James Wild MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clauses 75 and 76, as well as new clause 13 in my name. The clauses fit within the inheritance tax part of the Bill. In Committee of the whole House, we had debates on the family farm tax and the family business tax, and the damage and distress they are causing in rural communities, so I will not prolong that debate. I will focus briefly on clause 75, however, which tightens the rule on inheritance tax exemptions for gifts to charities and registered clubs, including sports and social clubs. Clause 76 provides limited protection for existing arrangements, seeking to prevent new restrictions from applying retrospectively or unfairly. New clause 13 would require the Treasury to publish a report on the impact of clause 75, including on the volume and value of charitable donations, the financial health of affected charities and clubs, donor behaviour and impact on Exchequer revenues. We agree with the principle, which the Minister set out, of ensuring that charitable reliefs are used as intended, but it is also important that the Government understand the practical consequence of any tightening of the rules. On Tuesday afternoon, we discussed some of the concerns that charities have about earlier provisions in the Bill, and the potential complexity and bureaucracy that was being added to them. We all know that the charitable sector is under significant pressure, and we do not want to add undue burdens on to trustees of charities in particular.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see the Exchequer Secretary in his place. Some Committee members may have felt that his ministerial colleague the Economic Secretary dealt with some clauses rather briefly in our earlier sittings, so we look forward to the loquaciousness that the Exchequer Secretary displayed on the Floor of the House the other day. I shall speak to clause 55 and to amendment 41 and new clause 10 in my name. The clause is about clawing back the winter fuel payment from anyone whose total taxable income is above £35,000. According to the Budget costings, this measure will cost about £1.8 billion in 2025-26, settling at £1.3 billion the year after, but overall the changes that the Government have made with the removal of winter fuel payments will save £450 million. However, the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group have raised concerns about the potential complexity of the clause; about how it could cause anxiety for people who have not had to navigate tax rules before; and about how the £35,000 per year cap will only diminish over time as inflation eats away at it. I have therefore tabled new clause 10, which would require the Government to review the case for uprating the £35,000 threshold by CPI each year, ensuring that it retains its value. I have also tabled amendment 41, which would go further and put that commitment squarely on the face of the Bill so that there can be no ambiguity about whether the level will increase. The Minister skated over a bit of the background to the clause. The measure flows from one of the Chancellor’s first political choices, which was to remove the winter fuel payment from all pensioners except those in receipt of pensioner credit. That meant that pensioners living on incomes of around £13,000 a year lost their winter fuel support. Vital support was pulled from millions of pensioners across the country. In my constituency, 22,000 pensioners lost their entitlement overnight; the figure may have been similar in your constituency, Mr Efford. It was a deeply damaging move, which is why organisations such as Age UK and my party campaigned against it, and the Chancellor was forced to come back to the Dispatch Box to perform one of her U-turns. In response to the pressure, the Government announced that everyone would get the payment but that it would be clawed back. I turn to the points that the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group have raised about the clause and the schedule. If a pensioner’s income is £1 over the threshold, they will lose the entire winter fuel payment; there is no taper. Unlike other income-related charge-backs, such as the high-income child benefit charge or the tapering of the personal allowance, the winter fuel payment is based on total income, not adjusted net income. It will affect pensioners who are seeking relief on their charitable contributions. Will the Minister explain why the Government have opted for a system that measures income in inconsistent ways, with different rules from similar income-dependent clawback schemes? The Bill sets out that the Government’s approach relies heavily on data sharing between the DWP, devolved social security bodies and HMRC. There are some exemptions, for example for those who have been on means-tested benefits during the qualifying week or who have opted out of receiving the payment, but if that information is not shared swiftly and accurately, instances may occur of administrative issues causing distress and financial loss. Pensioners could also see an unexpected tax code on their pay slip, clawing back money that they should never have been charged. That might lead them to have to fight through an appeals process just to claim what is rightfully theirs. The plan to collect the charge through PAYE, as is set out in the clause, brings its own issues. From 2027-28, HMRC will move to in-year coding, meaning that pensioners could start paying back a benefit that they have not even received yet, based on HMRC’s best guess at their income. As we all know, the winter fuel payment is a one-off payment that is usually paid in November, but PAYE collection is spread throughout the year, so pensioners could be having money clawed back that they have not yet received. If that estimate turns out to be wrong, they will have money taken off and refunded later. That is a recipe for potential confusion and hardship, and it could lead to more calls to HMRC that may go unanswered. In the year of transition, some pensioners could face being charged twice in a single tax year. That is not a minor administrative issue. It needs to be addressed. We all know that any fixed monetary threshold in legislation loses its real value over time, but if Ministers believe that £35,000 is the right level today, surely they accept that uprating in line with inflation is only fair. If the Minister will not support that principle outright, perhaps he will commit to supporting new clause 10, which simply asks for a review of the impact of doing so. Schedule 10 allows for the alteration of the limit, but there is no obligation on Ministers, as there is for other benefits, to review the level or uprate the limit.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes a valuable point. We want more certainty within the system, as far as possible. On earlier clauses, we debated the uncertainty that can come from having administrative rules that HMRC can interpret. Our amendment would give people confidence that their income and the benefit they receive would continue in real terms. Nobody disputes the need to focus support on those who need it most. Where the Chancellor got it wrong was in taking it away from people who are just over the £13,000 income threshold. If the Government insist on recovering payments, they need to get the fundamentals right, with clear definitions, robust data sharing and a simple route for challenging any mistakes that may have been made. Let us be clear. We welcome the Chancellor’s latest U-turn, reversing the very first decision she took in office. She was wrong to remove the benefit from millions of pensioners. This clause helps her to correct her poor political choice.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Following the 2024 Budget, the Government decided to implement a long-term residency test for inheritance tax. That is a 10-year residency in a 20-year time period. Clause 70 imposes an inheritance tax charge where there has been a change in the settlor’s long-term residence status. While this is not the 20% exit tax—one of the kites that was flown by someone near the Treasury ahead of the Budget—there is a risk about the message that it sends about encouraging people to this country. