James Cartlidge MP: speeches
4 Jul 2024–3 Jul 2025
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Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.
3 published records · newest first.
Speeches
- 10 Feb 2025 · Defence Spending · Hansard source
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I thought that it would benefit the House to know that, given the importance of secure communications. I turn to my question, which involves secure communications. It says everything about the Government’s priorities that they are delaying increasing defence spending to 2.5%, but accelerating their terrible Chagos deal, at a cost of up to £18 billion. Last week, the Prime Minister justified the deal by stating that without it, “the base cannot operate in practical terms as it should”. No. 10 later briefed that that was a reference to satellite links. Is the Secretary of State seriously suggesting that there is an operational threat to US and UK military satellite communications at Diego Garcia?
- 10 Sept 2024 · Ukraine · Hansard source
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I am grateful to the Secretary of State for early sight of his statement, and for the briefings he has provided to me and all parliamentary colleagues. I associate myself and my party with the condolences he expressed regarding the tragic death of Lieutenant Leyshon. As we have confirmed previously, I reiterate without reservation that, as Labour did when in opposition, we will continue to do everything possible to support the Government over Ukraine. We remain steadfast in our total condemnation of both Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and his conduct of the war, during which he has shown no regard for human life, even, it would appear, that of his own service personnel, with losses now at terrible levels on all sides. Indeed—this was one of the Secretary of State’s most striking points on the operational situation—it is an extraordinary testament to the brutal disposition of the Putin regime that their strategy continues to rely on the mass sacrifice of infantry personnel. That said, the Secretary of State is surely right to remind us that, despite the extraordinary naval success Ukraine has enjoyed in the Black sea and the surprise incursion into Kursk that has thrown Putin’s regime into confusion, Russia remains a formidable foe and nothing at all can be taken for granted. On the contrary, it is clear that the UK must continue to do all it can to support Ukraine’s Government, people and armed forces. On the Conservative Benches, we are proud of the role our Government played in showing real leadership in respect of Ukraine. If Ukraine had fallen early, the world would have been in a precipice situation akin to the late 1930s, but we made a huge difference to avoiding that outcome by being the first nation to train Ukrainian troops, the first to provide main battle tanks and, in particular, the first to provide long-range weapons. In August, President Zelensky commented that Britain’s support for Ukraine has slowed down recently. What assessment has the Secretary of State made of those comments? On these Benches, we recognise that a key part of our leadership has been bringing other allies on board, which must continue in key operational and logistical decision making. Nevertheless, we have also shown leadership as a sovereign nation that believes wholeheartedly in Ukraine’s fight for freedom. As such, I confirm that we would have no hesitation in supporting the Government in continuing that leadership were they to confirm that the Ukrainian Government have maximum freedom of operation with regard to all the munitions we have supplied, including long-range missiles. On the provision of additional munitions and the latest news shared by the Secretary of State, I welcome the announcement of £160 million for air defence missiles to be produced, of course, in Belfast. That underlines the intention we had in government, when the latest round of support commenced, to ensure a maximum degree of benefit for the UK defence sector in our support for Ukraine. Will the Secretary of State confirm that that remains a top priority and that, as we supply Ukraine with more and more drones across defence, he will ensure that we rapidly learn the lessons of their deployment so that we can build the ecosystem for our own sovereign uncrewed sector? We agree that supplying Ukraine with arms has been the right thing to do but—and the public feel this very strongly—that must be accompanied by the replenishment of our own stockpiles and platform inventory. A top priority of our funded, timetabled commitment to 2.5% was an additional £10 billion to replenish our munitions. Is the Secretary of State still committed to that extra £10 billion for munitions? Can he confirm that the delay in setting out a clear timetable to 2.5% will not lead to the deferment of any major munitions orders, either this financial year or next? The Secretary of State spoke of Russian artillery outfiring Ukraine by 3:1, and he knows the crucial importance of industrial output. That being so, does he recognise that we must urgently fire up production across our own defence sector by committing to 2.5% as soon as possible? Finally, one lesson from Ukraine is the vital importance of maintaining air superiority in battle. In relation to our future combat air capability, I asked the Secretary of State a set of written questions on 29 July on the sixth-generation global combat air programme spending, and he has to date answered only the questions on historical spend, not those on the current financial year. Will he therefore confirm whether his Department will be deferring any spending on GCAP planned for the current financial year?
