the moment. The village primary school is located directly on the A21. Getting children to and from school presents a daily safety challenge that no community should have to accept. Parents and carers have no safe drop-off or pick-up areas and are forced to stop on a national trunk road. Pavements are narrow, often obstructed and completely unprotected from fast-moving traffic. Walking or cycling—activities we rightly want to encourage—are simply not viable options for many families. I have walked this route myself at peak times. Standing inches from a continuous stream of HGVs, vans and cars makes the risk immediately obvious and is very intimidating. This is not an abstract policy issue; it is the lived experience of families every single day. As the Roads Minister will no doubt be aware, rural single-carriageway A roads carry a disproportionately high share of fatal and serious collisions. More than half of all deaths on A roads occur on single carriageways, despite them carrying significantly less traffic overall. Last weekend, a serious incident on the A21 at Robertsbridge, which is single-carriageway, resulted in the tragic loss of life and serious injuries. While investigations are ongoing, my thoughts and heartfelt sympathies are with the families and loved ones at this incredibly difficult time. The road remained closed for over 24 hours to allow emergency services to carry out necessary investigations and repairs. Since 2020, National Highways has been delivering a £20 million safety package on the A21, reflecting persistent structural risks on this stretch of road. Those measures are welcome and necessary, but they also demonstrate that we are repeatedly treating symptoms rather than addressing the underlying cause. Recent interventions, including the ongoing installation of traffic lights at the A21-A265 junction in Hurst Green, have highlighted the daily impact of this route on local communities. They have brought into sharp focus not only the sheer volume of traffic on the A21 but the severe consequences when that traffic is brought to a standstill. Residents were deeply concerned about the manner in which they were consulted on that installation, which was not sufficient, given that this is a major change for residents who will experience it on a daily basis. Some of them were not even written to until the week before, and there was not a serious attempt to engage with them on the final plans. There had been earlier efforts to engage more broadly on what might be done, but we know that our constituents are busy and have other things going on in their lives, so they tend to engage most profoundly when presented with the final plans setting out, “This is what we are minded to do.” In this case, the contractors were already in place and the plans were already decided and paid for, which of course raises a lot of scepticism about National Highways’ ability to have responded to residents’ concerns. The A21 is acutely vulnerable to disruption, as we are seeing in Hurst Green during the construction period. Collisions, flooding and landslip events regularly lead to full or partial closures. When that happens, there are no suitable alternative routes. Traffic diverts on to narrow country lanes, damaging rural roads, delaying emergency services and cutting off villages for hours at a time. I have direct experience of that. When there has been some sort of incident ahead when driving down the A21 to my constituency, I have naively listened to the advice given by Google Maps to divert off the A21, along with the many other people who are encouraged to do the same; I have been stuck for 30 minutes because that has happened at both ends of the road, and it has taken the good grace of residents living on that road to come out and manage the traffic to unblock the stoppage. As climate-related events become more frequent, this lack of resilience represents a growing risk, not just to road users but to the wider local economy. Businesses cannot plan around a route that fails unpredictably, and workers cannot rely on it for consistent access to employment. Nowhere are the consequences of poor connectivity more evident than in Bexhill and Hastings. Bexhill contains significant pockets of deprivation, with lower than average wages and productivity—I know the hon. Member for Hastings and Rye (Helena Dollimore) will raise similar issues experienced in her constituency. Across the Bexhill–Hastings corridor, productivity levels remain around 20% below the south-east average. Importantly, deprivation in this area is not due to a lack of ambition or potential. Bexhill and Hastings have benefited from regeneration initiatives and local growth programmes, but without a reliable strategic road connection, their impact is fundamentally constrained. Piecemeal local schemes cannot overcome a broken strategic link. Unreliable journey times limit labour market catchments, reduce business productivity and deter inward investment. Employers struggle to recruit when commute times are unpredictable. Investors hesitate when access to the wider south-east corridor is uncertain. The A21 sits at the centre of that challenge. This is ultimately an issue about opportunity. For many residents in Bexhill, the ability to access work, training or better-paid employment depends on the A21. When that route is unreliable, opportunities narrow and inequalities deepen. There is clear evidence that strategic upgrades deliver lasting benefits. The dualling of the A21 between Tonbridge and Pembury resulted in major reductions in serious collisions, improved journey reliability and a strong economic return. That outcome is consistent with national evidence about the benefits of dualling high-volume single-carriageway A roads. Further dualling south of Pembury would deliver sustained safety improvements, improve reliability for commuters and businesses, reduce vulnerability to incidents and climate-related disruption, and improve the health and wellbeing of all those living in the villages directly placed along the A21. If we are serious about tackling deprivation, expanding opportunity and restoring confidence in coastal communities, we must address the structural barriers that hold them back. We have already seen how local strategic road investment can transform opportunity. The Queensway Gateway road transformed access to the A21 from Bexhill and Hastings, reducing severances and improving reliability. Crucially, it made regeneration and employment sites viable by replacing an unreliable approach route with a modern strategic corridor. Investor confidence increased because access was no longer a risk. The Bexhill-Hastings link road provides even clearer evidence. By