Keir Mather MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for amendment 74 and new clause 45. Amendment 74 would give the passenger watchdog enforcement powers when it issues requests for improvement plans, and new clause 45 would give the passenger watchdog enforcement powers broadly equivalent to those of the ORR. We are creating a strong passenger watchdog, which will have real powers to monitor passenger experience and hold GBR and others to account. It will be able to demand information from GBR to a deadline, investigate problems and demand improvement plans to encourage improvements. Finally, it can refer cases for enforcement to the ORR. It is important to have one clear enforcement body for the entire sector to avoid duplication or confusion for industry. If there were two bodies with enforcement powers, the risk of conflicting enforcement steers would be too high. The ORR will therefore enforce GBR’s new, streamlined licence, ensuring that the organisation meets its industry obligations and all minimum standards, including passenger standards. As it does today, the ORR will also enforce all other railway licences, to ensure that there is an independent, consistent enforcement body for the sector. That is fair and rational. If operators did not comply with their consumer licence conditions—for example, relating to accessible travel standards—the passenger watchdog would directly engage with them and request an improvement plan. We would naturally expect operators to comply with that request, because if they do not, they will be aware that the ORR can simply take action against them for the original licence breach. That mirrors what happens in practice today, where most compliance issues are resolved through direct engagement and improvement plans rather than resorting to enforcement.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I see.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Railways Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for these amendments, but also right hon. and hon. Members across the Committee for their contributions on this important point. The right hon. Member for Melton and Syston is correct that I intend to argue that the passenger watchdog will focus inherently on the needs of passengers. I believe that that is self-actualising, to an extent, in creating one in the first place. But he is also right to push me further on specific provisions. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford made some really important points, first about the fact that the duties and responsibilities inherent to the passenger watchdog demonstrate how it will serve the interests of passengers. Having an independent monitoring power for the passenger experience, investigation powers, enforcing minimum consumer standards—this is inherent to representing passengers on the railway.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before I get into to my substantive points on this amendment, I want to circle back to a query the shadow Minister raised earlier, via an intervention, about accessibility and data sharing. I have a little more specificity to share with him: independent retailers will have the same opportunity as GBR to provide passenger assist to customers, and we are absolutely committed to a fair and open market. As part of this, the ORR’s code of practice will ensure that retailers get sufficient access to systems and data.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for her contribution as part of this debate, and throughout our proceedings, on the importance of accessibility for people with disabilities and for parents with children. She has already shared with me, for my benefit, examples from across Europe of where family-friendly accessibility measures are baked into the way train services operate. One notably striking example was of a children’s playground in a railway carriage in Finland. We hope that accessibility in all its forms can be embedded into GBR’s operational processes, including where it creates new opportunities for things like additional passenger services. I also point my hon. Friend to the fact that the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy is a really important piece of the puzzle in ensuring we have rolling stock that is unified in its capacity to offer better services for passengers with disabilities and for families travelling on our railways. Her point is very well made. The Government are committed to ensuring that Britain’s railway continues to rank as one of the safest worldwide and, as promised, the Bill does not change that safety regime. In my view, there is no need for further safety duties in the Bill. In short, everything that amendment 32 seeks to do is already in the Bill’s provisions, so to include it would be duplicative and would muddy the definition of “performance”. Amendment 31 is intended to require a report on how GBR has balanced the general duties in clause 18, but the amendment is unnecessary. The clearest account of how GBR has balanced its duties will be set out in its published business plan, which the ORR must advise on and the Secretary of State must approve—both reviewing the plan with those same duties in mind.