Kieran Mullan MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Ms Butler. I am being reasonable. On the matters on which the Minister said she would write to us—the three offences and whether there will be amendment in that respect— I have accepted a letter. However, it is not appropriate to ask us to vote when we are unclear about the implications of these changes. We have already had to do that once, and it is not appropriate to ask us to do it again. We can debate the clauses, which relate to the potential loss of an important right, but we do not necessarily have to vote on them. I have never said there was a right of appeal; I have never described it as a right of appeal. I have said that there is a right to judicial review of an allocation decision. It is not right that we proceed without knowing the full implications of that being taken away through the Bill.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned. We have had some discussion in private, and I think it will be helpful, while not revealing what was said in private, to illustrate the Opposition’s thinking on the matter. As I explained during our previous sitting on Thursday—there has been a significant length of time since—I was of the understanding that moving the allocation decision away from the magistrates court to the Crown court would lead to a substantial reduction in access to judicial review of allocation decisions. This is not about appeal—we argued separately for appeal. Rather, the point of contention is about the right to judicial review. In that debate, the Minister, I am sure inadvertently, potentially misled the Committee by suggesting that that was not true, and I was called patronising by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, the Parliamentary Private Secretary sitting behind her, when I suggested that that was the case. The Bar Council has submitted evidence to the Committee that supports my argument that there would be a substantial change in access to judicial review. That is directly relevant, not just to clause 3, which we are being asked to vote on, but to the next clause. The Minister accepts that she needs to write to us with further clarity on this issue, so she is conceding that it is not clear, but we are still being asked, by the Government Whip and the Minister, to vote on this measure. That is highly unsatisfactory. I want us to vote with a shared understanding of what the implications are. If the Minister agreed that there would be a significant reduction in access to the right to judicial review, we would have that shared understanding, but I do not believe that she is willing to concede that point. On the basis that it is unclear what we are voting on, I am afraid that it is simply not appropriate for us to be asked to vote on clause 3. That was not my intention; I was of the understanding—I accept incorrectly—as I think the Minister also was, that we could shelve the vote and continue the debate, so that progress on the Bill was not curtailed. However, the Clerks have advised us that we cannot shelve the vote, so if this is the only available option to prevent us from voting without the full facts, I think it is appropriate that we adjourn the debate until such time as we get them. To reiterate, this was not my intention; I had expected that we would continue the debate and then have an option— [ Interruption. ] Does the PPS want to say something? No. On that basis, I think that we should adjourn.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not speak at length—much to the delight, I am sure, of Government Members—but I want to pick up on a few key points that have been raised. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate and for Isle of Wight East for their extensive review of clause 3, and also the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is not in her place. Let us be clear about all the things we have highlighted that are lacking. We are talking about a significant erosion for 50% of those who currently enjoy jury trial, and we have made it clear that the evidence for the necessity of that is lacking. In earlier sittings, we talked about the backlog already falling in a number of regions, even though we are so early on in the process of trying to tackle this issue. Today alone, 11% of Crown courts are not sitting—they are sat empty—and it was the same yesterday and it was even higher last week, so there are clearly other things we could be doing. There has been criticism of the retrospective element of the measures in clause 3, which the Opposition, at least, have agreed is unacceptable. Different standards will be applied because we have not been able to amend the measures on reallocation, so there is a different standard for allocation and reallocation. That is doubled with the lack of appeal, on which we were not able to make progress. We have covered the lack of community confidence that will arise from these measures. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington has tabled new clause 29, which we think is sensible, to try to go at least some way to addressing the issue of community confidence. However, I am not convinced that, even if the Government accept the new clause, we will get any change as a result. Let us say we do the review in a year from now and it finds there has been a deterioration in these issues, will they unpick their reforms? I am not confident that they will. We have had suggestions that the cross-examination of the defendant is inappropriate. Of course, the reforms will lead to more defendants being cross-examined, unrepresented, in the magistrates court. We have had a suggestion that the changes are not substantial. I made it clear in my intervention that, under any sensible reading of the facts, most people would consider a 50% change to be substantial. We have laid out, in a clear and detailed way, all the different ways in which clause 3 is wrong and fails on its own merits. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and make some necessary changes.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert “cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”. This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively. We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process. Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness. The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined. There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals. There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts. On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here. The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously. This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view. Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say: “The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.” Those include “the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting” for a long time and “any other matters the court considers relevant.” Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us. The written evidence continues: “In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.” Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty. Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve. In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost. By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides. In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate. That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request. When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished. Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so. In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail. To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I mentioned, the Government have chosen to exclude all sexual offences. If that is the logic that the Government seek to apply, why have they chosen to not apply it to an adjoined offence that is a sexual offence?