delivering a second strategic connection between the two towns and a stronger link to the A21, it removed long-standing capacity constraints. That intervention directly unlocked over 1,000 homes and significant land for employment in north-east Bexhill that could not otherwise have been released. In both cases, public investment in strategic connectivity unlocked substantial private investment and long-term economic gains. The lesson is clear: strategic roads unlock growth and marginal fixes simply ration constraint. For communities along the A21, this is not simply a transport issue; it is about productivity, opportunity, and fair access to work and services. I urge the Minister to recognise the A21’s role as the principal gateway to some of the most economically disadvantaged communities in the south-east and to move beyond short-term mitigation. Specifically, will he commit to advancing the strategic case for dualling the A21 south of Pembury, including village bypasses? Will he support further design and development work so that the scheme is genuinely ready for delivery? Finally, will he set out how this corridor can be considered within the next road investment strategy? My residents are clear: they live with the A21 and they bear with the A21, but it is not the version of a road network that is delivering for them. I have explained all the reasons why dualling the A21 will make a profound difference to the opportunities of so many people in my constituency and in neighbouring constituencies. Anyone who has lived alongside that road, in the way that residents have to at the moment, will know that the current situation is not sustainable and cannot be the long-term fix or the solution that makes a real difference. I ask the Minister to think carefully, consider my questions and give hope to all those in my constituency who do not want this issue to be off the agenda or the radar, even if we recognise that the dualling is not something that will happen overnight.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will move on to a more directly relevant point. When we talk about the challenges in the courts and what was inherited, the Government would do themselves a much greater service and reflect accurately the debate and the challenges if they more regularly sought to speak fairly and freely about what actually happened in relation to Crown court backlogs, and the reason why the amendment was tabled. Prior to the pandemic, Crown court backlogs were lower under the Conservative Government than they were under the previous Labour Government. Every time the Government highlight the real challenges with the Crown court backlogs and omit to recognise that the historically unprecedented level of the backlogs was almost entirely driven by the covid pandemic, they do a disservice to the complexity and reality of what went on in our court service. Every time they talk in isolation about a lack of investment in the period of 14 years, they fail to understand that Members on Labour’s side, who have been highly critical of the Conservative party, actually recognise that over many decades, prior to the Conservative Government, as other Labour Members said on Second Reading, there has been a lack of investment—an investment lower than I would want—in our court service. I have been clear since taking up the position of shadow Justice Minister that I would have wanted a higher degree of protection for the justice system than that in the decisions taken at the time. The Opposition have not been afraid to say that or to own the responsibility for it, as we have in a number of other areas where we wish things had been done differently. I have explained that, for me, courts and the criminal justice system is one of the reasons—if not the main reason—why I sought election to Parliament, so I am always going to say that we should invest more strongly in the justice system. Just last week, I did an interview on Times Radio about our work on whole-life orders, after I successfully appealed a case in which someone had not got a whole-life order; the Court of Appeal gave them a whole-life order. The presenter asked me why we do not have more whole-life orders, and why more is not done about it. I explained that, in reality, as a politician I might have my priorities, and other individual MPs might have their own priorities, but inevitably the decisions of the Treasury, what goes into the manifesto and what the Government commit to are a matter of the public’s priorities. As someone who campaigns strongly on behalf of victims of crime, I understand the enormous impact that crime has. I also must accept that most people, most of the time, are not victims of any crime, let alone serious crimes, so convincing the public at large to vote for parties that will invest seriously in and improve our criminal justice system is difficult. In polling, the criminal justice system is not at the top of the list of the public’s priorities, as much as I might wish it were. The Government and Labour Members would do better to more accurately reflect the history of what has happened in the criminal justice system, and particularly in relation to Crown court backlogs. I do not recall that when Labour were last in government—I have looked through Hansard for this—Labour MPs got up and complained about Crown court backlogs that were higher than those we delivered in Government, prior to the pandemic. That is the reality of what happened: the pandemic had an unprecedented impact on our criminal justice system. The vast majority of the historically unprecedented situation that we are dealing with is directly related to the pandemic. If, every time they talked about this, hon. Members made that point, the Opposition would be able to take their criticisms of our record more seriously. To pick up on some remarks, I welcome those of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, who drew attention to the issue that we considered in the evidence hearings about the not guilty pleas that some of us are uncomfortable with. As I said, I strongly objected to some of those. On the Colston statue, behind the scenes I was one of the MPs lobbying for the Attorney General to do as she did—to seek clarification from the Court of Appeal to stop that from happening again. I very much resent some of those things—but is that not the point? We have a system that allows for that, that allows for MPs to have a view, to be unhappy or to criticise something that a judge sitting on their own would say, “Look, this is obvious. This is absolutely a guilty—no question”, but a jury might find a different outcome for reasons of their own. I have to admit that, before this debate and