Karin Smyth MP: speeches

Speeches

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 59 provides for the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission. Under the new arrangements, the Care Quality Commission will assume responsibility for carrying out investigations into incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety. It is really important to stress that the core purpose of that function remains unchanged: to identify systemic risks, support learning and drive improvements in the safety of health services, rather than determine blame or liability. It is a central measure in strengthening the framework for patient safety investigations and ensuring a more coherent and effective system for learning from incidents across health services. With more than 70 types of channels or organisations through which patients or users can share feedback, the current landscape has led to fragmentation between investigation, regulation and improvement activity, thereby diluting the impact that insights from investigations might otherwise achieve. HSSIB has been isolated, undermining its efficacy. We will bring HSSIB into the mainstream as a core but distinct part of the CQC. That will enable HSSIB to use its functions more strategically, working in partnership with the national quality board. Clause 59 achieves that by conferring responsibility for those investigatory functions on to the Care Quality Commission through the provisions set out in schedule 8. In doing so, it embeds a comprehensive investigatory framework with an established statutory regulator. The CQC will be one organisation with separate functions—a regulatory function and an investigative function—to preserve the integrity of each. Within the CQC, HSSIB will continue to operate as a discrete unit and retain its independence from providers, allowing it to identify learnings and take a no-blame approach.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am happy to get back to the hon. Lady on that specific point, if that is the case. The charging framework is about recovering costs, not making a surplus, which is what the amendment would result in. If that is not the case, I will make sure that she receives a proper correction. The Government do not think that there is a good case for the amendment, because, as I have said, the aim of the provision is to provide for fair and transparent cost recovery, not to raise extra income beyond cost. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is suggesting that it might be good for the commission to create additional funding, but if that is not clear, I am happy to get back to her on it. The provision makes the recovery of costs more predictable and consistent for those who have to pay them. That is usual for public bodies. New clause 42 relates to funding provisions for the CQC’s new investigation function. The Department already provides grant in aid to the CQC to provide adequate funding for investigations and special reviews; similarly, HSSIB’s budget is provided through grant in aid and is set each year. When the CQC takes on HSSIB’s functions, the funding streams will remain distinct, and the CQC will have to assure the Department that the amount allocated to the new investigation function is being used for that purpose. Funding decisions for the investigation function will continue to be captured in wider departmental budget-planning processes and considered centrally. That provides assurance that business and strategic priorities for the investigation functions can be met. Robust financial oversight will require the CQC to demonstrate that grant in aid is used appropriately, and solely to support the investigation function, without the need to prescribe funding arrangements in legislation. As there is already an operational mechanism for the Secretary of State to provide adequate funding and resources for investigations, the new clause is not needed. It would also be inappropriate to prescribe the form or level of funding in legislation. The new clause would reduce the Department’s ability to manage funding through the established spending review and estimates process; introduce unnecessary rigidity as the merged function evolves; and risk creating binding funding expectations that may not align with future fiscal constraints. A non-legislative approach ensures flexibility, scale and adaptive function while maintaining robust oversight. I agree with the intention behind amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, which is, as I understand it, to ensure that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body functions that are transferred to the CQC retain a high level of operational independence and continue to command the confidence—the Committee heard that word a lot this morning; I completely agree on its importance—of patients and their families, healthcare professionals and the wider public. Similarly, I understand that the objective of the amendment is to maximise the perception—again, that is a word I am coming back to; I tried to address the issue earlier—of independence in the CQC. The Government have protected safe spaces in legislation, and we agree that operational independence of the investigation function is required, but our plans support and enable that. For that reason, we cannot support the amendment, which would impose a highly prescriptive governance structure on the CQC by requiring the creation of a separate statutory committee and setting out in primary legislation detailed requirements for its purpose, membership appointments and operational arrangements. While the Government fully agree that effective safety investigations must be conducted independently and objectively, we do not consider it necessary to put such detailed organisational arrangements in the Bill. The Bill already provides a clear legislative framework for the transfer of those functions and enables the CQC to discharge them appropriately, within its broader statutory responsibilities. Furthermore, the CQC already operates within a robust statutory framework and is capable of establishing governance arrangements that support the effective delivery of its functions, including appropriate safeguards to protect investigative independence and the handling of safe-space material. The amendment would reduce organisational flexibility by mandating a specific committee structure, and would constrain the CQC’s ability to adapt its governance arrangements over time in response to operational experience, changes in circumstances or future improvements in best practice. Under the amendment, governance arrangements would be fixed in statute, rather than having the capability to evolve as the organisation learns and develops. Those additional administrative and governance requirements would increase bureaucracy and complexity, which the Government are looking to reduce. I re-emphasise that, in addition, a statutory committee would weaken the important links between learning and the action that the transfer of this organisation is intended to support. One of the key benefits of bringing these functions into the CQC is the opportunity to strengthen strategic oversight and ensure that learning from investigations can more readily inform improvement activity across the system.