James Wild MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 98 increases the standard and lower rates of landfill tax from 1 April, uprating them in line with the retail prices index. In practical terms, that means the standard rate will increase to £130.75 per tonne, with the lower rate applying to less polluting materials increasing by the same cash amount. Landfill tax, as the Minister said, is intended to discourage disposal in landfill and promote recycling and recovery, and of course we support that aim. However, it is also right that we scrutinise the real-world effect of these changes on business costs, recycling rates and wider environmental outcomes. That is why we have tabled new clause 22. According to the Budget 2025 costings document, the measure is expected to raise £35 million in 2026-27, increasing to £130 million by the end of the decade. Members will remember the intense speculation ahead of the Budget that the Government might move to a single landfill tax, and the Minister referred to a consultation. The speculation did not come from nowhere; it came from a Government consultation that proposed to do precisely that. As such, the Minister could have been a bit more up front that this is something the Government were consulting on, presumably because they thought it might be a good idea. Indeed, I recall raising this directly with the Chancellor at Treasury questions earlier last year, where she accused me of scaremongering when I spoke about her own consultation, so I am glad that she has dropped her proposal to move to a single rate. Had she gone ahead with it, material such as topsoil could have faced a thirty-onefold increase. The Minister kindly referred to my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Bourne and his video; he led a determined campaign alongside the industry to stop the reckless proposals put forward by the Chancellor. They could have added £28,000 to the cost of a new home and increased road construction costs by up to 25%. When we asked what discussions the Treasury had had with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government before coming forward with its proposal for a thirtyfold increase in the tax rate, it was clear that there had not been any. There was then a sudden panic that the 1.5 million new homes target would be sunk by the Treasury’s actions. I welcome the rethinking of this policy—I will be generous to the Minister on that—to spare the sector yet another unnecessary blow that could have worsened house building numbers and jeopardised the key infrastructure upgrades that we all want to see across the country. So far, so good, but—and there is always a “but”—the Government’s retreat on that issue does not mean all is well with these proposals. The long-standing exemption for dredging material and its removal has caused deep concern, if the Committee will accept the pun, in the ports and water sector. The British Ports Association, I believe, has written to the Minister as well as the Chancellor, warning that if these changes proceed unchecked, we may see “the collapse of major industrial and development projects, particularly in ports, rivers and canals”. I declare an interest, as King’s Lynn in my constituency has a fine historical port. Indeed, the wealth of King’s Lynn was built on our trading links with the Hanseatic League in medieval times. The knock-on effects of removing the exemption could be significant; delayed waterway clean-up projects, increased flooding in vulnerable areas, and reduced investment in our ports, which keep our country trading. New clause 22 seeks a proper assessment of how these tax changes will affect construction and infrastructure projects, investment in ports, recycling levels and illegal dumping rates, and progress towards the Government’s environmental objectives. The Minister needs to set out how the Government are responding to address the serious concerns raised by the British Ports Association, which, if correct, could have a very damaging effect on major infrastructure. We welcome that the proposals put forward in the consultation have been ditched, but there are concerns that the Minister now needs to address.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is the Minister therefore ruling out any further support for hospitality, leisure and retail businesses in the Chancellor’s spring statement?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 80, page 96, line 28, at end insert— “(2A) The Treasury must, each year, amend by order the applicable limit set under section 5A(2)(a) by the change in the level of the consumer prices index in the previous tax year.” This amendment would provide for the £200 applicable limit to be uprated annually in line with the consumer prices index.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to clause 56, the schedule and new clause 11, which is tabled in my name. The Minister talks of reform; indeed, clause 56 fundamentally changes how carried interest is taxed. New clause 11 proposes a thorough assessment, given the significance of those reforms. Until now, carried interest has been taxed as a capital gain up to 28%. Under clause 56, however, a full 72.5% of qualifying carried interest will be treated as trading income and taxed at income rates that could reach up to 45% plus class 4 national insurance contributions. The effective rate, therefore, would be around 34%. The Minister spoke about competitiveness, but that rate is far above other jurisdictions in Europe—for example, 26% in Italy and 25% in Spain. The precise rate will vary depending on the average holding of the underlying investment; longer holds will receive slightly fairer treatment. Does anyone think that sounds like a measure that is likely to attract talent and investment into the country? As we have discussed in previous sittings, those are things that everyone is signed up to, but many measures in the Bill do not deliver on them. Carried interest is not some mysterious perk; it is a share of profits that fund managers receive only when their investments do well. It is long term, risk based and uncertain. According to UK Private Capital, in most cases it takes seven years or more before a fund pays a penny of carried interest, and quite frequently it never does. This measure is a substantial tax rise designed to reclassify carried interest as remuneration, rather than a general return on capital. That may sound tidy in theory, but it misunderstands what carried interest is. As UK Private Capital puts it, carried interest is “fundamentally different” from a salary or a bonus because it is paid only when investments succeed, often many years later and quite often not at all—that is the nature of risk. The famous tax information and impact note expects the measure to raise £145 million in 2027-28 and £80 million in the following year, but there is a risk of driving talent and investment abroad. Can the Minister share his assessment on what happens if fund managers start relocating to other tax regimes such as Dublin, Luxembourg or New York? What would that mean for wider tax receipts, for the thousands of jobs that funds support and those who rely on them, and for the UK’s standing as a global financial hub? TheCityUK and PwC published a significant report at the beginning of this week about measures that need to be taken to ensure that London remains a pre-eminent finance hub. The measures in the clause run counter to that. That is why I have tabled new clause 11, which would require a review of the clause’s impact on UK competitiveness in attracting and retaining fund managers, the level and composition