Keir Mather MP: speeches

Speeches

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  It is a privilege to respond to this important debate on the potential merits of step-free upgrades at Leagrave railway station. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Sarah Owen) on securing it, and I thank her for her tireless advocacy on behalf of her constituents on this very important matter. I know well how deeply she cares about her community and how tirelessly she campaigns for improved public transport and safer, more accessible stations. For many residents, Leagrave station is not simply a station. It is a gateway to work, education, healthcare and family life. As my hon. Friend clearly set out, for too many users, especially those with mobility challenges, parents with buggies, older passengers, or anyone travelling with heavy luggage, this gateway does not offer the accessibility that they expect. She is also right to say that the travelling experience must be safe, comfortable and inclusive for all. That sits at the heart of this Government’s commitment to a more accessible and passenger-focused rail network. Many stations across Britain were constructed long before modern equality and accessibility standards existed. While around 56% of stations are now step-free and around two thirds of journeys take place between such stations, we recognise that this is just not enough. I may be one of the younger Members of Parliament, but I doubt that even I will see the full realisation if we carry on at the rate that was expressed by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham (Jerome Mayhew). There is a lot more hard work to do, and that is why we remain committed to improving accessibility through programmes such as Access for All, through our recently published rail accessibility road map, and through long-term reform of the railways as we move towards the establishment of Great British Railways. In May 2024, the previous Government published a list of 50 stations selected for initial feasibility work as part of the Access for All programme. As my hon. Friend will know, that included a nomination for Leagrave station. However, those feasibility studies were announced without clarity on how projects would ultimately be funded and significantly raised stakeholder expectations in a way that was not fair. This Government have taken a more rigorous and disciplined approach, ensuring that only affordable and deliverable commitments are taken forward. Our approach seeks to ensure that the maximum number of Access for All schemes can be delivered, and the risk of schemes overrunning on cost or encountering unforeseen engineering challenges is greatly reduced. With that wider national picture in mind, I would like to speak directly about Leagrave station. I regret that it does not currently offer full step-free access to all platforms. For wheelchair users, people with mobility needs, parents with pushchairs and those travelling with luggage, this remains a real challenge and a deeply frustrating reality. My hon. Friend was absolutely right to point to the human experience of dealing with a lack of accessibility. It is something we experienced at Selby station when our lifts were out of order and only had a barrow crossing. If there was no member of staff available to take people across it, they would have to get the train to Leeds to then come back towards Hull. It is not a dignified way to travel, and it does need to change. We have been clear, though, that the commitments we make must be affordable and represent value for money for passengers and taxpayers. As my hon. Friend knows, we have unfortunately decided that accessibility upgrades at Leagrave station will not progress at this stage. In reaching that decision, we assessed nominations against a clear set of criteria, including the number of passengers who would benefit, the need for a good geographical spread across Wales, Scotland and different parts of England, the extent to which schemes could build on existing technical developments, and the availability of third-party funding. Stations that performed most strongly against those criteria are the ones that are now progressing to delivery or design. As we know, Leagrave station meets some of the criteria, including being a busy station and contributing to geographical balance. Indeed, my hon. Friend correctly highlights that Leagrave station sees over 1 million users a year, and other stations in better connected areas and with fewer passengers were chosen to progress; however, footfall was only one of the criteria used in assessing Access for All nominations. In the case of Leagrave, there was little prior technical development work in place. My hon. Friend is also right that no third-party funding contribution was identified. I would like to make it clear to the House that the absence of that third-party funding was a key factor in the decision not to take the scheme forward at this time. Indeed, this was the case in relation to 22 other projects nationally for which no third-party funding contributions were identified, none of which, unfortunately, are progressing at this point. As we look ahead, local third-party funding contributions will remain an important consideration in future Access for All funding rounds. That reflects both the limited public funding available to the Access for All programme and the substantial economic, social and accessibility benefits that these schemes deliver beyond the rail network itself.

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  However, we have heard powerfully from my hon. Friend about how dealing with Luton traffic is a key barrier to people accessing those accessibility benefits. I will give way to her to add some further context.

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  Absolutely. The Government want to realise the benefits of the aviation sector—its economic potential, but also, as my hon. Friend pointed to so powerfully as it pertains to rail, the human benefit of being able to be connected to loved ones and to access new places. The two things need to work in tandem. I would be glad to engage in those conversations further. Local partners are also encouraged to develop a local funding package, drawing on opportunities such as section 106 developer contributions and city region sustainable transport settlements. These can be used to match-fund Access for All projects and are another way to bring forward accessibility projects. Further detail on this matter is set out in the written ministerial statement published on 15 January 2026. I recognise that this decision will be disappointing to my hon. Friend and her constituents; however, funding for future rounds of Access for All may be available as part of the next spending review. That could provide an opportunity to fund accessibility upgrades at Leagrave station. Positive accessibility work is already under way in the neighbouring constituency of Luton South and South Bedfordshire. At Luton station, an Access for All project is currently under construction, which will provide step-free access across the station and make a tangible difference for passengers. Nearby Luton Airport Parkway also provides full step-free access to all platforms, less than a 20-minute drive from Leagrave station.

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is right to enlighten me as to the reality of motoring your way through Luton to access certain areas. She sets me a formidable challenge, which I dare not take on, given her advice. Likewise, I congratulate and respect the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins) on securing those improvements. My hon. Friend the Member for Luton North is right to point to the fact that the people in her constituency who need to benefit from that accessibility at their doorstep need those improvements to come faster and further. That is why, through Great British Railways and the work we are progressing through the Railways Bill, as well as through the next spending review and other ongoing work, we hope to ensure that those accessibility improvements are available to people across the country. I can understand her impatience and I thank her for it, because it keeps our feet held to the fire.

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  I appreciate and respect the sentiment that lies behind the new clause that the hon. Member has tabled to the Railways Bill. I would say to him that, through clause 18 of the Bill, we give Great British Railways a specific legal duty to promote the interests of passengers, particularly passengers with disabilities. We also have a tough new passenger watchdog to enforce consumer standards and to put accessibility at the heart of the railways. This intersects with the long-term rail strategy. That should provide him with the assurance he needs that accessibility is at the heart of the future railway under GBR. My hon. Friend the Member for Luton North also shared her concerns about the current state of the footbridge at Leagrave station. Let me reassure her that Network Rail carefully monitors the condition of its assets and that whenever the rail industry installs, replaces or renews station infrastructure, the work must comply with current accessibility standards. I would be happy to talk with her further if she feels that those standards are not being met. My hon. Friend also noted that the plan for Luton airport expansion was likely to increase overall demand on local transport networks, including rail. That point was very well made. At this stage we have limited evidence to confirm the scale or certainty of the impact, but, as I have mentioned, a future round of Access for All might be funded as part of the next spending review, and this could provide an opportunity to fully or partly fund accessibility upgrades at Leagrave station. Let me close by again congratulating my hon. Friend on securing this debate and thanking her for her tireless representation of her constituents’ needs. I am aware that the Rail Minister will meet her on 16 March to explain the decisions made in relation to accessibility at Leagrave, and I look forward to continuing to work with her, with Govia Thameslink Railway and with Network Rail to ensure that Leagrave station is well placed to serve its community now and into the future. Question put and agreed to .