- 24 Jul 2024 · International Immunities and Privileges · Hansard source
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My right hon. Friend, who not only served on the Committee but was an Armed Forces Minister, makes an excellent point. There are those who argue that we should go beyond 2.5%; I would argue that 2.5% is still a significant jump for this country. We had a funded plan, and that 2.5%—crucially and critically, with the pathway we set out, which became an accumulation of significant additional billions of pounds for the MOD—enabled us to afford GCAP and stabilise that programme. I want to make one crucial point about the uncrewed domain. To be frank, for the uncrewed side of the Navy, Army and Air Force, those programmes are not funded: hitherto, the funding has come primarily from support for Ukraine. That is entirely logical because, under the defence drone strategy, we were very clear that there is no point in the Army, for example, ordering large-scale drones now; it might order them to train with, but the technology is changing so fast. What we as a country need to build, as I set out in the drone strategy, is the ecosystem to develop those drones, and we are doing that. I have always said—I said it during my statement on the integrated procurement model—that my most inspiring moment as Defence Procurement Minister was visiting a UK SME that was building a drone for use in Ukraine. It was a highly capable platform, but brilliantly, it was getting feedback and spiralling it—as we call it—the very next day. On GCAP, it should be a technology for the whole of defence—it should be a pan-defence technology of how we team with uncrewed systems, how the Navy fights with an uncrewed fleet above and below the surface, for the Army and of course for the Air Force. I have two final points on military capability, as a couple of points have been floating around in the press. The first is that the Army is putting out its opposition to GCAP. I find that idea impossible to believe. Of course, if the Army wants to succeed, it needs the support of the Air Force and so on. That is why an integrated approach to procurement is so important, not single service competition. There has also been the point that we should choose between GCAP and AUKUS, as if, when the next war comes, the Russians will step into our dressing room and ask if we would like to bowl or bat: would we like to fight on land or sea—what is our preference? The fact is that we do not know where the threat will come from, but we know that it is growing, so we should support both GCAP and AUKUS, not least for the enormous economic benefit they bring. You will be pleased to know, Mr Speaker, that that brings me to the last part of my speech, on the economic benefits of GCAP. There are those who say we should buy off the shelf. We would stress how, in a state of ever greater war readiness, it pays to have operational independence and sovereignty. In particular, investing in the great tradition of UK combat air offers huge economic gains for every part of the country. In 2020, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that the Tempest programme alone would support an average of 20,000 jobs every year from 2026 until 2050. Those are well-paid jobs in every constituency up and down the country—including many in Lancashire, as you will know, Mr Speaker. Scrapping GCAP would hit our economy hard. Even delaying or deferring GCAP expenditure would undermine our brilliant aerospace industry, which was on display this past week at the Royal International Air Tattoo in Farnborough, and cast doubt over the vast sums of private investment that are waiting, from which hundreds of UK SMEs stand to benefit. An interesting point was raised by the Leader of the Opposition when asking the Prime Minister about exports and discussions with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is an incredibly important point. I was clear that, in reforming procurement, we have to have exportability at the heart of it because otherwise industrial supply chains wither. It is as simple as that. The demand from this country is not big enough. This has been the French lesson for many years, which is why they have put so much effort into export, and we need to do the same—whether it is GCAP, or any other platforms or capability manufactured by the United Kingdom. To undermine GCAP is to undermine our economy, our future war-fighting capability and relations with our closest international partners. The Government should instead embrace GCAP wholeheartedly and confirm that they stand by their previous position of steadfast support. Then they should commit to a clear timetable on 2.5%, so that we can turbocharge the programme by investing not only in the core platform, but in the associated technology of autonomous collaboration and a digital system of systems approach, enabling the mass and rapid absorption of battlespace data. To conclude, the best way to win the next war is to deter it from happening in the first place. Part of our overall deterrence posture is to signal to our adversaries our preparedness to always be ready to out-compete their technology. How can we send that deterrent signal if we have such mixed messages on our largest conventional military programme? We support this statutory instrument, we support GCAP and we support the powerful gains it will give to the United Kingdom’s economic and military strength.
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