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The only point I would add is that, as the Minister has accepted, this is a relatively small number of cases, so the test of what is justifiable is actually disproportionately weighted against the Minister in these cases, in comparison with the earlier cases on clause 3. People’s rights and expectations remain the same, and from their perspective will be undermined by these measures, yet the benefit that the Government will actually secure from them is relatively minor, as the Minister accepts. I refer to the fact that 11% of Crown courts are sat empty today, and for a very minimal gain we are putting forward measures that make it difficult for people to exercise their rights in the legal system in a fair and reasonable way. On that basis, we will press the amendment to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”. This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA. Clause 4 relates to the allocation to the Crown court bench division of complex or lengthy cases. The amendment relates to how the mixture of cases presented on an indictment would affect the allocation decision. It addresses a clear overreach and would limit judge-only trials to situations where all the offences of which someone was accused are listed in new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As it stands, a case may be directed to be judge-only where only one of the offences on the indictment falls within the schedule list, with only very limited exceptions in relation to murder and related offences, and sexual assault and related offences. It is important for Members to realise just how potentially expansive new schedule 3ZA is. If just one of these offences appears on someone’s list of charges, they will lose their access to a jury trial. They include conspiracy to defraud, cheating the public revenue, offences under the Taxes Management Act 1970, offences of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968, insider dealing, money laundering and bribery—a whole range of offences whereby, just one of which will remove access to a jury trial. Someone could be accused at the same time of offences as serious as serious physical assault, grievous bodily harm, burglary or theft. Those offences may be many years apart; there may be a series of offences, dating over a number of years. That means that someone may lose a right that the Government otherwise accept they should have access to. Someone could have a serious offence of theft, with a likely sentence that, as we know, can be over the three-year benchmark. They could be facing a sentence of four years, which the Government otherwise agree should allow them to have a trial with a jury, and they will lose access to a trial by jury in relation to one of the other offences. The test is not about the seriousness of the offences; it is a test of complexity. Someone may have a less serious but complex case, in the Government’s view, and lose access to a right to jury trial. I cannot see how the Government can possibly argue that that is fair. This is a matter of coherence and fairness. Our position is quite clear: only when all the offences, instead of just one of the offences, are those listed under proposed new schedule 3ZA should someone lose access to their right to a trial by jury on the basis of clause 4.

• 21 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a). This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

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  The Prime Minister is suggesting that the idea that the security services had concerns about this appointment was a bolt from the blue to him two weeks ago, despite the fact it had been on the front page of a national newspaper in September. However, my question is not about the vetting file, because we all know the answer that the Prime Minister is going to give on that. This is separate from the vetting file. Was he at any stage made aware of any element of the security services raising concerns about the appointment of Mandelson?