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are probably not going to agree on this point. I have made the point several times—and we made it in the Dash review—about bringing these organisations together. As I said again in my opening comments, it is about the opportunity to get this right and share that learning and experience. It is not about the cost but about aligning the recommendations and the actions that follow through from them. That learning, and the opportunity to push that through, is something we should grasp. Coming back to amendment 5, creating a separate statutory committee risks introducing additional layers of separation that could slow the flow of intelligence and impede timely action in response to emerging patient safety concerns. We believe the integration of investigatory functions can be secured through clear statutory functions and appropriate safeguards, rather than through organisational structures set out in primary legislation that are too rigid. Establishing detailed governance requirements in statute may also make future improvements more difficult to implement without legislative change. I understand and respect the concerns that underpin the amendment, but the Government believe that the Bill already provides the necessary framework for the safe and effective delivery of health services’ safety investigations following their transfer to the CQC. We will of course work closely with both the CQC and HSSIB on their transition arrangements through a transition board, whether on the issues of ensuring operation independence of the investigation function and the ways in which that learning is shared, or, further to the Opposition spokesperson’s point, how we make sure that learning is shared and creates an impact, and where that is felt most clearly. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend clauses 59, 60 and 61 to the Committee. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. The purpose of the new clauses is to support our life sciences and medicine sector, in order to make that more streamlined. She will be aware of the proposals about the negative and affirmative procedure. If there were particular issues of scrutiny, normal parliamentary rules and processes would apply if Members wanted to raise any particular issue. Question put and agreed to. New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 92 Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements “(1) The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/618) are amended as follows. (2) For regulation 1A (Schedules) substitute— ‘ 1A Schedule Schedule 2A has effect.’ (3) In regulation 2 (interpretation), in paragraph (1)— (a) in the definition of ‘mutual recognition agreement’, in paragraph (a), for ‘country listed in Schedule 2’ substitute ‘country specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time’; (b) in the definition of ‘third country conformity assessment body’, for ‘established in a country which is listed in Schedule 2 and designated in accordance with a relevant’ substitute ‘designated in accordance with a’. (4) Omit Schedule 2 (mutual recognition agreements).”— (Karin Smyth.) This new clause would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” in the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (as it has effect in England and Wales, and Scotland) so that agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 93 Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations ‘(1) Section 45 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (consultation) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1), for “a provision of Part 1, 2, 3 or 4” substitute “Part 1 or 3”. (3) After subsection (1) insert— “(1ZA) Before making regulations under Part 2 or 4 the relevant authority must— (a) carry out a public consultation, or (b) consult such persons as it considers appropriate.” (4) In subsection (3), at the beginning insert “Where a public consultation is carried out”. (5) In subsection (4), in the words before paragraph (a), for “subsection (1)” substitute “subsection (1ZA)”.’— (Karin Smyth.) This amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices. It gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate instead of a public consultation. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 94 Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure ‘In section 47 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (regulations: procedure), for subsection (3) substitute— “(3) Regulations under Part 1 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. (3A) Regulations under Part 2— (a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions— (i) provision made in reliance on section 6(1)(a) (fees); (ii) provision amending the meaning of ‘appropriate practitioner’ or ‘approved country health professional’ for the purposes of Part 12 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (see regulation 214 of those regulations); (iii) provision amending any of the following provisions of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012— • regulations 217C(3) or 217CA(3) (original pack dispensing for products containing relevant substances: definition of ‘relevant substance’), • Schedule 13 (prescription only medicines for which community practitioner nurse prescribers are appropriate practitioners), • Schedule 15 (requirements for specific products subject to general sale), • Schedule 16 (patient group directions and vaccine group directions), • Schedule 17 (exemption for sale, supply or administration by certain persons), • Schedule 18 (substances that may not be sold or supplied by a pharmacist without a prescription in reliance on emergency provisions), • Schedule 19 (medicinal products for parenteral administration in an emergency), or • Schedule 21 (medicinal products at high dilutions); (iv) provision amending regulation 250 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (restrictions on persons to be supplied with medicinal products: exceptions) for the purpose of changing the products to which any exception from time to time provided for by that regulation applies; (v) provision that is consequential on provision of a description mentioned in any of sub-paragraphs (ii) to (iv); (b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they— (i) contain only provision that is made in reliance on section 7 (emergencies), (ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health, and (iii) are not within paragraph (a); (c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within sub-paragraphs (a) or (b). (3B) Regulations under Part 3— (a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision made in reliance on section 12(1)(a) (fees), and (b) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a). (3C) Regulations under Part 4— (a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions— (i) provision made in reliance on— • section 17(1)(a) (fees), or • paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 (supplementary provision about civil sanctions); (ii) provision amending or revoking regulation 1ZA of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (expiry of certain provisions) or consequential on such provision; (b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they— (i) contain only provision made in reliance on section 18 (emergencies), and (ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health; (c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a) or (b).”’ —(Karin Smyth.) This changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure. The changes all relate to regulations about medicines and medical devices (although the procedural provisions relating to certain other matters are restated in the amendment). Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 95 Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations ‘In Schedule 7 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (regulations), in paragraph 12— (a) in sub-paragraph (1) for “relate to altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money” substitute “fall within sub-paragraph (1A)”. (b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert— “(1A) Provision falls within this sub-paragraph if it relates to— (a) altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money, (b) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged in connection with the exercise of a function which a public authority has by virtue of provision made under section 8C in connection with the EU medical devices Regulations, or (c) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/50). (1B) In sub-paragraph (1A)(b) ‘the EU medical devices Regulations’ means— (a) Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, or (b) Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU, as they have effect from time to time by virtue of Article 5(4) of the Windsor Framework.”’ —(Karin Smyth.) This allows regulations altering certain fees in relation to medical devices etc to be made subject to the negative resolution procedure. At the moment those regulations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. New Clause 1 National Maternity Commissioner “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, appoint a National Maternity Commissioner, situated within the Department of Health and Social Care. (2) The functions of the National Maternity Commissioner are to— (a) oversee NHS maternity services; (b) act as an independent voice for women and families; (c) ensure lessons are learned from identified failures and that the recommendations of maternity reviews are acted upon; (d) promote consistency, safety and accountability across NHS maternity services; and (e) advise the Secretary of State on matters relating to the safety, quality and provision of maternity services in England. (3) The person appointed as Commissioner must— (a) be a person with knowledge, expertise and experience relevant to the discharge of functions of the role; (b) have first-hand experience of working in maternity services, so far as reasonably possible; and (c) not be a sitting Member of Parliament.”— (Helen Morgan.) This new clause would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise of maternity services, and not a political appointment. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is a popular clause, Ms Lewell—and rightly so. I recognise that this provision has elicited a lot of interest among our constituents and the wider public. I look forward to hearing Members’ contributions.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will begin with Government new clauses 91 to 95. Many hon. Members will know that the current regulatory framework for medicines and medical devices is seen as overly complicated and difficult to navigate. It is also slow and burdensome to amend, limiting our ability to ensure that it keeps pace with developments. Maintaining the safeguards to public health is central to every decision we make. However, the regulatory framework currently slows down innovation and delays patient access to healthcare products. From a market growth perspective, it also places barriers to the UK market, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. These new clauses will deliver a more streamlined regime for making and updating secondary legislation. The ability to make faster and more responsive updates to secondary legislation will enable the Department and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency to address the current barriers that I have highlighted in the regulation more quickly. New clauses 91 and 92 provide for changes with regard to powers to make “ambulatory references”, which are references in legislation to external documents such as technical standards and lists, which can be updated from time to time. These changes will ensure that the legislation continues to capture updated versions of those documents without the need for further regulations. International and domestic standards are crucial in the highly technical areas targeted by the change. It is important that the regulatory regime remains aligned with the technical, scientific and international framework that is designed to evolve over time. Currently, there are limited powers for medical devices regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that change over time, and there are no such powers at all for medicines. Without the ability to make ambulatory references to those documents, legislation is needed each time the standards are updated. That is disproportionate and risks unintentional regulatory divergence that creates uncertainty for industry. The new clauses introduce a power for human medicines regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that are updated over time. For medical devices, the provisions also extend the current ambulatory reference power to make reference to lists of countries subject to mutual recognition agreements, lists of devices or categories of device that are eligible for an international reliance pathway, and lists of British technical standards. Amendment 80 sets out that the extent of new clause 92 will cover England, Scotland and Wales. The provisions of new clause 93 enable a more flexible approach to consultations on regulatory changes related to medicines and medical devices, rather than the current one-size-fits-all requirement. Under the amended powers, the MHRA and the Department will still retain a legal duty to consult relevant stakeholders, and significant regulatory changes will continue to be subject to public consultation. The measure is designed to enable consultations that are proportionate to the scale of the change in hand. That will ensure that regulations can be updated more efficiently and in line with the needs of the health service. New clause 94 will enable certain technical updates to medicines and medical devices regulations to be made using the negative rather than the affirmative procedure. Specifically, it relates to changes that routinely arise as clinical practice evolves—for example, updating detailed lists of medicines or making limited adjustments to the professional groups who may prescribe, supply, sell or administer particular medicines. At present, even minor or time-sensitive changes of this sort can require a debate under the affirmative procedure, which is not always the best use of parliamentary time. New clause 95 is the final measure in the regulatory framework package for the MHRA. It is designed to streamline the process for routine fee updates made using powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 by allowing the use of the negative parliamentary procedure for routine fee uplifts. That will bring the powers in line with those relating to fees in the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021, where uplifts to existing fees can be made with the negative procedure. That will also reduce delays in making and communicating such adjustments, while maintaining appropriate safeguards, including the requirement to set out the cost basis for any new uplifts with any legislation—whether it is made under the negative or affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure will be retained for any substantive changes, such as the introduction of a new chargeable function. Finally, there are a number of consequential provisions related to those I have just discussed. Government amendments 80 to 82 primarily relate to the commencement period in which they come into force. In conclusion, the amendments will enable a faster and more responsible reform of the existing legislative framework, while preserving proportionate safeguards and necessary scrutiny. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for making the intention of her comments clear to the Committee. It is right that we need to build trust in patient voice and experience. We will pick up on that in our debate on local healthwatch branches, because that is perhaps where Members of Parliament are particularly important. At a national level, there are many voices and organisations continuing to review the issue and challenge the Government, including through reports, meetings with Ministers and in Parliament, highlighting the good work that they do and numerous Committees. Health Ministers appear before the Public Accounts Committee, the Health and Social Care Committee and Lords Committees; I have appeared before the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. That is an important way of ensuring that the Department and the new experience directorate will be accountable. I recognise the important contribution that Healthwatch has made in capturing patient insight and informing the design and delivery of services, but we do not believe that new clause 78 is necessary. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the Bill. I am aware of the views of the hon. Member for North Shropshire, but the Government’s policy is to abolish Healthwatch and ensure that patient and public voice is more directly connected to decision making. It would therefore not be appropriate or consistent to legislate for a specific funding level for organisations that would no longer exist, or to constrain how funding is deployed to support the new arrangements.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling these new clauses. I recognise the concerns behind them. Contracts involving NHS data, digital services and technology must be subject to proper scrutiny. Patients expect their medical information to be protected, and NHS staff expect the systems that they use to be safe and reliable. The Government agree that Parliament should be entitled to test how those protections work. I also want to be clear that the Government want British businesses to win more public contracts and build stronger UK capability in digital and technology. The Government are already using procurement to support British businesses, jobs, skills and national security. More than 90% of UK public contracts are currently awarded to UK suppliers, and the Government have set out reforms to make procurement do more to support British industry and supply chain resilience. I do not think that new clause 3 is the right way to achieve proper scrutiny. It would require the Secretary of State, within six months, to conduct and lay before Parliament a risk assessment of all contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside the United Kingdom. That would include contracts regardless of the value—we heard a little about that from the Opposition—and of the services being provided, the type of data and whether there is evidence of any sort of concern. Risk is driven by the nature of the data involved, not just where the supplier is located. That is why the Government’s approach is based on targeted assessment and proportionate control. We already have the tools we need in the Procurement Act 2023, which gives contracting authorities the powers to exclude suppliers and terminate contracts where the legal tests are met, including on national security grounds. They may also refer suppliers for a debarment investigation. The National Security Unit for Procurement supports Ministers in assessing suppliers on national security grounds, working closely with Departments and the intelligence community. In health and digital contracts, those procurement powers sit alongside data protection legislation and data protection impact assessments, in line with the digital, data and technology playbook. That is not an argument for complacency; we should continue to identify risks before procurement begins. A broad duty of the kind in new clause 3 would risk becoming a reporting exercise and would not necessarily make the highest-risk contracts safer. It could, however, draw time and resource away from the assurance activities that matter most. The right approach is to strengthen the targeted controls, not to create a single statutory risk assessment covering every non-UK supplier. Similarly, on new clause 4, a blanket “buy British” rule would not be the right test for NHS data contracts, although I hope that I have assured the hon. Member for Winchester that home-grown domestic products are absolutely what we are trying to focus on. The UK must treat suppliers from countries with reciprocal procurement access fairly. Our international obligations matter and are an important driver of the UK economy, including the World Trade Organisation agreement on Government procurement, which gives British businesses guaranteed access to £1.3 trillion in public procurement opportunities overseas annually. As the hon. Member will understand, new clause 5 would require the Government to commit to a new programme of work to develop domestic capability, to reduce reliance on overseas suppliers of IT services and technology. The strategy would also require us to set out an approach to managing the risk associated with our current use of technology provided by overseas suppliers. I welcome the notion of encouraging domestic innovation to ensure the security and resilience of our IT infrastructure. However, ensuring the security of our data and the resilience of our systems is already embedded in everything we do. The new clause is therefore simply not necessary. Hon. Members will accept that we want to see continued growth of digital and tech industries in this country; it is one of our real success stories. However, it will not be achieved by cutting across procurement law and not seeking the solutions that provide the best value for our money and the right service for the NHS. Our approach to securing the best IT and tech solutions should always be to seek the best on offer in a diverse, global market, not to prioritise based on location. Prioritising domestic providers means making a decision on grounds other than the quality, integrity or value for money of a solution. I understand the concern behind new clause 43, which the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham spoke to. However, where public money is used to provide NHS services, there should be proper transparency about the contract, the service being delivered and the use of public funds. Patients and the public are entitled to expect that information is not placed beyond reach simply because a service is delivered through a contract. I do not think the new clause necessary, and I am concerned that it could create confusion about the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Act already deals with information held by another person on behalf of the public authority. The key issue is not where the information physically sits. It does not matter whether it is held by the authority or by one of its commercial partners; what matters is whether it is held for the public authority’s purpose. The Government agree with the principle of transparency, but new clause 5 would not improve the existing framework. It would risk duplicating duties that already exist, cutting across standard contract terms and creating uncertainty about patient information, which is rightly protected. For all those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press the new clauses. Finally, I say to the hon. Member for Winchester that we have already debated the single patient record. Public trust is key, and there will be multiple suppliers. We are bringing patients and the public with us and will continue to do so. The hon. Member asked about the FDP roll-out. I do not think it was about the supplier. I think it was about the money. It was about inertia in rolling out some good technology that provides good efficiency. It was also about capacity, capability and an attitude to productivity, which we absolutely need to drive more of.