Julian Lewis MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Feb 2026 · US Department of Justice Release of Files · Hansard source

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  And the Hinduja passport.

• 2 Feb 2026 · US Department of Justice Release of Files · Hansard source

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  Can the Minister not see that it is in the Labour party’s interest, as much as it is in the national interest, that this issue of stripping Mandelson of his peerage should be resolved as soon as possible and that wider legislation is brought in subsequently? The Minister may be a little young to remember when the late John Prescott compared Mandelson to a scorpion in a jam jar that he was holding, but can he explain to the House the fatal fascination of Labour leader after Labour leader appointing this man to post after post, given his chequered record of corruption and multiple resignations?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Ukraine: Non-recognition of Russian-occupied Territories · Hansard source

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  Yes, that is entirely the sort of contribution that I have in mind. As a result of that, when Putin was ready to take his next bite, the Ukrainians were able to prevent him, yet many people, including me, thought the most that we could probably do was to offer the Ukrainian Government a Government-in-exile headquarters in London when the whole country was overrun. The whole country was not overrun. Hopefully, the whole country never will be overrun, but those parts of it that have been overrun must never be recognised as belonging to the successors of the Soviet Union—namely the gang around Vladimir Putin, the killer in the Kremlin.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Ukraine: Non-recognition of Russian-occupied Territories · Hansard source

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  Having listened to all the excellent preceding speeches, I have to say that occasions such as this make me proud to be a Member of the British Parliament. I congratulate everyone who has spoken with such a united voice. If I may, I will just make some brief elaborations on the opening comments and superb contribution of the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). He referred in particular to the non-recognition of the Baltic states, and it is worth looking at that a little more closely. The Baltic states were occupied and incorporated into the Soviet Union for approximately half a century; never did this country recognise that. If those of us who saw the Soviet Union at the height of its power in the mid-1980s had been told that one day the Governments in exile of those three absorbed republics would be able to step forward and pick up the torch of democracy owing to the collapse of their overlords, we would have said, “Well, we would love to think that would happen, but do we honestly think it is going to happen in our lifetimes? Probably not.” But it did, and when it did, the implosion was dramatic, unexpected and complete. [Dawn Butler in the Chair ] Yet there are some people who regard the break-up—the dissolution—of the Soviet empire as a geopolitical disaster. Hon. Members know to whom I am referring in particular: Vladimir Putin. Given that that is Putin’s attitude, one thing that we can certainly deduce from the present situation is that there is no such thing as a peace deal to be had with Vladimir Putin and his cohorts. The fact is that if there is a deal of any sort—if there is a ceasefire—it is for one reason and one reason only: that Putin feels at the time of such a deal or a ceasefire that he cannot successfully go further. If then there is a cessation of fighting for a while, we can be equally sure that the moment Putin thinks he can go further, he will start all over again. So there is absolutely nothing to be gained, in terms of good will, or a basis for future relationships or stability, by giving any concessions to Putin whatsoever in terms of land exchanges or recognition of occupation. Let me turn to another parallel with the 1930s—the fact that Putin made one big error. He signalled by his early occupation of Crimea what his intentions were, but he was not then able to carry them out for quite a few years, in which time the defensive capability of the Ukrainians had massively increased with the surreptitious help, I suspect, of certain western powers, including ourselves. As a result, Ukraine was able to put up a much stronger defence than anybody who was not part of that secret rearmament and training programme would have anticipated.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I think there is a further twist, because the Pelindaba treaty not only prohibits the storing of nuclear weapons on the territory of Mauritius, which the Chagos islands would become, but requires an inspection regime. I understand that the country that would carry out the inspection is South Africa, which is somewhat closer to China and Russia—particularly where naval co-operation is concerned—than it is to America or the United Kingdom.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  Pathological.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  On that point—

