Keir Mather MP: speeches

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Speeches

5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Lady for giving me an opportunity to piggyback on her response to the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I want merely to say that, from the Government’s perspective, having one centralised body accountable for access to and use of the railway and for determining best use is a good way to avoid the phantom train scenarios she describes, such as the 7 o’clock service from Manchester Piccadilly to London. I am grateful that she has given me the opportunity to row in behind her on this point.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I beg to move amendment 271, in clause 75, page 43, line 23, at end insert— “(2A) In section 55 (orders for securing compliance), after subsection (7C) insert— ‘(7D) The Office of Rail and Road may not, by a final or provisional order, require the payment of a sum by Great British Railways.’” This amendment would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will respond first to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. The point about confusion does not pertain to confusion created through arbitration in the courts on the principles of access decisions as a matter of law. I think that that is fundamental to making sure that GBR works within the boundaries of the legislative framework we have created, as well as, via public law principles, operating in a way that is both fair and transparent. The point about confusion is having two decision-making bodies on what constitutes best use of the network and access to the network. That is where we want to avoid confusion, because that is the system we have inherited, and it does not work for passengers. The shadow Minister raised a point about fees, and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston mentioned costs. Any appeals will be made against JR principles and not processes. It is not that each case will be brought before the courts, with the associated costs that that would bring, so I am confident that the costs of appeal would not be a significant factor under the new system as opposed to the old one. On the matter of European systems, the shadow Minister tests the boundaries of my knowledge of the operation of rail systems overseas. There are systems in Europe in which a body similar to the ORR has too dominant a role in having charge over access and decision making in relation to it. That is not working in the existing system, and that is what we are trying to change through the Bill. Amendments 88 and 89 seek to remove the requirement that appeals be made on judicial review principles and replace this with a requirement that appeals are determined “on the facts and the law.” As I set out in my opening speech, judicial review principles will ensure that the ORR focuses on the legality and fairness of GBR’s decision making, not on retaking the decision. Replacing this with a requirement to determine appeals on the facts and the law instead would convert this to a merits-based system, which would require the ORR to rerun strategic judgments and exercises on best use of the network. That is not the role we intend for the ORR. The framework is designed to provide strong, independent oversight while preserving GBR as the single directing mind. We have discussed repeatedly in Committee that what is wrong with the railway today is the fact that there is no one decision maker. There has to be just one, or the railway will continue to stagnate. GBR is the body with the expertise to be that decision maker, and the ORR is the body that should check that it has acted fairly and proportionately. Judicial review principles strike the right balance between accountability and effective decision making. Amendments 90 and 91 would extend the ORR’s powers to substitute its own decision for one of GBR’s. As I have mentioned, the Bill deliberately distinguishes between types of appeals and the powers available to the ORR in each circumstance. For appeals concerning provisions within GBR’s strategic documents, such as the access and use policy, infrastructure capacity plans or its charging and performance schemes, the ORR may remit the provision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration, and may do so with binding directions, but may not substitute its own decision. That is because these are not yes or no decisions—they are not simple decisions—but rather complex and comprehensive policies that govern the railway. It is not appropriate for the ORR to rewrite strategic policy documents, and that is not what regulators are meant to do. The ORR should be checking that GBR has acted consistently with its procedures and policies, not substituting them with its own. However, for operational decisions, for example about charges for operators or about whether someone should be included in the timetable, the ORR has stronger powers. The ORR may quash all or part of the decision and may substitute its own decision in cases where there has been an error of law and, without the error, there would have been only one decision that Great British Railways could have reached. The amendments would remove these carefully drawn distinctions, potentially allowing the ORR to step beyond its oversight role and into decision making on best use of the network. We cannot have that. The amendments would allow the ORR to make decisions on best use without decisions going back to GBR to correct, removing GBR’s ability to learn from and correct its mistakes, and adding duplication between two decision-making bodies. The Bill already provides robust remedies where an appeal is upheld, including the power to remit with binding directions, even when substitution is not available, which ensures effective redress while preserving GBR as the single directing mind. Amendments 92 and 93 would require the Secretary of State and the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing either regulations or practice and procedures for appeals under this chapter. The Bill already sets out a clear and proportionate consultation requirement, and the current formulation is deliberate