• 20 Apr 2026 · Victims and Courts Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to take part in this debate on the Lords message on the Victims and Courts Bill. The Bill has been debated extensively in the other place. I thank the Lords for their care and consideration in trying to improve it, as we tried to do in the Commons. Members will know that, when the Bill was last in this House, we were sadly defeated by Labour MPs on a number of provisions relating to court transcripts, the victims code and the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Since then, the Lords have done a good job in securing concessions from the Government, including an agreement that there should be a clearer and more defined set of rights for victims of homicide abroad, which the Minister mentioned. Although it is not the subject of the debate, I join the Minister in acknowledging the campaigning by the relatives and MPs of Olivia, Zara, Sabina and Jan, which we have discussed a number of times in the Chamber as we passed specific amendments. Today we are considering two remaining provisions added in the Lords. I begin with the Government amendment in lieu of the Lords amendments on the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Many Members of this House will be familiar with the ULS and will have used it themselves. Anyone, including a victim, a relative of a victim or a member of the public, can ask the Attorney General to consider whether a sentence should be referred to the Court of Appeal as being unduly lenient. If the Attorney General considers that it might be, they refer it to the Court of Appeal for review. However, there is a strict 28-day limit within which the Attorney General is able to refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal—and, by extension, a 28-day limit within which the victim or a member of the public can refer the case. If the Court of Appeal finds that the sentence is unduly lenient, it may alter the sentence or substitute it for another. I have used the scheme on occasions when I have considered sentences to be unduly lenient, including, most recently, in relation to the horrific murder of Alana Odysseos, who was murdered by her boyfriend, Shaine March. He stabbed her 19 times when she refused to have an abortion. Despite having been convicted of murder and released on parole for that offence, when he committed this second murder, he was given a second life sentence—a term that is increasingly unfit for purpose—with the prospect of leaving prison again. That was plainly wrong, and after I referred his case to the scheme, his sentence was overturned and replaced with a whole-life order, meaning that he will never be released. I have had the pleasure of speaking with Alana’s sister, Jasmine. She has told me of the importance of that outcome, which means that Mr March is serving a sentence that reflects the gravity of his crime. That demonstrates how effective the scheme can be in certain circumstances, but it does not always operate as we might want it to. I have had the privilege of being able to meet and work with a number of victims and their families. They explained to me clearly the pitfalls in the scheme, and drew particular comparisons between the rights and privileges of the criminals and those of victims and the bereaved, in relation both to awareness and notification of the scheme and to the time available to use it. MPs and others can refer cases to the scheme, but those most likely to have an interest in making a referral or appealing a sentence are the victims or their families, and they do not always know about the scheme. There is not much point in people having a right if they are not told about it. The Government have agreed to a statutory duty to notify victims of the existence of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which will mean that victims and bereaved families can easily find clear information about the ULS and about their rights in the victims code. Will the Minister clarify which body she envisages will have responsibility for that? It is important that we have some kind of plan to ensure that notification is working. I am sure that the various bodies involved would say that they like to think that everybody is told about it, but that is not the case, so how do the Government plan to ensure that whoever is given that job follows through on it? My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox), who is no longer in his place, spoke about what the Government did or did not agree to. The Government’s original plan for the ULS in the Bill was not to give victims more time, but to give themselves more time. It was not on their radar, in any way, shape or form, to extend the time available to victims and their families. When we sought to amend the Bill in that respect, we were told that it was not possible and that we would have to wait for the findings of the Law Commission’s review of criminal appeals. I think the Minister must now accept