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 21 preserves the Secretary of State’s current ability to issue guidance to the Office of Rail and Road under the Railways Act 1993, and clause 22 does the same for Scottish Ministers. The clauses are necessary to maintain the ability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to issue guidance to the ORR when exercising relevant statutory functions, alongside the ORR’s duty to have regard to such guidance, which must of course be published to ensure that the safety regime that underpins the railway does not change. Both clauses confirm that neither the Secretary of State nor Scottish Ministers can issue guidance to the ORR in relation to its functions as an enforcing authority under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This is to ensure that the safety regime remains completely independent of Ministers. In addition, guidance cannot be issued to the ORR when it carries out functions relating to train driver licensing, or its functions under the Competition Act 1998 to main consistency in the arrangements for competition regulation between the ORR and the Competition and Markets Authority. That will also provide further protection for the private sector. The guidance issued under the clauses is intended, as is currently the case, to support the ORR in discharging its relevant statutory functions. Guidance can provide for a better common understanding of an area or encourage a strategic focus on specific issues, whether that relates to supporting freight growth, driving efficiency or improving passenger experience. Furthermore, the ORR will be afforded the flexibility to balance any issued guidance against its wider statutory duties and requirements. The ORR confirmed at the Transport Committee that it can balance receiving ministerial guidance with its role as an independent regulator, and that it does so effectively already. Therefore, the clauses will help to ensure that the ORR’s regulatory role remains aligned with the strategic priorities set by the Government in a manner that is practical, proportionate and does not undermine the ORR’s independence as a regulator. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 169, in clause 24, page 13, line 29, at end insert— “(da) contain provision about the use to be made of the power to give directions under section 7,”. This amendment makes further provision concerning memoranda of understanding between the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse. I thank all hon. Members for their amendments, which seek to make changes to the provisions on the rail freight growth target. I also thank the shadow Minister for his very warm birthday wishes. I agree with the sentiment that he expressed: what more of a gift could I have received than working through the amendments in this group? Amendment 262 seeks to require the Secretary of State to produce an assessment of how targets to increase freight on the rail network could impact level crossings. As I said in a debate on a previous group of amendments, effective consultation, robust evidence gathering and meaningful engagement with communities and local authorities will ensure that any future decisions on rail operations—passenger or freight—are well informed and responsive to local needs and those of the railway more broadly. GBR will continue to manage level crossings in a way that maintains high levels of safety for all users, as enforced by the ORR, that reflects local and national priorities, and that is firmly grounded in evidence at a local level.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have already discussed amendments 166 to 168, which provide clarity on the situations in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the devolved Governments when issuing directions or guidance to GBR. Amendment 169 will provide the opportunity for further clarity by encouraging the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to address how the power of direction and consent requirement will be used within the terms of the memorandum of understanding. That mirrors the provision in clause 23 for the MOU between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. The amendment is a sensible mechanism to ensure that the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers will work together to hold GBR to account against their own priorities within a stable and co-operative framework that supports the operation of the whole system. I commend it to the Committee. Clause 24 provides the legislative basis for the MOU with the Welsh Government. Just as clause 23 does for Scotland, clause 24 requires the preparation and publication of the MOU and states some of the areas that it may cover. The areas the MOU may cover for each devolved Government are different to reflect their distinct devolution arrangements. For example, clause 24 explains that the MOU for Wales may contain joint objectives for the railway within the Wales and borders area. That creates a practical mechanism to drive co-operation and to set out the detail of how the railway will be run. It will encourage both Governments to carry out their functions in a joined-up way, while ensuring appropriate accountability and transparency. In turn, that will drive better outcomes for passengers on both sides of the border. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 19 ensures that the existing safety duty under section 4 of the Railways Act 1993 will be preserved in full and continue to apply to the relevant sector bodies. Safety is a critical priority for the Secretary of State and for this Government. The clause is necessary to fulfil the Government’s commitment that the Bill will not alter the existing legal framework underpinning rail safety, which has led to Britain’s railways consistently ranking as among the safest in the world. That is all I have to say on the clause.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will start with the point about accessibility, which the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford have both spoken about. I reiterate how essential it is that accessibility provisions are hardwired into the Bill. I thank my hon. Friend for raising the work that is already taking place in that space, whether that is delivering the next phase of the passenger assist programme, rolling out welcome points more broadly or widening eligibility for the disabled persons railcard. He is right to say that there is a lot further to go. We are all responsible, through the creation of GBR, for ensuring that accessibility is wired into the heart of it through its duties and in the functioning of the passenger watchdog—to which we will turn to later in our deliberations. My hon. Friend also makes an important point about accessibility of railway functions through an app. GBR will have a one-stop-shop app where people will be able to book train tickets and passenger assist all in the same place, which will hopefully go some way to addressing the concerns that he has outlined.