John Milne MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a second time. This new clause would abolish the administration levy, which allows the Pension Protection Fund and Fraud Compensation Fund to meet their expenses from their respective general funds. PPF administration costs could instead be recovered from the wider protection fund, while FCF administration costs could be met from the FCF fund, funded through the FCF levy. The levy has in any case been suspended from 2023 to 2025. Many in the industry expected that this would lead to full abolition, especially given the clear recommendation from the DWP review in 2022. The Society of Pension Professionals, which originally composed this amendment, remains a strong supporter, and its view is widely shared across the pension sector. Discussions with the PPF indicate that it has no objection to this proposal and would be content for its administration costs to be met from general reserves. Given industry support and PPF agreement, we feel that the Government should implement this change without any further delay. The levy raises only a relatively small amount, but it adds unnecessary complexity and confusion to scheme finances and risks undermining broader reforms, especially efforts to reduce the risk-based levy to zero, which have been widely welcomed. Overall, this amendment provides the Government with the necessary powers to eliminate an outdated levy, which would streamline pension scheme funding. It is a small but meaningful reform that aligns with wider pension reforms that are all aimed at reducing red tape, simplifying funding and ensuring efficient use of scheme resources.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his observations, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 9 Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes “(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. (2) The review must consider— (a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme, (b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present, (c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on— (i) lower-paid staff, and (ii) women, (d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and (e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress. (3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review— (a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes; (b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and (c) undertakes appropriate consultation with— (i) affected scheme members, (ii) employee representatives, (iii) pension experts, and (iv) stakeholder organisations. (4) The person or body conducting the review must— (a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and (b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full. (5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations. (6) For the purposes of this section— ‘state deduction’ means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement; ‘defined benefit pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993; ‘Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme’ includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.” — (John Milne.) This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his reply. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 45 Transfer of British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members “(1) Within 3 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the transfer of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members of the scheme. (2) Those regulations must include— (a) a timetable for transferring the total of the investment reserve to members of the scheme, and (b) plans for commissioning an independent review into how future surplus will be shared. (3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.” —(Kirsty Blackman.) This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members and committing to review how future surplus will be shared. Brought up, and read the First time .

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I feel I ought also to thank everyone, and the Minister especially for a superb performance. I think we can all agree that this is a very good Bill, with lots of really good things in it. I am particularly interested in the investment side of it, with the greater resources to invest in UK plc, which we certainly do need. Sadly, I expect the Bill will not receive the publicity that many do—it has not been in the headlines so far—and that is a pity. Much more trivial and ephemeral stuff, frankly, gets all the headlines, while something that is interesting and dynamic, like the measures in this Bill, will probably be displaced by the latest resignation.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his words. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 98 Regulations: general Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into pension losses suffered by former employees of AEA Technology. It focuses on employees who transferred benefits from the UK Atomic Energy Authority to AEA on privatisation in 1996, and who later suffered losses when the company went into administration. Many former employees experienced significant losses due to circumstances beyond their control, and this review would ensure a transparent, evidence-based assessment of what went wrong. It would also hopefully provide a structured way to explore redress or compensation options for affected pensions. To summarise, the new clause would ensure that lessons were learned and safeguards were strengthened for future privatisations and pension transfers. We move it in the hope that the Minister will put his thoughts on the record, so that campaigners can at least see them—like them or not, they will know where he stands.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would have the effect of making pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest. Trustees should act solely in the best interests of their members, not those of the sponsoring employer. Currently, conflicts of interest can arise where company-appointed trustees also have personal or financial ties to the scheme sponsor. The new clause seeks to strengthen independence, excluding conflicting trustees while still allowing member-nominated trustees. Members deserve trustees who are free to challenge employers and prioritise pensions over corporate interests. Having strong, independent trustees means stronger protection for savers’ retirement security.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Overall, this Bill has wide cross-party support, as evidenced by the fact that we have been rattling through it at such a pace. However, the power of mandation is undoubtedly the most controversial aspect. To be briefly Shakespearean: to mandate or not to mandate, that is the question. The new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38—the mandation powers—be enacted only through secondary legislation. It is an attempt to square the circle between two competing views. The Liberal Democrats have concerns about the implications of mandation, frankly, as has much of the pensions industry. For example, Pensions UK, which is a signatory of the Mansion House accords, has stated: “We believe that the best way of ensuring good returns for members is for investments to be undertaken on a voluntary, not a mandatory basis. We also note powers being taken to specify required investment capability for schemes, and to direct LGPS funds to merge with specific pools. All of these powers will require careful scrutiny.” Similarly, the Society of Pension Professionals has said: “The SPP does not support the reserve power to mandate investment in private market assets and recommends its removal from the legislation. The mandation