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  This is why some people are concerned that if Mauritius allowed the Americans to have nuclear weapons on the base, although I do not think it would allow that, that would give China an excuse to break the same treaty to which Mauritius is already committed about a non-nuclear Africa, and China would not even get the odium that it otherwise would receive if it started deploying nuclear weapons all over the African continent.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  Ministers keep saying “How dare you compare this with the Falkland Islands?”, but Labour’s manifesto at the last election gave a commitment to defend the sovereignty of the British overseas territories—not some of them, all of them. If they cannot be trusted on this one, they cannot be trusted on any of them.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech, but I think he knows the answers to those simple questions. The answer to the question whether Mauritius could stop us having nuclear weapons stored on Diego Garcia is clearly that it would be able to do so. It is clear that the answer to what happens if the Americans say no to changing the 1966 agreement is that this deal to get rid of our sovereignty over the Chagos islands would be dead in the water. The reason that Ministers will not say those things, even though they know them to be true, is that they are afraid of a headline saying, “Minister admits that Chagos surrender can’t go ahead without American agreement”.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I have a helpful suggestion. I know that I cannot commit my party as a whole, but let me speak personally. If the Government change their position, I—and, I am sure, my right hon. Friend—will give a personal pledge never to accuse them of having done a U-turn on this matter. We will praise them to the skies, and we will not seek to take party political advantage of their belated acceptance of reality.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend—as I will always regard him, having known him for the past 40 years and knowing that his patriotism is beyond question—for giving way. Does he agree with me that there is a bit of a pattern here? The Government clearly want to do this surrender deal or giveaway, yet try to shelter behind inconclusive legalistic analysis. Is that not exactly the same as the betrayal of our Northern Ireland veterans, as the Government, when pressed, admit that they wanted to remove the immunity for our veterans anyway, but still seek to shelter behind questionable legal considerations that have not been fully tested? Why, when the Government want to do these terrible things, will they not at least have the guts to stand up and admit that that is what they want to do, and that they are not being forced to do it by lawyers whose credentials and jurisdiction are in question, to put it at its mildest?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I am a little worried that the Minister is confusing Ministers coming to the Dispatch Box and not answering questions with proper scrutiny of what is going on, so here is a very specific question for her. She has heard previously about the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, and all signatories have to declare their territories to be nuclear-free zones, effectively. If in the future the Americans, with our agreement and approval, wish to have some nuclear weapons permanently or temporarily on the base at Diego Garcia, will they be able to do so if Mauritius has sovereignty over the islands?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I must tweak what my hon. Friend just said. Although there is discretion for the Mauritian Government to give permission for a nuclear-armed vessel to visit temporarily, for example, there is no discretion for nuclear weapons to be stored permanently on Diego Garcia.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  I am a great admirer of the hon. Gentleman; he is courteous and thoughtful, and I always listen to what he says with great focus and attention. He is criticising the dangers of ambiguity, and I agree with that point. Does he accept, however, that we have not cleared up the ambiguity about whether nuclear weapons could ever be on Diego Garcia if the Americans and the British wanted them to be? It is no good saying, as the Minister did, “We never talk about deployments of nuclear weapons.” We are not asking about deployments of nuclear weapons. We are asking about the legal position if the case was that the Americans or the British wanted to have nuclear weapons, temporarily or permanently, on Diego Garcia. If we transfer sovereignty to a country that is signed up to be part of a nuclear-free zone, that is bound to call into doubt the ability to have nuclear weapons there in the future. Can he clear up that point?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is making a number of serious points. Does he see, as I do, a sort of parallel between President Trump’s egregious suggestion that NATO troops were, allegedly, not on the frontline and this issue of Diego Garcia? The fact is that President Trump makes certain comments and then, when confronted with the truth, has to try to elaborate on them, even if he will not go so far as to say the dreaded words “I’m sorry.” Is that not what is happening here? The Americans did not realise the extent to which giving up sovereignty over the base would compromise their military situation, and we have not heard anything to say that Mauritius could not stop any nuclear weapons ever in future being on Diego Garcia.

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  Very specifically, the Minister has read out something about what can be stored on the island. Can that include, and does it include, nuclear weapons? And on the earlier point about a deal, may I remind him of a saying from an earlier context—a different context—which is that no deal is better than a bad deal?

• 26 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  The Minister is keeping up a brave face in public, but when he goes back to his colleagues he will have to tell them that the only contribution from his own Back Benches was to disagree with the Government’s position, and to do so bravely and articulately. Does the Minister accept that the reason that this Bill may not go through is the work of the Conservative Opposition in both Houses of Parliament and the words of the leader of the Reform party in Mr Trump’s ear? Does that not show what can be achieved when two parties make common cause in a very worthwhile aim to achieve a vital objective?

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  May I take the Secretary of State back to the earlier exchange about Northern Ireland veterans? I have some good news and some bad news for him. The good news is that I strongly suspect that, at the end of all the raked-up trials held against Northern Ireland veterans, none will be convicted. The bad news is that that is not the purpose of doing all this; the purpose is to put them through a nightmarish ordeal that allows republican terrorists to rewrite history. He should not be quite so satisfied with the state of the Government’s legislation regarding Northern Ireland veterans. It is a disgrace, and it is tearing up something that was working and that could have worked, according to four professors of law who gave testimony to a previous Defence Committee.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  It is all well and good to say that defence spending has increased since it was realised that the peace dividend is inappropriate for a post-Ukraine invasion situation, but the fact is that during the 1980s, when we were in the grip of the cold war, we were not talking about spending 5% in 10 years’ time or 3.5% in four years’ time; we were spending between 4.5% and 5% of GDP every single year.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  Will my hon. Friend allow me?

• 26 Jan 2026 · Police Reform White Paper · Hansard source

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  I congratulate the Home Secretary on having attracted dozens of her Back Benchers to support her, when the Foreign Affairs Minister responding to the urgent question just before could not find a single one to support him on the dreadful Chagos deal. Can the Home Secretary tell us a bit more about how the new structure will be governed? I understand the idea about the national police commissioner at the very top, but what sort of executive key people will there be lower down to ensure that relevance is maintained in rural areas, as opposed to the different needs of urban areas?

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

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  It is often said, and rightly, that what is very important is that families should find out the truth about what happened. Which scenario makes it more likely that families will get the truth after all this time? Is it a scenario in which people can be prosecuted on either side, and therefore have an incentive, if they are guilty, to conceal the truth, or is it a scenario such as existed under the legislation introduced by our Government, whereby people are much encouraged to tell the truth about what happened because they know that they will not be punished if they do so?

• 21 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles: Legacy and Reconciliation · Hansard source

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  May I remind the Secretary of State—I know that he knows it, as he has heard it from me and others many times before—that there is nothing about creating a false equivalence between the two? Everybody is equal before the law. If anything created a false equivalence, it was the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which said that no matter how many murders a paramilitary had committed, and no matter how many illegal acts, if any, a soldier had committed, neither of them would ever serve more than two years of a sentence. That equivalence is there. It is not moral equivalence; it is equivalence before the law, and the 2023 Act did not initiate it.