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  With respect to the hon. Member, I do not think that those two examples are analogous. The Secretary of State has a responsibility to set out the long-term rail strategy, to guide how GBR will work over the decades to come, but in terms of access, charging, passenger experience and making sure that our railway runs for every part of the United Kingdom, GBR will be solely responsible for that work. Therefore, I do not believe that the NHS England comparison works in this instance. Both amendments 98 and 236 would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds. In carrying out its monitoring role, the ORR is already under a duty to consider the efficient use of taxpayers’ money, alongside duties to promote the interests of passengers, the use of rail freight and the public interest. Prescribing a specific and focused test that the ORR must apply when monitoring the delivery and outcomes of GBR’s activities is ideologically driven and adds nothing to the already comprehensive monitoring role that the ORR possesses. The ORR’s monitoring and advisory role, His Majesty’s Treasury spending controls and external scrutiny will all ensure proper value-for-money scrutiny. If the ORR thought there was a significantly better value-for-money way of achieving a certain objective than the one proposed in the business plan put forward by GBR, the ORR could highlight that to GBR and the Secretary of State. The Bill therefore already delivers this intent. New clause 43 would require the Secretary of State to set a private sector growth target. I agree that the private sector has a vital role to play in our railways. That is true across the supply chain—in rolling stock, freight, open access services, ticket retail and innovation—and nothing in the Bill seeks to exclude or marginalise that contribution. However, we do not agree that imposing a statutory growth target for private sector involvement is the right approach. The Bill establishes Great British Railways as the single directing mind for the railway, responsible for balancing its statutory duties in the round. Those duties include promoting the interests of passengers and potential passengers, making efficient use of public funds, promoting the use of rail freight and enabling providers to plan for the future of their businesses. Those are the right incentives to create the railway that we want—one that is reliable, connected, effective and brings together the best of the public and private sectors to deliver for the general public. Private sector growth in isolation, without regard to those aims, could drive the wrong incentives and will not create the railway that we all want to see. The Bill is designed to secure the best of both worlds. GBR will simplify engagement and provide clearer long-term direction and greater certainty, while continuing to procure billions of pounds’ worth of goods and services from private sector suppliers. We expect that a substantial proportion of GBR’s expenditure, once established, will continue to flow through the private sector. Open access operators will continue to play a role where they add value and represent best use of the network, supported by fair and transparent access and charging arrangements, with appropriate regulatory safeguards. The supply chain will benefit from longer-term strategies and more coherent planning than the fragmented system delivers today, and the duties reflect the need for private sector providers to plan with certainty. What matters is not meeting an arbitrary target, but delivering better outcomes for passengers, freight and the taxpayer. A statutory private sector growth target would add rigidity where flexibility and judgment are required. In the light of all those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham not to press the amendments and the new clause.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before I speak to amendment 39, I will respond to the questions about the timings of the MOUs, but may I bring the Committee’s attention to the fact that, by reaching this clause, we are now one quarter of the way through the Bill? [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] The hard work progresses. Work has begun on negotiating the MOUs with Welsh and Scottish colleagues. The MOUs are subject to negotiation with the two Governments, but as the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston pointed out, the heads of terms for the Welsh MOU have been published. It is our intention to publish the Scottish MOU as soon as possible. The hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham imagined a nightmare scenario in which we are not able to publish the heads of terms because we do not reach an agreement. Both the testimony we heard at the Transport Committee and what Scottish Ministers, including Fiona Hyslop, have had to say suggest that the negotiations are progressing, as are deliberations on the Bill overall. The hon. Gentleman was right to ask what the pre-election period means for the publication of the MOUs. I refer him to the noble Lord Hendy’s testimony on publication to the Transport Committee, in which he essentially conveyed the message that we are cognisant of the fact that that period is approaching and that we are working on the development of the MOUs on that basis.