power creates significant uncertainty, including questions about legal accountability for investment underperformance and how eligible assets will be defined. The threat of mandation risks distorting market pricing and could reduce public trust in pensions, as savers may fear that financial returns are no longer the top priority.” The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that mandation should not be necessary, that he does not expect to have to use it and that the Mansion House accord demonstrates the industry’s willingness to act voluntarily. The obvious response is that if that really is the case, and that UK private markets truly offer the best option for pension savers while meeting the fiduciary duties, the industry should not need any prodding and mandation will not be required. The Minister’s response on previous occasions, and no doubt today, has been to observe the history and point out that thus far, the industry has been slow to make that change. We recognise that the Minister is wholly committed to the path of giving himself mandation powers, whatever we or anyone else says. Indeed, he sees it as core to the legislation. For that reason, we have proposed the new clause as a halfway house. The power would be put on the books, but it would require secondary legislation to be enacted. It would give the Minister the ability to have access to mandation powers at short notice if he deemed it necessary, without needing primary legislation, but in the meantime, it does not hang over the industry like a sword of Damocles. It may seem just a psychological difference, but psychology matters, and there are other advantages. Somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes having too much of a stick can be a problem in itself. The Minister would be under pressure to use the stick for the sake of consistency in every case where any company went slightly over the limit or was under the limit, even when he might prefer to take a softer, more conciliatory approach. We therefore see this new clause as a way to help the Minister exercise the powers he needs, but without stepping too heavily on industry’s toes. As he has said, he does not believe that he will ever need to exercise the power, so let us keep it at arm’s length.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. New clause 10 would require that provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes. That matters because pension savers deserve protection from unwanted or misleading marketing, especially when they may be vulnerable to scams. I used to work in direct marketing, so I feel a little bit guilty.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pavement Parking · Hansard source

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  12. What recent progress she has made on the development of policy on pavement parking.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pavement Parking · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister assure us that any enforcement powers will be extended to local authorities, not just the police, in order to make any regulations effective? Alongside that, will he reassure us that local authorities will have the power to make exceptions in areas where such restrictions would be impractical, as is the case in many streets in my Horsham constituency?

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her question. We have to look at performance: over the years, most people—the great majority of people—have not been getting any advice. Those who do tend to be better off because they have more private pensions, so they are obviously far more engaged, but the majority of people, especially now we have many on auto-enrolment, have minimal engagement. There are some very good services on hand—such as Pension Wise advice, which is free; I will come on to that in another measure—but, overall, people are simply not accessing that advice. We are keeping the wording of the new clause reasonably open to establish the principle. There are many ways to solve the problem, and we will come to some of those in other new clauses. We are hoping to get agreement on the principle, though there are many ways to crack this particular egg. Moving on to new clause 40, this is about targeted advice access for under-saving cohorts. Its purpose is to put the focus on groups of people who have historically been among the worst served by our current pension system.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is really about trying to place the Minister’s attention on this important issue—we will not press the new clause to a vote. It is about focusing the Minister’s mind on the task at hand. The undersaving groups include, but are not limited to, women, ethnic minority groups and others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps. The new clause would provide mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support. New clause 41 is designed to put a cap or ceiling on the amount of free advice accessed by any individual saver. It is a subset of new clause 1. Some individuals have very complicated financial affairs, which threaten to take a disproportionate amount of effort to decipher, in the event that we were to provide free advice. Those individuals will tend to be much better off and with multiple pension pots, which is precisely why they will end up needing more advice. Placing a ceiling on the advice available would ensure that the free advice was targeted only at those who needed it most. New clause 43 is a potential solution to the information deficit that we are trying to address. It would enable auto-enrolment into Pension Wise as the vehicle for giving advice. We tabled it as a probing amendment to provoke the Minister’s consideration. The purpose of the new clause is to help people properly understand and engage with their pension by auto-enrolment into Pension Wise advice at key stages, with the freedom to opt out. Pension Wise guidance is free, impartial and has very high satisfaction rates—94%—among those who have used it, yet uptake remains strangely low, which is an excellent illustration of exactly why the whole advice area needs urgent attention. Government data shows that of those who have accessed defined-contribution pension pots, only 14% have done so after receiving Pension Wise advice. That is despite various efforts, including a stronger nudge to encourage taking guidance before pots are accessed. Wake-up packs and other communications have shown limited effectiveness, and the evidence shows that savers will need more than passive information; they need action-oriented support. If anything, the situation is getting worse. The proportion of pensions accessed after receiving guidance or advice has reduced by around 9 percentage points since 2021-22. Evidence from the DWP’s 2022 research shows that although most people start saving for retirement in their 20s and 30s, many do not start planning for retirement until their 50s. Auto-enrolment into guidance would therefore significantly increase take-up and improve retirement outcomes for many. Defined-contribution scheme members, in particular, often lack clear information about their options; Pension Wise would help fill that gap. New clause 43 leaves flexibility for the Secretary of State to determine the appropriate ages, processes and notification methods. We recognise that it would be a significant move, and that there would be technical issues to solve. That is why we have tabled it only as a probing new clause, to explore whether the Government will look at trials or further measures to boost guidance uptake. Auto-enrolment into a pension scheme has been a great success, so perhaps the next logical step is auto-enrolment into advice. Why not try it?