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My understanding is that the clause will not change that particular power, but I will get back to the hon. Lady if I am wrong. Question put and agreed to. Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 63 Time limit for bringing proceedings Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand. I am grateful to the hon. Member for that clarification, but her new clause represents an incomplete picture of Government funding for Healthwatch. A £14.15 million grant has been provided to local authorities for local healthwatches, and that is only part of the overall funding; a larger proportion is rolled into the wider local government financial settlement, and because that is not visible as a distinct line, headline figures often understate the total funding available. All of this funding is not ringfenced.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am going to try to go through these points because I have listened carefully to everybody’s contributions. If there is something outstanding, I will be happy to come back to it. To answer some of the direct questions that were put to me about the Dash review, I do not recall anybody particularly disagreeing with its findings when it was published or when we put it forward in our 10-year plan last year. I do not expect everyone to agree with every single recommendation or point made in that review. To an earlier point that was made by the Opposition, it was informed by a broad range of evidence and perspectives from across the health and social care system, including engagement with commissioners, providers, patients, families, and people harmed by poor-quality care, as well as charities, academics and national organisations. It looked really closely at what has not worked and why. I encourage hon. Members to go back to the work that Penny Dash was asked to do and the wider report. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston asked why the review covered only six organisations. The then Secretary of State authorised the Dash review to look at six organisations in this space that were directly overseen by the Department. Many other organisations in this space are not directly overseen by the Department, so they were not in scope of that review as they had their own regulatory landscape ecologies and so on. That is why those six organisations, which we oversee, were looked at. Last night at the Dispatch Box, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), made it clear that the rationale for this change is not based on cost. It is not based on the recommendations being too expensive. Rather, as I am sure colleagues will agree, we have seen far too many recommendations regarding patient safety but too little action. Inaction is not helping to improve the patient landscape. Opposition Members referenced the view from the longest-serving Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), that the NHS will not change or adopt the recommendations. That is a profoundly depressing prospect. We cannot predicate our laws and the health landscape on the basis that the culture in the NHS cannot and will not change. This is not a party-political point, but because of what has happened in the last decade, we must move from a defensive culture into a culture of learning while keeping a safe space in which people can speak up. We have heard a lot about “perception” today. I accept that there is a perception of negativity that is damaging to patient safety and people speaking up, but that is what our wider reforms are seeking to address.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. This morning, we had really good and detailed exchanges about patient safety and learning the role of HSSIB. Often politics is confrontational and divisive, but I want to be clear that I take at face value that every single Member who has spoken and who I have met with, including people who do not want to see this change, have the best of intentions. They want to understand patient safety—in the long term we can talk about safety and quality of service, but let us focus on the safety aspects here—and they are trying to navigate something. They are seeing a change, which is always difficult, and we need to ensure we get that right. It is absolutely right that we do that in Committee, on Report and in the House of Lords. We will continue to take note of all the points made and seek to address them. I fortunately had the lunch break to reflect and do that a bit more carefully. For people here and those reading our deliberations, what is difficult about the Bill—we understand this as legislators—is that we are abolishing an organisation and moving functions. That stands within a wider framework of changes to the safety and quality landscape that the Government are seeking. When one focuses on things that are being abolished, it is very binary. I will try and locate some of that without veering too far from the matter in front of us. Among all the discussions, there are a couple of key questions that I want to address, including why I do this. Through the passage of the Bill, many people in the wider landscape have said to me, “Why are you bothering having a row about this?” I find that quite shocking as a riposte, because the answer is simple in the context. It is too important to not attempt to get this right and make changes to something that clearly is not working. I do not think I have heard anybody say that the current system is working. As the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston noted, I said during the passage of the Health and Care Act 2022 that the functions of HSSIB are really important and must be built to the highest standard. I absolutely stand by that. It is not working; that is why we are changing it, but also why we are preserving the function within a new system, which we will seek to improve.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, we have had an important discussion, particularly around the issue of independence; I accept that it is difficult and that there are arguments on both sides. We have heard a lot about Professor Croisdale-Appleby’s evidence on behalf of Healthwatch. I made this argument on Second Reading: we have had this arrangement for 52 years, and I think we can all agree that the situation is not good. It has not worked. As I said earlier, 20,000 reports add a lot of work. There is a lot of work in this landscape—well-intentioned work by good people. We can argue about whether Healthwatch was set up appropriately to do the job it has been asked to do. I was pleased to hear the three examples from the Lib Dems and other individual examples of where light has been shone upon a closure, for example. It is good that that has been valued by local Members of Parliament. I would argue that nobody should be closing services without fully engaging with the local population and setting out clearly why that is being done. That is a failure of those local organisations, and we need to address the cause of that failure. I am struck by the oral evidence to the Committee