to provide flexibility for the ORR to engage industry and stakeholders, including open access operators, without creating an inflexible statutory list. It may also be helpful to emphasise that the ORR’s appeals role exists precisely to ensure fairness, transparency and lawful decision making for operators, including open access operators. The ORR has already begun engagement on its approach to developing its appeals process and has published a discussion document setting out its emerging thinking, which is publicly available and open to comment and views from industry and other stakeholders, including open access operators. The work is intended to inform its final appeals process, and there will be a formal consultation once the Bill receives Royal Assent. Open access operators will therefore be able to provide views as part of the consultation without the need for an explicit mention in the Bill. The process already provides a clear and appropriate route for open access operators to have their views heard. I also note that the Secretary of State regulations relate to process matters only, such as steps that must be taken before an appeal is brought, time limits, and fees. They do not determine access rights or decision making on capacity allocation or charging. It is therefore appropriate that the statutory consultation requirement focuses on bodies with system-wide responsibilities and oversight roles, rather than individual categories of operator. As with other consultation provisions in the Bill, singling out one category of operator will create a precedent for others to request to be added to the statutory list, and we will risk making the framework overly prescriptive. The current drafting already achieves the right balance, ensuring engagement and maintaining flexibility. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for South West Devon not to press the amendments, and commend clauses 67 and 68 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 68 Appeal procedure Amendment proposed : 88, in clause 68, page 38, line 11, leave out subsection (1).— (Rebecca Smith.) This amendment removes the requirement that appeals may only be made under Judicial Review principles. Question put, That the amendment be made.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his amendment, which would retain the ORR’s power to fine GBR in the event of a licence breach. He will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to repeat the arguments that I made in my opening remarks. However, as I suspect he knows, I cannot accept his amendment, because in creating the ability for the ORR to fine GBR, it would simply lead to the recycling of public funds, which he so ably outlined as being an issue. On the subject of licence breaches, the ORR can issue an enforcement order to direct a different outcome from GBR. There is also a point to be made about accountability for GBR’s executives. That kind of relates to the penalties for Network Rail today: the ORR already recognises its public sector status and scales penalties accordingly. The chair and board of GBR will be responsible for ensuring that the CEO has in place robust performance management for senior staff, inherent to which will be not defying the ORR when it has issued legally binding directions. There will be a clear expectation that any significant failures will have a material impact on performance-related pay, and where the failure is sufficient to demand it, an individual should be at risk of dismissal. Put simply, removing the ORR’s power to fine will not cause the executive of GBR to be remiss in their duties. Although the hon. Member asks me to speculate on potentially extreme cases where GBR could defy the ORR, I believe that, in the round, sufficient safeguards remain in place, with the ORR retaining its existing ability to issue mandatory and legally binding enforcement orders to GBR on matters within the licence; it is only the monetary aspect that is targeted here. Amendment 271 agreed to. Question put , That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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Amendments 175 to 183 and 186 will ensure that GBR can enter into connection contracts with adjacent infrastructure managers and facility owners. A connection contract is a formal agreement that focuses on the physical interface and upkeep of the connection between two rail networks. Connection contracts are important in enabling the smooth passage of trains from GBR’s network to others, such as the Core Valley Lines in Wales. They also allow GBR’s network to be connected to privately owned depots or ports, which will be of importance to freight operators. These technical amendments retain the existing arrangements, enabling GBR and other parties to enter into connection contracts. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the right hon. Member for that contribution, because he gets to the nub of the principles. GBR will be held accountable through compliance with its duties as set out in legislation, which ensures that it has to have regard to passengers, including passengers with disabilities, and regard to the need to promote rail freight. It also has public law accountability built into it, through its legal obligation to act in a manner that is transparent and fair. The right hon. Member asks a broader question about whether the JR principles threshold is too high. We would argue it is not too high, precisely because of what it unlocks if we get to the stage where an appeal is upheld. The ORR will have strong powers to dismiss the appeal or remit the decision to GBR for reconsideration, with legally binding directions that GBR cannot ignore. It is right and it is the stated principle both of the policy and of the overall notion of nationalisation that GBR can be a directing mind for the railway and have the power to do so, but there is a strong buttress against it if it is found that it has acted incorrectly as a matter of law.