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The amendments in this group relate to the ORR’s competition duty and primarily look to remove the various exemptions set out in clause 20. I will begin by saying that we of course recognise the benefits that competition can bring to railway users and the economy at large. In the supply chain, competition drives innovation and efficiency. In the online retail market, competition provides choice and drives up the quality of passenger experience. However, although competition may be a powerful means of achieving a goal—such as innovation—there are many railway functions where it would not be appropriate, and could even be counterproductive, to treat competition as a goal in itself. That is true of many of the ORR’s functions in the new model. Amendments 237 and 240 look to apply the ORR’s competition duty when it is advising the Secretary of State on GBR’s business plan, and when monitoring GBR’s activity against that business plan. It would also apply the ORR’s competition duty when it was monitoring GBR’s activities against its railway safety purposes. Our view on this matter is clear: if competition is not improving the railway for the passenger, taxpayer or economy, we will not be pursuing it. Competition for competition’s sake is ideological and does not help us to achieve the goal of making the railway work better. When creating its business plan, GBR will need to take into account economic considerations, as set out in the public interest duty in clause 18; and when the ORR reviews the business plan to ensure that it offers value for money, it will be applying the same tests relating to the economy and cost efficiency. It would not be right for the ORR to overlay an additional competition objective on to that advice when the purpose of the advice, as clearly set out in the Bill, is to scrutinise GBR’s proposed business plan to ensure that GBR can deliver on the Secretary of State’s objectives in a value for money way. That should be a simple assessment of performance, not a way to pursue separate goals. Amendments 37 and 210 would require the ORR actively to promote competition when hearing access appeals. The nature of the appeals role is a broader point, which we have covered to a small extent today and which I am sure we will cover in greater detail in a few days’ time, so I will endeavour to be brief now. The Bill establishes a robust and fair framework to enable GBR to take decisions on the best use of the network. The ORR’s appeals role is designed to ensure that GBR acts lawfully, fairly and consistently with its duties, but it is not there to supplant GBR as the directing mind by wholly retaking strategic decisions or applying a different decision-making framework. An active duty for the ORR to promote competition at the appeal stage would undermine that, effectively creating two decision makers, applying two different yardsticks, at different stages in the process. In fact, two different bodies taking decisions based on different criteria is exactly what we have at the moment with Network Rail and the ORR, and this is fertile ground for exactly the kind of conflict, disagreement and delay that plague the current access regime and that our approach is designed to fix. That is part of the system that has failed to deliver for passengers and taxpayers and that we absolutely must move away from if we want a better railway. Amendment 210 would have the additional effect of applying a competition duty to the ORR’s enforcement of GBR’s licence. That is also the focus of amendment 238. The ORR’s task when enforcing the licence is to ensure compliance so as to provide legal and regulatory certainty. Applying a competition duty to this function would distort the purpose of these powers. The amendment would therefore undermine the regulatory framework and be counterproductive. Flirting with tautology, amendment 239 would require the ORR to promote competition when exercising its competition powers under the Competition Act 1998. The Railways Act 1993 establishes the ORR as the competition regulator for the sector, alongside the Competition and Markets Authority. To ensure effective regulation, the two must act according to the same rules, without interference from sector-specific priorities. That is why neither the ORR’s railway competition duty nor the other ORR-specific duties apply when it is acting as a competition regulator. This is a continuation of the current approach to regulating competition in legislation and not one from which we should deviate. Amendment 38 is not necessary, as it simply duplicates clause 18(2)(f), which already requires the ORR to take “into account the costs that will need to be met from public funds and the need to make efficient use of those funds”. An additional requirement to consider value for money would therefore be redundant. Amendment 268 seeks to ensure that the ORR exercises its duty to promote competition in a way that does not adversely affect issues such as passenger rights, or unreasonably increase costs to public funds. I support the spirit of this amendment and its focus on safeguarding passenger rights, the smooth operation of the railway and the public purse. It is precisely because I agree with those aims that clause 20 already ensures that the ORR will not be subject to a duty to promote competition when carrying out certain functions. Further, the Bill already protects public funds through clause 18. It includes an obligation on the Secretary of State, the ORR and GBR to consider cost efficiency, which should ensure that the value for money that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham is looking for is delivered. When the ORR considers value for money in the context of GBR’s business plan, the Bill ensures that it will not be distracted by the irrelevant consideration of promoting competition. Regarding passenger rights, the ORR’s competition duty, where it applies, is specifically to “promote competition...for the benefit of users of railway services.” It will therefore