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We have tabled a number of amendments designed to improve people’s access to advice. As I said in a previous sitting, for me, the biggest missing link in this Bill is the absence of action on pensions advice. Relatively few people are able—or perhaps willing— to access paid advice, and that situation is not likely to change. We have to find another way. The purpose of new clause 1 is to help people to properly understand their pension options through universal access to free, impartial advice at key life stages. We previously debated how that might be funded—slightly ahead of time—but this is purely about the principle of that advice. Most people find pensions very complicated. It is hard to persuade people to engage with the issue at a young enough age, and it is even harder for someone to grasp what would constitute an adequate pension many years before they might have to draw on it. The Work and Pensions Committee, of which I am a member, has repeatedly highlighted this issue and examined ways to improve things. The intention of new clause 1 is to ensure that everyone—not just the financially literate or well advised—can make informed decisions about retirement. Advice would be offered at or around age 40, which is a critical moment for mid-life planning and pension consolidation, and again within six years of expected retirement, to support decisions about drawdowns, annuities and retirement income options. That change is designed to give people confidence and clarity about their pensions, and to avoid poor decisions that would undermine retirement security.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his reassurance, but urge him to keep this in mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 268, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out subsection (a) and insert— “(a) that, as at the date of the application, the financial position of the ceding scheme is— (i) not strong enough to enable the trustees to arrange an insurer buy-out, or (ii) not affordable for the next 36 months following an assessment, certified by the scheme actuary, of all funding options to become strong enough;”. This amendment expands the onboarding condition to give an alternative to a single day snapshot of a scheme’s funding position. The Bill tests a scheme’s funding position on a single snapshot day. We feel that is too rigid and could unfairly exclude schemes. A scheme might just miss the mark on that day, even though funding prospects over the next three years are realistic and affordable. The amendment would allow actuaries to certify affordability over a 36-month horizon, providing a fairer and more flexible test. It would protect members by ensuring viable schemes are not shut out, while still requiring strong actuarial oversight. That is especially important in an environment where economic conditions and markets can move significantly and take scheme funding positions with them. Schemes have not always enjoyed the present funding levels, and today’s surplus is tomorrow’s deficit. We should have regard to that fact and approach the legislation in a manner that reflects it. In the assessment over a longer time period, the trustees would also be able to consider and respond to the situation in relation to dividends, changing investment strategies and expected scheme contributions, among other key factors. In summary, the purpose of the amendment is not to block the superfund option for schemes, but rather to ensure that the legislative framework is set squarely on the basis of protecting DB scheme member benefits and the security and soundness of the pensions system.