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will first speak to Government amendment 271 and clause 75 as drafted, which is essential to ensure that the accountability arrangements for GBR reflect its status as a publicly owned body, as well as enshrining the strategic role of Ministers. The clause will make two changes to functions of the ORR that would otherwise apply to GBR. The first is to prevent the ORR from issuing specific directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities, such as stations or depots. However, we expect that the GBR licence will include a condition relating to long-term asset management to ensure that the ORR retains oversight of infrastructure in the new system. As Members are aware, GBR’s licence will be subject to formal consultation. The direction power was originally included to ensure that improvements were made when it is was clearly in the interests of the railway generally, but a railway operator might have no commercial incentive to make them. In the new system, GBR will be incentivised to improve its own infrastructure, and the change in legislation recognises that it is for Ministers, as funders, and GBR itself—not the regulator—to set the strategic direction for GBR. GBR should then make decisions and improvements as part of its business planning, and the ORR should be able to monitor against the agreed business plan, supported by a licence condition that ensures that it can enforce long-term asset management in case anything goes wrong. If the ORR identifies a failing that constitutes a breach of that condition, and dialogue or early intervention have not proved effective, it will be able to escalate issues to the GBR board, require GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issue an enforcement order, which is a legal instruction that would require GBR to take action to meet its responsibilities. The second change is to remove the ORR’s power to fine GBR. Imposing financial penalties on a public body would not align with the aims of maximising the benefits of public ownership. It would simply mean recycling public funds between two public bodies, continuing the money-go-round that is pervasive in today’s system. It would also add an administrative burden with only a limited effect on incentivising the right behaviours. Amendment 271 is a technical amendment to ensure that when the Bill removes the ORR’s power to fine, it refers to all the correct parts of the law, including section 55 of the Railways Act 1993, to achieve that aim. The ORR will retain the ability to issue fines for breaches of licence conditions by non-GBR licence holders where that is an effective tool because those organisations will not be wholly funded by Government money. GBR can still be subject to a financial penalty if it violates health and safety or competition laws, as we are not changing the safety regime that will apply to the railways, and competition law will still apply in full to GBR. I look forward to hearing from hon. Members about amendment 212.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I am not arguing that stakeholders are not valid in raising concerns about the issues: they are. I am seeking to ameliorate their concerns by outlining what provisions are in the legislation to offer sufficient scrutiny and ensure that the way in which the process happens offers robust safeguards. Constraints are built into clause 72 to ensure sufficient oversight, with the Secretary of State consulting persons considered appropriate and making changes in secondary legislation that is subject to the affirmative procedure. That means that legislation will be subject to full public consultation and subsequently debated in both Houses, which reflects the importance of the regulations in providing certainty for business. I have already said that the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties to ensure that there is full transparency and industry comment. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 would all narrow that power in some way. Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings, and amendment 231 would exclude freight-only facilities. I have already spoken on why some of the principles that lie behind those amendments are unnecessary. Let us take my example of GBR changing the date when its new working timetable is to take effect. On the basis of the amendments, other infrastructure managers would forever be misaligned with that new timetable change date, even if they wished to align. The Government do not intend to use the power to direct the owners or operators of private freight facilities on operational matters. I am happy to reassure the Committee that the power cannot be used to bring other infrastructure managers or operators of privately funded facilities into public ownership, as I know how exercised Opposition Committee members have been about that principle. In the consultation, industry broadly supported the ability to make necessary amendments, although it is of course right to raise concerns when they arise. Most sector bodies agree that it will be important to ensure that there are no regulatory barriers to passenger and freight operators crossing between different networks, and that is what the clause seeks to achieve. Amendment 221 would make the ORR and affected facility owners statutory consultees to the power. That is unnecessary as before exercising the power to make regulations, the Secretary of State is already required to consult all persons they consider appropriate, which would include the ORR and any affected facility owners. If the Secretary of State did not consult such persons, there would be strong grounds to challenge the regulations. Clause 73 will ensure clarity in how key terms are applied throughout the access chapter of the Bill. It defines “GBR infrastructure”, “GBR passenger service” and “working timetable”—fundamental terms to the operation of GBR. The definition of GBR infrastructure ensures that the new access arrangements developed by GBR apply only where intended. The clause also includes a power to amend the definition, which is necessary to ensure that, as GBR’s network evolves over time, it remains clear to GBR and other infrastructure managers which parts of infrastructure are GBR’s responsibility. The clause is therefore critical to provide clarity and transparency. Given what I have set out, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments. I commend clauses 72 and 73 to the Committee.