not be promoting competition except for the benefit of passengers. That wording, plus the fact that the ORR will continue to be the enforcer of passenger rights and consumer law, means that the ORR is already set up to recognise the importance of passenger rights. The Bill already sufficiently protects passengers’ rights, effective running of the network and taxpayer funds ahead of competition, so there is no need to duplicate efforts by making the amendment. In summary, clause 20 rightly requires the ORR to promote competition when it exercises its functions, subject to some specific and necessary exemptions, which I have just explained in detail. I therefore urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the shadow Minister’s point about profit sharing, the MOU is designed to set out the operational arrangement between GBR and Welsh services. In that respect, the MOU will not affect the existing profit-sharing arrangement between the Governments for cross-border services. The shadow Minister also asked me for a little more information on how the MOU will affect cross-border services between England and Wales. The clause allows the MOU to identify services in England that the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers would like to be provided alongside Welsh-designated services. It lets UK and Welsh Ministers set objectives for integration and steps to facilitate it, as well as the arrangements for sharing information. That will hopefully provide a clear framework for co-ordinating cross-border operations, enhancing efficiency and passenger experience, and supporting seamless connectivity across the Wales and borders area. The shadow Minister’s amendment 40 would require the Welsh MOU to be published at the same time as the long-term rail strategy, and to be laid in Parliament for two months before coming into force. I refer the Committee to my previous comments. The MOU serves a different purpose from the LTRS, and linking them would add unnecessary complexity for little apparent gain.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Regard will have to be paid to the business plan over the period for which it is implemented. It will also be possible to tell, on the business plan’s completion, whether it has been completed in a way that is cognisant of and reflects GBR’s duties. The Secretary of State will review the business plans with the duties in mind, as set out in clause 18. That approval process is in itself an assessment of how GBR has balanced its duties, affording lessons as to how they have been applied in the past but also, as the hon. Member is right to point out, for the future. The approval process is designed so that the bodies can provide checks and balances on each other, through co-operation and constructive challenge, ensuring that the common objectives are achieved in the best way possible. The business plan and the advice relating to it will be published, so Members can follow along and scrutinise whether GBR is appropriately balancing its duties at all times. This is already a transparent reporting system. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw or not press these amendments.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the amendments. Amendment 33 would add further duties to clause 18. The proposed duties are either duplicative of existing provisions in the Bill or would constrain GBR’s operational priorities, undermining the directing-mind approach that the Bill implements. Specifically, the proposed duty on passenger growth duplicates the existing duty to “promote the interests of users and potential users” of the railway. That duty will already require GBR to consider how to bring more passengers to the railway. As a passenger service operator, GBR will naturally be incentivised to grow passenger numbers in order to raise its own revenue, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield so ably outlined. The proposed duties on economic growth would also duplicate the public interest duty, which explicitly requires GBR to consider economic benefits when making decisions on the railway. The proposed duty on passenger satisfaction would duplicate the minimum consumer standards that we expect to include in the GBR licence. On the shadow Minister’s point about enforcement powers relating to the passenger watchdog, it is worth saying that the watchdog will set those minimum consumer standards, covering things such as accessibility and passenger information, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the ORR. It can also request enforcement from those bodies, as well as improvement plans from GBR. There are mechanisms to ensure that accountability takes place.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 36 would require GBR to make an assessment of how procurement from the private sector could help it meet its value for money duty. The amendment is drafted on the basis that GBR would otherwise be uninterested in working with the private sector, but I highlight to the Committee that that is not currently the case for Network Rail and will not be for GBR either. Currently, Network Rail spends, on average, around £8 billion per year with more than 4,000 rail suppliers. We expect that, in future, at least 60% of expenditure by GBR could feasibly be spent in the private sector. By providing a more integrated approach across track and train, and greater long-term certainty, GBR will be in a position to give the private sector the confidence it needs to invest, support innovation and promote the adoption of new technology. When discharging its duties under clause 18, GBR must consider the efficient use of taxpayers’ money, and it must be able to decide the most appropriate way to do that. That is the basis of the principle of decentralising decision making away from Government and empowering GBR to run the railway. Prescribing a specific assessment of potential private sector involvement, which might not always be relevant every time GBR discharges that duty, would itself be an inefficient use of funds. Amendments 42 and 43 would allow private sector companies to operate passenger trains for Scottish and Welsh Ministers and the Secretary of State. The Government were elected on a clear manifesto commitment to return franchised passenger services to public ownership. Public ownership is the only way to make the railway run better, with the whole system working to one set of clear objectives.