on those 20,000 reports in 52 years. It was suggested that it takes six months, as I think the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said when quoting the evidence, for somebody to “go out”—that is the phrase that is used: “Let’s go out and talk to people in these far-flung communities. What do they think? What is their experience? Who are they?” It constantly surprises me, as it did when I worked inside the system. These are not remote people. We know who they are and what is wrong with them. We know how remote they are from the system. That goes to the heart of why the taxpayer is so alienated in this country from public services and their poor functioning. That is what the Government want to change. It is not a matter of ICBs adding a new function; the Opposition have fundamentally misunderstood that. It is about rewiring these organisations to do something very different. Their function as strategic commissioners is to understand and to use all the data and evidence, including direct voice. We can argue about how that direct voice is taken in, but that is fundamentally what a commissioner is—I say that, having been a commissioner. It is not being done well, and that is why we are changing the legislation. Under previous legislation, ICBs had multiple functions. We are changing that to force them to be commissioners, but it is not an add-on; it is fundamental to the commissioning process. It is a complete rewiring of the organisation to listen to patient voice, patient experience and the reality of health inequalities. In my constituency, I am afraid have not seen examples of the independent voice really speaking on behalf of the people I serve—some of whom have the worst health inequalities in the country, largely as a result of the tobacco industry and its legacy—whereas their experiences and their health outcomes are very well known and should drive the necessary changes. That is why we are driving all the changes in the 10-year health plan: to meet the needs of communities. We will continue to have this debate, but I wanted to make that absolutely clear. We assume that the independent voice is always clear, but it is not. We have heard that it is variable and fragmented. That is not the fault of anyone trying to provide it, but that is where it is. The system is supposed to listen and improve services, and it does not. Things need to be changed in order to achieve that, and that is what we intend to do. The changes will be supported by scrutiny, transparency and oversight arrangements. The alternative, which is maintaining a separate structure with limited levers to drive change, has not delivered, and it cannot continue to try. We are not removing patient and user voice; we are embedding it at the heart of the new system. ICBs will be expected to carry out proactive, inclusive engagement, particularly with so-called seldom-heard groups, including carers, those who do not have access to digital platforms, those less proficient with technology and people for whom English is a second language. Crucially, ICBs will be accountable for demonstrating reach and impact, not simply how many reports or engagement exercises they have done. Impact is what we will be looking at. As I have said, this is about moving from a model where voices can be collected but overlooked to one where they must be heard and acted upon. The new patient experience director in the Department will work closely with local systems to identify national themes and significant concerns, ensuring that patient experience informs policy and improvement at the national level. To answer a previous question, the Secretary of State will have the power to issue directions to ICBs and local authorities if they are failing to exercise that function. As I have said in debates on previous groups, I understand that it is difficult when we are debating the abolition of something outwith the wider framework of the 10-year health plan, the Dash review, the patient experience directorate in the Department and changes to the national quality board. It is incumbent on the Government to make that architecture clear and to build confidence and trust. That is what we intend to do, and that is how this body will be taken forward. All comments have been noted. There is a fundamental difference of approach. We are making those bodies fundamentally different and rewiring them to do something different. I understand the bumpy road—I have been part of that, with community health councils and links to Healthwatch, and it has been a long one. I think we will keep returning to this theme. Those organisations have not been changed to do what they are supposed to do, and that is the ambition of this Government. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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  I am going to persist on some of these arguments. I think I have addressed all the points made by the Opposition. It is the job of effective leadership to manage those interests and responsibilities, and that is what we expect of the CQC’s leadership. I will now turn to the amendments on this topic, which I thank the hon. Members for Sleaford and North Hykeham and for North Shropshire for tabling. Amendment 55 would make provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers in certain circumstances. I recognise the importance of ensuring that investigatory powers are not exercised in relation to sensitive Crown or Government premises where there is a national security interest. I want to be clear: the Bill already provides for that. The Bill already amends section 96 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 so that it applies to the new CQC investigatory function. Section 96 makes provision for the application of CQC legislation to the Crown, which means that the mechanism that the amendment is seeking to introduce is already in place within the existing legislative framework. Additionally, the Bill already provides for a power which enables the Secretary of State to disapply these investigatory powers in relation to Crown premises when it is in the interest of national security. The amendment would therefore duplicate an existing provision and would add unnecessary complexity to the legislation without delivering any additional benefit. Amendment 56 would allow the Care Quality Commission to recover charges that are higher than the actual costs it incurs when providing assistance to anyone other than an NHS body or the Secretary of State. I understand the intention behind the amendment—to give the commission greater financial flexibility—but the Government do not think that it is necessary. The charging framework in the Bill is based on the clear principle of cost recovery. Removing subsection (9) of proposed new section 51R of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 would mean that the commission could charge more than it actually costs to provide a service, shifting away from recovering costs and towards allowing the commission to make a surplus through its charging powers.

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  I thank my hon. Friend for that. He and others on both sides of the House with clinical experience, including the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, have shared live examples that can shock the layperson. It is important that those practices are changed clinically, and it is up to Government to make sure that the overarching legislative framework enables that.

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  I am just computing that in my brain. Can I seek clarification on that?