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member pre-empts me, as I will turn to how this particular issue to do with the rail service intersects with the needs of the aviation sector. He is of course right to point to the fact that surface access must play a really important role in the considerations around how we grow our aviation sector in a way that is sustainable but meets the accessibility requirements of which he and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North spoke so powerfully. It is reasonable that organisations and developments that benefit directly from improved step-free access—such as local authorities, major employers, developers and transport hubs, including Luton airport—should play a role in contributing to their delivery. Even partial local funding would significantly strengthen a future case for accessibility upgrades at Leagrave station and demonstrate shared local commitment to the scheme.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will briefly turn back to the debate on the previous clauses; because the Opposition spokesperson asked me to provide an example of the motion of consent in general as it relates to timetabling and I was remiss in my duty in not doing so. To give more context, the network code currently sets out the circumstances where train service timings need to be adjusted by a few minutes without requiring specific consent. GBR will follow a very similar process and that is a normal process that industry would expect us to follow. I now turn to the amendments at hand, all of which seek to make changes to GBR’s charging scheme. I confirm to the hon. Member for South West Devon that the charging regime broadly replicates the one that is in place today. That is intentional, so that all of the charges and discounts referenced will be familiar to industry to achieve a smooth transition to the new framework. Furthermore, given that GBR will be bound by public law duties, which require fairness, reasonableness and non-discrimination in actions and decision making, there is no reason to think that GBR will behave unreasonably. Rather, when making or amending its charging scheme, GBR will be required to balance the various duties set out in clause 18, which include promoting the interests of passengers, promoting the use of the network for carrying freight and enabling operators to plan the future of their businesses. GBR will also be required to consult with industry through the development of its charging scheme, and will be held to account via a clear route to appeal to the ORR on the scheme’s design and application. Given that existing competition law and applicable subsidy rules will automatically apply to GBR, GBR will not be able to treat other operators unfairly or start levying excessive charges that would undermine their ability to operate successful, profit-driven services. That will be further supported by the ORR’s continued role as competition regulator for the railway. I hope that gives hon. Members some assurance to begin with. I now turn to amendment 242, which proposes to remove the provision at clause 64(1)(b) that enables GBR to charge operators for services that do not run as planned. In today’s system, that mechanism is called a reservation charge, and the Bill replicates that for GBR. Importantly, the Bill does not mandate that a reservation charge must be issued in all instances where services do not run. Instead, GBR will have discretion regarding how and when to use it. That is particularly important for taking into consideration different industry operating models, especially freight, which is market driven and therefore has to live with less certainty over the services that it needs to run to serve its customers. A routine and technical example of when a reservation charge is used today, and likely to be replicated in the future, is one affecting passenger services, not freight. Where a passenger service is allocated to a path that is expected to stop at eight stations but—for reasons of its own making and not GBR’s—it terminates short of its final destination and stops at only seven, it could still be charged as planned for the full service. In addition, with finite capacity on the network it is important that, when passenger operators are granted access, they provide those services they said they were going to run and are disincentivised to simply hold on to capacity. To use a different example, if an operator consistently failed to run a service in its entirety, it would disadvantage passengers seeking to use that train and other operators that might wish to operate a passenger or freight service on an unused path. It could therefore be charged in full. As I have outlined, the purpose of the measure is to encourage operators to use the capacity that they have been allocated. Therefore, the ability to levy a reservation charge is an extremely useful tool to drive the right behaviours on the network. It ensures that best use is made of capacity and that operators remain accountable for providing the services in the timetable that they agreed to deliver.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is my pleasure to speak to this long-awaited group of amendment to what are arguably some of the most critical aspects of the legislation. Clause 60 will require GBR to set out its proposal for the best use of its infrastructure, while clause 63 will require GBR to retain sufficient capacity to run its own passenger services and carry out engineering work. First, I will explain how the Government have reached that conclusion. We are here because the current system for allocating capacity is clearly not working; it is designed so that each part of the railway acts and takes decisions in isolation. There was a four-year delay to the implementation of the new east coast main line timetable that was finally achieved in December 2025. Meanwhile, there is no single body with a clear vision for the best use of the network, and therefore no clear statement of the capacity that can be made available for different users of the railway. As a result, open access operators have expended considerable effort and resources in developing proposals for access to the network, many of which have ultimately been rejected by the ORR. Both freight and open access operators would benefit from a single body empowered to provide that clarity about future opportunities for them to grow their presence on the railway. The only possible answer to fixing that is GBR, which can take decisions strategically, making the very best use of the limited capacity that we have. Only GBR can review the network holistically with a view to creating more space, which will benefit open access operators where they can show that their new services constitute best use of the network. That will benefit every hon. Member’s constituents, because there will be more opportunity for connectivity and more co-ordination to avoid disruption and delays. In our new system, the process of allocating capacity starts with clause 60. The infrastructure capacity plan will set out GBR’s view of the best use of the network, showing how capacity can best be allocated between GBR’s own services, freight services and open access services. In creating that plan, GBR must have regard to the need to accommodate all types of services. The clause is one of the most crucial in the Bill, because it is where GBR—having consulted carefully with existing and prospective operators and other interested parties, and taken account of its statutory duties—will set out its view of the best use of the network. Once established, the plan will provide much-needed certainty for operators contemplating investment in new services. I will be crystal clear for the benefit of the Committee: the capacity duty mentioned in clause 63 does not apply to the creation of the infrastructure capacity plan. Under clause 60, GBR will make its best-use assessment on the basis of the duties in clause 18 and other general duties in the Bill only. At this stage, it will not have any basis to refer to the duty as described in clause 63. It will take the decision fairly and transparently, in line with its duties, with the need to allocate paths for freight, open access and itself in mind. There is absolutely no intention for other operators to be unfairly pushed out or disadvantaged by GBR. We want the best service for passengers, freight users and the public on every part of the route, to enable the best possible connectivity, quality of service and overall economic benefit. That is the goal, regardless of who provides those services. Were GBR to mistakenly apply the capacity duty at the capacity plan stage as part of its determination of best use, that would be grounds for appeal to the ORR.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 61, page 34, line 38, at end insert— “(4A) Agreement under subsection (4) may be general or specific, and the ways in which it may be given include it being given— (a) in accordance with the terms set out as mentioned in section 59(3); (b) by means of, or in accordance with, provision contained in an agreement or other document to which Great British Railways and the operator are parties.” This amendment ensures that changes to the working timetable can be agreed in advance and in general terms, and sets out various of the ways in which agreement can be given.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is of course right to be wary about the involvement of open access in the railway, because although such provision forms a comparatively small proportion of railway journeys, we have discussed at length how certain access operator services provide great inter-city connections. There is of course a role for open access in the system being created by the Bill. With GBR having regard to its duties when creating its access and use policy, it will have to factor in how users of the railway, both current and future, are able to make best use of services, whether they are provided by GBR or anybody else. Being bound by competition law, and the transparency and fairness inherent in it, will ensure that those that already provide services on the railway, and those that seek to provide services in the future, will have the opportunity to do so. I understand the hon. Member’s point about making sure that something is prescriptively listed in the Bill so that it is given due regard, but I would say that, whether through existing open access entitlements or the two rail freight targets that exist, there are sufficient assurances that there is scope for the inclusion of those services in the future of the railway, and that the access and use policy has to reflect that. I will turn to that in more detail soon. All of the work on the access and use policy so far has happened without the need for a long and ever-expanding list of operators in the legislation, which would be the likely result of the amendment. If we name open access operators, we should presumably also list others, such as freight operators and devolved operators. Clause 66 currently requires that GBR must consult “such other persons as it considers appropriate”, and that formulation is deliberate; it ensures that consultation can be targeted, relevant and proportionate. Network Rail’s actions so far clearly demonstrate that open access operators are considered to be other appropriate persons in the reading of the clause, so both the reality and the future can be accounted for. I reassure the hon. Member that there is no world in which GBR will create an access and use policy without consulting the relevant industry bodies that are affected. The amendment would add complexity, without delivering additional practical benefit. Although I thank the hon. Member for the amendments, for those reasons, I urge that she does not press them to a vote. Clause 59 requires Great British Railways to publish an access and use policy. That key document will provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators, such as freight and open access, on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with. For example, the policy will set out how operators should apply to access and use GBR tracks and infrastructure. It must set out the criteria Great British Railways intends to apply, in accordance with its statutory duties, when making access decisions, as well as its procedures for resolving competing demands and disputes. That will include, for instance, details on the economic and performance assessments GBR will undertake to determine best use. The policy must also include an explanation of how GBR will carry out maintenance and improvements to GBR infrastructure, and other necessary provisions, to ensure that the network works effectively. That exists in today’s system, within the industry network code, and we would expect GBR to draw on that when developing its policy on these key points. The access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on initial content has already been published, and can be reviewed by the Committee or anyone else who wishes to input into its development. We hope that the extensive engagement being undertaken will ensure that a robust and effective document is produced that industry will be content with. However, as a backstop, any person aggrieved by a provision in this policy may appeal to the ORR. Clause 66 will make it a legislative requirement that GBR must consult the ORR, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and such other persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its access and use policy, which is dealt with in clause 59. That is in addition to GBR being a public body bound by public law principles. GBR must behave in a fair and transparent way, and therefore must consult interested parties, including rail freight and open access. The clause also ensures that GBR consults such persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its infrastructure capacity plan, before issuing a working timetable and before making, revising or replacing a charging or performance scheme. Those issues are dealt with in clauses 60, 61 and 62. Clause 66 is essential to provide reassurance to industry and our Scottish and Welsh counterparts that key parts of the new framework—GBR’s policies and processes—will not be designed in isolation, but will be underpinned by a transparent and consultative process. The clause provides the essential framework for collaborative and strategic planning by GBR across the rail network. I therefore commend clauses 59 and 66 to the Committee.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 174 will provide greater clarity for all parties that the agreement GBR is obliged to have under clause 61(4) can be made in advance in a contract or other document between GBR and the operator in line with the terms set out in GBR’s access and use policy under clause 59(3). The amendment broadly replicates the current industry practice of making changes to the working timetable through contractual arrangements, so it is familiar to industry and was always the intended approach. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment, tabled by the Government in my name. I thank the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) for tabling new clause 52, which would require the Secretary of State to publicly consult on and publish a report that recommends an appropriate train frequency that would meet local need and which GBR would then be obliged to deliver. Although this Government support the principle of designing a train service that meets passengers’ needs and local needs, the new clause would embed that responsibility in Government, and not with GBR. That would serve only to continue Government’s micro-management of the railways, under-mining GBR’s intended role as an empowered, directing mind that is enabled to take decisions on the best use of the network. To take access decisions and plan its passenger services —which GBR will do in accordance with its duties, which are clearly defined in the Bill—GBR, and not the Department, must be able to design its own passenger train services. GBR will also be legally required to consult devolved Governments and mayoral strategic authorities before making certain decisions, such as service frequency decisions that will significant affect their local areas. The Government and GBR will also have to consult the new passenger watchdog when developing their policies, strategies and priorities for the railway, including when GBR is developing its business plan and passenger offer. The Secretary of State will set the long-term strategic objectives of the railway through the long-term rail strategy, which GBR will need to consider when taking decisions about service frequencies. The Secretary of State will also have to approve GBR’s integrated business plan, which will cover both track and train activity. That framework represents the right balance between an empowered directing mind that can independently weigh up its duties in a considered and rational way when delivering its statutory functions, including developing the timetable, with appropriate consultation requirements and proportionate Government oversight. We do not want to continue the current system, under which stifling Government interference hampers the efficient running of the railways. I therefore urge members of the Committee not to move new clause 52. Clause 61 requires GBR to issue a timetable that defines “all planned train movements which will take place on GBR infrastructure during the period for which it is in force”. Enabling GBR to establish a working timetable is fundamental to running trains safely and reliably at their published times. The current system cannot deliver significant timetable changes, even where there is a strong public interest case for doing so with significant taxpayer investment. That is because the process for revising the timetable is dependent on different organisations taking, at different points, different decisions that affect the timetable’s production. That creates complexity and challenges that can result in significant delays to the implementation of a new timetable being implemented and passengers and taxpayers losing out. Despite the significant efforts made by Network Rail and the ORR, the new east coast main line timetable was delayed for over four years, which resulted in delayed benefits to passengers. Ultimately, until the current Rail Minister was appointed no one was willing to make a final timetabling decision. That cannot happen again: GBR must be empowered to take decisions or passengers and taxpayers will not see improvements. Under clause 61, as the directing mind GBR will be responsible for taking decisions on timetabling in a process overseen by the ORR. A person whose application to be included in the timetable is rejected or who disagrees with the terms and conditions of their inclusion may appeal to the ORR. The clause ensures that GBR will deliver an achievable, reliable timetable that the network is able to deliver. Better co-ordination of the timetable and engineering works will reduce delays, improve reliability and reduce cost. GBR’s holistic review of the whole network can also improve connectivity for passengers. Without the clause, the current unacceptable system of timetable delays, disagreements and ministerial intervention will continue, which serves no one. Clause 62 sets out the steps that GBR must follow before issuing a working timetable, as previously described in clause 61. It is a critical provision as a timetable is the backbone of a safe and efficient railway operation. Without a clear and structured timetable, trains cannot run reliably at their published times. GBR must invite applications for inclusion in the timetable from operators other than GBR’s own passenger services. The invitation must specify the period within which applications must be made and the information that must accompany an application. GBR must prepare and send a draft of the working timetable to those applicants. A person who has had an application rejected by GBR may appeal that decision to the ORR. The clause ensures that the process for developing the timetable is fair and transparent. I commend clauses 61 and 62 to the Committee.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Good morning, Mr Western. It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairship. I thank the hon. Member for South West Devon for these amendments, which all seek to make changes to GBR’s access and use policy. First, I will provide a brief explanation of what the access and use policy sets out to do. It will set out a clear and consistent process for any operator seeking to run services on GBR’s network. It will therefore provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators—such as freight and open access—on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with when seeking access to GBR’s infrastructure. It will be very similar in concept to the way the ORR publishes access processes and policies today. It will therefore follow a well-known path by which industry can engage with the access process, and like today, this engagement will be underpinned by legislation. I can reassure hon. Members that the access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on the initial contents of the policy has already been published. It can be reviewed by hon. Members of this Committee and anyone else who wishes to contribute to its development. I will turn to amendment 79, which seeks to add an appeals route to the working timetable after the dispute resolution process. I am delighted to start in a place of agreement with the hon. Member for South West Devon because the addition to clause 59 is, in fact, already in the Bill. The Bill provides, first, a mechanism for resolving disputes relating to the working timetable and, secondly, an appeals route to the ORR. GBR will be required to set a dispute resolution procedure within its access and use policy for applications to be included in the timetable. That will allow parties to resolve disagreements collaboratively before escalation to the ORR, as detailed in clause 61(5). To be clear, the Bill already provides a subsequent route of appeal to the ORR for operators who have disputes over the working timetable. The amendment is therefore duplicative of that existing appeals route, and risks creating additional bureaucracy and confusion within the process. It would not improve the dispute resolution framework and, in our view, is redundant, but I am pleased that we have found at least one thing in these clauses on which the official Opposition and the Government can agree. Amendment 217 would add requirements that GBR should use the access and use policy to promote high-quality service and competition. I cannot agree with this amendment. GBR’s duties under clause 18 cover the range of points that the hon. Member for South West Devon has suggested GBR must consider for its access and use policy. For example, I agree that GBR must promote a high-quality service, and this is already reflected in GBR’s duty to ‘‘promote high standards” of performance. We must remember that the clause 18 duties are the key decision-making criteria that GBR must apply at every stage—including when making its access and use policy—and so the requirement to drive towards a quality service is already embedded. On competition, however, I must clarify that the Government support competition on the railways where it can add real value to passengers and farepayers. As the directing mind, GBR will be required to determine the best use of the network for all operators under a new and simpler legislative framework that ensures passengers and taxpayers are at the heart of decisions that are taken on the railways. Where competition can support GBR in fulfilling its statutory duties—for example, to grow the economy and to provide improved choice and benefits to passengers —without undermining the vast investment made by taxpayers, we are supportive of the benefits of competition, and GBR must take those benefits into account. However, what the Government will not support is competition for competition’s sake. It is ideological and does not help us achieve the goal of making the railway work better. The hon. Member for South West Devon seems to be equating promoting competition with fairness, but they are not one and the same. GBR must be fair to all third-party operators at all times. To ensure fairness for all parties, GBR will be bound by the Competition Act 1998, under which rules it cannot discriminate or abuse its dominant market position, and the ORR will continue to enforce this as the competition regulator. GBR does not need to actively promote competition to achieve that aim. Amendment 77 would require GBR’s access and use policy to be laid before Parliament for three months before it can be implemented. GBR would be unable to implement any part of the access and use policy for a period of three months after it had been laid in Parliament. This would only result in delays for operators seeking to access the GBR network—a concept that is unlikely to be considered favourably by either open access or the freight industry. The hon. Member for South West Devon should note that the access and use policy is a technical railway document. The purpose of this document is to provide a fair and transparent process for operators to apply for access. It sets out, for instance, the timings for applications, so that operators can prepare for the application window in advance. It also sets out what information applicants will need to supply and how applications will be assessed by GBR in accordance with its statutory duties. It is therefore right for GBR to develop it in consultation with industry and other railway bodies such as the ORR. This document should rightly be industry and expert-led. To reassure hon. Members about the content of the access and use policy, Network Rail has published a discussion document that sets out emerging thinking on a future access and use policy, with input from industry stakeholders. If Members of Parliament are keen to scrutinise the document, they are welcome to do so now, and I encourage them to engage with Network Rail’s external engagement process, or the usual processes in Parliament. The industry has responded positively to the transparent and collaborative approach that has been taken in the development of the access and use policy. The freight sector has commented on how the discussion document acknowledges the key role of private investment. Network Rail’s engagement with industry will continue as the policy is developed, and there will be a further full consultation on the access and use policy with the ORR as a statutory consultee, which Members of Parliament are again welcome to contribute to.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I take fully on board the hon. Member’s point that we need to ensure services are not squeezed out. The process I am outlining is specifically to ensure that that does not happen. Where GBR has regard to its duties under clause 60 when deciding best use, it has to have regard to the freight target and the need to grow freight, but also the need to accommodate a range of services on the railway. That best use policy is locked in. It is under clause 63 that the capacity duty comes into effect, and GBR can make practical operational decisions about how to effectively actualise those proportions being allocated on the railway. GBR will have to have regard to open access and freight under its duties in clause 60 when making the macro decision about what constitutes best use, which at the end of the day is not a binary yes or no question. The capacity duty in clause 63 merely ensures that it can provide the services it has been allocated. I will come to that in a bit more detail and set it out further. The hon. Member is welcome to intervene again if he feels my subsequent detail is insufficient. On the capacity duty more broadly, the Government have been nothing but consistent. Put simply, the services that offer the genuine best value proposition for passengers, freight customers and the taxpayer, consistent with GBR’s duties, should be allocated capacity. Clause 63, meanwhile, creates a legal duty for Great British Railways to ensure there is enough space in the timetable to run the services funded by the Government and taxpayers. To reiterate, clause 63 is a requirement for space in the timetable. It is not a requirement for space in the capacity plan. It does not apply to the capacity plan and it therefore does not and cannot undermine the best use decisions taken at the capacity planning stage. That is because the Government are paying for certain GBR services and must not waste public funds. The clause 63 duty is about managing taxpayers’ money after best use has been determined. It is not about keeping anyone out. Amendment 78 would require GBR to consult open access and freight operators in preparing the infrastructure capacity plan. Amendment 80 would require GBR to have regard to its key performance indicators when preparing the plan, and amendment 81 would amend clause 63 to require GBR to retain capacity for open access and freight operators. Amendments 253 and 229 would both give freight operators more weight in the capacity process. Adding a further consultation requirement to clause 60 is unnecessary as there is already a separate requirement in clause 66 for GBR to consult affected operators when developing or amending the capacity plan. Were GBR to publish or amend a capacity plan at any point without consultation, that would constitute a breach of its duties under the Bill and present strong grounds for appeal to the ORR. Amendment 78 is therefore duplicative of the provisions already in the Bill. As for amendments 80, 81, 253 and 229, the intended effect of clause 63 is to create a statutory duty for GBR to ensure that there is enough space in the timetable to run its own passenger services, which are funded directly by taxpayers. That is because taxpayers spend many billions of pounds subsidising the railway. Any responsible Government would be obligated to protect that investment and ensure that taxpayers get full value from it. The clause is therefore needed to ensure that where GBR considers its services constitute the best use of the network, and where it then allocates capacity to itself, it will actually run the trains that it is proposing to run and which it will be funded for. I do not believe anyone on this Committee would be delighted to find that, following GBR being paid several billion pounds to run services, it was unable to do so. Clause 63 is therefore an essential legal safeguard to prevent that from happening. The interests of freight and open access operators are protected by GBR’s general duties under clause 18, and freight operators are further protected by the duty on GBR to have regard to the rail freight target set by the Secretary of State under clause 17. Those duties will apply when GBR establishes best use at the capacity planning stage for all operators, including freight. The existence of not just one but two statutory duties is a clear signal of this Government’s view that freight must be front and centre of GBR’s decision making. This will give freight much greater prominence in capacity planning and allocation decisions than the current system, in which capacity is too often allocated on a first come, first served basis without reference to any coherent view of the best overall use of available capacity. The clause 63 duty exists only to protect the Secretary of State’s investment in the railway; it is not intended to influence GBR’s capacity planning or to keep anyone out of the network. The amendments are therefore not compatible with the intended purpose of the clause. Amendment 80 draws a link to the concept of key performance indicators. As I have set out in previous debates, the Government do not accept the need to make statutory provision about KPIs and so cannot support the proposed reference. As I have consistently said throughout these debates, KPIs should be in GBR’s business plan and not in legislation. Amendment 211 would require GBR to publish a statement on any decision not to provide access on the basis of capacity. As a public body, GBR is bound by public law principles to behave in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. That means that GBR must set out its decisions transparently, including when granting access, with robust evidence that shows how it has acted in accordance with its duties, access and use policy and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. If GBR failed to do that, it would be grounds for appeal to the ORR. The amendment is unnecessary because GBR is already required to transparently account for its access decisions, whatever the reason for them. Finally, new clause 56 would require GBR to report on the merits of a centralised train planning and auctioning scheme, with high-yielding services being operated by private sector operators rather than GBR. This Government were elected with a clear mandate to return franchised passenger services to public ownership. Public ownership, with responsibility for passenger services and infrastructure brought together in a single organisation, is the only way to make the railway run better. It enables everybody to focus on a single set of objectives centred around the needs of railway users and the interests of the taxpayers who fund it, rather than shareholders and private profit. Public ownership of passenger services will save the taxpayer up to £150 million a year in fees to private operators alone. Therefore, GBR, rather than private operators, must be responsible for operating the services that taxpayers will fund it to deliver. Making GBR responsible for essential services also avoids the costs of maintaining a public sector operator of last resort function ready to step in if a private operator suffers financial failure or chooses to withdraw from operating the services. While I fully support the provision of services by open access operators on the network where they add value and where there is capacity on the network, the model set out by the new clause is not compatible with the mandate that this Government were elected on: to bring franchised passenger services back into public ownership. It is not compatible with the regime set out in the Bill, which already provides clarity about the role of private sector operators and the opportunities for them to run services. Given what I have set out, I hope that the hon. Member for South West Devon feels able to withdraw the amendments. I commend clauses 60 and 63 to the Committee.