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the shadow Minister and others for their contributions. It is a small point, but the shadow Minister raised international obligations and treaties, and I want to reassure her that infrastructure managed and operated by parties other than GBR, including High Speed 1, will continue to be governed by the existing access and management regulation. There will therefore be no impact on international obligations and treaties. Hopefully, that will instil confidence throughout the rail supply chain as to how seriously we take those obligations. I will speak first to clauses 69 and 70, before turning to the amendments. Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to exempt GBR from the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. In short, the clause prevents the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. Amendment of the existing provisions is vital to allow the Government to fulfil their commitment to establish GBR as the directing mind responsible and accountable for making best use of the railway. Retaining the role of the ORR as the decision maker on access is not the answer. Under the current ORR system, decisions on the timetable are plagued by delays and disagreements between ORR and Network Rail, and require ministerial intervention for timetables to be finalised. As the regulator, the ORR does not have the ability to review the system holistically, create more routes and optimise the overall use of the network—it can only respond to the specific applications that are submitted to it. If we keep the current system, we will continue to see disruption and delays caused by timetabling problems, and inefficient use of the network that is no one’s best interests. We will continue to see problems, such as trains running without passengers on them, purely because of the systematic issues that govern access and timetabling decisions. Retaining the ORR as the access decision maker would not lead to better performance, and would not benefit passengers. The only way to achieve the high-performing and high-quality railway that this country needs is to put one body—GBR—in charge of the railway and of granting access to it. It is only GBR—not Ministers or the ORR—that will have the level of expertise and the detailed knowledge of the whole railway system that is needed to make the right decisions for passengers, freight users and taxpayers. Clause 70 makes technical changes to the body of law that currently governs access, to exempt GBR and make some other consequential changes, so that the existing access and management regulations will no longer apply to GBR in relation to its infrastructure. The technical amendments in the clause are necessary to enable GBR to become the single decision maker and directing mind for its infrastructure. The existing regulations will continue to apply for adjacent infrastructure managers, such as Transport for London and Core Valley Lines in south Wales. Clause 71 provides the Secretary of State with a time-limited power to ensure that contracts can continue to operate effectively, following the establishment of Great British Railways. The Government have made the commitment that, following its establishment, the existing access rights held by operators, known as schedule 5 rights, will be honoured, as will the charges set by the ORR for the remainder of the current control period. The clause does not change those commitments. However, the power is needed to prevent contracts from becoming inoperable because they are reliant on the previous legislative framework in the Railways Act 1993, which will not be applicable once the Bill is enacted. In a similar way to how the ORR provides notices for contracts today, the Secretary of State will, if necessary, and only as a last resort, use the power to make technical changes to existing contracts, simply to ensure smooth transition to the new access and charging regime under GBR—for example, to account for the establishment of GBR and address the changed roles of the ORR and GBR, so that contracts still operate as they should. Without those changes, operators with access rights would potentially not be able to provide the services that they have contracts and rights to run, because the contracts will become inoperable. However, recognising the need for reassurance, and to offer certainty for third parties, the Government have also committed publicly to ensuring that operators with existing contracts in scope of needing that power will be engaged with and consulted, to identify inoperable clauses and agree on replacement wording. Amendment 146 would take away the ability to amend or terminate contracts. However, it is necessary for the clause to be drafted widely, including with reference to termination, in case the best way to effect the technical changes to the contract is to terminate and immediately replace the contract with one that is aligned to the new legislative framework, rather than making numerous technical amendments throughout that would otherwise render the contract unusable or unwieldy. As stated earlier, that will not affect any operators’ schedule 5 rights, nor will it impede the existing charging determination set by the ORR until its natural expiry in April 2029, which the Government have confirmed both publicly and in writing. Not including that provision would be a risk to the smooth transition to the new regime, which the Government are not prepared to risk. Given all that I have discussed, I urge hon. Members not to press the amendment to a vote. Amendment 175 agreed to. Amendments made: 176, in clause 69, page 39, line 26, leave out from “after” to end of line and insert— “subsection (1) insert— “(1A) Where the facility owner is Great British Railways, the Office of Rail and Road may give directions under subsection (1) only for the purpose specified in subsection (2)(e).” See the explanatory statement for amendment 175. Amendment 177, in clause 69, page 39, line 32, leave out— “to which this section applies” and insert— “of the