of investment into the UK, and the revenues collected compared with forecast revenues. For the Minister’s benefit—because he was not in the Committee’s earlier sittings—we have tabled new clauses that would require reviews because a TIIN is a prediction of what might happen, not a review. We are assured that the Treasury keeps all measures under review, so if those reviews are happening, what is the problem with publishing them and giving that information to Parliament? As well as on the principle, we need answers on the implementation. HMRC will now be expected to verify the average holding period of thousands of complex investment portfolios. What additional resources and guidance will be provided to HMRC to do that? How will it cope if receipts are lumpy and unpredictable? UK Private Capital has warned that the measure will be challenging to manage. I think that is an understatement; it could be a recipe for disputes and confusion. A further danger is double taxation. The sector has warned that under the rules, some managers could be taxed twice on the same carried interest in different jurisdictions. Can the Minister assure fund managers and the sector that the Treasury has appropriate double taxation agreements and treaties in place to ensure that their concern is ill-founded? If the Government get this wrong, we risk losing capital to countries that do offer such clarity. In debates on earlier clauses, we have spoken about wanting to encourage enterprise and investment, to compete internationally, and to support growth in high-value businesses, but clause 56 sends the opposite signal. It will leave us with one of the highest rates of tax on carried interest among competitive and competitor jurisdictions. We can see why some Labour MPs may be happy about having some of the highest levels of tax on fund managers, but these measures will fundamentally dampen the animal spirits in our economy at a time when we need to be unleashing them. That is why I contend that new clause 11 is essential to ensure that Ministers measure the real-world consequences of their choices before lasting damage is done to our economy.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to clause 61 and new clause 12, tabled in my name. They concern reliefs and the energy profits levy, which the Chancellor increased to 78%—a very high level. When it was introduced, prices were much higher than they are now. Clause 61 clarifies that payments under decommissioning relief agreements—long-term agreements under which the Government guarantee a minimum level of tax relief for decommissioning costs—cannot be claimed by reference to the EPL; and it makes it clear that companies cannot seek refunds or payments when decommissioning costs arose on or after 26 November 2025. New clause 12 is about ensuring that the impact of these changes on decommissioning, employment and capital expenditure in the oil and gas sector, production and demand and the Scottish economy is considered by the Treasury and the Chancellor. That is important because of the context. The reality in the North sea is stark. Investment has sunk to record lows and, according to research from Robert Gordon University, jobs are being lost at a rate of 1,000 a month. Offshore Energies UK has warned that the Government’s decision in the Budget to reject replacing the energy profits levy in 2026 will cost tens of thousands of jobs, cripple investment and undermine Scotland and its energy security. The decommissioning reliefs to which this clause refers were designed to give long-term certainty on tax treatment in the basin, precisely so that companies could plan for responsible decommissioning. The Government themselves have acknowledged that we will need oil and gas for decades to come, with about 75% of the UK’s energy still coming from oil and gas and 10 billion to 15 billion barrels required by 2050. Offshore Energies UK has shown that we can produce more than that at home, through tax reform in tandem with a pragmatic approach to decommissioning and licensing, instead of importing more energy and exporting the jobs. That is why new clause 12 would require a proper assessment of the impact on the areas that I have set out. The Chancellor likes to describe the energy profits levy as temporary, but there is nothing temporary about the damage that is being done to jobs, investment and energy security in the North sea.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 57 updates HMRC’s pension rules to align them with the Pension Regulator’s authorisation regime for collective money purchase schemes. Such schemes pool members’ contributions into a single fund, with the benefits linked to the performance of that shared pot rather than a guaranteed payout, as Members will be aware. Master trusts operate on a similar principle, but manage pension savings on behalf of multiple, unconnected employers, each with its own ringfenced section. The clause goes a little further than just a technical update; it gives HMRC new and wide-ranging powers to refuse or remove the tax registration of those schemes, and to change the underlying tax rules through secondary legislation. The aim is straightforward: to ensure the alignment of the tax and regulatory frameworks so that only properly supervised schemes benefit from the generous pension tax reliefs. That is a principle that we would all support. Well-regulated CDC—collective defined contribution—schemes could play an important role in the future of workplace pensions, particularly as the next generation of whole-of-life, multi-employer and retired CDC models develop. If done right, that could help savers manage their transition from work to retirement more smoothly, but it will work only if the rules are clear, consistent and fair with the existing annuity structures. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation has highlighted, the current framework does not allow for reductions in pension payments that vary between different groups of members. That potentially risks creating unfair outcomes for savers in otherwise identical positions. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify how the Government intend to address that concern raised by the experts. We also know that, under the new guided retirement model expected from 2027, trustees will be making complex decisions on behalf of their members yet, as the Chartered Institute of Taxation notes, trustees will hesitate to act without sufficient flexibility such as limited opt-out periods or conversion options. Those safeguards are notably absent from the clause. Has the Minister, or potentially his colleague the Minister for Pensions, been engaging with the sector on those points? A further practical point, which I hope the Minister will be able to tidy up, concerns the co-ordination between HMRC and the Pensions Regulator. What safeguards will be in place to prevent a scheme being authorised by one regulator but not recognised by the other? What steps are in place to ensure that savers—our constituents—are not caught in the middle?