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  I thank the hon. Members for South West Devon and for West Dorset for their contributions. I remain of the view that a unified system under GBR will plan and deliver an achievable, reliable timetable and ensure that the network is actually able to deliver it, so that the services promised to passengers are delivered. Better co-ordination of the timetable and engineering works will reduce delays, improve reliability and reduce costs, and through its role in issuing the timetable, GBR will be able to ensure that all services represent the best use of the network, with a strong appeals role for the ORR to ensure that fairness is embedded in the system. I therefore retain the view that the hon. Members should not move their amendments. Amendment 174 agreed to. Clause 61, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 63 Capacity duty Amendment proposed : 81, in clause 63, page 35, line 34, leave out from “to” to the end of line 37 and insert— “be satisfied that it retains sufficient capacity across GBR infrastructure to allow for— (a) the operation of GBR passenger services, passenger services not operated by GBR and services for the carriage of goods by railway, and”.— (Rebecca Smith.) This amendment aims to reduce the ability of GBR to prioritise its own operations where there are network capacity constraints and create a level playing field. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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  That is why the point about designing the scheme in close consultation with industry partners is so important. The hon. Member has read my mind, as I am about to turn to specific instances or potential demarcations with respect to what does or does not constitute being within or outwith GBR’s control. It is probably important to briefly explain what happens if an unforeseen situation arises and operators believe it is GBR’s fault but GBR disagrees, and the role of the ORR in that process. That brings us back to the intervention from the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. The Bill will include in the future scheme a clear route to appeal, to protect all parties in instances that are disputed, but the risks will be mitigated by requirements for GBR to clearly publish the details of the performance scheme, including criteria for when GBR would be liable to pay compensation. That goes back to the public law point about transparency and fairness. The ORR, as the independent appeals body, will have a legal obligation to review the situation impartially and advise on appropriate action where necessary. In addition to the ORR, to further mitigate the risk, operators will be able to seek other means of resolution though the Access Disputes Committee where matters relate to a contractual dispute. We believe that the clause is important, as there is a need to balance rightly protecting operators whose services have been disrupted with protecting taxpayer interest where it is reasonable to do so. For example, in instances of trespassing, we would not expect the exclusion in clause 65(3)(b) to apply, as the disruption that it causes should be within GBR’s gift to mitigate through investment in defences, and GBR would have significant opportunity to influence how quickly services are restored. In such an instance, therefore, we expect that compensation would be payable. However, where disruption follows events in extremis that are clearly not within GBR’s ability to mitigate against or control—for example, an act of terror—we envisage that the exclusion in clause 65(3)(b) might apply. I reiterate that formulating the scheme in consultation with industry will allow us to flesh out in far greater detail the demarcations, and make sure that private sector operators and rail freight have the surety they need that the scheme has been designed in the right way. The ORR will play a key role in the process in ensuring fairness, acting as the independent appeals body if GBR does not act in line with its duties. Amendment 223 seeks to ensure that third party operators do not face penalties for disruption outside their control. The Bill stipulates that only GBR is protected from paying penalties or compensation for disruption outside its control, because GBR is the only party that bears responsibility for the operation, maintenance and renewal of its network. There is no responsibility for that placed on third party operators, including freight. On that basis, we do not see how the concerns raised by the hon. Member for South West Devon that a freight operator could face penalties for, say, infrastructure failures or planned engineering works would arise in practice, other than in extremely unusual circumstances —perhaps where an operator’s faulty train had caused damage to the infrastructure. Such events could only be the responsibility of GBR, as today they are not the responsibility of the infrastructure manager or the operator, so it is GBR that would pay the penalties for such issues. It is right, therefore, that the Bill pursues a policy that protects the rights of third parties to reasonable compensation when disruption occurs as a result of another party’s actions or inactions, while also mitigating the risk of unjustified costs to the taxpayer when disruption is not reasonably in GBR’s gift to avoid or resolve. I hope the hon. Member will be reassured that the amendment is therefore unnecessary, as we believe the Bill already achieves the intended effect. Amendment 86 would prevent the performance scheme set out in clause 65 from becoming operational until it has been laid before Parliament. Such provisions for parliamentary scrutiny are a well-trodden path at this stage of the Committee’s proceedings, and we again believe that the amendment would add unnecessary layers of bureaucracy to what is effectively a technical industry process. In reality, the expertise about what specific incentives should be set for different operators on different routes is within the rail industry, and those experts are the ones who need to review and help GBR to develop the performance scheme. That is why the Bill includes requirements for GBR to consult on its performance scheme and requirements for what GBR must include and consider as part of its design, with clear rights to appeal to the ORR in the event of disputes. The amendment would add little practical value. It would delay the new access regime and the benefits it will bring to passengers. Clause 65 requires GBR to provide for and publish a performance scheme that is designed to incentivise it, its subsidiaries and other train operators to minimise disruption to other train services and to the network itself. The scheme may include provisions for GBR and other operators to be required to pay penalties for causing disruption, receive compensation for disruption caused and receive bonuses that reward better-than-planned performance. The scheme may not provide for penalties or compensation when one train service causes disruption to another but they are both operated by the same person. The clause also prevents GBR from having to pay penalties or compensation in relation to disruption outside its control. The clause gives GBR the power to require operators to provide information necessary for the scheme to function and offers no right to compensation or bonuses for parties that do not comply with those rules. The clause allows any person aggrieved by a provision in the scheme or any replacement or revision to it to appeal to the ORR. The clause is vital to create an efficient and reliable railway. It equips GBR to design a scheme that safeguards operators, forces accountability across the network and promotes continuous improvement. I therefore commend it to the Committee. Question put, That the amendment be made.