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has pointed out that individuals faced with the prospect of UK inheritance tax on their overseas trusts may already have decided to leave the UK and/or wind up the trust, an issue that was debated on Tuesday afternoon in relation to the clauses that pertain to non-doms. The measures that the Government are taking will undermine what we all want to see, which is more money being brought back into the UK and invested in our country. What conversations has the Minister had with groups such as Foreign Investors for Britain about these changes? How would he respond to their concerns?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  At present, when a disabled person uses their mobility benefits, such as the mobility component of the personal independence payment or disability living allowance, to lease a vehicle under the Motability scheme, that lease is zero-rated for VAT. Let us remember why Motability was created: it was established to help those with serious, long-term physical disabilities to access independence and mobility, not to provide subsidised cars for people with minor or temporary conditions. However, the numbers show that the scheme has expanded far beyond its original purpose. Last year, 815,000 people were using Motability vehicles, an increase of 170,000 in a single year. For many participants, their benefit covers the full cost of a three-year lease, so they pay nothing beyond their benefit entitlement. However, when someone chooses a more expensive model, such as a larger or higher-spec vehicle, they must make an up-front top-up payment. Until now, the entire lease, including that top-up, has been VAT-free, but clause 77 changes that. Under the new rules, only the proportion of the lease funded by the qualifying Motability payment will remain zero-rated, and any additional amount paid voluntarily will be subject to the standard rate of 20%. That is a fair and balanced reform that we wholeheartedly support. Clause 78 narrows the insurance premium tax relief for vehicle insurance linked to disability schemes. IPT is a 12% tax on most general insurance premiums. Many cars that are leased to disabled people currently benefit from that relief, even when the vehicles are standard, unadapted models. We welcome that the clause limits the relief to applying only to contracts for vehicles that are specifically adapted for wheelchair or stretcher users; for example, vehicles with ramps, lifts or structural changes supporting wheelchair access. If a vehicle has no such adaptation, premiums will rightly be subject to the 12% charge. Conservative Members have long argued for tighter focus and accountability in the Motability scheme, and I welcome the Government’s decision to act— we have been pushing them to do so. Sadly, we read in The Times this morning that the Prime Minister has apparently ruled out any wider reforms to welfare in the King’s Speech. Some of the growth we have seen in the Motability scheme, which the clauses will hopefully address, reflects genuine need, but much of it does not. That expansion raises questions about the eligibility standards and on whether taxpayers’ money is being used as intended. Motability should not be a back-door subsidy for people who do not meet the scheme’s original intent, which was to help those with serious disabilities. As the Minister said, over the scorecard this measure makes a significant saving that is a meaningful contribution to public finances, which we welcome and support. Taxpayer resources should be targeted more effectively to ensure fairness. However, the measures in the Budget overall raise people’s taxes to pay for more welfare spending. We consider that to be the wrong choice. We welcome the fact that the clause mitigates some of that additional welfare spending, but overall, this is a welfare spending Budget.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, the clause introduces a new anti-avoidance provision aimed at arrangements involving non-derecognition liabilities. These are complex structures whereby a company transfers assets to another entity, but under accounting rules continues to recognise those assets and related liabilities on its own balance sheets. Such structures are of course common in securitisations, which are an important part of the UK’s financial landscape. In these arrangements an originating company passes on the economic risks and rewards with an asset, yet maintains the asset on its books. Used properly, these arrangements serve a legitimate commercial purpose. However, as the Minister said, there are examples of people bending or breaking the rules. Can he give the Committee a flavour of how prevalent he thinks that bending or breaking of the rules is? The provisions of this clause seek to correct any rule-breaking by denying tax deductions where their main purpose is to seek to gain a tax advantage by exploiting non-derecognition accounting. The Opposition strongly support efforts to tackle avoidance and close loopholes that undermine trust in the tax system, and efforts to bring the tax gap down—as the last Government successfully did, and this Government are, I am sure, continuing to seek to do—but, as always, the details matter.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Charities are a very important topic. We need to ensure that we give it appropriate scrutiny, given the importance of charities in our society and communities. Clause 52 and new clause 6—which I will speak to—relate to extending the definition of attributable income to include legacies left to charities. In practice, that means that when a charity receives a gift left in a person’s will, it could face a tax charge if that money is not spent on its charitable activities. How charities use their funds is a topical subject in the context of the Church of England, which is planning to spend £100 million on its fund for healing, repair and justice—effectively a reparation fund for slavery, which many consider not to be an appropriate use of the funds, or what people gave funds to the Church for. I now turn to the clause. The change will apply to gifts made on or after 6 April this year. New clause 6, in my name—it bears repetition—would require the Chancellor, within six months of the Act becoming law, to publish a report on the impact of the measure on charitable giving through estates and on the wider impact on the charity sector. Concerns have been raised that expanding rules to cover legacies could have unwelcome implications if charities do not apply inherited funds quickly enough to their charitable purposes, leading to them being taxed. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales warns that that uncertainty, particularly around the timing, may discourage potential donors from including charities in their wills. Clearly, none of us would wish to see that. HMRC has said that it will not set a deadline for how soon money must be used, although that ambiguity creates issues in itself. If the rules are unclear, HMRC could later decide that a gift has not been applied appropriately and withdraw the tax relief, undermining confidence that legacy gifts to charities will remain tax-free. Perhaps the Minister could give the Committee some clarity on that point, and on how HMRC will determine what counts as timely or appropriate application of funds. There is also a concern about the administrative burden it may place, particularly on smaller charities, which will have to prove that each legacy received has been properly applied to charitable purposes, even when the money is placed in long-term endowments or reserves. The Charity Finance Group warns that the changes could mean more record keeping, compliance checks and bureaucracy, taking money away from frontline charitable activities and towards administration. I do not think that anyone would wish to see that. I do not know whether the Minister has anything more to add on that complexity. Adding complexity could also make life harder for executors and delay the administration of estates, which could affect the timing of cash flows to charities at a time when finances in the sector are under considerable pressure, and income is critical for them to do their job. There is also a risk that wealthier donors might think twice about leaving legacies to smaller charities, if they think that the charity might struggle to comply with HMRC rules. I am really asking for the Minister’s assurance that HMRC will take a sensible and proportionate approach, particularly with smaller charities that are seeking to do the right thing in applying these rules. We all want to avoid the potential risk that this measure could deter charitable giving, when that is clearly not the intention. It is important that the concerns raised by the sector are aired in the Committee, and it is our role to do so.