Jeremy Wright MP: speeches 2026

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Speeches

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Role of Big Tech in Society · Hansard source
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    We have not been universally successful at keeping to four minutes. I ask everyone to now get closer to three minutes, because I need to begin Front-Bench contributions at 5.28 pm.

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Role of Big Tech in Society · Hansard source
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    The debate must finish at 5.50 pm, so the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) has a minute to wind up his debate.

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Prison Safety · Hansard source
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    The debate may now continue until 4.50 pm if necessary.

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Prison Safety · Hansard source
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    I will call Michelle Welsh to move the motion; I will then call the Minister to respond. I remind all other Members present that they may make a speech only with prior permission from the Member in charge of the debate and from the Minister, although they can of course intervene without prior permission. As is the convention for 30-minute debates, there will not be an opportunity for the Member in charge to wind up. It is highly likely that we will be interrupted during this debate for votes on the Floor of the House. I anticipate two votes, which means that I must suspend the sitting for up to 25 minutes. If the hon. Lady, the Minister and I are all back before 25 minutes, we can proceed more quickly, if that is any incentive.

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Environmental Sustainability: UK-Indonesia Collaboration · Hansard source
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    I thank the hon. Lady for opening the debate. I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called. So far, only one Member has done so, which means that he has about half an hour to speak, if he wants it. He is not obliged to take all that time, but I will call Front Benchers shortly before 3.30 pm, at the latest.

  • 23 Jun 2026 · Environmental Sustainability: UK-Indonesia Collaboration · Hansard source
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    I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, not least for his remarkable display of self-control. We now come to the Front-Bench speeches, beginning with the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

  • 18 Jun 2026 · Polling Stations: Blind and Visually Impaired Voters · Hansard source
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    All voters, including blind and visually impaired voters, should be able to vote independently and secretly. In its reports on elections in 2024 and 2025, the commission found that there have been improvements to the support available and that returning officers provided a range of accessibility equipment and support. The commission will publish a report on the May 2026 polls in the autumn, including consideration of accessibility. However, there is more to be done, and the commission has recommended improving awareness of the support available, including providing clear information on poll cards and in polling stations.

  • 18 Jun 2026 · Polling Stations: Blind and Visually Impaired Voters · Hansard source
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    As I have said, the commission will review what happened in the May 2026 polls and make any further recommendations it feels necessary as a result. The hon. Lady makes two important points. It is important that equipment is available, and she will know that tactile devices have been found by the commission to have been available in every polling station. Her other important point is that people who are blind or partially sighted need to know about that, and communicating that information is crucial—she is absolutely right.

  • 18 Jun 2026 · Polling Stations: Blind and Visually Impaired Voters · Hansard source
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    I will certainly make sure the commission hears what the hon. Gentleman has said. He will appreciate that judgments on these things are often for returning officers or for those managing individual polling stations, but he makes an important point about access. As I say, I will make sure the commission hears what he has said.

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source
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    I am bound to say that the Home Secretary, for whom I have huge respect, is wrong to suggest that she cannot take interventions because of a lack of time—she has decided that there is a lack of time. I want to make one simple point to her, which my hon. Friend on the Opposition Front Bench has adverted to. Jonathan Hall KC produced an excellent report, most of which we will all agree with, but he did that in May last year. The Home Secretary cannot have it both ways. Either this is a desperately urgent matter, in which case the Government should have brought forward legislation long before now, or it is not, in which case we should have longer than a day to consider it, should we not? Question put.

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time) · Hansard source
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    Will the Home Secretary give way?

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    I was going to ask the Home Secretary later but, as she has raised the matter, perhaps I can ask her this now. On proposed new section 17C of the National Security Act and, indeed, in respect of other parts of the Bill, the knowledge of the person who may be committing an offence becomes important. Can the Home Secretary clarify—because the language in the Bill is potentially ambiguous—that the knowledge required of the person in question is that the body they are supporting or being remunerated by is a designated body? The language could be read simply to mean that the individual needs to know that the body they are supporting is a particular body, not necessarily that they know that that body has been designated. Can the Home Secretary be clear that the language refers to knowledge of designation, not simply knowledge of the particular institution or body that the individual is supporting or being remunerated by?