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  Me too, Mrs Hobhouse. Thank you for placing such confidence in me; we will see in due course if it is justified. I thank the shadow Minister for speaking to amendment 222, which would require the ORR to monitor KPIs. My response will be brief, to avoid repeating myself, as the amendment is heavily linked to new clause 2, which we have already debated. We expect GBR to have KPIs, as I have said before, but the right place for them is in GBR’s integrated business plan, alongside the detail of the activity that GBR will carry out over the five-year funding period. No sensible business would ever set its KPIs in stone, potentially for generations to come. It is important that the ORR, in its role scrutinising GBR’s proposed business plans and monitoring its delivery of them, is able to assess whether commitments made by GBR are ambitious and realistic. As the independent expert adviser to the Secretary of State, the ORR will have a clear route to influence the formulation of GBR’s KPIs. By keeping them within the business plan, the ORR’s involvement is already ensured by legislation. Amendment 97 would require the ORR to monitor whether GBR is implementing safety recommendations and standards set by industry bodies. I sympathise with the sentiments behind the amendment. Britain’s railways remain some of the safest in the world, which is why we are maintaining the roles of the statutory bodies in this area—the ORR and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch —and preserving the legal duty on all public bodies, including GBR, to give due regard to the investigation branch safety recommendations addressed to them. Existing safety legislation already gives the ORR broad powers to monitor GBR’s safety management, including its implementation of investigation branch recommendations, and to take enforcement action if it finds that GBR is not managing safety effectively. The amendment risks confusing or duplicating well-understood roles and responsibilities in relation to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of safety best practice. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member that this suggestion is already covered. Amendments 99 to 101 would require the ORR to audit GBR’s statutory functions when undertaking its monitoring role. That is unnecessary, and would distort the clear and distinct roles set out in the Bill for both GBR and the ORR. The Bill retains the ORR’s important role as sector regulator and creates an enhanced monitoring function through which it will monitor GBR’s statutory functions and provide independent advice to the Secretary of State. The ORR’s role as sector regulator is rightly separate to the role of an approved auditor. The annual accounts of GBR will be audited by the National Audit Office in the usual way. We do not propose to change that effective system, and cannot agree to an amendment that would layer it with unwarranted and inappropriate duplication, given that the ORR will already be monitoring GBR’s delivery of the KPIs within its business plan and GBR’s consideration of its duties when doing this. Oversight of GBR will be proportionate, risk-based and focused on the outcomes that matter most to users of the railway, taxpayers and the wider public. The ORR will have a crucial part to play in providing this oversight, including by undertaking its enhanced monitoring role in the way it, as the independent regulator, considers appropriate. With that in mind, I urge the hon. Member not to press those amendments. I commend clause 74 to the Committee. It will provide the ORR with enhanced monitoring powers, in line with its new role in the reformed sector. It will ensure that the ORR can effectively scrutinise GBR and provide independent expert advice for the Secretary of State for Transport and Scottish Ministers on its performance. As set out in the Bill, GBR will be required to produce an integrated business plan that demonstrates how it will deliver its priorities across the breadth of its statutory functions, including passenger services and the management of the GBR network. Although GBR will report to the Secretary of State on the delivery of the plan, the ORR will be required to monitor the performance of GBR and independently advise the Secretary of State. The clause sets out that the ORR will monitor how GBR exercises its functions, including whether the commitments in GBR’s business plan are being met, how costs and income compare with estimates in that plan, and the extent to which GBR is ensuring safety on the railway. On an ongoing basis, the ORR will be able to escalate concerns to Ministers as it considers necessary, enabling the Secretary of State to make informed decisions in line with her responsibilities as funder of GBR. Given that the Secretary of State is democratically responsible for the billions of pounds of taxpayer subsidy invested in the railway, it is right that she has the final say on how it is used, with proper, comprehensive advice from an expert independent regulator to support her. To fulfil its new role, the ORR must have the ability to gather information, conduct investigations, and assess whether GBR is fulfilling its statutory functions and business plan commitments. Clause 74 provides that statutory basis. It will allow the ORR, where it deems appropriate, to publish any information or advice it provides to the Secretary of State in connection with this monitoring function. That will ensure that the public can see how GBR is being held to account for its performance and how it is delivering in the interest of its customers, taxpayers and the public. The policy rationale is clear: the Government are committed to preserving an independent expert adviser within the rail system and are providing the necessary tools for that body to operate and scrutinise GBR effectively. I commend the clause to the Committee.

