Jake Richards MP: speeches 2025

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Speeches

5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source
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The hon. Lady has set out the process, but I believe she may have missed an important juncture in the Bill. If there are any doubts as to capacity, then the person would be referred to a psychiatrist for a full assessment.
5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source
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I was expecting someone else to have spoken in support of amendment 296, but I will be very brief. The tone of the debate so far has been respectful, and it should continue to be so. I hope that this will not be characterised as a personal attack on my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, who tabled the amendment, or anyone else who supports it, but this is a shocking amendment. It is shocking because I doubt that the motives behind it are to improve the Bill or make it safer. In fact, I fear that the motives are to build a political attack to support opposition to the Bill, rather than to be constructive in improving it. I have come to that conclusion because there is no concept in any other piece of legislation, or in any healthcare guidance in operation, that would ever presuppose that a clinician would undertake a consultation, assessment or meeting that would ever put other patients in danger. I fear that this amendment has been tabled because some people are attempting to assert, perhaps not purposefully or wilfully, that the introduction of an assisted dying system would somehow force clinicians to put other patients at risk. If that is the assertion, that is wrong and—in my view—shocking. It is a shocking indictment on their view of our medical practitioners in the NHS.
5 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting) · Hansard source
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I am grateful, Chair, and I can take further interventions on any further points from the hon. Gentleman, but I will deal with that one. This is not a personal criticism of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. I do not doubt that she has good intentions. What I stated was that her opposition to the principle of the Bill is guiding some of the amendments that she has tabled, and this is one of them.
5 Mar 2025 · Courts and Tribunals: Sitting Days · Hansard source
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I have been in this House for only a few months, but I must admit that I am absolutely staggered by the chutzpah of Conservative Members—most have left, but when they were here—in their attitude to this issue. In a competitive field, the state of our criminal courts and our criminal justice system perhaps wins the award for the most acute crisis as a result of the legacy of the previous Government. I really welcome today’s statement, in particular the emphasis not just on capacity but on productivity. May I just press the Government on whether that approach will also be taken in our family courts? I welcome the investment in infrastructure and capital spend in family courts, but we also need to look at how we can improve productivity.
4 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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I am very sympathetic to the amendment and have thought long and hard about it. Can my hon. Friend explain to me, from his experience, but also from looking at the Bill and speaking to others, the effect of clause 4(4)(b)? As a non-clinician layperson, it appears to me that if a medical practitioner is discussing the likely effect of any treatment, then by its very nature that would lead to a discussion about prognosis, and the uncertainty and certainty around that.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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The evidence that I have heard, both in Committee and from other sources, shows that the gagging clause leads to complete absurdities. Doctors feel completely unable to look after their patients and inform them of their options, and this leads to conversations that involve winks and nods. That is exactly what the Bill is trying to stop. Does my hon. Friend agree? I sense not.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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I have been listening to the argument in some detail. Is there not a danger here of trying to translate the dry words of clause 4 to the conversations that naturally happen between clinicians and patients? Subsection (3) attempts to give some discretion as to when, how and whether to raise this prospect, instead of making it mandatory on any prognosis of terminality.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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That was an intervention that I was grateful to take. I accept the point that there are dangers of a system that somehow incentivises this. That is why the Bill has to have such strict safeguards and such strict regulation of medical practitioners to comply with the law. The point about mandatory referral is key; I would have real concerns about this area of the Bill without that amendment, and unless the sponsor of the Bill had not made it very clear that she would be supporting it. But I take the point.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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But I am happy to take another, although I may come to regret it.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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Well, that was the sense—