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime. On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is “a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.” That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is. I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction. The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    I will come to exactly that point about the carve-outs. It is, I think, evident from a close reading of the Bill that the Government’s approach to the first of the new offences it creates differs from their approach to the next two. I want to understand from the Minister for Security—and this is my second observation—why that difference exists. I should say at this point that it is a great pleasure to see the Minister, the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle), in her place. As a distinguished former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, she knows about these matters. However, I am also conscious that she has only just arrived. I hope I am setting out these specific concerns in a way that will give her two chances to answer them, on Second Reading and in Committee. If she is concerned about the lack of time between the two, she has no one to blame but her own colleagues—but we will come back to that. As I was saying, my second observation relates to precisely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns). There is a difference between the way in which the Bill sets out the first of the new offences and the way in which it approaches the other. For example, new section 17B, which amends the National Security Act, creates the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, while new section 17C creates the offence of “Obtaining…material benefits from a designated body”. Neither of those requires the additional motive of acting with a prohibited purpose. Instead, both allow for defences to be raised by those accused to establish that they were acting for a proper purpose. That would, of course, include not giving carte blanche to anyone who works for the British Government to behave as they wish, but if that person is acting within the purposes of their public appointment, it would offer them the chance to raise that defence, and would also offer opportunities to present a defence of acting in compliance with a UK legal obligation. I simply want to understand from the Minister why that approach was not taken in relation to the offence of supporting a designated body, because that would have been an attractive way forward. Perhaps the Government will say that the prohibited purpose requirement matches some of the offences in the National Security Act, where they are carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, but the National Security Act definition includes any foreign power, benign or malign. This, of course, is different, because a designated body has already been designated by the Secretary of State as a body that is— if I can use unparliamentary language—up to no good, and should therefore, in my view, be in a different category. Perhaps we have already established that demonstrating that they were acting innocently in support of it would be a high bar for any potential defendant to meet. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s view on that. Let me finish where I started. I agree with the purpose of the Bill; I think we all do, and it is clearly important for the Government to plug an evident gap in our legislative armoury. However, we must be certain that the way in which the Government are approaching the plugging of that gap is the right way, and that all these parts of the Bill fit together—not least, as we heard from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), with other parts of the sanctions and other regimes. It is that process that I hope the Minister will be able to deal with, either when she winds up this part of the debate or subsequently in Committee.

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    I think we agree about the threat we face and about its scale. We do not need to spend the four hours allocated for this debate sharing that agreement, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) rightly said. Our job is to scrutinise the Government’s proposed response to the threat, and that is what I want to do with my time. It is especially important to do that when the timescale for consideration of the legislation is compressed, as it is today. I have huge sympathy with those who have spoken about the IRGC, but I would counsel against using this legislation to make the final decision about its proscription or designation. I do not want to steal the Minister’s lines, but I suspect that she will say to us, rightly, that it is important that we do not set a precedent, under this new system, of making designations in primary legislation, rather than by ministerial decision. There is an important procedural point there, which it will be necessary to maintain if we want to defend the flexibility that I think the Government are seeking in this legislation. However, it is right to reflect on the problem that the Government are seeking to solve. The problem is clearly the gaps that they, and many of us, perceive in the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act, which does not enable them to deal with damaging behaviour by entities, including state entities, that are not captured by the proscription regime. That is the problem that Jonathan Hall identified in his report, and the problem that the Government are seeking to remedy through this legislation. They have made it clear that their objective is to present a regime that is broadly equivalent—the Government have used the word “equivalent” in their publications relating to this Bill—to the proscription regime. I want to explore that a little, to understand exactly how the Bill is going to deliver on its objectives. I will start, as the Bill does, with the grounds for designation. The Bill is clear that in order to designate a body under this legislation, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in what is described as “foreign power threat activity”, and then must consider that “designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.” It is important to understand what foreign power threat activity is. It is defined in section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 as “the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats”, which are set out in subsection (3), and include obtaining or disclosing protected information or trade secrets, assisting a foreign intelligence service, entering a prohibited place, sabotage, general foreign interference and obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service. Section 33 goes on to specify other acts: “serious violence against another person…endanger the life of another person, or…create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.” I set that out in detail because it is important to understand that for designation to be attached to a relevant body, it must have been involved in that sort of serious harmful activity. That is what would justify designation in the mind of the relevant Secretary of State: the body’s activities must be considered to be different from those of a normal state or other body engaged in its normal business. In the explanatory notes, the Government give examples of things that might result in designation, such as, in paragraph 21, “a foreign intelligence service obtaining protected information and inspecting sensitive defence or intelligence sites in the UK…a mercenary group carrying out acts of serious violence on behalf of a foreign power”, or, “a network preparing to carry out sabotage or threatening to commit acts that create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public”. I set all that out because the Bill creates an offence of supporting a designated body, but in the construction of that offence, it is clear that the Government do not believe that all acts or expressions of support for a designated body are sufficient for that criminal liability. I want to understand why not.