that that was not true—as we knew at the time—because here we are making amendments before those findings are published. I do welcome the amendments, however. I pay tribute to those I have worked with directly, many of whom the Minister has mentioned. I have worked closely on this issue with Katie Brett from the campaign group Justice for Victims. I pay tribute to her MP, the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood (Lorraine Beavers), who made a particularly powerful and effective speech on this matter last time it was before this House. She has been very effective behind the scenes in driving forward this change. Katie’s sister, Sasha, was murdered in 2013. This is difficult to talk about, but it is the reality of what people are going through. Aged just 16, Sasha was raped and stabbed more than 100 times, and her body was set on fire. Katie and her family believed that Sasha’s killer met the existing criteria for a whole-life order, but he was given only a minimum sentence of 35 years. In reality, that meant that there was every possibility that he would end up getting out of prison. Despite all Katie’s amazing work on this issue, the scheme is not retrospective, which is something the family will have to accept. Katie was so upset about being unable to successfully appeal the sentence that she collected more than 10,000 signatures on a petition to remove the 28-day limit for appeals. The way that Katie described the situation has always stuck with me, and I have used it in discussions with Ministers and others. She said that 28 days is the amount of time we have to take something back to a shop. Someone has the same amount of time to decide whether or not they like a top that they have bought. How can we have the same test for something so serious? That measure was a cross-party one—we did not amend it when we were in government. I also met Ayse Hussein, another member of Justice for Victims, who campaigns on behalf of her cousin, Jan Mustafa. Jan’s killer had raped, tortured and imprisoned various girls and young women. He murdered Henriett Szucs and Jan and hid their bodies in a freezer, one of top of the other. He did not receive a whole-life sentence and may leave prison one day. Again, Ayse and her family never knew anything about the scheme. I have also had the pleasure of meeting Lauren Redmond, who lost her ability to appeal a sentence purely because of errors made by the Crown Prosecution Service. When a request to appeal the sentence was placed, the Attorney General’s office asked for the relevant files. The CPS sent the wrong date to the Government, who then worked towards an incorrect timetable. As a result, Lauren was denied the right to appeal. I have also had the opportunity to meet Tracey Hanson. You have given us guidance on addressing visitors in the Public Gallery, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the Minister has already done it for us. Tracey has campaigned for many years on this issue, and works on victims’ behalf more generally through the Josh Hanson Trust, which is named after her son. I know that she has been supported by the Victims’ Commissioner in that work. As the Minister said, Joshua was 21 when he was murdered in an unprovoked knife attack. Tracey and I have not always seen eye to eye on exactly how the scheme should be reformed, but that in no way diminishes the incredibly vital role that she has played over many years in campaigning for improvements to the scheme. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Blake Stephenson), who has done a great job of advocating and lobbying on Tracey’s behalf. I am glad that the Government have been persuaded to act. They will now allow up to six months for victims and their families to make use of the scheme in certain circumstances. I want to allow space for Katie and Tracey’s words on those changes. Katie said: “It’s a relief that, in Sasha’s memory, victims and their families will have 6 months to challenge an unduly lenient sentence, and the new legal duty to be notified means every family will know their rights to be able to do so. No family should ever be left in the dark like we were, every victim deserves support. We’re grateful these steps are being taken to redress the balance that so often feels weighted against victims.” Tracey said: “After…years of relentless campaigning through the Josh Hanson Trust, this is a significant and long-awaited victory for victims’ rights. Following our extensive advocacy, the Government has agreed to transformative amendments to the Unduly Lenient Sentence (ULS) scheme. These changes represent a hard-fought victory in ensuring that families are no longer left in the dark or rushed through a traumatising process during the most painful moments of their lives. These reforms are a testament to Josh’s memory and the passion and dedication of everyone who stood with the Josh Hanson Trust. We have moved forward, but the fight for full equality in the eyes of the law continues.”