the Bill coming before the House, I had only ever viewed this issue through the prism of frustration, wanting to understand how it works and how we might even curtail this, supporting the Court of Appeal declaratory ruling on that judgment. This whole process, however, has made me reflect on the broader role of juries in civil liberties and in curtailing the power of the state. Even if Parliament wants something done in a particular way, a jury of ordinary people retains the right—as frustrating as that might be, but it has been clarified repeatedly in case law—to say, “Look, we understand all the facts, and we might even agree privately that the law has been broken, but for this reason or that we are going to offer that as not guilty.” Our system has been asked explicitly whether that is something that should happen, and we have been told explicitly that that is something that our system deliberately holds on to. On the balancing, every time we shift more cases into the magistrates court, again we are minimising that, reducing it as an important part of what we might call an informal constitutional settlement. I welcome the remarks by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, who helpfully drew our attention to the gaps between what Sir Brian recommended and what the Government are doing. That is another major hole in the Government’s argument. The example that the hon. Member articulated was about his suggestion of two years going back to magistrates ending up as the Government’s three years. We will also discuss the issue of a Crown court bench without any magistrates, so in two major ways, the Government are not doing what Sir Brian recommended. In evidence, the Minister even put to some of the witnesses from the Bar Council: “What do you know that Sir Brian…does not?” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 43, Q81.] That question, I am afraid, can be turned right back around to the Minister, who is also not doing what Sir Brian recommended. What does she know that Sir Brian does not? If it is so important that we listen carefully to Sir Brian, because he has done such an exhaustive piece of work and put so much time into developing detailed, specific and concrete proposals, why are the Government happy just to disregard the elements of that that they do not agree with? We cannot do the same. We cannot say, “Actually, we don’t think the evidence is there. We don’t think the case has been made”, but the Government can. They want to say that about a fundamental element—this is not a minor element—which is whether a judge sits on their own or with two magistrates. That is a major difference. In fact, the most radical element of the proposals is the judge sitting on their own in those types of cases, but the Government do not agree with what Sir Brian said about it.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Reflecting on what has been said, I think that confusion remains. I welcome the further remarks from the Minister, but I am still not clear on whether there will be any impact in the real world for people as a result of the change. Earlier, I read out a sentence from the explanatory notes that talks about how the clause relates to sentencing, but the sentence before that says it relates to a “written indication of a guilty plea”. The legislation says that a written plea is not actually a guilty plea, so there could still be a trial—someone might change their mind. The difference that the legislation talks about is that if someone gives an in-person plea, that is their plea. This reform introduces the idea of a written plea, and, probably quite sensibly, it was decided that that should not be seen as the final example. Decisions are being made at that point, but then the plea could be changed and there could be a trial. It could have a real-world impact; it is not a technical change. If the Government are clear that they are not enacting this measure, why not? There must have been a reason why they thought that written guilty pleas were of use. I suspect it probably was an efficiency measure at the time and they thought, “If we allow people to more easily give an early indication, that might encourage them to do so, and we can get all the benefits that flow from that.” If the Government are on an efficiency drive, why are they not enacting the measure? I would have asked the same of my Government if they had the ability to enact it. I do not know what the timeline was—was there a natural lag or a deliberate decision not to enact it? We need it laid out in black and white: will this change have any real-world impact—yes or no? What exactly will that impact be? Because of the quite open possibility that it will have a real-world impact in terms of reducing someone’s ability to go to the Crown court—that is what we are talking about—all the concerns that Members have about clause 1 apply to clause 2. I want to pick up on some of the changes. The Minister mentioned how we have listened to Canada. The point I made quite clearly in our evidence session with the Attorney General of Ontario was that they brought their backlog down without making any changes to jury trials whatsoever, so I am not sure how helpful that is as an example of why we need to change the system. Members mentioned a sunset clause. If the Bill were just about bringing the backlog down, there would be a sunset clause in it. That again demonstrates that the Government actually think this is a better way of doing things. If that is the case, they should make that argument. They should just say, “We are making these reforms because they are the better way to do things. There will be an additional benefit in terms of bringing down the backlog,” but they have not said that. I certainly would not use the language that the Minister used, but I am absolutely clear that we need to improve judicial accountability. We had a whole panel in the evidence sessions in relation to the family courts, for example, and whether they are making the right sorts of judgments about the interests of the child. We heard quite clearly that judges should not place too much weight on the idea that there is a good relationship with both parents when making decisions. The reason the Government are proposing changes on this issue is that they clearly do not think that judicial decisions are consistently doing the right thing. My first encounter with this lack of accountability in judicial decision making—this is very important if people will be subject to individual judicial decisions—was the case of a constituent who had fostered a young girl in difficult circumstances. The young girl was physically fit and healthy, but struggling. The family—the original