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    We need to be clear about which provisions relate to which offences. The offence that I think the Minister has heard concern expressed about, and to which amendment 3 relates, is the offence under proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023—in other words, the offence of supporting a designated organisation. The provisions that relate to protections for those who are acting on behalf of the UK state apply to the other two offences, not to the 17A offence, do they not? The Minister is of course right that there is a difference between the way in which the UK state needs to interact with another state entity and the way in which it needs to interact with a terrorist entity, but these offences relate to individuals not to states or, indeed, the designated body. We are talking about offences that might be charged against individuals who are themselves accused of supporting that designated body. Is not the point here—the point has been made several times—that we are setting up an additional hurdle in order to prosecute successfully for an offence of supporting a designated body? As the Minister heard me say on Second Reading, what I am concerned to understand is why that is not duplication, in effect, of the designation process itself, which distinguishes an innocent, perfectly rational state body from one that is up to no good for all the ways described in the designation process. Why do we need the prohibited purposes test in addition to the designation process?

  • 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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    I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I hope she accepts that I am genuinely trying to ensure that I have understood correctly how the test is supposed to work. I would be grateful if she also addressed the other point that I raised. I understand her argument that the intention is to ensure that, for example, those at NGO level who might engage with a designated body are not held criminally accountable for doing so. However, she will recognise that the Bill deals differently with the offences of assisting or obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. In those cases, there is provision for the defence that she has outlined, but that approach is not taken in relation to supporting a designated body. Can she explain why we have that difference?

  • 16 Jun 2026 · Community Hospitals · Hansard source
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    I am grateful to all Back-Bench contributors to the debate. We now move to the Front-Bench speeches, beginning with the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

  • 16 Jun 2026 · Community Hospitals · Hansard source
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    Order. I thank the hon. Lady for opening the debate, and remind all Back-Bench colleagues who wish to speak that they should continue to bob—not right now, but as the debate continues—so that I know they want to speak. I am hoping we can avoid any time limits this morning. We have five Back Benchers wishing to contribute, and if they limit themselves to about seven or eight minutes each, we should be fine.

  • 15 Jun 2026 · Social Media Ban for Under-16s · Hansard source
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    There is a great deal to welcome in what the Secretary of State has said, but she will know that detail really matters, so can I ask her two points of detail arising from her letter to Ofcom that was published today? First, she talks about launching “a rapid assessment of what highly effective age assurance looks like for determining whether someone is over 16.” Why is that work being commissioned after the announcement has been made, not before it, and given the integral importance of age assurance to her policy, is it not important for the Government to know that it can be delivered effectively? Secondly, on the child safety duties under the Online Safety Act, will the Secretary of State confirm that what is likely to happen is that a children’s access assessment will demonstrate that those platforms with highly effective age assurance in place will not need to go on and carry out a children’s risk assessment for anyone under the age of 16?