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  How can I top that? I am not going to try. This group of amendments concerns performance schemes, which, as hon. Members are aware, are designed to improve the performance of the railway network by incentivising operators and infrastructure managers to enhance punctuality, reliability and overall service quality, underpinned by compensation, bonuses and penalties. For example, performance schemes can require operators to pay penalties if their services cause unplanned disruption, or can offer bonuses for better-than-planned performance. The performance scheme provided for by clause 65 will apply to GBR itself, both in its capacity as a service operator and as the body responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. The clause supports one of the overall goals of the Bill: to dramatically improve service performance for passengers and freight operators, and to make a railway that really works. I thank hon. Members for their amendments, which I will speak to in turn. Amendment 85 seeks to remove the provision that protects GBR for liability for performance scheme payments or penalties where the disruption is not its fault. To be clear, that provision is not designed to prevent GBR from ever paying penalties or compensation. Clause 65(2) clearly provides for GBR to pay penalties, compensation and bonuses. Where it is at fault for disruption, there is no question but that it must compensate other operators. GBR will have the flexibility to design a bespoke performance scheme for its network. The Bill is intentionally broad, including at clause 65(3)(b), which does not define what constitutes disruption outside GBR’s control. Instead, GBR will consult the industry on its policy on the extent to which disruption after an unplanned event has occurred, and whether it is or is not outside GBR’s control. It will consider any legal requirements before publishing all agreed terms for transparency.