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  I want to make some points first. I will pick up any outstanding points I do not cover. The abolition of HSSIB and the transfer of its functions to CQC is being done to strengthen the link between patient safety investigations and the action being taken on the frontline to simplify the patient safety landscape. We want to align the recommendations with action. Hon. Members quoted evidence that Dr Dash gave to the Committee. Let me remind the Committee of something else she told us, about how HSSIB’s functions can be better aligned as part of the CQC. She said: “by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two. For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—‘Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seem to be a particular challenge?’ It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS”. –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 7, Q8.] to enable best action. These organisations can learn better from each other. Transferring investigation powers to the Care Quality Commission is an opportunity to strengthen the CQC. We have to move away from a defensive culture to a culture of shared learning if we are to improve patient care. The CQC can learn and improve from HSSIB best practice and take a more holistic approach to patient safety. Those executing the regulatory and investigatory functions can learn from each other and exchange skills, which would strengthen the links between learning, oversight and improvement, leading to real and sustained change across the system, driven by the CQC.

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

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  I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Shropshire for bringing this discussion before the Committee. I put on record our thanks for the work she has done in this area and for her engagement with me, and indeed with officials at the Department, to help us understand it more clearly, particularly in the light of the new clause. Hon. Members across the Committee are committed, as are the Government, to ensuring that women, families and babies receive the care and support they need. We know that the vast majority of births are safe and that there are outstanding examples of care in the NHS. However, where things do go wrong, it can have a devastating impact on women and their families. That is why the Government launched the national investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal care, chaired by the noble Lady Baroness Amos. Baroness Amos brought the findings from past reviews, local rapid reviews and new evidence from families and staff together into one clear national set of recommendations, which as we heard was published last week. The Government also launched the maternity and neonatal taskforce, chaired personally by the Secretary of State, which will translate Baroness Amos’s recommendations into action. As we heard, Baroness Amos recommended the appointment of a statutory maternity and neonatal commissioner. We have accepted that recommendation, and I know there is support for it across the House. To be clear, the Secretary of State stated last week that we are committed to putting the role on a “statutory basis” as soon as possible. I am afraid I cannot give the hon. Member for North Shropshire a more detailed timetable at the moment, because we are currently looking at options to legislate at pace, including potentially through this Bill, subject to discussions through the usual channels, while also—this is crucial—giving the taskforce the opportunity to shape the scope of the role. That was one of Baroness Amos’s urgent actions, and we accept it as a crucial first step in overseeing systemic improvements to care and outcomes and earning back the trust of women and families. The maternity and neonatal commissioner will champion the voices of families and drive forward that necessary change. The Secretary of State will remain accountable to Parliament for maternity services. The role will be discussed urgently with the taskforce and will have a relentless focus on driving those improvements, which will include co-chairing the taskforce. As the Committee knows, these are complex matters. The Government, having accepted the Baroness Amos’s recommendation, intend to legislate as soon as practicable. Our immediate priority is to work quickly through the taskforce to define the scope and responsibilities of the role. I know that the hon. Member for North Shropshire will not press the new clause, but I commit to keeping in touch with her and other hon. Members as this work progresses.

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  Clause 62 underscores the importance that we place on special reviews and investigations, and it will maintain the Care Quality Commission’s ability to conduct them by ensuring that the CQC’s investigatory role remains properly aligned with its original statutory purpose. The CQC is the independent regulator of health and care providers, and in the case of commissioners, it has the powers to undertake a special review or investigation when requested to by the Secretary of State. On 30 January 2024, the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), commissioned a section 48 review into mental health services in Nottinghamshire following the tragic events of June 2023. As we know, that revealed serious and systemic failings and led to strengthened oversight and a clear improvement plan. With NHS England being abolished and its functions being transferred to the Department and across the wider system, this clause will remove NHSE from the scope of section 48 and allow Ministers to set out, through regulations, the future scope of section 48. NHS England’s commissioning functions will mostly transfer to the integrated care boards but, as we discussed previously, NHSE’s most specialised commissioning functions will transfer to the Secretary of State. In future, regulations will set out the specific commissioning functions that the Secretary of State will be responsible for and that the CQC may review or investigate. The scope of the special reviews and investigations will continue to apply only to commissioning functions under the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which is the CQC’s existing remit. This approach will ensure that the CQC’s investigatory powers will not be automatically extended to departmental functions, which would fundamentally change the relationship between an arm’s length body and a Government Department and would not align with the original intention of section 48 reviews. For that reason, the Bill will provide for scrutiny through secondary legislation. That will set out a transparent and accountable way to specify which commissioning functions are in scope, enabling parliamentary scrutiny and CQC oversight where it is genuinely relevant to patient safety and care quality. This approach will also provide important flexibility: as commissioning arrangements change, the right function can be brought into scope without unnecessary delays. Taken together, this clause will protect the CQC’s independence, maintain accountability and provide a sensible framework for scrutiny where it adds real value for patient safety and care quality. I commend the clause to the Committee.