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clause 54 and to new clauses 8 and 9 tabled in my name. The clause makes significant changes to how tainted donations are treated. At present the donation is considered tainted only if it was made with an improper purpose. This clause replaces the motive-based test with an outcome test. If someone connected to the donor under the new regime receives financial assistance from a charity, such as a grant, guarantee or loan, the donation will be deemed tainted regardless of the donor’s intent. I have tabled new clause 8 to require the Government to publish a report on how the change affects legitimate charitable giving, or genuinely tackles tax abuse. New clause 9 would require a review of the implementation of the new outcome test after two years and would assess whether it proves to be clearer than the existing purpose test. The Minister and the Government said that this measure is about tightening anti-avoidance rules and the challenge of proving intent. But I have been approached by the Charity Finance Group, which represents over 1,400 organisations and manages one third of the sector’s £20 billion annual income, and it has raised concerns around the change. It warned that the outcome test could unfairly penalise both donors and charities for results outwith their control. For example, a donor could make a genuine good faith contribution only for a charity months later to make a routine investment or financial arrangement that inadvertently benefits a linked person. That donor could then find themselves caught by the anti-avoidance rules without ever having done anything wrong. That could cause uncertainty and raise concerns about people leaving legacy gifts that the charity sector relies on. It is not just the charity and that one body. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has warned that donors may have limited influence over the outcome once the donation has been made. It, too, questions the fairness and practicality of shifting from a motive to an outcome test. Indeed, it proposes that the existing rules are not altered for that precise reason. We tabled the two new clauses to introduce proper scrutiny of the measures and ensure Parliament understands the effect on the charitable sector and whether donations continue to be given. Does the Minister consider there is a risk that shifting to such an approach could have the effect that the charitable sector has set out? If so, will she commit to perhaps providing some practical guidance, with examples that charities and their compliance teams could look at so that they can see that charitable giving is not undermined? None of us on this Committee would want to do anything that would undermine the ability of charities to raise money and disincentivise anyone from giving money for fear that they might be caught inadvertently by rules when they have done nothing wrong.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, this is a fairly straightforward measure allowing HMRC to pay interest to companies that have had to hand over money under a now overturned EU state aid ruling relating to the controlled foreign company rules. The 2019 ruling was subsequently annulled. My only question for the Minister is: does the clause mark the final chapter in the UK’s compliance with the EU state aid rules relating to the controlled foreign companies regime, or could other outstanding matters give rise to further issues or payments?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 49 and schedule 7 make changes to the rules that decide, where a company has a permanent establishment in the UK, how its profits are then taxed and when they apply. The Minister talked about modernising and simplifying the rules to bring them into line with international best practice. To clarify, in November 2025 the OECD published new guidance on the definition of a “permanent establishment”. Can the Minister confirm whether the UK’s current approach reflects that updated guidance, as I have been advised that it does not? Some expert bodies have pointed out that the OECD changes are generally helpful and would bring more consistency across countries, so does the Minister agree that it would make sense for the UK to broadly adopt them? Is that the Government’s approach, or have they deliberately decided to have a set of UK rules? If so, what is the purpose of that, considering that we might be dealing with multinational companies operating in multiple jurisdictions that would have to follow separate rules when the OECD has brought together a coherent package?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 47 and schedule 6 mark an evolution in the UK’s transfer pricing regime. The Opposition recognise the importance of getting this right: it goes to the heart of how multinational profits are attributed and taxed, and therefore how we ensure that companies pay the correct amount of tax in this country. The principle behind transfer pricing is simple, even if it is rarely simple in practice. I believe that these measures flow from a consultation process launched by the last Conservative Government, so they have a good origin. I hope that they will lead to greater certainty and reduce the burden that some companies may face.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Well, indeed. I will come on to the detail. On the broader point, we support the initiative behind these measures—to encourage people to bring more of their money to the UK, precisely so it can help fund our public services. Our concern is about the implementation, and I will come on to some of the comments that representatives of the Chartered Institute of Taxation, who are widely acknowledged as experts in this area, have raised about the complexity and the retrospective elements. As I said, schedule 3 is in three parts. Part 1 relates to relief for new residents on foreign income and gains—FIG. Under the new FIG regime, when someone moves to the UK, they do not pay UK tax on their foreign income for the first four years here. That is very sensible, but the Government have made claiming that relief so complicated that honest taxpayers risk falling into traps simply through lack of awareness. I hope the Government will take account of the following sensible steps suggested by the Chartered Institute of Taxation: first, to remove the requirement to report every possible element of FIG as part of the claim, and instead making relief from UK tax on FIG the default position; similarly, extending the relief to the personal representatives of a deceased individual who themselves qualified; and finally, simplifying the legislation by aligning the income tax position on trust distributions with the capital gains position. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response on those points when she winds up. Part 2 relates to the temporary repatriation facility, clarifies how remittances to the UK under that temporary facility should be matched to their original source. For years, non-domiciled individuals could keep foreign money offshore, paying UK tax only if they brought it here. The TRF offers a window until 2028, precisely to encourage people to bring money to the UK at reduced rates of 12% in the next two years or 15% in ’27-28. That is, as I said to the hon. Member for Burnley, a good idea in principle, but the devil, as ever, is in the detail. Our friends at the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out some serious concerns that there are several paragraphs within the schedule—which I see the hon. Member turning to—that do not appear to work as intended or that produce unintended consequences. First, they believe that, as drafted, the new offshore income gains paragraph introduced here leads to an anomaly in the way that trust distributions are matched where a trust has generated offshore income gains. That results in trusts with surplus pre-6 April 2025 capital gains tax being treated differently from those without. We do not believe that to be the Government’s intention; perhaps the Minister can clarify. Secondly, investments clearly fall in value, but under this legislation, if someone invested foreign income overseas and it is now worth less, they will still pay the temporary repatriation facility charge on the original higher amount. That could mean paying 12% tax on £100,000 even though the investment is worth only £60,000. Do Committee members think that is fair? Do they think it will encourage or discourage the repatriation of funds that this facility is designed to encourage, to help support our economy and public services? I would contend that the incentive, as a result, is to keep the money out of the UK, which is not what we on the Opposition side—or, I believe, on the Government side—of the Committee want to see. We therefore tabled amendment 30 to remedy this issue, and I encourage Members to support us on it when the moment comes. Thirdly, the Bill contains retrospective taxation. Let us be clear: retrospective taxation should be reserved for the most egregious tax avoidance, but here, trustees who made payments to beneficiaries in good faith after April, relying on existing law, may now face double taxation because of rules that look backwards. That is not about closing a loophole; it is about changing the rules after people have already acted. Our amendments 31 and 32 would ensure that double taxation does not apply retrospectively. Fourthly, in this clause and schedule the Government have created arbitrary restrictions so that the TRF is available only to UK residents. Why should someone temporarily living abroad not be able to use this facility? The temporary non-residence rule means that they will be paying UK tax when they return anyway, so why not let them use the TRF? The rules create a situation where someone who wants to pay tax voluntarily is not able to do so. Our amendment 33 would ensure that the TRF is available to both UK residents and non-residents. Similar concerns have also been raised regarding offshore trusts. The temporary repatriation facility applies a 12% or 15% rate to the personal FIG of individuals who have previously used the remittance basis as well as certain capital payments from offshore trusts. This was to encourage the winding-up of foreign trust structures. Right now, though, the trusts part works only if the beneficiary getting the capital could have used the remittance basis in their own right. That creates an unfair outcome in families where one beneficiary has used the remittance basis but another has always paid full UK tax on worldwide income, because only the former can benefit from the lower temporary repatriation rate if the trust is wound up. Perhaps I could give the Committee an example to illustrate this point further: a family has an offshore trust for two adult children and one child previously used special tax rules while the other has always paid full UK tax. Under this Bill, only the first child could benefit from the TRF when the trust is wound up. That does not encourage bringing money to the UK but, I would contend, actively discourages it. Amendment 34 would therefore enable offshore trust beneficiaries who have not themselves used the remittance basis to use the TRF. Amendment 35 would enable trustees to pay a temporary repatriation facility charge on the trust’s past FIG while retaining the funds within the trust, without having to make capital payments to the beneficiary. Amendments 1 and 2, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin), relate to this issue. The Government refer to the temporary repatriation facility as encouraging wealthy people to stay and invest here, and the Treasury is counting on these measures to raise a significant sum for public services, although I note that the OBR suggests there is considerable uncertainty about that. However, we know that the wealthiest people—the wealthiest investors, the people who are supporting our entrepreneurs and the high-growth businesses that we want to see—are leaving the UK as a result of steps that the Chancellor has taken. By some estimates, 10,000 people have already got on a plane and left—those are figures from Oxford Economics. We can debate whether the number is 10,000 or 5,000, but some figures suggest that the equivalent of 750,000 basic rate taxpayers have left the country. So this is not about ideology; it is about giving certainty and addressing the points that the Bill as drafted does not. The TRF could become unusable for some because of the risks it exposes them to. There is the double taxation, which I have talked about, as well as the retrospective elements, but in addition, accusations of tax avoidance could arise from using a scheme that Parliament has itself created and lead to potentially lengthy investigations. People are leaving, and the Chartered Institute of Taxation has said that tax rules under the measure make the UK a less attractive destination for people. It should be easier to understand and apply measures aimed at getting people to bring money back to the UK. There is a risk that, as drafted, these measures drive against the Government’s intention. Amendments 1 and 2 are tabled in a constructive spirit. Amendment 1 would stop the double counting, and amendment 2 is about the retrospective and unfair action. They would provide the certainty that, according to some experts in this field, is currently missing. Without the TRF being attractive, we will not be able to get the money coming into the country. I urge the Minister to respond more fully than she did in her opening remarks and to consider whether, on Report or at a later stage, amendments could be tabled to deliver the clarity that my amendments and those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor offer. Without clear guidance, ordinary commercial transactions could inadvertently be caught. The Government must publish comprehensive examples, or businesses and individuals will be left guessing. When Ministers replaced the long-standing non-dom regime last year, they promised a clean, modern and transparent framework, yet within a year we have a schedule of corrective provisions to make the legislation operate “as intended”. That rather suggests that the original drafting was not as watertight as claimed, and that further tweaks along the lines we have suggested might still be needed before the system settles.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak clause 53 and new clause 7, which was tabled in my name. My comments will reflect submissions from people involved in the charitable sector and my discussions with them. The clause extends the allowable purpose to all categories of recognisable charitable investment—at present, it applies to only one, but it will cover all 12. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has raised a suggestion that the test be reframed from “for the sole purpose of” to “wholly or mainly” to the benefit of the charity. The concern is that there could be increased obligations for compliance on trustees who have to demonstrate that their every investment in, for example, their portfolio was made for the benefit of the charity rather than an ancillary purpose therein. Was that more flexible approach something that the Government have considered, and if so why did they chose to reject it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause introduces schedule 5, which will repeal the diverted profits tax and replace it with new rules to tax unassessed transfer pricing profits within the corporation tax regime, coming into effect for periods beginning on or after 1 January. The diverted profits tax will continue to apply for prior accounting periods. In effect, the clause creates a higher tax charge on profits that should have been taxed here, but were shifted out of the UK by using non-market prices between groups. Like the DPT, the new transfer pricing profits rules are intended to target structured arrangements that are designed to erode the UK tax base by omitting profits that are subject to transfer pricing. These unassessed transfer pricing profits will be taxed at a rate that is six percentage points higher than corporation tax. In simple terms, if a global business structures its arrangements to shift profits from the UK in a pricing manipulation, HMRC will be able to bring those diverted profits into UK tax at a higher, penalty-style rate. In principle, we support that approach. Moving away from the stand-alone tax and bringing diverted profits under corporation tax provides better treaty access and clarity, and clearly the six percentage point charge works as a deterrent, as countries that play games with their transfer policies will risk paying more tax than if they had priced their UK dealings properly in the first place. However, I would welcome the Minister’s response to the concerns that the Chartered Institute of Taxation has raised about the drafting of the clause. First, the new tax design condition is very broad: it captures transactions designed to reduce, eliminate or delay UK tax liability. There is a question as to whether legitimate commercial decisions made for regulatory compliance or capital requirements could be caught by the condition simply because they are deliberate and happen to reduce tax liability, even when tax planning is not the primary motive. I know that is not the intention behind the drafting, but that point has been raised, so I hope that the Minister will respond in order to avoid any uncertainty as to whether businesses that think they are operating within the law, without seeking to reduce, eliminate or delay tax liability, may be captured. Will the existing arrangements be grandfathered? Can HMRC revisit settled positions under these broader rules? As the Chartered Institute of Taxation rightly says, it is unsatisfactory to pass legislation with a wide definition and simply hope that HMRC guidance and rules will narrow it down later. That is not how we in Parliament should legislate. We discussed the loan charge during this morning’s sitting; HMRC applied rules in a way that most MPs did not consider reasonable, and we have now had to make changes through this Bill to address that historical issue. The law should be made clear in the Bill, not left to administrative interpretation. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed how many multinational companies HMRC estimates are using pricing manipulation to avoid tax. Can she guarantee that legitimate business structures that have previously been accepted by HMRC under the DPT will not suddenly fall foul of the scope of the new rules? Will she also comment on the main purpose test, to provide clarity and certainty for businesses?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 4 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. As the Minister says, clause 48 introduces a power for HMRC to implement a new reporting obligation: the ICTS, which will come into force in 2027. This new power would require businesses engaged in significant cross-border transactions to disclose specified information about their dealings. Rightly, the intention is to give HMRC better tools to identify transfer pricing and international tax risks that could affect the tax take, and to allow it to conduct more efficient and better-targeted compliance activity. I recognise that objective and support it in principle. I agree that the ICTS could help HMRC to identify risk earlier and to avoid wasting the time of the Department and businesses. Chasing down questions and embarking on inquiries can often lead nowhere and can cost businesses time that could be spent on growing their business. However, it is also important that the Government explain how the system will work in practice and how it will be seen to work. Our new clause 4 would therefore require a report on the impact of these changes on cross-border trade and the administrative burden on businesses. During the consultation last year, the Treasury acknowledged that more needed to be said about how the data collected through the ICTS system would be used and how it would fit alongside existing obligations such as master and local files. That remains a crucial point of detail that the industry and advisers will be looking for as this measure is implemented. Can the Minister shed some light on those concerns today? As the Minister rightly says, most major economies already have some equivalent form of reporting, but it should be pointed out that the differences between them are significant. Australia, for example, operates a single transaction-driven disclosure process through its international dealings schedule; the United States of America relies on a more fragmented, relationship-based approach spread across multiple forms. Each system clearly has its benefits and disadvantages. What matters is that each country has a clear, consistent model to which businesses can understand and readily adapt. What the Government seem to be proposing is a hybrid. That might mean that we have the best of both worlds—let us all hope so—but it might also lead to an approach that is inconsistent with the systems that some multinationals already have. The Treasury has said that it will consult on detailed regulations in the spring of this year. We welcome that commitment. Can the Minister give an assurance that she will make sure that businesses and representative bodies will be closely involved in shaping how the system is put into practice? With the planned 2027 start date, there is not a lot of time to get the rules in place or for companies to build or modify systems to provide the new data. Can that be done without causing undue cost and disruption to businesses? Finally, I want to make a slighter broader point on the clause. We clearly understand the importance of robust compliance and the need to protect the UK tax base on behalf of our constituents so that we can deliver public services. However, each new requirement—whether it is the ICTS, pillar two returns or transfer pricing documentation—adds to the cumulative impact on businesses. We need to see these obligations in the round, not as each one being reasonable on its own terms. What is the overall picture of what we are imposing on companies? If that load becomes too great, the UK will be seen as a less attractive place to invest, which is certainly not what we want. Although we support the principle of better risk assessment, we continue to press Ministers to ensure that we have proportionate and workable solutions that add value for HMRC, businesses and our constituents. New clause 4 would simply require a report setting out those impacts. I would add that, according to the Budget costings, the reporting duty would raise around £25 million in 2026-27, growing to £350 million a year, helping HMRC to tackle artificial profit shifting. That is welcome, but we should also consider the one-off and ongoing costs for businesses that have to re-engineer their systems. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response to my points about implementation and whether the hybrid model will actually be the best of both worlds.