• 11 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 10 Sept 2025 · Bus Services (No. 2) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I will speak mainly to new clauses 32 and 33 in my name. There is a lot to like in the Bill, but it is at its weakest where it touches on rural areas. That is a great shame, because if we could solve transport, we could also solve the rural productivity problem. Economic inactivity is nearly two-and-a-half times higher in rural areas than it is in urban areas, and that is directly related to transport issues. If we could boost rural productivity to urban levels, it would fix the Chancellor’s Budget deficit in one go. The key freedom that the Bill brings is to support local authorities that want to establish a bus franchise or to set up their own municipal service. If we stand back to look at the scale of the challenge, however, do we really think that that will be enough to reverse the long-term decline in rural areas? The answer must be no. Given how cash-strapped and under-resourced most local authorities are, it is clear that most will be unable to take advantage of that freedom without additional support. In my previous life as a West Sussex county councillor, I served on a committee considering a bus improvement plan, but the measures we were given to look at were all small and tactical. No one on that committee believed that the plan would change the curve. Too many local authorities long ago surrendered to a tacit acceptance of managed decline. That has to change—hence my new clause 33, which would set out a new duty actively to promote and increase bus usage. The key paradox that must be solved is why, if public demand for bus services is so high, usage is always dropping. Clearly, price is one issue, but the service has also become increasingly mismatched with local need. In West Sussex, a 2021 survey found that 80% of residents had stopped using buses because of a lack of a suitable route or infrequency of service—that is a huge percentage of the potential market to give away. The problem, especially in rural areas, is that what we have left today is a legacy service—the ghostly outline of routes and frequencies that existed years ago. We have fought a long defensive war of attrition, and we have been losing. Individual routes have been salami-sliced to destruction. That is why I have tabled new clause 32 to require local authorities to consult in advance on significant service changes. In my constituency of Horsham, residents of Partridge Green discovered they were losing their direct No. 17 service to town only when they saw the new timetable. In Slinfold, the No. 63 was removed altogether, also without any warning. The county council says that the changes are nothing to do with them, and they are the responsibility of the commercial operator, but the operator says that they are up to the council. There is simply no one left at the wheel of our local bus service. When I looked at the huge public reaction as villagers fought to save their services after the axe had already fallen, I could not help but wonder what might have been. What might have happened if we could have harnessed that enthusiasm to create a service that met people’s transport needs? We have been beaten down, over many years, into accepting that it is impossible to fix the problem, yet Switzerland, Austria and Germany, in areas with far lower population densities than many areas of the UK, are providing all-day, every-hour services, seven days a week. We can do that too, if we have the will. It is good to see bus services getting legislative attention, and I appreciate that, but I hope that the Government do not think that this Bill will be nearly enough by itself. I urge the Government to make a special study of the needs of rural areas, which have been a recurring theme during the debate, and work out what it would take to genuinely reverse decline.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To add briefly to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay, I emphasise that with new clause 3 we are taking a non-prescriptive approach. It says that “the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to identify and mitigate barriers faced by new market entrants in the defined contribution pensions market.” It is a very gentle ask. We are all very aware of the issues today, but will they still be in everybody’s mind in the future?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Renewable energy schemes—particularly community energy, which I am a big fan of—are a very good addition, so we would support that.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to new clause 4 on targeted investment vehicles. Its purpose is to empower the Secretary of State to establish or facilitate targeted investment vehicles for pension funds. Overall, the pensions industry is supportive of the Bill, as are the Liberal Democrats, but some sections have expressed concern that a requirement to invest in UK infrastructure and assets could lead to excess demand for a limited stock of investment, especially in the early days when the economy is adjusting. In a worst-case scenario, it could lead to overpaying for investments or difficulty in reaching Government targets. Government assistance to ensure a healthy flow of investment vehicles would therefore serve to prevent that from happening. Furthermore, there is a unique opportunity to create vehicles that would allow schemes to invest in projects with clear social and economic benefits. It could include many different types of investments. For example, the Government could support the development of investment vehicles designed to revitalise high streets and local communities, provide affordable and social housing development, provide care home accommodation or support other projects that deliver long-term value while strengthening society. The new clause sets out regulations that would set clear rules on which schemes can participate. Different provision could be made for different schemes and types of investment vehicles. The Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority would be given defined responsibilities in authorising, supervising and regulating these vehicles. To be clear, trustees would only be expected to consider the investments where consistent with their fiduciary duties and long-term value for money for members. Pension funds are among the largest sources of long-term capital in the UK, so harnessing even a small proportion for socially beneficial investment could deliver real economic and community impact. Pooling of assets would also facilitate open access for smaller schemes. Done properly, that could align members’ retirement interests with a wider public good. To summarise, the new clause is designed to ensure a constant supply of suitable investment vehicles so that pension funds can invest at scale in areas that are currently not receiving sufficient attention. At the same time, it would create a framework where pensions could be a force for social renewal and financial security. The clause ensures opportunities with safeguards in place for schemes to contribute to national priorities, while still securing value for members.