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  No. There will be no barrier to investigating whether CQC inspections are causing unintended harm. If they are, and the investigator feels that a recommendation for change should be made, they will make it. The insight gained from investigations will continue to inform recommendations concerning the CQC’s regulatory functions, and the Bill allows for the investigation function to make recommendations to the CQC in its report. The CQC would be legally required to respond to such recommendations. There will be no need for litigation through the courts. That is an important point. Again, I am addressing the points made by Opposition Members. We will continue to set this out more clearly for Members. I am happy to find different ways to do that. I now turn to the wider point about whether both an investigatory and a regulatory function can reside in the same body. Many organisations have different functions and responsibilities that they have to discharge simultaneously; we have also heard a lot about the safety body, which of course is part of the Department for Transport. It happens across a lot of bodies. I totally accept that it would be helpful for the debate if we were clearer on what some of those bodies are, and we will come forward with more information on that.

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  The 10-year health plan reaffirms the Government’s commitment to families affected by bereavement or serious harm, ensuring that lessons are learned from their experience and that more cases are fully reviewed and acted on. Families seek closure following serious harm to or the death of a loved one by wanting to understand what went wrong and what could be done to stop other families experiencing similar trauma, and by wanting to hold someone to account. Families often turn to the Care Quality Commission for help. Clause 63 will extend the CQC’s power to bring proceedings against a health and social care provider for a serious breach of regulations from the existing limitation of three years from the date of the offence to five years. Let me be clear: extending the three-year limitation from the time of the offence will not alter the first requirement that the CQC should act within 12 months of sufficient evidence of a serious breach of regulations becoming available. That 12-month window for action once the regulator is aware of the offence will remain unchanged. Extending the limitation period to five years from the date of the offence will mean that fewer events that should be considered by the regulator will effectively time out and go beyond the reach of the regulator’s action. The CQC is not the only body with an interest in investigating serious breaches of regulations that result in unnatural death; there are other investigatory bodies, such as the police, with equal interest and powers to investigate deaths for the purpose of pursuing criminal prosecution. The coronial process serves a different purpose. A coroner’s role is to establish facts surrounding an unnatural death rather than to find fault. In a complex case, a police investigation or a coroner’s inquest—sometimes both—can take time to conclude. Those independent processes are a useful source of information for the CQC to form a full picture of a breach of regulation. A culture of learning from investigations, inquiries, errors and poor care should be the norm in the NHS. It is therefore expected that a service provider may also commission its own internal investigation to learn from an unnatural death. Furthermore, there are cases where the CQC is approached late with information after an offence may have been committed. For example, the CQC may only receive information about an offence two and half years after it was committed, leaving little time in the remaining six-month period to investigate. Extending the period to five years would help mitigate such circumstances, and that is why we are extending the statutory limitation period. This will ensure that the CQC has the ability in far more cases to address the serious regulatory failings that it should and must address, without risking falling foul of a time limitation. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

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  Put simply, the answer to the hon. Lady’s questions is that we are not seeking to change other aspects. The CQC wants to get to points as soon as possible, so the 12-month period has not been changed. The function of clause 63 is merely to recognise the issues around the three years and to change that to five years. We are not seeking to alter anything else in that regard. On her point about the commencement date, that is merely recognising what is considered to be parliamentary convention. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 64 Abolition of Healthwatch England Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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  Clause 65 and schedule 10 will abolish the current local healthwatch arrangements and place responsibility for gathering the views of local people firmly with the bodies with the clearest levers to act: integrated care boards and local authorities. At present, many organisations are gathering views, running engagement exercises and raising issues, often with the best of intentions, but the result can be duplication, variable coverage and uncertainty about who is accountable for responding. We can end up with lots of feedback but too little clarity on the action that follows. By placing those duties on integrated care boards and local authorities, we are ensuring that insight from patients, service users and communities feeds directly into where commissioning and service planning decisions are made for both health and care. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield said, the people are in the room. It makes it easier to connect lived experience to priorities, quality improvement and the tackling of inequalities, rather than leaving intelligence at arm’s length from decision makers. This is about strengthening impact, not silencing criticism. Integrated care boards and local authorities will have a statutory duty to demonstrate how they have engaged with all people in their area, including seldom heard groups, and will be expected to have clear routes for people to raise concerns. We expect transparency about what people have told the system, what the system has done in response and how learning is shared across partners. As I said in my evidence, many constituents in my Bristol South constituency are said to be hard to reach. They are not hard to reach, in my view. We know exactly where they live, who they are, how old they are and what sex they are. We know largely what diseases they have. We know their level of income. We know their levels of education and attainment, and how they impact their health outcomes. They are not hard to reach; the system is not set up to listen to them. That is what we are determined to change. Dr Penny Dash’s review of patient safety described a cluttered landscape, with overlaps in how user experience and advocacy are organised. It described the burden that that can place on the frontline, producing multiple, poorly co-ordinated asks with limited impact. Bringing the patient and community voice closer to the organisations responsible for improvement—it is actually their job as commissioners—will help to make feedback more actionable, reduce confusion and support better services. I commend the clause to the Committee.

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  Apologies—I missed the exact question as to what needed to be changed. Could the hon. Lady repeat that?