• 20 Apr 2026 · Victims and Courts Bill · Hansard source

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  There will be some back and forth about who wants what elements of this scheme and in what ways, but I think the Minister was wrong to say that our focus was on it being for everybody. I have been clear from the start that our focus was also on extending the provision for victims and their families, and not for everybody.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a background in healthcare. The Minister has talked about triage being led by healthcare professionals, but there is another side of healthcare where people can insist on choice. This Government have introduced Martha’s rule, where the family member can not only insist on choice, but override what the treating clinical team think is the right course of treatment. They are given a route to go around them, to call someone, to insist that they are wrong and that they fundamentally disagree with them, and to get somebody else in who will challenge what the consultant in charge of the patient thinks is right. The Minister points to one element of the healthcare system where the state has a greater degree of control, but does she accept that there are other aspects of the healthcare system where we allow people to override what the healthcare team want to do?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, we talked about this before. There are degrees of fairness. Specifically on whether a defendant will get a judge who is as fair as possible in terms of representation, understanding their background and so on, I think it is less fair than a jury system. But I made it clear that other factors are given greater weight in the youth court. For example, the intimidation that a young defendant might feel in the adult court versus the youth court is given greater weight. I might think overall that the deal, so to speak, for the youth defendant is fair and reasonable, but that does not mean that I cannot say that the absence of a jury might be less fair for a youth defendant in some regards.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I covered that in earlier remarks, when I pointed out that those people are not adults, so it is a different set of circumstances. If the hon. Member is asking me to be ultra-specific—I am happy to be—what is proposed is unprecedented for cases of this nature, with adults, with these sentence lengths. That is, of course, the vast bulk of our justice system. There are lots of things that we do differently for children than we do for adults in the justice system. I am not familiar with arguments suggesting that those distinctions cannot be made, and that something we do with the youth custodial element or judicial process must therefore be perfectly acceptable with the adult estate. We do not do that.

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  The Minister said earlier, and she just said again, that it was the test recommended by the independent review. But if we are being specific, the test that was recommended was two years. The Government have made the test three years, so it is not the test that was recommended. It is important that the Minister does not repeat that inaccurate phrase.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I want to begin by touching again on the question of necessity. One of the key arguments for clause 3, and one of the reasons why the Opposition think there is a debate to be had, is that we do not feel that the new provisions are entirely necessary to bring down the backlog, and that there might be other means by which we might do so. We have had a debate about what the figures say, and I have laid out why I think they are important. They are important because the Government accept that, quite plainly, they have not yet implemented the reforms that they think are absolutely necessary to bring down the backlog. While the Government and the Opposition recognise that some steps that might help have been taken, such as the lifting of the cap on sitting days, the Minister herself accepts that even that measure will not have had full effect yet. On other measures, such as on prison transport, there has not been any significant reform or undertakings to do things differently. We are at a very early stage of the approach to bringing down the backlogs in the significant way that the Minister and the Opposition would like to achieve. In that scenario, given that so little has been done in comparison with what we would hope to achieve—with or without the Bill—if there were some suggestion that backlogs were falling, that would be incredibly important for the Committee to understand. It would give us the confidence to question whether, at this early stage, there is an alternative approach. If we are managing to bring the backlogs down in some parts of the country, we could base that approach on understanding what is happening in those areas and expanding on it before taking the unprecedented step of restricting jury trial rights. The Minister and I had an exchange about this in an earlier debate. I suggested that there have been positive developments and a reduction of the backlog in some areas. I want to be clear about what I said to the Minister: “What is happening right now with the backlogs is extremely important to this debate. If the backlogs are coming down in some places without these changes being introduced, it is vital to know and understand that.” I echoed those points in other parts of the debate. The Minister responded: “I checked this during the adjournment of the sitting: the CBA’s point relates to new receipts in certain courts, rather than the state of the backlogs, which, as I said, continue to rise. I absolutely welcome the progress in some parts of the country in lowering receipts, which is obviously good news for the courts, but that does not yet reflect any lowering of the backlogs. As we would expect, the investment will take time to kick in.” –– [ Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2026; c. 159.] In response to my question as to whether the backlogs were coming down in some parts of the country, the Minister told the Committee—on the record—that they were not. As Members might imagine, I went away and had a further look at the data to ensure that that was the case. My understanding of the latest available published statistics is that the Minister may have inadvertently misled the Committee in stating that the backlogs were not coming down in certain parts of the country. As of December 2025—the latest period for which we have this data is from quarter 3 to quarter 4—there has been a drop in the backlogs in the south-east, the north-west and Wales. We have seen a drop in the backlogs in the quarter-on-quarter data in three parts of the country, and it is extremely important that the Committee understands that.