description specified in subsection (2)(e) unless one of the conditions in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) is satisfied; and any such contract is void unless one of those conditions is satisfied.” This amendment replaces the general restriction on Great British Railways entering into access contracts with one that will apply only to “facility to facility” access contracts. Amendment 178, in clause 69, page 40, line 1, leave out subsection (4)(c). This amendment removes the restriction on Great British Railways as a facility owner entering into installation access contracts. Amendment 179, in clause 69, page 40, line 4, at end insert— “(4A) In section 21 (model clauses for access contracts), after subsection (5) insert— ‘(6) The powers of the Office of Rail and Road under subsection (5) may not be exercised in relation to an access contract where the facility owner is Great British Railways unless the access contract is of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).’” This amendment provides for the ORR’s model clauses powers to be exercisable in relation to access contracts entered into by GBR only where the access contract is a “facility to facility” access contract. Amendment 180, in clause 69, page 40, line 6, leave out “if” and insert “where”. This amendment and amendment 181 provide for ORR approval to be required for amendment of “facility to facility” access contracts entered into by Great British Railways. Amendment 181, in clause 69, page 40, line 7, at end insert— “unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e)”. See the explanatory statement for amendment 180. Amendment 182, in clause 69, page 40, leave out lines 10 to 12 and insert— “(5A) Directions may not be given under this section in relation to an access agreement where the facility owner or installation owner is Great British Railways unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).” This amendment restricts the ORR’s power to give directions under section 22A of the Railways Act 1993 to the parties to an access agreement in line with the approach taken by the other amendments about access agreements. Amendment 183, in clause 69, page 40, line 12, at end insert— “(7) In section 22C (amendment: supplementary), after subsection (1) insert— ‘(1A) Directions may not be given under subsection (1) in relation to an access agreement where the facility owner or installation owner is Great British Railways unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).’”— (Keir Mather.) This amendment restricts the ORR’s power to give directions under section 22C of the Railways Act 1993 to the parties to an access agreement Great British Railways in line with the approach taken by the other amendments about access agreements.
5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source
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Amendments 203 to 205 seek to do two things: to remove the Secretary of State’s ability to make regulations relating to the appeals process; and to remove the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers as statutory consultees on the ORR’s appeals procedure. I support the ambition to ensure that the appeals framework works independently and commands confidence across the industry. However, the amendments are not necessary or appropriate to achieve that aim. The ORR will establish its own appeals process and engage with industry on its development. In fact, it has already published a discussion document seeking views from interested parties on its policy choices. That was published on 3 December and can be found on the ORR’s website. The Secretary of State’s regulation-making powers are intended to provide a safeguard to ensure that the appeals framework operates effectively, and are not expected to play a routine role. The powers may be used only for matters of process—for example, the setting of legally binding time limits for bringing appeals and, if appropriate, providing for the charging of fees. The powers cannot be used to interfere with the ORR’s independence in deciding and assessing individual appeals, or used to dictate the outcome of any appeal. Other procedural arrangements will be set by the ORR as it develops its appeals process. The power ensures that the framework can be set and adjusted, if required, to maintain effective operation over time while fully preserving the ORR’s independence in determining appeals. The Secretary of State will, of course, be required to consult the ORR, GBR, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and such other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making any regulations under the power. In a similar vein, when the ORR issues, revises or replaces its appeals practice and procedure, it is important that it must consult GBR, the Secretary of State, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and such other persons it considers appropriate. That ensures coherence across the railway network, particularly where services cross borders. Removing these provisions would reduce flexibility and resilience in the appeals framework without materially strengthening the independence of the ORR’s appeals role. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for West Dorset to withdraw the amendment, and not to move amendments 204 and 205.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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These direction powers, as drafted, replicate those in many other pieces of legislation, which are fit for purpose in making sure there is democratic accountability for the functioning of institutions, while not being overly onerous and overbearing. We see them with the Oil and Gas Authority, Great British Energy and Great British Nuclear. Only one direction has been given to the Oil and Gas Authority in the 10 years the legislation has existed. In government, the Opposition included the precise same direction power for GBR in their draft Rail Reform Bill, so they clearly believed it was necessary at the time. I therefore believe that it strikes an adequate balance.