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister for his comments about the safety regime on our railways, and join him in the sentiment he expressed about the ORR. The Committee can argue about the merits of privatisation versus nationalisation, but the fact remains that the people who work across our railways do so with safety first and foremost in their considerations. The shadow Minister is absolutely right to recognise that we have a formidable safety record in the United Kingdom because of the hard work of people across the railway network. With regard to situations in which UK and Scottish Ministers could give potentially contradictory directions to GBR, the Bill explicitly provides for the MOU to make provision about the use of directions powers, and the intention is to use that to agree how those powers will be used to avoid giving GBR contradictory directions. We have discussed that with Scottish Government colleagues. If the shadow Minister requires further information on that point, I will be happy to provide it for him. In the meantime, I am glad that he sees the sense in the clauses, and I commend them to the Committee . Question put and agreed to. Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 23 Memorandum of understanding: Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As tempting as the right hon. Member’s requests are, if he would like me to use another phrase, I will say: as soon as possible. I say to the shadow Minister that, although he has to keep asking me about publication of the MOUs today, he may not have cause to do so in the future. That is something we are working to progress as quickly as possible. The shadow Minister is right to point out—this is an important point—that the MOU itself is not legally binding or enforceable; it does not create new legal powers or obligations beyond those in the Bill. However, its preparation and publication are a statutory requirement; both parties are legally required to produce and publish it. That ensures the transparency and public accountability piece of the puzzle. The MOU is being designed to set out practical arrangements for co-operation between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to provide clarity on governance, track and train integration arrangements, and accountability, without altering statutory responsibilities.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As Lord Hendy was fulsome in explaining, those involved in negotiations for the MOU are extremely cognisant of upcoming election dates in Holyrood, and I would say that they are similarly cognisant of upcoming election dates in the Senedd. I hope that provides the shadow Minister with the indication that he may need. Returning to amendment 40, the MOU with Wales has the same publication requirement as the MOU with Scotland, meaning that transparency is already baked in without the need for a two-month review period. As the shadow Minister set out, the amendment would specifically require the MOU to include details of the allocation of ticket revenue from cross-border routes. That would add unnecessary complexity by effectively embedding granular, technical review formulas into a document designed to set out a strategic agreement between Governments. This detail is an operational and commercial matter rightly governed by established industry settlement mechanisms and bilateral contracts. The Bill already provides a statutory framework for fare setting and transparency, enabling GBR to set fares for its services while devolved operators manage their own. Including these details in the MOU would duplicate existing processes and could conflict with the Bill’s intent. I therefore urge the shadow Minister not to move the amendment and commend the clause to the Committee. Amendment 169 agreed to .

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I said, it has the power to request enforcement, and that is important because, ultimately, GBR needs to be able to take those decisions but have robust accountability from the ORR and the Secretary of State should it not have regard to things such as its duties, one of which is to promote the interests of passengers with disabilities. But the watchdog plays an incredibly important oversight function in ensuring that GBR is not remiss in its duties. The proposed duty on efficiency and productivity is already in the Bill: there is a cost-efficiency duty in clause 18. On the proposal to increase private sector involvement, we want GBR to co-operate with the private sector to create the best possible railway for everyone, but not to increase private sector involvement as a stand-alone goal. There will be times when increasing private sector involvement will be needed, such as when it comes to freight growth, and the Bill already provides for that, but it should not be an end in itself. Rather, GBR should focus on delivering for passengers and taxpayers in the best possible way, using all the options available to it. The duties in the Bill are clear, and introducing additional, duplicative detail will not help GBR to deliver effectively. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw amendment 33. Amendment 32 would replace the current definition of railway service performance in the Bill with a longer list of criteria, including reliability, safety, passenger comfort, affordability, passenger growth and the establishment of new services. Those are all important issues, but the Bill already requires GBR to focus on performance, including specifically reliability, punctuality and the avoidance of overcrowding. Those are top passenger priorities when it comes to train performance. Matters such as cleanliness, passenger comfort and value for money will already be considered as part of the passenger interest duty and through minimum consumer standards, which the passenger watchdog will set. Clause 18 already requires consideration of the social and economic benefits that can be derived from the railway, which will include considering where new services might be needed. That is one of the core benefits of GBR: it will be able to look across the entire network holistically. There will be greater opportunity to maximise our limited capacity and potentially create new services compared with the current system.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is my understanding that the system this Bill creates for GBR to engage with third-party retailers through ticketing will include the sharing of necessary data. I presume that would apply to such things. However, I will clarify that for the hon Member and get back to him on that point as I do not have the exact answer at the moment. Amendment 34, tabled by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, seeks to clarify the application of the general duties in clause 18, and I thank him for it. It is important for the reformed sector that there is a set of duties shared by the key sector bodies, and that these duties apply to Ministers, GBR and the ORR. I am happy to reassure the hon. Members that clause 18(1) already sets out clearly that the duties will apply to Ministers, Great British Railways and the ORR when carrying out the functions specified in clause 18. There can, in my view, be no question as to who and what they apply to. In that regard the amendment is unnecessary from a drafting perspective, and does not provide greater legal certainty. The hon. Member also asked about GBR’s purpose. Those functions and duties are quite literally GBR’s purpose. It seems to me that all this amendment does is rewrite them in a different format, but the functions themselves are clearly segregated for each organisation to which they apply. However, the duties apply to all and must be balanced by all. On that basis, I commend clause 18 to the Committee. It sets out the general duties which will be shared by key players on the railway. The duties apply to GBR, the ORR, the Secretary of State for Transport and Scottish and Welsh Ministers. The duties will apply whenever those bodies carry out their relevant functions. The shadow Minister has already outlined what the duties are. If Members wish to have a look at them, they are on page 10 of the Bill, so I will not repeat them. We believe that this common set of goals across the key sector bodies provides shared incentives to ensure that everyone works together to create the railway that we all want to see. The new duties also reduce the confusion, complexity and duplication that exists in railway legislation, allowing everybody to be clear on what their objectives are. While the functions in clause 3 of the Bill explain what we expect GBR to do, these duties set out what we want GBR to think about and achieve. Together, these two clauses set out the purpose of GBR, as the Government promised we would during the passage of the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024. To conclude, clause 18 is a critical part of the Bill. It sets the foundation for how the key sector bodies will operate, guided by the public interest and empowered to deliver a railway that works for its users, taxpayers and the wider public. These duties are the core criteria that should guide every decision that GBR and others make about the railway. They are therefore imperative to the proper functioning of the future railway. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to once again serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. Before I begin my remarks, may I seek a piece of advice on amendment 250? We are considering it as part of this group, but if it has not been moved and has been proposed by a Member who is not on the Committee, am I required to speak to it?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Railways Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister pre-empts what I am sure will be a spirited debate about open access in later clauses. Open access provides a proportionally very small percentage of passenger services on the railway, but it makes a really important contribution, especially in terms of inter-city links, which I personally benefit from with Hull Trains running from Selby to London. GBR does not want to lose the benefits that open access can provide. In fact, having a more streamlined and cohesive railway, as a result of GBR’s responsibility for capacity, could even increase the ability for open access services to run on within the network. That does not change the fact that, in our view, overwhelmingly across the UK, public ownership is the right way to make the railway run better, as it can work to a whole-system approach and a clear set of objectives to improve reliability, performance and punctuality for passengers. Privatisation created conflicting priorities and complex contracts that cost the taxpayer £150 million annually in unnecessary fees. A 2020 report found that Network Rail and train operators were employing hundreds of people just to work out who was to blame for disruption. That system was outrageous, and it was symptomatic of a privatised system in which operators were financially incentivised to point fingers instead of fixing problems. We cannot continue with no one in charge, and the Bill makes it clear that, in future, GBR will be responsible for making the railway work, and no one else.