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Member for Maidenhead for bringing forward these amendments to what is a very important clause, one that honours a commitment; I remember sitting in the main Chamber when a number of colleagues from across the House were pressing Ministers to introduce such a change, and it is very welcome that the Government have brought it forward in the Bill. I believe a similar treatment applies to the Horizon IT scandal. It is a common-sense clause. Fundamentally, the victims of this appalling scandal deserve compensation and their families deserve to then benefit in due course. I put on record my tribute to the work of Sir Brian Langstaff, as well as to the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen) when he was in the Cabinet Office, working particularly with victims’ groups. The clause will help to provide the remedy that victims and their families have been seeking. I have said that a similar treatment applies in the Horizon case, but I should mention to the Minister that the Hughes report on the valproate and pelvic mesh scandal is still outstanding. It was published two years ago and recommended that interim compensation payments should be made. I have raised the matter with the Health Secretary on a number of occasions; I ask the Minister to take that issue back and to consider, as the compensation scheme is designed, whether that sort of provision can be built in from the start. We support the thrust of the amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which seek to ensure that Government regulations around the issue reach the right objectives, as well as supporting victims and their families. Amendment 46 would establish a mechanism to support families to navigate the system. I think that is very important and, if the hon. Member for Maidenhead chooses to press the amendment, I assure him that Conservative Members will support it.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the debate on the first clause that we considered in Committee, there was a commitment to keep corporation tax at 25% across this Parliament. Can the Minister at least commit to not further increase the rate of tax on carried interest in this Parliament?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 58 makes changes to the corporate interest restriction rules, which limit how much interest large companies can deduct from taxable profits each year. It aims to fix an administrative problem that has frustrated many businesses. Under the CIRR, each group must appoint a reporting company—that is, a UK group member responsible for submitting a group’s interest restriction to HMRC—and the clause simplifies that process, which is obviously welcome. At the same time, the clause introduces a new £1,000 penalty where a group submits a return without any company having been validly appointed to act as the reporting company. That is a small fixed penalty designed to encourage groups to get the appointment right. Can the Minister assure us that this will be applied with some common sense? Does HMRC have discretion not to apply the penalty automatically, so that it can take into account any mitigating factors? Clause 59 makes a targeted but important change to the way in which companies calculate tax-EBITDA under the corporate interest restriction rules. The clause adjusts the calculation so that certain types of capital expenditure related to cemeteries and crematoriums and environmental and infrastructure spending—such as waste disposal, flood prevention and coastal erosion management—are excluded from the limits on how much interest a group can deduct for tax purposes. In practice, that means that when a company makes large one-off investments in public interest infrastructure, such as new flood defences, those up-front costs will no longer unfairly reduce the amount of interest they are permitted to deduct. The measure applies retrospectively to periods ending on or after 31 December 2021. On the face of it, this is a sensible change that ensures that the rules operate as intended, and we support the principle behind it. The Government describe this as a largely technical fix, which is broadly correct. It does correct the distortion in the corporate interest restriction rules that discourage capital investment in environmental and infrastructure projects. The Budget documents suggest the fiscal impact is limited, allowing qualifying businesses to claim interest deductions they were previously denied. But it does raise some other questions. If the calculation of tax-EBITDA has accidentally penalised spending on projects such as flood defence, waste treatment or crematoriums, are there are other sectors that the Treasury has looked at that might face similar unintended consequences? Are there sectors where the Government think there might be similar distortions, or were others considered and dismissed? How will HMRC manage amended tax returns and claims retrospectively back to 2021? Does it have the resources and processes in place to do that officially? Finally, will the Minister commit to a wider review of the corporate interest restriction rules to ensure that the system generally supports the long-term environmental and infrastructure investment that our economy and our constituencies need?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I may not have read that manifesto as closely as the hon. Gentleman. [Laughter.] For the record, I did not say that. I think the record will also prove that that measure was not put into effect. We continued the winter fuel payment. The issue is that the Chancellor came along. She was given advice by Treasury officials—no offence to the Treasury officials in the room—suggesting this was a simple way to save some money and fill a fictional black hole. Foolishly and regrettably, she went along with that advice; happily, she is now correcting her mistake in part. I am looking to press amendment 41 to a vote, because it is important that we give pensioners certainty that the threshold will be protected.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clauses 75 and 76, as well as new clause 13 in my name. The clauses fit within the inheritance tax part of the Bill. In Committee of the whole House, we had debates on the family farm tax and the family business tax, and the damage and distress they are causing in rural communities, so I will not prolong that debate. I will focus briefly on clause 75, however, which tightens the rule on inheritance tax exemptions for gifts to charities and registered clubs, including sports and social clubs. Clause 76 provides limited protection for existing arrangements, seeking to prevent new restrictions from applying retrospectively or unfairly. New clause 13 would require the Treasury to publish a report on the impact of clause 75, including on the volume and value of charitable donations, the financial health of affected charities and clubs, donor behaviour and impact on Exchequer revenues. We agree with the principle, which the Minister set out, of ensuring that charitable reliefs are used as intended, but it is also important that the Government understand the practical consequence of any tightening of the rules. On Tuesday afternoon, we discussed some of the concerns that charities have about earlier provisions in the Bill, and the potential complexity and bureaucracy that was being added to them. We all know that the charitable sector is under significant pressure, and we do not want to add undue burdens on to trustees of charities in particular.