parents—had applied to get custody back. The foster mother did not want the girl to go back to the family, and nor did the local authority or the wider family, but the judge decided—again, we are giving more power to judges by removing the power to elect—that the girl should go back. That girl is now in an almost vegetative state—it is not quite like that, but she is extremely disabled. The wonderful lady who fostered that young girl, even though the girl was then in a very difficult physical state and was going to be extremely dependent for the rest of her life, adopted her, which was an extraordinary thing to do. She approached me to say, “Social services have to account for what has happened. The police, if they had been involved, would have had to account for what happened. Can you tell me what happens to the judge who made that decision, which led to these consequences?” I wrote the Lady Chief Justice asking whether she could explain to my constituent what the consequences were. If there is a legal matter, it goes to the Court of Appeal; other than that, there is no issue for the judge. That has really driven my view about a need for more judicial accountability. I recognise the Minister’s right to say that we have to be careful about the language we use when talking about these things, but there is nothing wrong with saying that we need a more accountable judiciary. On the need to increase sitting days, the Government like to claim that there are record levels of sitting days. I do not know whether the Minister knows that that is not a fair reflection of what is going on, but we changed the way in which we measure sitting days. There used to be two separate counts of sitting days—trial days and judge days—and we then combined them. If we look at the figures fairly, the counts are at some points pretty similar, if not higher previously. The figure is higher now because there is just one figure. I am not seeking to take away from the Government’s efforts in that regard, but we should be fair and accurate in how we describe the historical record. We discussed whether it was fair to use the term “abolition”, which has come up repeatedly. I am very careful about the language I use, and I do not say that, but I will not take any lectures on the issue from a party that, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) was Prime Minister, put out a Facebook campaign saying that he did not think that paedophiles should go to prison—a disgusting misrepresentation of the reality. The Labour party was happy to do that, so I will not take any lectures from Labour Members.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me think of a directly relevant example that shows just how important and meaningful that distinction is, in a way that the Minister is seeking to blur. We all follow political polls that are based on models. Those models are probably all sound, but they are all different and produce completely different results based on the assumptions—on voter turnout, for example. I might speak to some Government Members and say, “Look, we have this poll that shows you’re going to smash it at the next election. You’re under no threat from Reform or the Lib Dems.” However, I might also say, “As part of that poll, we have assumed that 99.9% of the people who intend to vote Labour are going to come out and vote Labour.” Would Government Members then say, “Oh, great news! Absolutely, I’m going to smash the next election.” No. They would say, “Well, that assumption is fundamentally flawed.” The model may be correct, including the factors being considered, but inserting the assumptions into a model is what actually counts. That is what actually determines the outcomes, and the IFG is very clear about that. Again, the Government are asking us to erode the important right to a jury trial, based on assumptions that the IFG says are highly uncertain. The Opposition’s position is quite clear. What is not uncertain is the fact that improving prisoner transport will help deliver improvements; that improving case management will deliver outcomes, which nobody disputes; or that improving access to early legal advice by reforming legal aid will help reduce the backlogs. There is a whole slew of things that are not uncertain. Surely, the sensible and balanced thing to do is to get those things done first. Then, if the Government show that they really have done everything they possibly can, there could be a different discussion with MPs and the public about why they had chosen to erode and curtail an historic right that we have had for hundreds of years. The reason why the data from the CBA is so important—the Minister accepts this—is that it is showing an improvement into the input. If the input is improving, then in theory the output will improve; I have not heard the Minister say that we will not get an improvement in the outlook at some point. If fewer cases are coming in, then surely there will be less of a backlog down the line. That is happening already—prior to the changes on jury trials and, more importantly, prior to all the other things having embedded in, as the Minister has herself admitted. We have not even touched prison transport and we are getting an improvement; we have not even touched legal aid and we are getting an improvement—I could go on and on. The point was powerfully illustrated, in terms of priorities, by the representative from the HMCTS. I asked him about his priorities for reducing the backlogs and improving the situation. Jury trials did not even come close to the list of things that he thought were important. Surely we need to deliver on those elements successfully and consistently, but we all know that that is going to be extremely hard work. I made the point to the Minister this morning. I do not doubt her sincerity on this, but being a Minister is about driving through major reform and change while having to manage day-to-day improvement in the system. She might think this an unfair comment, but I asked her this morning about what was happening with the inputs into the Crown courts. She is the Minister in charge of our backlogs, but when I asked for a clear answer about some of the statistics in regional variation, the Minister did not have them, did not know or was not able to answer. She had to go away at lunch time to answer a question about those key statistics. That is a bit like me asking the Health Secretary what is happening with regional variation in waiting times and the Health Secretary saying, “Well, I know overall waiting times are going down, but I don’t know the answer to that. I will have to go away and look and see what is happening in different parts of the country.” It is a giveaway.