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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Well, there we are. Let me start by responding to what the shadow Minister described as a probing amendment. He asked me to set out a little more detail on how we envisage the use of conditions on discounts, and I want to reflect the intent that he described. We want to ensure that eligibility for concessionary schemes and discounts is kept up to date, is reflective and is rationalised where necessary. A good example could be changing terms and conditions to change the eligibility criteria for the disabled railcard to include non-visible disabilities, which we have committed to in the accessibility road map. The intent to make sure that discounts are reflective of the lived experience of those who rely on them very much lies behind the provisions. I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 61, which would seek to remove GBR’s ability to set conditions on the use of discounted fare schemes. As drafted, the legislation will enable GBR to develop and adjust discount arrangements, if necessary, to reflect changing circumstances and passenger needs. More generally, it is worth noting again that the future framework on fares introduces clear and enforceable mechanisms that can be used to hold GBR to account, to ensure it delivers value for passengers and sustainable outcomes for taxpayers. Under this model, the Secretary of State will set parameters and guardrails aligned to GBR’s financial settlements. We believe that strikes an effective balance between strategic oversight and operational independence.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Member for tabling the amendments, which would place a statutory duty on GBR and on Scottish and Welsh Ministers to ensure that discounted rail fare schemes are available for persons aged 26 to 30—I do not know whether I should declare an interest, as a holder of one of those railcards. The Government have stated that there are no plans to change the existing range of discount schemes, including the 26-30 railcard, but we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to list specific age ranges in the Bill in the way proposed. Listing specific age ranges would be unnecessarily inflexible. The Government are absolutely committed to retaining discount schemes for younger people; however, much of the current discount system is fragmented due to its origin in the franchising system, so GBR may want to rationalise the existing range of discount schemes currently targeting younger people to simplify duplicative and overlapping offers and age ranges between 16 and 30, for example, as part of introducing a modernised, more consistent offer for passengers. Given that Acts of Parliament are drafted to last a generation or more, placing specific age ranges in the Bill would likely remove those opportunities and potentially limit opportunities for young people. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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Clauses 28 and 29 enable the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to exempt certain railway passenger services from designation. Exempting a service means that the Secretary of State or devolved Ministers will not be responsible for that service. Instead, responsibility can be devolved to someone else—for example, a mayoral strategic authority—for them to run or contract out the service. That mechanism preserves the existing approach for devolving services to mayoral strategic authorities and their transport agencies, such as Transport for London or Merseytravel, and for light rail networks such as in Greater Manchester. The Secretary of State cannot exempt Scotland-only or Wales-only services, because those fall under the devolved responsibilities of Scottish and Welsh Ministers. Clause 29 allows devolved Governments to determine which services fall outside designation, offering flexibility in managing their respective networks. These clauses are necessary to ensure that there is still a way to devolve services, where that can bring benefits and is the best outcome for the network. Exemptions must be made by regulations, ensuring that the allocation of responsibility for passenger services is transparent. Clause 30 provides supplementary provisions for exemptions under clauses 28 and 29. It allows exemptions to apply to specific persons, classes of persons, services generally or parts of services. Exemptions may be conditional or time-limited, so that decisions to devolve services can be tailored to the specific circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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For the reasons I have just outlined. I have already confirmed that there are absolutely no plans to change the existing range of discount schemes, which include the veterans railcard and the armed forces railcard.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend makes an interesting point and is absolutely right to note that we want the concessionary schemes to be able to evolve to reflect the needs and lived experiences of those they are designed to help. I will expand on that point in more detail later. I will make some progress now. We are of the view that minimising the number of listed discounts on the face of the Bill will enable GBR to develop and adjust discount arrangements over time, reflecting passenger needs and other objectives. For example, in the future it might be desirable to rationalise the existing concessionary offer for current and former military personnel and their families to ensure consistent terms and conditions between the armed forces and veterans. GBR should be able to consider such options but, if we enshrine the schemes in primary legislation, it will become virtually impossible to amend and improve them. The Government remain fully committed to supporting the armed forces community through travel discounts and other means. For that reason, while I sincerely understand the motivation behind the amendments, the Government do not believe they are necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw them. New clause 51 requires GBR to provide free travel “to and from events that commemorate Remembrance Sunday.” As I have said, the Government remain committed to all those who serve, and that includes supporting their attendance at events commemorating Remembrance Sunday. Last year, as in previous years, the Government worked closely with the rail industry to ensure that serving members of the armed forces and veterans were eligible for free travel to and from services of remembrance across the country. Likewise, Poppy Day volunteers and collectors—and their children—travelling to the London Poppy Day events were given complimentary travel to support their fundraising efforts on behalf of the Royal British Legion.