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to see the Exchequer Secretary in his place. Some Committee members may have felt that his ministerial colleague the Economic Secretary dealt with some clauses rather briefly in our earlier sittings, so we look forward to the loquaciousness that the Exchequer Secretary displayed on the Floor of the House the other day. I shall speak to clause 55 and to amendment 41 and new clause 10 in my name. The clause is about clawing back the winter fuel payment from anyone whose total taxable income is above £35,000. According to the Budget costings, this measure will cost about £1.8 billion in 2025-26, settling at £1.3 billion the year after, but overall the changes that the Government have made with the removal of winter fuel payments will save £450 million. However, the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group have raised concerns about the potential complexity of the clause; about how it could cause anxiety for people who have not had to navigate tax rules before; and about how the £35,000 per year cap will only diminish over time as inflation eats away at it. I have therefore tabled new clause 10, which would require the Government to review the case for uprating the £35,000 threshold by CPI each year, ensuring that it retains its value. I have also tabled amendment 41, which would go further and put that commitment squarely on the face of the Bill so that there can be no ambiguity about whether the level will increase. The Minister skated over a bit of the background to the clause. The measure flows from one of the Chancellor’s first political choices, which was to remove the winter fuel payment from all pensioners except those in receipt of pensioner credit. That meant that pensioners living on incomes of around £13,000 a year lost their winter fuel support. Vital support was pulled from millions of pensioners across the country. In my constituency, 22,000 pensioners lost their entitlement overnight; the figure may have been similar in your constituency, Mr Efford. It was a deeply damaging move, which is why organisations such as Age UK and my party campaigned against it, and the Chancellor was forced to come back to the Dispatch Box to perform one of her U-turns. In response to the pressure, the Government announced that everyone would get the payment but that it would be clawed back. I turn to the points that the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group have raised about the clause and the schedule. If a pensioner’s income is £1 over the threshold, they will lose the entire winter fuel payment; there is no taper. Unlike other income-related charge-backs, such as the high-income child benefit charge or the tapering of the personal allowance, the winter fuel payment is based on total income, not adjusted net income. It will affect pensioners who are seeking relief on their charitable contributions. Will the Minister explain why the Government have opted for a system that measures income in inconsistent ways, with different rules from similar income-dependent clawback schemes? The Bill sets out that the Government’s approach relies heavily on data sharing between the DWP, devolved social security bodies and HMRC. There are some exemptions, for example for those who have been on means-tested benefits during the qualifying week or who have opted out of receiving the payment, but if that information is not shared swiftly and accurately, instances may occur of administrative issues causing distress and financial loss. Pensioners could also see an unexpected tax code on their pay slip, clawing back money that they should never have been charged. That might lead them to have to fight through an appeals process just to claim what is rightfully theirs. The plan to collect the charge through PAYE, as is set out in the clause, brings its own issues. From 2027-28, HMRC will move to in-year coding, meaning that pensioners could start paying back a benefit that they have not even received yet, based on HMRC’s best guess at their income. As we all know, the winter fuel payment is a one-off payment that is usually paid in November, but PAYE collection is spread throughout the year, so pensioners could be having money clawed back that they have not yet received. If that estimate turns out to be wrong, they will have money taken off and refunded later. That is a recipe for potential confusion and hardship, and it could lead to more calls to HMRC that may go unanswered. In the year of transition, some pensioners could face being charged twice in a single tax year. That is not a minor administrative issue. It needs to be addressed. We all know that any fixed monetary threshold in legislation loses its real value over time, but if Ministers believe that £35,000 is the right level today, surely they accept that uprating in line with inflation is only fair. If the Minister will not support that principle outright, perhaps he will commit to supporting new clause 10, which simply asks for a review of the impact of doing so. Schedule 10 allows for the alteration of the limit, but there is no obligation on Ministers, as there is for other benefits, to review the level or uprate the limit.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes a valuable point. We want more certainty within the system, as far as possible. On earlier clauses, we debated the uncertainty that can come from having administrative rules that HMRC can interpret. Our amendment would give people confidence that their income and the benefit they receive would continue in real terms. Nobody disputes the need to focus support on those who need it most. Where the Chancellor got it wrong was in taking it away from people who are just over the £13,000 income threshold. If the Government insist on recovering payments, they need to get the fundamentals right, with clear definitions, robust data sharing and a simple route for challenging any mistakes that may have been made. Let us be clear. We welcome the Chancellor’s latest U-turn, reversing the very first decision she took in office. She was wrong to remove the benefit from millions of pensioners. This clause helps her to correct her poor political choice.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Following the 2024 Budget, the Government decided to implement a long-term residency test for inheritance tax. That is a 10-year residency in a 20-year time period. Clause 70 imposes an inheritance tax charge where there has been a change in the settlor’s long-term residence status. While this is not the 20% exit tax—one of the kites that was flown by someone near the Treasury ahead of the Budget—there is a risk about the message that it sends about encouraging people to this country. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has pointed out that individuals faced with the prospect of UK inheritance tax on their overseas trusts may already have decided to leave the UK and/or wind up the trust, an issue that was debated on Tuesday afternoon in relation to the clauses that pertain to non-doms. The measures that the Government are taking will undermine what we all want to see, which is more money being brought back into the UK and invested in our country. What conversations has the Minister had with groups such as Foreign Investors for Britain about these changes? How would he respond to their concerns?