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 45 will extend the PAYE notification process to include treaty non-residents and introduce the 30% cap, to which the Minister referred, on overseas workday relief that can be claimed through PAYE. In simple terms, clause 45 and schedule 4 will change how employers operate PAYE for people who move to the UK but are treated as resident in another country under a tax treaty. The clause will let employers agree with HMRC that the part of the employee’s salary that is expected to be exempt overseas be left out of PAYE during the year, and it will formally limit how much foreign employment relief can be given to 30%. The changes under the clause will require employers to send further notification to HMRC whenever there is a change in the employee’s circumstances that affects the proportion of earnings subject to PAYE. That sounds reasonable in practice, but I want an assurance from the Minister about the potential administrative burden that it will place on employers. It could mean that employers will now be expected to monitor the day-to-day working practices of globally mobile working employees. They will need to track whether individuals are working from home or from a hotel room in Boston, which is not necessarily a simple task. For multinational companies with hundreds of employees, this represents a potentially significant compliance burden at a time when we want to reduce the burdens on business. For smaller businesses venturing into international markets for the first time, it could be a disincentive—indeed, a barrier—to their trying to do so. The Government must provide clear, comprehensive guidance on exactly what level of review and monitoring employers are expected to undertake not to fall foul of the rules. Without that clarity and guidance, we risk creating a compliance minefield in which well-meaning employers inadvertently break rules that they could not reasonably be expected to follow. Guidance can help employers to comply with the law, as we all want them to do. The Government like to talk about making Britain the best place to do business and to champion our competitive advantage in attracting global talent—we have just discussed one area in which that may or may not be the reality—but we should seek to avoid introducing measures that potentially add to the compliance burden without giving guidance to employers. I hope that the Minister can assure the Committee that she will look at the case for publishing clear guidance to ensure that businesses are not adversely impacted.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clause 50 and to new clause 5, which is in my name. Clause 50 will amend parts of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2023 and implement the multinational top-up tax and domestic top-up tax. As I set out in the last Finance Bill Committee, in October 2021 more than 135 countries signed up to the G20/OECD agreement on reforming international transactions and taxation, which the clause refers to—a major achievement that aims to ensure that multinational groups pay a fair share of tax where they generate profits. Pillar two delivers a minimum global effective tax rate of 15% for large multinational groups in every country they operate in, and the UK has been one of the first jurisdictions to legislate for the changes. New clause 5 would require the Chancellor to review the changes on a six-monthly basis and lay before Parliament a report assessing three key issues: whether other major economies are implementing pillar two on comparable timelines and with comparable scope, whether any competitive disadvantage is arising for UK-based multinationals, and the impact of differentiated treatment for the United States. Crucially, if that review identified a material competitive disadvantage to the UK and UK businesses, the Treasury would be obliged to provide remedial measures within three months. In rejecting new clause 5—another new clause that asks for a review—the Minister says that the Treasury is always conducting regular reviews of measures. If it is conducting this work anyway, why not share it with Parliament, and accept that it is a proportionate step to ensure ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in a very important area—a level playing field for British firms? The Minister referred to the length of the schedule. The sheer volume of amendments, coming less than two years after pillar two was first introduced, highlights the extreme technical complexity of the global minimum tax and the challenges for businesses that have to comply with it to keep up to date. The Government’s aim is to ensure that UK rules remain consistent with the OECD model legislation, and schedule 8 is therefore aligned with the guidance and technical fixes. Those are sensible to maintain international consistency, but throughout last year there was growing international uncertainty about pillar two, the subject of the clause, as political divergence emerged over how it should operate, particularly regarding the treatment of US-parented companies. The Minister referred to the side-by-side agreement made between G7 Governments last summer—and formalised, I think, this month—allowing certain UK and US multinationals to be exempt from parts of the rules while retaining access to the newly defined safe harbours. The agreement might bring some short-term stability, but it raises questions, and clearly we will be scrutinising it when, as the Minister said, it comes forward in future legislation. The US Treasury Secretary has described the side-by-side deal as “a historic victory in preserving US sovereignty and protecting American workers and businesses from extraterritorial overreach.” Will the Minister comment on what pillar two means in that context and on the UK’s position? The impacts that might flow from that are precisely why new clause 5 is needed. The Government say that the UK is aligned with international developments, but the international landscape is shifting. Other major economies have delayed implementation or have adopted narrower regimes; meanwhile, the US has its own agreement and has not legislated for this framework at all. Without scrutiny, the risk is that UK-headquartered multinationals will find themselves complying with complex and burdensome rules, while their competitors operating elsewhere face a lighter regime. I simply note that the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out that it thinks the burdens of pillar two “continue to appear disproportionate to the amount of tax that will be raised”. If the Government truly believe that the regime provides a balanced and proportionate approach to a level playing field and that we can be assured that the competitive advantage does not go to other countries, let us have that report, see it set out to Parliament and have the matter resolved. To conclude, international co-operation on tax is essential, but we need to ensure not only that the UK is honouring its commitments, but that other countries are meeting theirs, so that UK companies are not losing out as a result.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister says, clause 42 abolishes the notional tax credit that non-residents have historically been able to claim on their UK dividend income. Under the current system, non-domiciled individuals can offset that notional credit against other UK income streams, such as rented income or partnership profits. However, from April, that arrangement will no longer apply. Non-residents will no longer be treated as having already paid UK tax on dividends received from UK companies, meaning that they will lose the ability to reduce their overall UK tax liability from using the credit. It is worth noting that UK residents lost access to the notional dividend tax credit back in April 2016, so in one sense the clause simply removes what is perceived as a potential unfair advantage enjoyed by non-UK residents. The disregarded income regime will continue to operate, providing some limitation on the tax paid by non-residents in specific circumstances. We need to look at the clause, and the ones coming up, in the broader context. It represents a shift in how UK tax dividends flow to foreign investors and, in practice, it will effectively increase the tax rate burden on dividend recipients who are non-UK residents. At a time when the UK needs to attract