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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Good morning, Mrs Barker, and to everybody—another day in Committee. I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for these amendments, which seek to ensure that the designation of passenger services does not negatively impact rail freight or undermine GBR in network capacity planning activity. I hope it is helpful if I clarify that clauses 25 to 27, which set out designation powers of the Secretary of State and devolved Ministers for passenger services, only describe a very high-level mechanism for assigning responsibility for passenger services. For example, the designation helps make clear who is responsible for the service. Further clarity is provided by exemption from designation to show where services have been devolved to other authorities, such as to mayoral strategic authorities or Transport for London. Designation is not a detailed service specification, nor does it determine network access or capacity allocation. Last week, we published a draft of the Secretary of State’s designation letter to help clarify that, and copies are available in the room today. Ministers’ designation powers do not override or conflict with GBR’s role in determining network access. The access decision process requires GBR to balance passenger and freight needs. The safeguards in the Bill, including the statutory duty to promote rail freight or the ORR’s oversight and appeals body to protect fare freight access are also unaffected by designation. The amendment is therefore impractical and unnecessary and would not achieve its intended purpose in practice. Protecting rail freight, which I fully endorse, is already enshrined within the Bill. For absolute clarity, I must emphasise that the access clauses in the Bill set out the stages through which network access is determined. It is not determined or affected by designation. The access clauses include producing the infrastructure capacity plan, which will set out GBR’s view of how best to use GBR’s infrastructure to accommodate freight, open access and publicly funded passenger services, as well as maintenance and improvement of the network. GBR will take into account its infrastructure capacity plan when allocating capacity. In comparison, designation is simply the method of determining whether a service should be devolved to, for example, a local authority, or maintained by the Secretary of State and run by GBR. I therefore request that the hon. Member withdraw the amendment. Clause 25 requires the Secretary of State to designate railway passenger services for which GBR should be responsible. Designation is the mechanism by which responsibility for who should run passenger rail services is determined. Clauses 26 and 27 replicate this, but for Scottish and Welsh Ministers respectively. The Secretary of State, Scottish and Welsh Ministers each have designation powers to set out services which GBR or others—including Transport Scotland or Transport for Wales—may run for them. Designation powers will also assist in providing clarity about which Minister has responsibility to provide, or contract for, cross-border services. Ministers can also exempt services from these designations, which is the way that services can be devolved to mayoral strategic authorities. That was the mechanism used to allow Transport for London to run its devolved service. As I have mentioned, the new Secretary of State designation is expected to be succinct and will not include route level or timetable detail. Designation is therefore entirely separate from access or timetabling decisions.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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Yes, I am very eager to agree with my hon. Friend. This is a serious point. In my constituency, I see the difficulty that veterans have in attending Selby Abbey to mark the enormous contribution that people in our armed services have made across many conflicts. I would have thought that this is personal to every single member of this Committee, which is why I am pleased to agree with my hon. Friend.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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As I have just mentioned, we want to carry over those schemes to provide consistency for those groups. We are carrying over the role of the discretionary schemes as set out in legislation. We think that consistency is important but, for reasons that I will come to later, we also believe it is important that GBR is able to move in an agile way and think about evolving needs when it comes to concessionary travel. It is important, in terms of legislative carry-over, to ensure that that remains in place.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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We may have to hash this out in our own time. There is a principle around the replication of functions between organisations. The principle of GBR is that once those decision-making powers are taken out of the Department for Transport—this is the single-mind approach to access decisions, charging and best use of the railway—there is not replication and burdensome inefficiencies in how those functions are designated and actualised by the different organisations. I believe that the difference lies in that point. To return to my previous remarks, and on the basis of what I have explained, I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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The right hon. Member is far too eager. I shall turn to that in due course. Amendment 148 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing directions to GBR relating to fares, and amendment 45 would do the same for directions and guidance. I remind hon. Members that, as I said when we debated the directions and guidance clauses earlier in the Bill, the strategic parameters and guardrails that the Secretary of State will set for GBR on fares may not ultimately be delivered through directions and guidance by default. Clause 33 already allows for provisions on fares parameters and guardrails to be included in public service contracts awarded to GBR for operating passenger services. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the Secretary of State retains the powers to direct and give guidance to GBR on fares. It is necessary that the Government and GBR alike can respond to exceptional circumstances, which may necessitate a swift reappraisal of the strategic approach to fares. That is precisely what the Secretary of State’s directions-making power allows for, supplemented by the ability to issue guidance, to ensure a clear and speedy response if there is a crisis or unexpected change in context. Amendments 148 and 45 would remove those options for the Secretary of State and, in fact, for Scottish Ministers where GBR is operating services that they designate. The Government strongly believe that that is not in the interests of passengers or taxpayers. I agree with Opposition Members that we do not want Ministers interfering with day-to-day fares policy. GBR will have the freedom to define its fares policy within the parameters and guardrails set out, simplifying fares, removing duplication and, in turn, improving value for money. It will therefore be set up to succeed from the outset. Contrary to what Opposition Members believe, the powers in clause 33 do not undermine that.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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We have repeatedly had this allusion drawn between NHS England and the NHS on the one hand and the Department for Transport and GBR on the other. I do not believe that these examples are analogous. NHS England replicated functions in a way that did not serve the interests of patients or taxpayers who paid into the health service. The entire principle here is to take decision-making power from DFT, which under this broken system remains the only body truly accountable for what happens on the railway, and to give it to GBR, in a way that empowers it to ensure that services run in the public interest and represent value for money. I cannot envisage that Members across the House would not think it reasonable, within very broad parameters, to retain some ability to have political accountability in the fare-setting process in exceptional circumstances, such as during the pandemic. That is wholly sensible in making sure the railway continues to offer value for money for both passengers and taxpayers, who are ultimately one and the same.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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I can start by confirming that existing exemptions from designation will be retained. I hope that provides an assurance to the shadow Minister. The powers could be used to allow devolved Administrations to determine which services fall outside of designations, and therefore give them flexibility in meeting the needs of passengers relying on services that otherwise could fall through the cracks. I hope that, having provided the shadow Minister with that assurance, he can support these clauses. Question put and agreed to. Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 29 and 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 31 Provision of railway passenger services
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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On the role of the Secretary of State in setting parameters for fares, we have had a lot of debate in the Committee about the need to ensure efficiency on behalf of taxpayers, who are also passengers on the railway. It is the Secretary of State who ultimately has the democratic responsibility to do so; therefore, it is right that the power exists to set broad parameters as they relate to fares. However, that process must be undertaken transparently. Parameters will be set through guidance and public service contracts, which will be published and open to scrutiny. The Bill says that the Secretary of State can direct on fares, but not that she will do so regularly. That is important to the point about overreach, and the exceptional circumstances in which direction might be a wise provision to have in the legislation. I will turn to that later.
3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source
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I sincerely thank the hon. Members for Broadland and Fakenham and for Didcot and Wantage for the amendments, which are about discounted travel for members of the UK armed forces, veterans, their families and the police. On amendments 46 to 55, first and most importantly, the Government fully recognise the enormous contributions made by members of the UK armed forces, UK veterans and their families. I am pleased to confirm that there are absolutely no plans to change the existing range of discount schemes, including the veterans railcard and the armed forces railcard, which also covers family members of serving personnel. Those are valuable discounts for people who have sacrificed in the public interest, and the Government are rightly committed to them. In our view, however, it is not necessary to reflect that commitment on the face of the Bill,. The Bill gives continued statutory protection to the discount schemes that are already protected by the Railways Act 1993 to ensure consistency for groups for whom cost has historically been a particular barrier to travel, to ensure that our railway continues to be inclusive and to be consistent with previous Acts. That does not mean that other discount schemes are not at the forefront of our mind and will not continue.

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