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I accept the first point. If the Minister had said, “Yes, there is a drop in the backlog in those three regions, but we tend to see that because of this,” citing the points the hon. Member made, we would be having a different discussion, but she did not say that; she said there was no drop. On the second point, the hon. Member is also right: if that rate of drop was all we were ever going to get, it would not make a material difference to the backlog. That is why I was very clear that, if we are getting a drop, in a context where everybody agrees we are very early in the process and have done a fraction of the things we could do, it is important for us to look at it. If we were at the end of the process and had done all the things we all agree are positive and should be done, and that was the rate of return we were getting, we would be having a different debate. But we are not at the end of it; we are at the start.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Why does the Minister think it is important that some cases remain with a jury trial? What are the material differences that she sees between a jury trial and a non-jury trial that cause her to seek to allow some to continue with a jury trial?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To use the word that the hon. Member used at the start of her intervention, it is a balance. We in the Opposition are clear that the Government have that balance wrong, which is why we oppose the measures. As I said, the Government want to have this both ways: on the one hand, when it suits them, they say that it is a balancing exercise, but on the other hand, when we point out flaws in the balance, they say, “Everything’s fine. You would be just as happy in a trial with or without a jury.” The Government should be consistent. If the Government just said, “This is a balancing exercise. There will be some detriment to people as a result, but we believe that it is right”, and then stuck to that line, at least it would be intellectually coherent. The Minister might think that makes it a debating point, but I think it is pretty important in politics to be intellectually coherent. We take a different view from the Government. The other point that we think is different, too, is that the proposal will not achieve the desired outcome. Even if we agreed, in theory, that the balancing exercise was correct and that the trade-off that the Government seek to achieve were a reasonable one to make against the loss of the rights that we are talking about, we do not think that the Government will get those outcomes. We therefore think that the Government’s argument is fatally flawed in two respects, which is why we continue to oppose the Bill. As I said, fairness is important. We focused on the example where a first-time offender might end up with fewer rights in our judicial system than a repeat offender; in respect of, for example, loss of respect, reputation, employment or income, the person who has more at stake has their rights removed. That is a point made clearly by JUSTICE, which supports our amendment 39. JUSTICE states that the three-year threshold is likely to lead to outcomes that are seen as unfair by those within the system and by the public. Repeat offenders are more likely to qualify for a jury trial, because their previous convictions would push the likely sentence above three years, while first-time offenders committing the same offence may be denied a jury trial. When we put that to Ministers, as I said, they say that it is perfectly fine for those people to have a trial without a jury, and that is fair. Ministers also say, however, that they are keeping jury trials for the most serious cases—but if they are keeping it for the most serious cases, they must at some level accept that it is a superior system in some way. Otherwise, why keep it for the more serious cases, as they define them? The Government cannot hold both positions coherently. Absolutely, as I said, the core issue is fairness. The Government want to have it both ways in this argument, but of course the defendants will not get to have it both ways. The defendants will just have what they are told by the judge, without any ability to exercise their rights in the way that they think is fair or consistent with the broader point. We therefore continue to press our amendment 39 and that is why I ask Labour Members to think carefully; this might not be universal, but how many of them would feel happy if they—with their previous good character, and all the damage that could happen to their reputation and income from a conviction—were not allowed to have the option of a jury trial? I cannot say for sure, but potentially some of them might feel differently then.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member has articulated extremely well that these things can be done differently and have a different outcome. I heard about case management directly from Liverpool Crown court. It has an aggressive approach to case management: it swept the cases and was clear whether it needed to be hearing a case or whether it could do any work to get a plea. It does a lot of work, and if every court was doing that, it would deliver different outcomes. The Minister might rightly point out that different courts have different circumstances, but surely the goal should be to correct those circumstances so that the positive things enabling some courts to bring the backlogs down can be done everywhere.