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  Clause 67 provides a route of appeal to the ORR for a person aggrieved by a GBR decision about access, capacity allocation and charging, including decisions made under those schemes. Clause 68 then sets out the principles for how appeals to the ORR will operate and empowers the ORR to issue a document setting out the detailed practice and procedure to be followed. Together the clauses establish the ORR’s reformed and independent appeals role, providing a clear, credible and accessible route of redress against GBR’s access and charging decisions. Opposition Members have consistently raised the view that basing the appeals role on judicial review principles is not strong enough. However, the rationale for the ORR deciding appeals based on judicial review principles is simple: we do not want the ORR to opine on best use. That is GBR’s job and if the ORR could simply disagree with GBR because it had a different opinion, we would be leaving the system as it is today, with parallel decision makers and unclear accountability. We would not gain the benefits of a body that is truly in charge of rail. That is precisely how we ended up with mistakes like the recent 7 am Manchester service that was set to travel with no passengers on it. The ORR admitted it did not have the adequate information or resource needed to make an informed decision on the operation of that service. That is exactly why we need a consolidated directing mind for the industry that can take decisions confidently and with passengers and freight users at its heart. Basing the appeals system on judicial review principles ensures that appeals are considered independently and on a recognised basis of fairness, legality and rationality, and without the fragmentation of decision making that plagues the current system. The appeals process will provide a robust accountability framework to ensure the railway delivers for passengers and freight customers. It is not judicial review principles that are weak; perhaps the hon. Member for South West Devon would suggest it is the powers available to the ORR to act on any wrongdoing that are flawed. I will turn to that next.

