Jake Richards MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is making a powerful argument, but there is a difference between trying to control external factors that may affect an individual making a decision and primary legislation that tries to regulate a person with capacity making an assessment of what is in their best interest. Can he think of any other circumstances in our society or our law where someone with capacity is restrained from making a best-interest decision in primary legislation?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My reading of the Bill—we are dealing with clause 1, but we will get to clause 24—is that clause 24(3) says: “In the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert”, followed by the provisions in new section 2AA.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very happy to share my CV afterwards. I practised as a barrister mainly in family law and Court of Protection law, but back in the day I also practised criminal law as a very junior barrister in the magistrates courts up and down the land. I do not want to delve into the criminal element too much, because we are on clause 1, but it appears to me that the criminal offence set out in clause 26 is far stronger than the Suicide Act 1961, which talks of an act of encouragement. That is not included in clause 26, which talks about inducement—a much more holistic and wider concept than that of an Act probably drafted back in the late 1950s. In my submission, that brings the law far more up to date with modern concepts of coercion and pressure.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes. As I say, the amendments are perfectly reasonable; it is sensible to raise them and it is good that we are having this conversation. I have looked into this carefully and I take it seriously. I feel that the square is squared—or the circle goes all the way round, to mix my metaphors—but that does not mean that we should not look into this further when we get to the relevant clauses.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  With respect, I think my hon. Friend is wrong: it is certainly not an exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. The courts—this is why we have a common law system—interpret the language used in legislation.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My answer to the hon. Lady’s first question is yes. In my view, clause 26 covers undue influence and encouragement—I could go on to state why. My reading of the Bill is that clause 24(3) essentially removes from the Suicide Act persons who are by all the other criteria eligible for assistance in death under the Bill. The Act that will be created is, in my view, stronger in any event. That is why—I genuinely mean this respectfully, because the hon. Lady made good points in an impassioned speech—this argument about encouragement in the Suicide Act does not follow through. What we have here is a much safer and more modern piece of legislation, which is reflective of what we all think of when we think of coercion and pressure.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s. Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice. I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I did not draft the legislation, but my understanding is that the reason why the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26—I do not know whether the Minister wants to comment on this—is that when there is a criminal offence, there needs to be a mens rea. The person who has committed the offence needs to have been intentional or reckless in doing so. As I say, I was a criminal barrister only very briefly; I am sure my law tutors are shaking their heads.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This debate has been very interesting and has reminded me of my life before being elected. When I was a barrister in court, I was often junior counsel and, by the time I stood up, all the best points had been taken. I feel a bit like that this morning. I have some observations, the first of which is on what is in the Bill currently. My central submission is that the Bill does more than enough in this area, and that simplicity is what is required, especially when dealing with very complex and difficult subjects, which coercion is. There are two sides to the coin of coercion: one is about acts by third parties, such as family members or society at large, and the other is the individual making the decision. Clause 1 is clear that, as part of the assessment made by the doctor, judge or panel, the person must have “a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life” voluntarily. That precisely echoes words from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on whether to prosecute that is currently in operation. That guidance has been in use for some time, and it seems perfectly rational and logical to continue that. The focus of the assessment should be on the individual and whether they make the choice freely. Clause 1 makes that clear, and I presume purposefully echoes the language from the CPS guidance. It then says it must be established that the person has “made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.” That must of course be read with clause 26, which introduces a new offence: “A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, commits an offence.” That carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the first point, in fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate was talking about a clause that we are going to consider and the link between two different criminal offences in the 1961 Act and clause 26 of the Bill. On the second point, the Bill—to coin a political phrase—needs to be fit for the future. The language used in legislation over the last decade when we are considering coercion—I use that word automatically because that is the language we use now—is much more appropriate than “encouragement”, which is slightly archaic, to be honest. Perhaps we need to look at the Suicide Act as well—although not in this parliamentary term; that is for the second term. [ Laughter. ] I have nothing further to add.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That sounds very sensible—I think my hon. Friend is talking about her amendment.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I keep making the point that clause 9 adds a different element to this process. It says that, when undertaking the assessment, one of the two doctors “may, if they have doubt as to…capacity…refer the person for assessment” of their capacity by a psychiatrist. Does that reassure the hon. Member that there is a further layer of safeguards in this area?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am sympathetic to the problem the hon. Lady has identified of people who have a terminal illness as well as other mental health conditions. Instead of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act for this new context, would it not be better to secure safeguards through clause 9, through which further assessments are potentially going to be mandated, if the amendment from the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) is agreed to, for those cases where there is doubt as to capacity? That would add a further safeguard rather than rewriting the established Mental Capacity Act and case law.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a few questions for the hon. Member. Who does she propose will decide whether a decision by someone who has capacity is wise or unwise? Does she also propose changing the law around patients’ refusing life-saving treatment? Should that be handled under the Mental Capacity Act, as it is at the moment?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am trying to understand my hon. Friend’s argument. In terms of a person choosing to ask their doctor to turn off their life support machine, as opposed to someone offering a person drugs to self-administer, I understand that there are differences in terms of public policy and that, for some, there are differences morally. However, in terms of capacity—the decision as to whether that person can make that choice themselves—why is it different?