• 9 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 32, page 30, line 12, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must, at least once every three years, review the amount for the time being specified in section 20(2) to consider whether that amount should be increased, having regard to— (a) the effectiveness, and (b) the benefit to members of the consolidation of small dormant pension pots.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review and consider increasing the level of small pension pot consolidation every three years. The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to review at least once every three years the threshold for small dormant pension pot consolidation. It aims to ensure that the level set in clause 20(2) remains effective and relevant over time. The Minister will be aware that we have already considered the right level at which to set the consolidation; we tabled amendment 262 as a probing amendment, which would have changed the small pot consolidation limit from £1,000 to £2,000. As we have discussed, industry has a very wide range of views on what would be the best figure. However, this amendment asks for a review, not a particular figure. As before, we do not intend to push it to a vote. To us, a formal review process seems sensible, but whether it should be set at three-year intervals or any other figure is open to question. Given the lack of certainty about what figure industry would like, it seems a good idea to review the threshold after we have seen the measure working in practice. The pensions landscape evolves quickly, with more job changes and rising numbers of small inactive pots. Therefore, a static threshold risks becoming out of date and undermining the policy’s effectiveness, whereas a regular review keeps the system responsive to members’ needs. It would consider effectiveness—whether consolidation is working to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency, and the benefit to members, so whether savers are seeing clearer statements, reduced charges and better value for money. It would also simplify retirement saving by reducing the number of scattered small pots, would help members to keep track of their savings and avoid losing pensions altogether, and would improve efficiency for providers, which could reduce costs for savers. I stress that the amendment does not dictate that there should be an automatic increase. It simply requires the Secretary of State to consider whether the amount is still appropriate. Therefore, in our view, it strikes the right balance between flexibility and accountability. To summarise, this measure would keep consolidation policy up to date, effective and beneficial for pension savers. A regular, three-year review is a simple, proportionate step to ensure that the system works as intended.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to support what my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said. As has been emphasised, we are not talking about making things mandatory. It is about making things possible, because there have been cases in which managers take a rather narrow view of fiduciary duty and almost deliberately exclude other considerations. It is about removing that blockage. We feel that the requirement in the amendment is of value and hope that the Minister will consider it. It is also worth saying that very often one cannot definitively say that one investment will be better than another. There are all the projections and estimates. If it was that clear, every single fund would have the same 10 investments and that would be the end of it, and it would be a very small industry. It is often a matter of assertion, or a calculation. It is often not a case of choosing a lesser return; any return is conjectural in the first place.

• 4 Sept 2025 · Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 9, page 9, line 4, at end insert— “(e) about the proportion of any surplus that may be allocated, or the manner in which it may be determined, for the purpose of contributing to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for scheme members.” This amendment enables a proportion of surplus funds to be used to fund free pension advice. The purpose of the amendment is to allow a proportion of pension scheme surplus funds to be allocated to funding free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for members. In my former life in advertising, it was sometimes my job to help people to understand their pension options so that they could make the right choices, and I can tell the Committee it was not an easy task. Pensions are complicated, and far too many people have no idea at all what is in store for them, and therefore do not take advice. We argue that rectifying this gap is the key task that at the moment is underserved by the Bill. There are proposals such as the pensions dashboard that certainly help, but they are by no means sufficient. More action needs to be taken, and that is the essence of the amendment. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions, such as taking all their lump sum and getting taxed unnecessarily, which could severely damage their long-term security. Free, impartial advice is essential to level the playing field between those who are more informed and perhaps have higher incomes, and those who are not. The details of our revised proposals are laid out in new clause 1, which, slightly inconveniently, will be discussed later in the proceedings; this amendment is about the funding for that measure. We propose two stages of advice: at age 40, which is a critical moment for all midlife planning and pension consolidation, and again within six years of expected retirement, when the emphasis shifts more to decisions about drawdown, annuities and retirement income options. The first question that is always asked when any extension to a Government service is proposed is, “How will we pay for it?”. This measure is a highly relevant, targeted solution to that question, made possible by accessing surplus funds. We have general agreement, I think, that surpluses in pension schemes should not be allowed to sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds, but we have less clarity and agreement on what exactly is the best use for them. I would argue that the measure we propose, employing a small proportion of the surplus to fund member advice, is at once a highly relevant targeted use for the funds, and something that will have a disproportionately large impact on pension adequacy, which is of course a matter of great concern to the Minister outside this Bill. The amendment does not mandate a fixed proportion; it simply gives the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion he or she thinks should be used. It creates flexibility and safeguards, so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Importantly, funding advice from surpluses would reduce the need for members to pay out of their own pockets; for many, the cost is prohibitive, so it simply does not happen. A further benefit is that it would build trust among the public that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond just the pension pot itself. To summarise, the amendment is designed to ensure that pension surpluses, when they arise, are used to strengthen member outcomes. Advice and guidance are just as important as the pension itself in ensuring good retirement outcomes. The amendment is a practical, fair and member-focused way of improving the system.