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  It is, once again, a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendment 254 would require GBR, when charging above the cost directly incurred—in other words, when charging mark-ups—to consider its target to increase the use of freight. I can reassure the hon. Member for West Dorset immediately that GBR will not be able to raise charges in a way that is not compatible with its statutory duties or targets. In practice, that means that when developing its own test of affordability, GBR is expected to establish bespoke criteria for divergent market segments operating on the railway, including freight, as Network Rail set out in its discussion document on charging. That allows GBR to design a test that can support its duties, including those under clause 18, and the targets to increase freight under clause 17. We intend that the provision will operate in a way similar to the “market can bear” test today. GBR will develop its own test of affordability in consultation with the sector, including the Office of Rail and Road, before publishing it. However, as we move away from European law, in which the “market can bear” test is established, and to the Bill, which carries over the same principles, we must ensure that the language in the drafting is fit for purpose for UK statute. That is why the Bill stipulates that GBR will be able to levy mark-ups only if it is affordable to efficient operators. The Bill preserves that fundamental safeguard for operators, but in a form that can be applied more clearly in the UK context. The test will be published with clear routes of appeal, as a further layer of protection for any operators, including freight, that are subject to charges when using GBR infrastructure. When hearing appeals, the ORR will consider the extent to which GBR has appropriately considered all factors before levying a mark-up. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member for West Dorset that amendment 254 is unnecessary, as the Bill already achieves its intended effect. Amendment 255 would give the ORR an explicit power, following an appeal against the content of a charging scheme, to direct Great British Railways to revise the scheme in cases where it considers GBR has not dealt fairly with the appellant. However, the amendment is not necessary to achieve that aim. The Bill already provides clear and robust rights of appeal to the ORR in relation to the content of a charging scheme. Those rights are supported by strong and effective remedies where an appeal against GBR is successful, as set out in clause 68. In the system set out in the Bill, where the ORR upholds an appeal on the content of a charging scheme, it has the power to remit all or part of the provision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration. That means that the ORR can require GBR to make changes to the charging scheme if it was identified during the appeal process that GBR had acted in a discriminatory manner, inconsistently with its statutory duties or in a way deemed procedurally unfair. The ORR can also give legally binding directions to GBR, which could include setting out what it failed to take account of in the original decision and what it must do to ensure that those matters are properly assessed when reconsidering it. The amendment would therefore introduce powers that are already provided for in clause 68. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press amendments 254 and 255 to a vote.