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  At present, when a disabled person uses their mobility benefits, such as the mobility component of the personal independence payment or disability living allowance, to lease a vehicle under the Motability scheme, that lease is zero-rated for VAT. Let us remember why Motability was created: it was established to help those with serious, long-term physical disabilities to access independence and mobility, not to provide subsidised cars for people with minor or temporary conditions. However, the numbers show that the scheme has expanded far beyond its original purpose. Last year, 815,000 people were using Motability vehicles, an increase of 170,000 in a single year. For many participants, their benefit covers the full cost of a three-year lease, so they pay nothing beyond their benefit entitlement. However, when someone chooses a more expensive model, such as a larger or higher-spec vehicle, they must make an up-front top-up payment. Until now, the entire lease, including that top-up, has been VAT-free, but clause 77 changes that. Under the new rules, only the proportion of the lease funded by the qualifying Motability payment will remain zero-rated, and any additional amount paid voluntarily will be subject to the standard rate of 20%. That is a fair and balanced reform that we wholeheartedly support. Clause 78 narrows the insurance premium tax relief for vehicle insurance linked to disability schemes. IPT is a 12% tax on most general insurance premiums. Many cars that are leased to disabled people currently benefit from that relief, even when the vehicles are standard, unadapted models. We welcome that the clause limits the relief to applying only to contracts for vehicles that are specifically adapted for wheelchair or stretcher users; for example, vehicles with ramps, lifts or structural changes supporting wheelchair access. If a vehicle has no such adaptation, premiums will rightly be subject to the 12% charge. Conservative Members have long argued for tighter focus and accountability in the Motability scheme, and I welcome the Government’s decision to act— we have been pushing them to do so. Sadly, we read in The Times this morning that the Prime Minister has apparently ruled out any wider reforms to welfare in the King’s Speech. Some of the growth we have seen in the Motability scheme, which the clauses will hopefully address, reflects genuine need, but much of it does not. That expansion raises questions about the eligibility standards and on whether taxpayers’ money is being used as intended. Motability should not be a back-door subsidy for people who do not meet the scheme’s original intent, which was to help those with serious disabilities. As the Minister said, over the scorecard this measure makes a significant saving that is a meaningful contribution to public finances, which we welcome and support. Taxpayer resources should be targeted more effectively to ensure fairness. However, the measures in the Budget overall raise people’s taxes to pay for more welfare spending. We consider that to be the wrong choice. We welcome the fact that the clause mitigates some of that additional welfare spending, but overall, this is a welfare spending Budget.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, the clause introduces a new anti-avoidance provision aimed at arrangements involving non-derecognition liabilities. These are complex structures whereby a company transfers assets to another entity, but under accounting rules continues to recognise those assets and related liabilities on its own balance sheets. Such structures are of course common in securitisations, which are an important part of the UK’s financial landscape. In these arrangements an originating company passes on the economic risks and rewards with an asset, yet maintains the asset on its books. Used properly, these arrangements serve a legitimate commercial purpose. However, as the Minister said, there are examples of people bending or breaking the rules. Can he give the Committee a flavour of how prevalent he thinks that bending or breaking of the rules is? The provisions of this clause seek to correct any rule-breaking by denying tax deductions where their main purpose is to seek to gain a tax advantage by exploiting non-derecognition accounting. The Opposition strongly support efforts to tackle avoidance and close loopholes that undermine trust in the tax system, and efforts to bring the tax gap down—as the last Government successfully did, and this Government are, I am sure, continuing to seek to do—but, as always, the details matter.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Charities are a very important topic. We need to ensure that we give it appropriate scrutiny, given the importance of charities in our society and communities. Clause 52 and new clause 6—which I will speak to—relate to extending the definition of attributable income to include legacies left to charities. In practice, that means that when a charity receives a gift left in a person’s will, it could face a tax charge if that money is not spent on its charitable activities. How charities use their funds is a topical subject in the context of the Church of England, which is planning to spend £100 million on its fund for healing, repair and justice—effectively a reparation fund for slavery, which many consider not to be an appropriate use of the funds, or what people gave funds to the Church for. I now turn to the clause. The change will apply to gifts made on or after 6 April this year. New clause 6, in my name—it bears repetition—would require the Chancellor, within six months of the Act becoming law, to publish a report on the impact of the measure on charitable giving through estates and on the wider impact on the charity sector. Concerns have been raised that expanding rules to cover legacies could have unwelcome implications if charities do not apply inherited funds quickly enough to their charitable purposes, leading to them being taxed. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales warns that that uncertainty, particularly around the timing, may discourage potential donors from including charities in their wills. Clearly, none of us would wish to see that. HMRC has said that it will not set a deadline for how soon money must be used, although that ambiguity creates issues in itself. If the rules are unclear, HMRC could later decide that a gift has not been applied appropriately and withdraw the tax relief, undermining confidence that legacy gifts to charities will remain tax-free. Perhaps the Minister could give the Committee some clarity on that point, and on how HMRC will determine what counts as timely or appropriate application of funds. There is also a concern about the administrative burden it may place, particularly on smaller charities, which will have to prove that each legacy received has been properly applied to charitable purposes, even when the money is placed in long-term endowments or reserves. The Charity Finance Group warns that the changes could mean more record keeping, compliance checks and bureaucracy, taking money away from frontline charitable activities and towards administration. I do not think that anyone would wish to see that. I do not know whether the Minister has anything more to add on that complexity. Adding complexity could also make life harder for executors and delay the administration of estates, which could affect the timing of cash flows to charities at a time when finances in the sector are under considerable pressure, and income is critical for them to do their job. There is also a risk that wealthier donors might think twice about leaving legacies to smaller charities, if they think that the charity might struggle to comply with HMRC rules. I am really asking for the Minister’s assurance that HMRC will take a sensible and proportionate approach, particularly with smaller charities that are seeking to do the right thing in applying these rules. We all want to avoid the potential risk that this measure could deter charitable giving, when that is clearly not the intention. It is important that the concerns raised by the sector are aired in the Committee, and it is our role to do so.