• 5 Feb 2025 · Gambling Harms · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) on securing this debate. I can be brief, because many of my points have already been made. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Maureen Burke), who mentioned her constituent Margaret, I have been an MP for only seven months. In this job we meet people who are going through difficult times, but I will never forget my meeting with my constituents Judith Bruney and her friend Liz. They came to my office in Dinnington to tell me about their sons, both of whom were hard-working, honourable, good young men trying to make their way in the world, but both of whom took their own life far too young as a result of their addiction to gambling. Chris, Judith’s son, was talented and hard-working but, without any of his close family knowing, he went spiralling into the depths of a gambling problem that in the end meant that he took his own life. I want to stress the point, which my hon. Friend has already made, that the trauma for the families did not end at that point. Afterwards, both Liz and Judith had to keep fighting for answers about how this happened and why this happened against an industry, and frankly a system, that too often closes doors, shuts down and does not look into the very important issues affecting hundreds or thousands of people every year. I urge the Government and the Minister to work with the Ministry of Justice in particular to look at ways in which we can empower coroners’ courts, and indeed place responsibilities on them, to look into these issues in a robust and rigorous manner. At the moment, we simply do not know the scale of the problem. We have heard a lot of statistics in this debate, but they vary because we just do not know what we are dealing with. Until we do, we cannot properly solve it.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This question is probably best for Alex. Yesterday we heard evidence about the health inequalities in our society and fears that they would be exacerbated by the introduction of assisted dying. What was the experience in Australia? Alex Greenwich: If I think of our health system and how we adopted voluntary assisted dying, like all health systems we were under pressure following the covid pandemic. By legislating in this space you give your health system the priority of dealing with this, making sure doctors are trained to be able to address it and that there is a good implementation period. I believe the Bill has two years, and I think that is completely appropriate to make sure your health system gets up to speed. When it comes to end-of-life choices and healthcare, voluntary assisted dying provides a great deal of honesty and safeguards.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Would the decision about the need for a psychiatric assessment be undertaken by a medical clinician? Professor House: In the circumstances you are talking about—generally, yes.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q If I may, I will push Professor House on the evidence he was giving to Mr Atkinson’s questions, so that I understand the necessity for psychiatric assessment under the current legal framework. Clearly there are degrees here. If a patient who has diabetes refuses to take insulin but would otherwise be able to manage their disease, then they would be referred to you, but is it your experience that if a patient rejected a round of chemotherapy, they would usually be subject to a psychiatric assessment? Professor House: No, these things depend on the circumstances. If somebody says, “I’ve had enough of this. I’ve had chemotherapy and I don’t want any more,” they would not be subject to that, unless it was such a sudden change in the context of other changes in the person that the oncologist treating them thought something needed further explanation; it would not be terribly common, no.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is welcome. Dr Graham: I think the judicial safeguard strengthens the convention compatibility because of the argument relating to Mortier that was set out earlier, but I do not think it is essential for convention combability because of the case law I mentioned earlier.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Dr Graham, in paragraph 21 of your very helpful written evidence, you say that the judicial involvement in the process strengthens the Bill, in terms of convention compatibility. Do you agree with Lord Sumption about the effect on convention compatibility if that stage were not present, and do you have any comments on the suitability of a judicial function, and whether there is any alternative? Dr Graham: I am afraid my answer will be quite short.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To be clear, would it concern you because it would cause confusion? Yogi Amin: It is a well settled and understood approach to the law, and producing a new one would throw up a whole new conundrum, where people would be questioning how to approach it, etc. It is not broken—it works well.