Kanishka Narayan MP: speeches
Kanishka Narayan MP: full overview
4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026
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Parliamentary contributions: dates and coverage
- Source checked
- 19 Nov 2026
- Last successful import
- 19 Nov 2026
- Records dated through
- 18 Nov 2026
- Selected period
- Reporting year 2: 4 Jul 2025 to 3 Jul 2026
- Completeness
- Published snapshot: 20,988 records in the source window 21 Aug 2026 to 19 Nov 2026. The published snapshot covers its stated source window. Older imports can extend beyond it; not every public speech is included.
This page lists the parliamentary spoken contributions we hold for Kanishka Narayan in the reporting year 2 (4 Jul 2025 to 3 Jul 2026). It does not include every public speech, party-conference address or constituency event. Latest retained contribution in this period: 1 Jul 2026. The source check date and dataset limits are shown above. Open the Hansard link for the full debate and surrounding context.
Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.
299 published records · newest first.
Speeches
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Having closed the debate, I am happy to conclude. Question put and agreed to. Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill .
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I commit to giving way at the end of my speech to the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Spelthorne. On the question of consultation, I am happy to confirm that the team in question has set up an implementation-focused effort. We have started to engage with regulators already, and there will be an extensive process of engagement on the Bill with business, as has been conducted historically. The shadow Minister highlighted a number of logical puzzles.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Clause 12 will introduce a new power for regulators to designate critical suppliers to organisations as in scope of the NIS regulations.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I am happy to proceed and to focus on Crown ownership of data centre provision to others. For those reasons, I continue to commend clauses 9 to 11 to the Committee.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I commit to giving way to the hon. Gentleman at the end of my speech. He asked about schools. I am happy to confirm that schools are not in the scope of the Bill. In response to the shadow Minister, I highlight that the five-step test is cumulative: a business must meet all the conditions to be designated as critical, not just one. I think that answers the series of logical puzzles that he tied himself up in.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Once again, the shadow Minister is auditioning for roles in the Treasury, by talking about general taxation, and in the Department for Business and Trade, by talking about general philosophies of regulatory reform. I will focus on matters within the scope of our debate, and on four aspects in particular. First, Opposition Members have raised questions about definition. They have been answered frequently, but I am happy to repeat the answer.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I simply point out to the hon. Member that the pricing for law varies materially. I hope that, with the benefit of technology, it continues to be very accessible to all relevant providers.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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The hon. Member raises an important point about the operating leverage of technology businesses. The Bill directly focuses on size as one proxy for risk, but it is not a complete or perfect proxy. That is why, through the critical supplier provisions, it ensures that any smaller providers can be caught in scope as essential services.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I appreciate the intent behind the amendments and the shadow Minister’s position of understanding but not supporting them, which I share. I share his concerns about the potential for emerging risks posed by AI systems, not least in the realm of cyber-security. At the same time, I am conscious that we have not specified any risk factors in the Bill from a reporting point of view for the National Cyber Security Centre or the regulators.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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What a pleasure it is to serve with you in the Chair. Clause 9 brings large and medium-sized managed service providers—MSPs—into the scope of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. MSPs are organisations that provide an ongoing IT function, such as an IT help desk or cyber-security support, to an outside client. In doing so, MSPs often have widespread and trusted access to clients’ networks and systems. A single targeted attack can ripple outward, disrupting thousands of other systems.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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On the first point, I am afraid that I do not think that was an appropriate characterisation, because where the sectoral scope is clear and where there is a clear risk of critical national infrastructure and essential services being directly exposed, we have specified that in the Bill. We have looked at the impacts set out in the impact assessment.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I thank my hon. Friend for that point. This issue has not come out of nowhere. Industry and a number of organisations asked that we introduce the measures in the clause. Beyond the very clear five-step test for critical supplier designation, the Bill provides that the requirements on critical suppliers are proportionate.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I welcome you, Ms McVey, to the most exciting event in Parliament this week.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Clause 7 amends the definitions of “relevant digital service provider” and “cloud computing service” in the existing NIS regulations. As in the original NIS regulations, an RDSP is a cloud computing service, online search engine or online marketplace. To be in scope, they must provide a service in the UK and not be a small or microbusiness. That prevents disproportionate business burden, focusing on those larger businesses whose compromise could have a significant impact on the UK’s economy or society.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I very much welcome that point. In talking about broad architecture characteristics—being able to scale compute and to be elastic to multi-tenants by being shareable—rather than setting out the specific nature of resources, we capture both commercial cloud and AI deployments. However, I am keen to ensure that we keep this under review and, where possible, use the flexibilities provided by the Bill to adapt it to changes in technology.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Clause 3 makes important distinctions as to which organisations can and cannot be considered operators of essential services for the purposes of the NIS regulations. It clarifies that a person—in practice, an organisation or business—can be an operator of an essential service regardless of whether that person is established in the UK, as long as they are providing essential services in the UK. That means that organisations established outside the UK can be regulated under the NIS regulations.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. The Bill will make crucial updates that build on the NIS regulations, which are the UK’s only cross-sector cyber-security regulations. As clause 1 sets out, “NIS regulations” refers to the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (S.I., 2018, No. 506). Clause 2 gives an overview of the Bill’s parts and what they include.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s question, and I have two comments to make on that front. First, the relevant digital service provider will have a range of different customers, and my expectation would be that the regulators and the NCSC would seek a deep understanding of the risk exposure across the full breadth of that portfolio, rather than for each particular customer. Of course, that would form part of some analysis.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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On the question about cross-border compliance and making sure that we have a proportionate and effective regime, we have had a series of engagements at ministerial and official level with representatives of techUK, the industry body. The NCSC has convened a series of organisations—not least managed service providers, but others as well—and there has been a pretty extensive period of consultation on that and every other matter in the Bill.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Member for that thoughtful point. One assurance I will offer her is that the direct definition of data centres in scope here rely on capacity as a proxy for their essential independent nature, but when data centres below the capacity threshold but high on the criticality threshold are suppliers to essential services, they would be covered in part by the critical suppliers framework in the Bill. I take her point into account.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I thank my hon. Friend for that point. The reality is that neither he nor I am placed to judge exactly where the thresholds should be set on a permanent basis. That is exactly why we have secured the flexibilities that we have in the Bill. Clause 5 brings Crown-operated data centres into scope of the NIS regulations, ensuring that Government data centres meet robust standards comparable to those in the private sector.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for tabling amendment 25, which would amend the duties for RDSPs in the NIS regulations. I empathise with the source of his concern about fraud; I think many of us in the House know and feel that concern, through either our personal experience or that of our constituents.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Although I will not rule a particular provider in or out of scope, if the provider in question met the threshold for RDSP coverage, it would be covered, but the locus of that coverage would be limited to the provider rather than to the end-customer entity. I hope that clarifies that sufficiently. Let me explain how clause 8 was designed to tackle the risks that Committee members have set out.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Loudly and slowly: this will capture organisations remotely managing significant amounts of electrical load via energy-smart appliances, both in a domestic and non-domestic setting. These organisations play an increasingly important role in the management of the electricity system, but are not currently regulated for cyber-security. A cyber-attack could therefore create major disruptions to the national grid, shutting down public services and critical national infrastructure. Capturing load control as an essential service will safeguard the public from these disruptions.
- 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Clause 4 of the Bill amends the NIS regulations by creating a new regulated sector, data infrastructure, and designating the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology and Ofcom as joint regulators. We have received clear feedback from the data infrastructure sector expressing concerns that a dual regulator model could create unnecessary complexity and limit accountability.
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4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained.
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