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clause 54 and to new clauses 8 and 9 tabled in my name. The clause makes significant changes to how tainted donations are treated. At present the donation is considered tainted only if it was made with an improper purpose. This clause replaces the motive-based test with an outcome test. If someone connected to the donor under the new regime receives financial assistance from a charity, such as a grant, guarantee or loan, the donation will be deemed tainted regardless of the donor’s intent. I have tabled new clause 8 to require the Government to publish a report on how the change affects legitimate charitable giving, or genuinely tackles tax abuse. New clause 9 would require a review of the implementation of the new outcome test after two years and would assess whether it proves to be clearer than the existing purpose test. The Minister and the Government said that this measure is about tightening anti-avoidance rules and the challenge of proving intent. But I have been approached by the Charity Finance Group, which represents over 1,400 organisations and manages one third of the sector’s £20 billion annual income, and it has raised concerns around the change. It warned that the outcome test could unfairly penalise both donors and charities for results outwith their control. For example, a donor could make a genuine good faith contribution only for a charity months later to make a routine investment or financial arrangement that inadvertently benefits a linked person. That donor could then find themselves caught by the anti-avoidance rules without ever having done anything wrong. That could cause uncertainty and raise concerns about people leaving legacy gifts that the charity sector relies on. It is not just the charity and that one body. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has warned that donors may have limited influence over the outcome once the donation has been made. It, too, questions the fairness and practicality of shifting from a motive to an outcome test. Indeed, it proposes that the existing rules are not altered for that precise reason. We tabled the two new clauses to introduce proper scrutiny of the measures and ensure Parliament understands the effect on the charitable sector and whether donations continue to be given. Does the Minister consider there is a risk that shifting to such an approach could have the effect that the charitable sector has set out? If so, will she commit to perhaps providing some practical guidance, with examples that charities and their compliance teams could look at so that they can see that charitable giving is not undermined? None of us on this Committee would want to do anything that would undermine the ability of charities to raise money and disincentivise anyone from giving money for fear that they might be caught inadvertently by rules when they have done nothing wrong.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, this is a fairly straightforward measure allowing HMRC to pay interest to companies that have had to hand over money under a now overturned EU state aid ruling relating to the controlled foreign company rules. The 2019 ruling was subsequently annulled. My only question for the Minister is: does the clause mark the final chapter in the UK’s compliance with the EU state aid rules relating to the controlled foreign companies regime, or could other outstanding matters give rise to further issues or payments?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 49 and schedule 7 make changes to the rules that decide, where a company has a permanent establishment in the UK, how its profits are then taxed and when they apply. The Minister talked about modernising and simplifying the rules to bring them into line with international best practice. To clarify, in November 2025 the OECD published new guidance on the definition of a “permanent establishment”. Can the Minister confirm whether the UK’s current approach reflects that updated guidance, as I have been advised that it does not? Some expert bodies have pointed out that the OECD changes are generally helpful and would bring more consistency across countries, so does the Minister agree that it would make sense for the UK to broadly adopt them? Is that the Government’s approach, or have they deliberately decided to have a set of UK rules? If so, what is the purpose of that, considering that we might be dealing with multinational companies operating in multiple jurisdictions that would have to follow separate rules when the OECD has brought together a coherent package?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 47 and schedule 6 mark an evolution in the UK’s transfer pricing regime. The Opposition recognise the importance of getting this right: it goes to the heart of how multinational profits are attributed and taxed, and therefore how we ensure that companies pay the correct amount of tax in this country. The principle behind transfer pricing is simple, even if it is rarely simple in practice. I believe that these measures flow from a consultation process launched by the last Conservative Government, so they have a good origin. I hope that they will lead to greater certainty and reduce the burden that some companies may face.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Well, indeed. I will come on to the detail. On the broader point, we support the initiative behind these measures—to encourage people to bring more of their money to the UK, precisely so it can help fund our public services. Our concern is about the implementation, and I will come on to some of the comments that representatives of the Chartered Institute of Taxation, who are widely acknowledged as experts in this area, have raised about the complexity and the retrospective elements. As I said, schedule 3 is in three parts. Part 1 relates to relief for new residents on foreign income and gains—FIG. Under the new FIG regime, when someone moves to the UK, they do not pay UK tax on their foreign income for the first four years here. That is very sensible, but the Government have made claiming that relief so complicated that honest taxpayers risk falling into traps simply through lack of awareness. I hope the Government will take account of the following sensible steps suggested by the Chartered Institute of Taxation: first, to remove the requirement to report every possible element of FIG as part of the claim, and instead making relief from UK tax on FIG the default position; similarly, extending the relief to the personal representatives of a deceased individual who themselves qualified; and finally, simplifying the legislation by aligning the income tax position on trust distributions with the capital gains position. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response on those points when she winds up. Part 2 relates to the temporary repatriation facility, clarifies how remittances to the UK under that temporary facility should be matched to their original source. For years, non-domiciled individuals could keep foreign money offshore, paying UK tax only if they brought it here. The TRF offers a window until 2028, precisely to encourage people to bring money to the UK at reduced rates of 12% in the next two years or 15% in ’27-28. That is, as I said to the hon. Member for Burnley, a good idea in principle, but the devil, as ever, is in the detail. Our friends at the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out some serious concerns that there are several paragraphs within the schedule—which I see the hon. Member turning to—that do not appear to work as intended or that produce unintended consequences. First, they believe that, as drafted, the new offshore income gains paragraph introduced here leads to an anomaly in the way that trust distributions are matched where a trust has generated offshore income gains. That results in trusts with