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  The intention of these changes is not to reduce transparency, but to modernise what is published and how. The new duty focuses on determinations under the Railways Act 2005 and the exercise of key enforcement and closure powers, which are among the most significant decisions the Secretary of State takes in relation to the railway. Other publication requirements—for example, on designations, directions and guidance, and the long-term rail strategy—are dealt with in other clauses, so the transparency framework should be viewed as a whole, not just through the lens of these changes to the 1993 Act. The shadow Minister raised an important point about how commercial and public interest protections interact with freedom of information and scrutiny. The clauses preserve a carefully balanced approach that has long existed under the 1993 Act. This is not a wholesale change in how that process works. The Secretary of State must not publish material where it would be against the public interest or commercial interests, or where it would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals or particular bodies. Those protections sit alongside and do not displace the wider legal framework, including freedom of information legislation and parliamentary scrutiny, which of course continues to apply. Question put and agreed to. Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause s 77 to 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Nesil Caliskan.)

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  Clause 76 updates the Office of Rail and Road’s information duties by inserting a new section into the Railways Act 1993 under which the ORR must proactively publish documents and information about key regulatory matters, including licences, access contracts, closures and railway administration orders, in whatever manner and form it considers appropriate. At the same time, the clause removes the ORR’s duty to maintain a formal statutory register under section 72 of the 1993 Act and repurposes that section so that it better reflects modern expectations of transparency, while retaining strong safeguards so that information that would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals, businesses or the wider public interest is not disclosed. The clause is not retrospective: it does not compel the ORR to publish historical material, but it allows it to publish information already held on the existing register where that is appropriate. The main purpose of clause 77 is to replace the Secretary of State’s duty to keep a statutory register under section 73 of the 1993 Act with a focused duty to publish information, in keeping with the Government’s commitment to ensure appropriate levels of transparency on the railways. Clauses 78 and 79 do the same but for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. These clauses retain strong protections for individuals, businesses and the wider public interest, making it clear that material that would seriously and prejudicially affect those interests must not be published. They allow Ministers to publish material currently held on the existing register, so that there is no gap in transparency during transition. The clauses deliver a modern, proportionate and more accessible publication regime, in keeping with the Government’s ambitions for a reformed railway.

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  I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 69, page 39, line 25, leave out “17(1)” and insert “17”. This amendment and amendment 176 restrict the power of the Office of Rail and Road to give directions to Great British Railways so that it will apply only to “facility to facility” access contracts.

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  I believe that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed all the points on these amendments, and I have nothing further to add at this stage.

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  The right hon. Gentleman pre-empts my later comments about the role of the ORR in this process. On the principle of whether GBR should be able to design a performance scheme for its own network, that is completely in keeping with the aspiration of the Bill to create a single uniting mind for the railway. We are cognisant of the fact that GBR has a threefold obligation in this process. First, it must create a scheme that it can use to deliver the efficiencies and operational realities of the railway in a way that suits the interests of the travelling public. Secondly, operators that use the service need to be able to ensure that they can have fair service under it. That is why consulting with the industry is so important. Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, GBR must protect taxpayers’ interests where it is reasonable to do so. A scheme is being created that directs GBR to run the railway in a purposeful way but with robust consultation and enforcement mechanisms, which I will come to in a moment, embedded within it. I believe that strikes the right balance. We are giving GBR control over the system but not allowing it to mark its own homework in every way, as the Opposition might see it. I will go into that in more detail in a moment.

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  I am pleased to speak to this group of provisions, which concludes the scrutiny on the access chapters of the Bill. Clause 72 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations to amend the Railways (Access, Management and Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2016 via the affirmative procedure. The access and management regulations are the existing body of secondary legislation that sets out the rights and obligations of infrastructure managers, train operators and the role of the ORR in relation to access, capacity allocation, access charges and performance. At present, those regulations can be amended only using powers under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, but those powers will expire on 23 June 2026, which means that, after that date, there will be no means other than an Act of Parliament by which those detailed and technical regulations can be amended. Great British Railways infrastructure will not be subject to the regulations, as the Bill establishes a new access framework to enable GBR to be the directing mind, which we have discussed over the last few groups. However, alongside Great British Railways there will be a number of rail networks, such as Transport for London, London St Pancras Highspeed and the Core Valley Lines in Wales, that will continue to be subject to the access and management regulations. Those “adjacent infrastructure managers” will therefore not be part of GBR’s access regime. The purpose of the power in clause 72 is to ensure that the legislative framework governing the other infrastructure managers can be updated to address any inconsistencies between networks—to “keep pace” between the two different regulatory regimes. Without this power there may be disruption to the smooth passage of train services across different networks—which the Government have a duty to protect. For example, the power might be used to secure alignment on the date when a new working timetable must come into effect. The access and management regulations currently stipulate a date in December, but given the risk of weather-related events, staff absences during the Christmas season and the engineering works that usually take place between Christmas and the new year, GBR will likely want to move away from that. If it did, it is not unreasonable to think that other infrastructure managers might want to follow suit to avoid being affected by the same risks and to ensure consistency in the timetable change date. To achieve that, it would be necessary to amend the regulations for the other infrastructure managers who wish to align with the date that GBR chooses in the future. The regulation-making power would enable that simple change to be made without needing an Act of Parliament. There may also be opportunities for adjacent infrastructure managers to seek further simplifications to the current regulations in a way that meets our ambitions to reduce regulatory burden and support growth, while maintaining a sustainable and predictable framework so that businesses have confidence to plan and invest. The Government consider regulations, rather than primary legislation, as a better way in which to achieve that. Regulations made under the clause must be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring full parliamentary scrutiny. Before exercising the power, the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties, ensuring full transparency, that industry has the chance to comment and that Parliament approves the regulations before any changes can be made. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 all seek to narrow that power in some way. Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings and terminals; amendment 231 would similarly exclude freight-only facilities. Those amendments are unnecessary, as the purpose of the power is to ensure alignment and remove inconsistencies in the regulatory regimes that will apply to GBR and non-GBR infrastructure and to enable simplifications where they align with the objectives of adjacent infrastructure managers.