international capital, we need to look at the measures in the Budget as a whole and whether they strengthen or undermine our competitive position. Attracting capital to be invested was a topic that we discussed this morning. International investors might be forgiven for concluding that the Chancellor is creating a tax and regulatory environment that feels increasingly unpredictable compared with some of our international competitors. Stability and certainty matter enormously in investment decisions. [ Interruption. ] The Chartered Institute of Taxation has also raised concerns about the figures underlying this policy. The Treasury estimates in the famous tax information and impact note, which was referred to by the Minister, that fewer than 1,000 resident individuals will be affected. The institute has questioned whether that can be accurate, given what its professional members are seeing on the ground. There is particular uncertainty about whether non-resident trust taxpayers have been properly included within those calculations. I welcome a response and assurance from the Minister either way on that. That said, even the institute agrees that those impacted will represent a small minority of the overall non-resident taxpayer population. We concur that this charge brings a welcome simplification to tax calculations.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister has skirted over quite a few detailed issues rather briefly. It will reassure the Committee to know that I intend to take a bit more time to go through what are detailed and important principles, and to reflect on questions raised in an earlier clause—how competitive we are, what we want to do, and whether we want to attract wealthy people to the country. I will initially speak to clause 43, schedule 3 and amendments 30 to 35, which were tabled in my name. Clause 43 introduces schedule 3 of the Bill, and members of the Committee will see that the schedule runs to 14 pages of complex detail, so it is important that we properly scrutinise it. Those pages make various changes to the foreign income and gains regime brought into effect by the Finance Act 2025. On the surface, this may look like a simple tidying-up exercise, but on closer inspection it raises some important questions about the coherence of the Government’s overall approach to taxing globally mobile individuals. While we support fair taxation, this Government have once again produced needlessly complex legislation that contains retrospective elements and leaves ordinary people potentially facing unexpected tax bills.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Support for Businesses · Hansard source

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  The Chancellor promised hospitality firms that she would lower their taxes, but her business rate raid is hammering every town, village, city and high street. This is not just an attack on pubs; hotels, cafés, music venues and many more are being hit. It is two months since the Budget caused huge worry for these businesses, and we await details of this latest U-turn, but the key question is: does the Chancellor get it? Does she get that it is not just pubs but hospitality, leisure and retail businesses that need support because of her terrible choices?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member and I agree about the importance of long-term certainty. People who are watching the proceedings may wonder why we did not just table an amendment to extend the scope to 2030, but due to the narrowness of the measures passed by the House, we are unable to do so. As I weigh up whether to push my new clause to a vote in a few weeks’ time, will the hon. Member consider supporting it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, these clauses are mainly technical, tidying-up measures, but they are worthy of debate none the less. Clause 31 clarifies the corporation tax treatment of payments made in return for the surrender of research and development expenditure credit, audiovisual expenditure credit or video games expenditure credit for payments made on or after November 2025. This technical clarification ensures that, when companies sell or surrender tax credits, the accounting treatment is consistent and correct. R&D expenditure credit has been in place since 2013 to support companies carrying out R&D, and these creative industry expenditure credits will fully replace the old film, high-end TV, animation, children’s TV and video games tax reliefs from April 2027. At the moment, there is no agreed approach between tax authorities and companies on how to treat payments received when these credits are surrendered for corporation tax purposes, which has created uncertainty. Clause 31 will hopefully put that beyond doubt by setting out a clear tax treatment in law, and HMRC will update its guidance manuals to reflect the new rules. Does the Minister have any figures—I do not have the TIINs to hand on this one—on whether that uncertainty has cost companies, or cost the Government, in lost revenue? Clause 32 corrects transitional rules between the video games tax relief and the video games expenditure credit to ensure that the new expenditure credit works fairly for games that are moving over from the old relief. It corrects how the expenditure credit is calculated for transitional games—those that already have tax relief claims and then opt into the new scheme—so that companies do not get too much or too little relief, simply because the old regime used European expenditure while the new one uses UK expenditure. In effect, clause 32 ensures that companies switching schemes do not get double relief or under-relief. Can the Minister provide an estimate of how many video games development companies will be affected by this transitional correction, and whether any have suffered financial detriment under the previous rules? Clause 33 makes changes to the special credit for visual effects, which is part of the audiovisual expenditure credit, as the Committee will be aware. It prevents the calculation for additional credit from producing incorrect results, correcting anomalies in the visual effects credit calculation. The explanatory notes explain that, without this fix, certain combinations of expenditure could generate incorrect credit amounts or negative values, so clause 33 ensures that the scheme operates as intended and that the special credit scheme is neither more nor less generous than intended. Does the Minister have any figures on how many production companies have experienced calculation errors as a result of the previous rules?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  We will look sympathetically on the hon. Gentleman’s new clauses if he chooses to press them to a vote. I have constituents who were heavily pressured by HMRC and ended up settling, which left them at a considerable financial loss, so I share his concern that those people, who were effectively bullied by HMRC, will now not get the same support as people who held out.