surplus pre-6 April 2025 capital gains tax being treated differently from those without. We do not believe that to be the Government’s intention; perhaps the Minister can clarify. Secondly, investments clearly fall in value, but under this legislation, if someone invested foreign income overseas and it is now worth less, they will still pay the temporary repatriation facility charge on the original higher amount. That could mean paying 12% tax on £100,000 even though the investment is worth only £60,000. Do Committee members think that is fair? Do they think it will encourage or discourage the repatriation of funds that this facility is designed to encourage, to help support our economy and public services? I would contend that the incentive, as a result, is to keep the money out of the UK, which is not what we on the Opposition side—or, I believe, on the Government side—of the Committee want to see. We therefore tabled amendment 30 to remedy this issue, and I encourage Members to support us on it when the moment comes. Thirdly, the Bill contains retrospective taxation. Let us be clear: retrospective taxation should be reserved for the most egregious tax avoidance, but here, trustees who made payments to beneficiaries in good faith after April, relying on existing law, may now face double taxation because of rules that look backwards. That is not about closing a loophole; it is about changing the rules after people have already acted. Our amendments 31 and 32 would ensure that double taxation does not apply retrospectively. Fourthly, in this clause and schedule the Government have created arbitrary restrictions so that the TRF is available only to UK residents. Why should someone temporarily living abroad not be able to use this facility? The temporary non-residence rule means that they will be paying UK tax when they return anyway, so why not let them use the TRF? The rules create a situation where someone who wants to pay tax voluntarily is not able to do so. Our amendment 33 would ensure that the TRF is available to both UK residents and non-residents. Similar concerns have also been raised regarding offshore trusts. The temporary repatriation facility applies a 12% or 15% rate to the personal FIG of individuals who have previously used the remittance basis as well as certain capital payments from offshore trusts. This was to encourage the winding-up of foreign trust structures. Right now, though, the trusts part works only if the beneficiary getting the capital could have used the remittance basis in their own right. That creates an unfair outcome in families where one beneficiary has used the remittance basis but another has always paid full UK tax on worldwide income, because only the former can benefit from the lower temporary repatriation rate if the trust is wound up. Perhaps I could give the Committee an example to illustrate this point further: a family has an offshore trust for two adult children and one child previously used special tax rules while the other has always paid full UK tax. Under this Bill, only the first child could benefit from the TRF when the trust is wound up. That does not encourage bringing money to the UK but, I would contend, actively discourages it. Amendment 34 would therefore enable offshore trust beneficiaries who have not themselves used the remittance basis to use the TRF. Amendment 35 would enable trustees to pay a temporary repatriation facility charge on the trust’s past FIG while retaining the funds within the trust, without having to make capital payments to the beneficiary. Amendments 1 and 2, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin), relate to this issue. The Government refer to the temporary repatriation facility as encouraging wealthy people to stay and invest here, and the Treasury is counting on these measures to raise a significant sum for public services, although I note that the OBR suggests there is considerable uncertainty about that. However, we know that the wealthiest people—the wealthiest investors, the people who are supporting our entrepreneurs and the high-growth businesses that we want to see—are leaving the UK as a result of steps that the Chancellor has taken. By some estimates, 10,000 people have already got on a plane and left—those are figures from Oxford Economics. We can debate whether the number is 10,000 or 5,000, but some figures suggest that the equivalent of 750,000 basic rate taxpayers have left the country. So this is not about ideology; it is about giving certainty and addressing the points that the Bill as drafted does not. The TRF could become unusable for some because of the risks it exposes them to. There is the double taxation, which I have talked about, as well as the retrospective elements, but in addition, accusations of tax avoidance could arise from using a scheme that Parliament has itself created and lead to potentially lengthy investigations. People are leaving, and the Chartered Institute of Taxation has said that tax rules under the measure make the UK a less attractive destination for people. It should be easier to understand and apply measures aimed at getting people to bring money back to the UK. There is a risk that, as drafted, these measures drive against the Government’s intention. Amendments 1 and 2 are tabled in a constructive spirit. Amendment 1 would stop the double counting, and amendment 2 is about the retrospective and unfair action. They would provide the certainty that, according to some experts in this field, is currently missing. Without the TRF being attractive, we will not be able to get the money coming into the country. I urge the Minister to respond more fully than she did in her opening remarks and to consider whether, on Report or at a later stage, amendments could be tabled to deliver the clarity that my amendments and those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor offer. Without clear guidance, ordinary commercial transactions could inadvertently be caught. The Government must publish comprehensive examples, or businesses and individuals will be left guessing. When Ministers replaced the long-standing non-dom regime last year, they promised a clean, modern and transparent framework, yet within a year we have a schedule of corrective provisions to make the legislation operate “as intended”. That rather suggests that the original drafting was not as watertight as claimed, and that further tweaks along the lines we have suggested might still be needed before the system settles.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak clause 53 and new clause 7, which was tabled in my name. My comments will reflect submissions from people involved in the charitable sector and my discussions with them. The clause extends the allowable purpose to all categories of recognisable charitable investment—at present, it applies to only one, but it will cover all 12. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has raised a suggestion that the test be reframed from “for the sole purpose of” to “wholly or mainly” to the benefit of the charity. The concern is that there could be increased obligations for compliance on trustees who have to demonstrate that their every investment in, for example, their portfolio was made for the benefit of the charity rather than an ancillary purpose therein. Was that more flexible approach something that the Government have considered, and if so why did they chose to reject it?