  • 8 Jun 2026 · Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill · Hansard source
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    I recognise that the hon. Gentleman does not normally engage in the detail of legislation, but if he did, he would know that this is the Committee stage, where we look at the detail. What the Government could perfectly properly do is pass the legislation, as amended by my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire, and if they felt at the end of the sunset clause period that they needed further powers, they could come back to this House with further primary legislation and seek our consent to do that. The difficulty with what we have before us is that the Secretary of State has the power to extend the sunset clause indefinitely, by regulations, over and over again. That is what the wording of the Bill says, and that seems to me to be something we should not accept here. What we should do is reinstate the natural, ordinary meaning of a sunset clause, which is set out in clause (3)(1), by removing the rest of that clause. If, as the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice) suggests, the Secretary of State wants to extend those powers, he should seek the authority to do so in primary, not secondary, legislation. These deficiencies in the Bill are cumulative: the power to indefinitely extend the Secretary of State’s proposed powers is more pernicious because the powers are so broad, and the huge latitude that he would have to define the public interest matters more because the Bill may apply to many more companies than might have been thought when hearing the Government’s original intentions for the Bill. Plus, of course, the Secretary of State’s consequent powers, which are set out in the rest of the Bill—having decided to nationalise and make that initial transfer decision—are mostly constrained only by the scrutiny of secondary legislation, so the initial transfer decision is all the more important. It is my view that the Secretary of State’s powers, as defined in clauses 1, 2 and 3, are simply too wide and need to be constrained. The Government make two substantive arguments in response to that view, and I want to address those arguments. The first, which the Minister put forward earlier, is that the Government are doing only what a previous Government did in the Banking Act 2009, and that the powers they seek to take here are no wider than those taken in that Act. I do not agree, for three reasons. The first reason is that the powers in the Banking Act were premised on the existence of a special resolution regime, where the bank in question was already in financial trouble. As far as I can tell, this Bill does not require the relevant steel undertaking to be in any trouble at all for nationalisation to be an option. The second reason is that the Act provides for a temporary transfer to public ownership. This Bill does not use the word “temporary”, and again, I can find nothing in the Bill that prevents a nationalisation being permanent. The third reason is that the Banking Act requires the Treasury to consult before using its powers under that Act. There is no requirement in this Bill for the Secretary of State to consult anyone, so I am afraid it is just not like the Banking Act. The Government’s second argument, which I discovered lurking in the memorandum from the Department for Business and Trade to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—I am sure we have all read it— is that broad powers such as the right to define the public interest are “buttressed by administrative law, including the need for interferences with property rights to be proportionate”. Of course, that is so: the courts may intervene if the Secretary of State tries to use his powers irrationally or unreasonably, but Parliament should not be subcontracting our work to the courts. If the legislative powers as drafted are too broad, it is up to the legislature—us—first and foremost to constrain them. The Secretary of State has consistently maintained, as has the Minister, that he wants only the powers needed to act where Government action is unavoidable, and only for the period needed, but the powers that he has in the Bill go well beyond that, and they could and should be restricted.

  • 8 Jun 2026 · Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill · Hansard source
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    I will focus my remarks on clauses 1 to 3 of the Bill and the breadth of the powers that they give to the Secretary of State. I start with the meaning of a “steel undertaking” in clause 1, which is one “that carries on a business consisting of or including…the manufacture or processing of steel, or…iron”. As the Minister will know, I raised in an intervention on the Secretary of State on Second Reading—indeed my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin), who speaks from the Front Bench, also mentioned this earlier—that that wording could appear to include undertakings that have as little as 1% of their business in iron or steel.

  • 8 Jun 2026 · Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill · Hansard source
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    I understand the logic of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. He has referred several times to the series of proposals being made in Committee by the Conservative party, as outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin). They come to this: that no Government should be able to create for themselves a very wide definition of what a steel undertaking should be, that they should not be able to define for themselves without restriction what the public interest may be, and that they should not be able to extend indefinitely, without parliamentary authority, the effect of the Bill. Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what he objects to in those proposals?

  • 8 Jun 2026 · Digital Safety: Children · Hansard source
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    The Minister is aware of my concern about the interaction between whatever the Government choose to ban and the workings of the Online Safety Act 2023 that we already have. I know the Minister recognises that that is an important interaction. Will he reassure me that the Government are fully aware that whether they ban access to social media entirely for children, or ban specific functionalities, we will need to ensure we do not undermine the duty of care that the OSA requires of social media platforms and others?

  • 3 Jun 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Response to Humble Address · Hansard source
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    Yes, I can—and this is an important point. The Intelligence and Security Committee wanted to be extremely clear that we took responsibility only for the redactions that we had considered and agreed. The Government, to be fair to them, have always accepted that those redactions that the Government made without the involvement of my Committee would appear on the documents differently, and they do. The House will be able to see exactly the difference when the documents are considered. I need to make it clear that I am not an enthusiast for the use of Humble Addresses to demand disclosure of documents at all, whichever party may choose to use them. That is simply because I think it is inappropriate to involve the monarch in a political argument, but if we are to have them, or indeed any other motions that demand the disclosure of material, we should be clear about the grounds on which the Government are entitled to redact that material.

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