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  As we have heard, clause 30 will extend the 100% first-year allowance for expenditure on zero emission cars, including EVs, and EV charging points. As the Minister said, the extension runs for a year to March 2027 for corporation tax and April 2027 for income tax purposes. Our new clause, consistent with other amendments that we have tabled, would simply ask the Chancellor to come back and report to Parliament, and to the public, on the impact of her measures. I do not really understand this reluctance to understand the actual impact of the measures. As part of the Government’s broader regulatory reform approach, they seem keen on post-implementation reviews, but the Treasury holds out alone against its homework being scored, it would seem. We want to consider whether long-term support should continue to be provided to maintain UK competitiveness in green technology. It is, in essence, a call for evidence that could make a difference to business confidence and investment. The allowance was first introduced in 2002 for low emission cars, and the threshold was tightened over time, reaching zero emissions from April 2021. The extension continues that policy, but only for a year, and the Government’s own costings suggest that the extension will cost £145 million. Businesses planning multi-year fleet transitions and charging infrastructure investments face repeated cliff edges. Each year, a one-year window does not help a company planning to electrify its fleet in two years’ time; it simply rewards those who are able to accelerate the investment within the next 12 months. Does the Minister recognise that it creates a stop-start approach that could discourage investment, undermine industry confidence and, ultimately, slow the UK’s transition to clean, green technology? That is odd when, in many ways, the Government are accelerating full throttle towards 2030 electrification across the grid. Members may have pylons and other pieces of grid infrastructure being dumped in their constituencies, with no public recourse, in the name of the Energy Secretary’s net zero goals. It is worth asking whether their policy is joined up if it includes these incremental extensions. In that spirit, I have tabled new clause 3 so that hon. Members can judge whether the Government have a coherent approach. It would require the Chancellor to assess, transparently and on the record, whether a long-term support system is justified to keep Britain competitive in the global race for green manufacturing. A formal assessment would give Parliament and businesses the information they need to plan ahead. In the debate on clause 11, the Minister referred to the long-term certainty provided by committing to a 25% corporation tax rate for this Parliament. Of course, that is not actually in the legislation, but we welcome that commitment and the greater certainty, and similar certainty could be given in this area. A formal assessment could also ensure that public money is being used wisely and that policy provides the certainty to unlock the investment we all want to see. Given their 2030 obsession, why have the Government again chosen a one-year extension that provides limited certainty for fleet operators or for the charging infrastructure sector? I see that the hon. Member for Banbury is getting ready to dive into the debate. Will the Minister support new clause 3 and commit to a proper assessment of the lasting framework that is needed to secure Britain’s place in the green technology economy of the future?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clauses 14 and 15 are a story of two halves. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation rather adeptly put it—we are grateful for its support in scrutinising the Bill—these changes give with one hand and take with the other. We support clause 14, but we have doubts about clause 15. Both clauses deal with our risk capital schemes—the enterprise investment scheme and venture capital trusts. EIS was introduced in the UK in 1994 to stimulate economic growth and, along with VCTs, these Government-backed schemes encourage individuals to invest in smaller high-risk trading companies by offering tax reliefs on their investment. As a former adviser in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, I helped to develop these schemes, as well as the seed enterprise investment scheme. I recognise their importance. As the venture capital industry has noted, these are essential tools in unlocking private capital for early-stage, high-growth UK businesses, which we all support, particularly in the knowledge-intensive sectors such as life sciences, clean energy and deep tech; however, companies now routinely require £20 million to £30 million in funding before they start to sell their products. The previous limits had prevented UK investors from following their initial investment with more capital, forcing businesses to turn to overseas capital too early. That is a problem I think we all want to fix. The main difference between the schemes is that with EIS an investor buys shares directly in an eligible company, whereas with VCTs the investor buys shares in a listed fund-like vehicle, which then spreads their money across a portfolio of qualifying companies. These clauses increase the annual and lifetime investment limits for the EIS and VCTs in Great Britain and raise the gross asset thresholds for qualifying companies. Clause 14 increases the annual and lifetime investment limits for the EIS and VCTs, and raises gross asset thresholds. These limits have not been uprated since 2018 for knowledge-intensive companies and 2015 for other companies. Now, all limits are being doubled, which is welcome. As we have heard, for both schemes, the limit will rise from £10 million to £20 million. The total amount that can be raised over time will increase to £40 million for those knowledge-intensive firms. The gross assets yield for qualifying companies will go up to £30 million before a share issue and £35 million thereafter. TheCityUK has said that schemes such as EIS remain vital for crowding in early-stage finance and these changes are welcomed by the industry. Clause 15 heads somewhat in the opposite direction. This clause reduces the rate of income tax relief for investment in VCTs from 30% to 20%. This is where our doubts begin to grow. The 2025 Budget policy costings reveal a calculated trade-off. The increased limits in clause 14 will cost the Exchequer £60 million in 2027-28. Meanwhile, the reduction in VCT income tax relief will raise £125 million in the same year, delivering a net yield of approximately £65 million. The policy costings state that this rate reduction is intended to “better balance the amount of upfront tax relief…and ensure funds are targeting the highest growth companies”, but the costings’ own assumption that “investors alter or reduce the way they invest into VCT” is an acknowledgment that the relief cut will dampen investor appetite. I am concerned by how much that tax increase will reduce investment in these high-growth companies that we all support. The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association has been explicit about its concerns, warning that this reduction “could lead to a decline in fundraising that would impact the high growth and high-risk investments that the Government is looking to encourage”. VCTs are a key part of the UK’s capital mix, providing one of the few consistent sources of long-term equity for early-stage and scaling companies. Any reduction in their ability to raise funds would directly affect the pipeline of innovative businesses that the UK needs to grow. The reduction in VCT relief to 20% creates a fundamental risk to venture capital funding, precisely when scale-ups face capital constraints. For early-stage companies dependent on VCT funding, the reduced relief translates directly into a higher cost of capital and reduced funding availability. The Budget relies heavily on revenue raising from less visible and more complex parts of the tax system. This VCT change exemplifies that approach, shifting costs to venture investors rather than implementing transparent broad-based taxation. New clause 1 would require the Chancellor to report on the impact of the cuts to VCT allowance on early-stage investment volume, investor participation and international competitiveness. Given the Government’s own admission that this will alter investment behaviour, such reporting is essential, and I reiterate that a TIIN does not review what actually happens in practice. Amendment 29 would simply remove the provision in clause 15(2) that reduces the rate relief from 30% to 20%, keeping the relief at its current level to support investment in high-growth firms. I believe both amendments would be supported by industry and, subject to what the Minister says, I intend to press amendment 29 to a vote. The Government are expanding VCT investment limits while simultaneously cutting the relief to 20%. How would the Minister address the concerns of the investment sector that the combined changes will dampen investor appetite for venture capital trusts at the very moment we need to encourage them?