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause introduces schedule 5, which will repeal the diverted profits tax and replace it with new rules to tax unassessed transfer pricing profits within the corporation tax regime, coming into effect for periods beginning on or after 1 January. The diverted profits tax will continue to apply for prior accounting periods. In effect, the clause creates a higher tax charge on profits that should have been taxed here, but were shifted out of the UK by using non-market prices between groups. Like the DPT, the new transfer pricing profits rules are intended to target structured arrangements that are designed to erode the UK tax base by omitting profits that are subject to transfer pricing. These unassessed transfer pricing profits will be taxed at a rate that is six percentage points higher than corporation tax. In simple terms, if a global business structures its arrangements to shift profits from the UK in a pricing manipulation, HMRC will be able to bring those diverted profits into UK tax at a higher, penalty-style rate. In principle, we support that approach. Moving away from the stand-alone tax and bringing diverted profits under corporation tax provides better treaty access and clarity, and clearly the six percentage point charge works as a deterrent, as countries that play games with their transfer policies will risk paying more tax than if they had priced their UK dealings properly in the first place. However, I would welcome the Minister’s response to the concerns that the Chartered Institute of Taxation has raised about the drafting of the clause. First, the new tax design condition is very broad: it captures transactions designed to reduce, eliminate or delay UK tax liability. There is a question as to whether legitimate commercial decisions made for regulatory compliance or capital requirements could be caught by the condition simply because they are deliberate and happen to reduce tax liability, even when tax planning is not the primary motive. I know that is not the intention behind the drafting, but that point has been raised, so I hope that the Minister will respond in order to avoid any uncertainty as to whether businesses that think they are operating within the law, without seeking to reduce, eliminate or delay tax liability, may be captured. Will the existing arrangements be grandfathered? Can HMRC revisit settled positions under these broader rules? As the Chartered Institute of Taxation rightly says, it is unsatisfactory to pass legislation with a wide definition and simply hope that HMRC guidance and rules will narrow it down later. That is not how we in Parliament should legislate. We discussed the loan charge during this morning’s sitting; HMRC applied rules in a way that most MPs did not consider reasonable, and we have now had to make changes through this Bill to address that historical issue. The law should be made clear in the Bill, not left to administrative interpretation. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed how many multinational companies HMRC estimates are using pricing manipulation to avoid tax. Can she guarantee that legitimate business structures that have previously been accepted by HMRC under the DPT will not suddenly fall foul of the scope of the new rules? Will she also comment on the main purpose test, to provide clarity and certainty for businesses?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 4 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. As the Minister says, clause 48 introduces a power for HMRC to implement a new reporting obligation: the ICTS, which will come into force in 2027. This new power would require businesses engaged in significant cross-border transactions to disclose specified information about their dealings. Rightly, the intention is to give HMRC better tools to identify transfer pricing and international tax risks that could affect the tax take, and to allow it to conduct more efficient and better-targeted compliance activity. I recognise that objective and support it in principle. I agree that the ICTS could help HMRC to identify risk earlier and to avoid wasting the time of the Department and businesses. Chasing down questions and embarking on inquiries can often lead nowhere and can cost businesses time that could be spent on growing their business. However, it is also important that the Government explain how the system will work in practice and how it will be seen to work. Our new clause 4 would therefore require a report on the impact of these changes on cross-border trade and the administrative burden on businesses. During the consultation last year, the Treasury acknowledged that more needed to be said about how the data collected through the ICTS system would be used and how it would fit alongside existing obligations such as master and local files. That remains a crucial point of detail that the industry and advisers will be looking for as this measure is implemented. Can the Minister shed some light on those concerns today? As the Minister rightly says, most major economies already have some equivalent form of reporting, but it should be pointed out that the differences between them are significant. Australia, for example, operates a single transaction-driven disclosure process through its international dealings schedule; the United States of America relies on a more fragmented, relationship-based approach spread across multiple forms. Each system clearly has its benefits and disadvantages. What matters is that each country has a clear, consistent model to which businesses can understand and readily adapt. What the Government seem to be proposing is a hybrid. That might mean that we have the best of both worlds—let us all hope so—but it might also lead to an approach that is inconsistent with the systems that some multinationals already have. The Treasury has said that it will consult on detailed regulations in the spring of this year. We welcome that commitment. Can the Minister give an assurance that she will make sure that businesses and representative bodies will be closely involved in shaping how the system is put into practice? With the planned 2027 start date, there is not a lot of time to get the rules in place or for companies to build or modify systems to provide the new data. Can that be done without causing undue cost and disruption to businesses? Finally, I want to make a slighter broader point on the clause. We clearly understand the importance of robust compliance and the need to protect the UK tax base on behalf of our constituents so that we can deliver public services. However, each new requirement—whether it is the ICTS, pillar two returns or transfer pricing documentation—adds to the cumulative impact on businesses. We need to see these obligations in the round, not as each one being reasonable on its own terms. What is the overall picture of what we are imposing on companies? If that load becomes too great, the UK will be seen as a less attractive place to invest, which is certainly not what we want. Although we support the principle of better risk assessment, we continue to press Ministers to ensure that we have proportionate and workable solutions that add value for HMRC, businesses and our constituents. New clause 4 would simply require a report setting out those impacts. I would add that, according to the Budget costings, the reporting duty would raise around £25 million in 2026-27, growing to £350 million a year, helping HMRC to tackle artificial profit shifting. That is welcome, but we should also consider the one-off and ongoing costs for businesses that have to re-engineer their systems. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response to my points about implementation and whether the hybrid model will actually be the best of both worlds.