• 26 Mar 2026 · Local Government Reorganisation · Hansard source

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  Labour is causing chaos in local government in East Sussex. After firing the starting gun on tearing up our local government boundaries—something that no resident in East Sussex wanted and that was not in its manifesto—the Government now will not let us out the blocks. My residents are absolutely clear that they do not want to be lumped in with Labour-run Brighton and Hove city council, which will dominate any new unitary authority, sucking up all the money, resources and attention. Is it not true that the only reason the Government are not letting us get on with an East Sussex proposal is because they want to help out their Labour mates in mismanaged, disastrously-run Brighton and Hove city council?

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Are there any lessons that could be drawn out for the rest of the country? You have given us some that you think cannot be. Sir Brian Leveson: Yes, and I have made recommendations. It is critical that the systems join up: the police, the CPS, the defence community, the courts, the judiciary, and the prison and probation services. They all have their own budgets, their own problems and their own priorities. One of the recommendations I made in part 2 of my review—which is not considered in the Bill, obviously—was the creation of a criminal justice adviser whose only responsibility was co-ordinating the work of each of the agencies to try to make them work together. That is where it has worked in Liverpool. But doing that on its own would not be sufficient.

• 25 Mar 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Jade, do you want to come in? Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I come from an angle of delay being a key factor. While my case was dropped 13 days before trial, from report to court it would have been 1,317 days, which is now becoming quite the norm. I regularly hear fellow victims advising on very similar situations, and how they feel about that and how it changes their perspective on wanting to navigate the justice process. If people are telling us that they would not necessarily come back into the system, for me, that is the clearest possible signal that change is not optional but very much overdue. We published a letter last week in response to the Bar Council’s letter, just to try to centre lived experience in this conversation and debate, which felt like it had been predominantly missing. In statements of support, a couple of victims have described the process of waiting for court and the delays as “extreme harm”—that was from Victoria. Sarah advised that she felt “suffering, gaslighting and anxiety”. Charlotte said that report to court was “total agony” and that we need to reduce the suffering. Jane advised that it felt like years on “eggshells, in limbo”. She said: “Waiting years with no guarantee of getting justice is like torture.” Charlotte—another Charlotte—advised of the delays that: “They shape our lives, our ability to move forward, and our trust in justice itself.” Those are important and strong statements from women describing that process. That is the angle that I come from. Charlotte Meijer: We have also handed the letter over to one of your colleagues, so that the Committee can read it. I was seen in a magistrates court, so having the recording of magistrates courts that is in the Bill is incredibly important. That transparency, which I did not have, will really change victims’ lives, whether that is just to understand what happened in their trial or to hold people to account. I did not have a good experience with my judge, but I am still pro my case being seen by a judge. I am so glad that my perpetrator chose that—although there is an issue with that in itself, as they should not be able to choose, and I am glad to see that being taken away. I am so glad I was seen in front of a judge, because to me a judge is educated in all aspects—or should be, as there is a definite need of training, as has been said—while 12 strangers off the street all have their own biases. We know that one in four men are generally perpetrators, so that could be three on the panel that is judging you and your case. For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way. One thing that I think is also really important in this discussion, where there is so much pushback against more cases going to magistrates courts, is that coercive control essentially involves rape—it involves coercive sex—and yet it is seen in a magistrates court. When we talk about how only the worst crimes are being seen by juries, and they need to be seen by juries, what does that mean about all the other crimes, including domestic abuse and coercive control, that are being seen in magistrates courts? Are we saying that they are not getting fair trials as it is? We believe that they are, so why is there such pushback at the moment about more cases going to magistrates courts? Magistrates are laypeople as well, so there is still that accountability from the general public.