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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No, I am not going to, actually. I am taking my rights. My final point concerns section 1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act and the discarding of the principle about whether a decision is deemed to be unwise. This is an issue we have already debated, but it is really important. Introducing a best interests test is, to my mind, impossible without ending up with a law that discriminates against certain groups. Essentially, it is impossible to do fairly. I remain to be convinced. If there were an amendment that could do what I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire wants, I would support it. If there were an amendment that could look into someone’s mind and make sure that they are doing this for reasons that society would deem fit, I would support it, but I think that that is impossible. What the Bill aims to do is assess a person’s capacity and ensure that they are making this decision voluntarily. It also aims to protect them from the influence of third parties and outside sources. That is the only way, if this principle is to be adhered to. Finally, I will be voting against the amendments, but I will finish where I started. I have genuinely thought long and hard, in particular about the presumption. I have spoken to experts who disagree with me, but in my mind it comes down to whether we rip things up and start again or whether we add rigorous safeguards, practices and processes, which may be a bit more boring but will actually be more effective at protecting any patients who go down this road.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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Much has been covered today, and the issue of capacity was debated at length when the Committee considered clause 1, but I do have some observations. I am sympathetic to the assertion that there should be changes to presumption and burden. Those are things that I have considered and spoken about with the promoter of the Bill and, outside the Committee, with experts who gave evidence to the Committee. I have spoken about them publicly as well; I am very sympathetic. At the heart of this, we have two options. We could change the burden and presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying, rewriting 20 years of case law and medical practice. There is certainly some value to that, but that would be a radical departure from current medical practice, and there are other concerns. The alternative is to put in place rigorous processes and training around the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that it is implemented properly. After some reflection, I err on the side of the latter option, for a number of reasons. First, I accept that there is debate among psychiatrists about this issue. We heard evidence from some who deem the Act not to be suitable for this new realm—I accept that we are entering new grounds, and I will come back to that point—but many psychiatrists and lawyers working in this area would deem it uncomfortable and unnecessary to depart from the Act. Secondly, there is an oddity in changing presumption. There is an oddity in someone having to prove that they have capacity to fulfil their own desire. That oddity is one of the reasons that the Act is drafted as it is. It is partly—there are two sides to this coin—to ensure that there is no discrimination, partly to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 and human rights more generally, and partly to ensure that we do not end up in a medical situation that is patrician, whereby medical doctors take an intrusive view of capacity rather than meeting the individual as they are. Thirdly, the Bill, when amended—I will come on to the amendments that give me some comfort—will offer more safeguards than the Mental Capacity Act. Amendment 5 to clause 9(3) would ensure a further level of assessment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she will support that important amendment, as have all members of the Committee. If there is any doubt, there will be a further assessment by a psychiatrist. That goes some way to reassuring me that it is not necessary to rip up the burden or change the presumption in this area. I want to make an observation about burden of proof, presumption and the nature of the assessment. Professor Whitty clarified his evidence. It is right that the burden and the presumption do not change, but of course the nature of the assessment rightly changes according to the circumstances. Every assessment of capacity is somewhat different, which is why amendment 50 is too prescriptive, in my view. Of course, we can consider incredibly serious cases involving deprivation of liberty or the ability to conduct litigation. I have worked with parents whose children are being removed and looked at whether they have the capacity to make decisions about how they present their case. It is very dangerous to compare the severity and the profound nature of different circumstances, but let us not pretend that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to assess the most complex issues of capacity every day. I am very sympathetic to amendment 50. I have met the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled it, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to discuss it, but I stress that such a prescriptive provision is not appropriate for primary legislation when we are entering new ground. I accept, as hon. Members with different views have said, that we are entering new territory and that this is difficult. I accept that psychiatrists and medical practitioners will have to think long and hard about the nature of the capacity assessments, especially under clause 9(3), when that is activated. That work will have to be done. It has been set out in primary legislation through some of the training clauses, which have already been referred to. There is no doubt that there will be a lot of work and consideration, but I do not deem it appropriate to have a clause drafted by one psychiatrist, albeit an undoubtedly esteemed and experienced one: the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled the amendment. Rather, the work needs to be done as the Bill is implemented over a two-year period. It needs to be done as part of a full consultation with psychiatrists, once the Bill has been passed, and that should be set out in guidance. That is what would usually happen with deprivation of liberty. I do not think it appropriate for primary legislation to set out the factors for a capacity assessment.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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We need to be careful when we say that the Mental Capacity Act is misunderstood, full stop. Let us be clear—
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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I am grateful, Mr Dowd. The evidence that we have received is that this is a test. These are assessments that happen every day across the country. Now, there are more complex assessments, and there will without doubt be areas in which the assessment is not done as rigorously as it should be done, but that is why I am assured by the safeguards in the Bill that if there is any doubt—any doubt—as to capacity at first instance, there will be a full and thorough assessment by a psychiatrist. Let us think that through for a minute. Any competent psychiatrist trained in this area will no doubt have a sense of what the Mental Capacity Act says and of the normal test for capacity. Someone who is seeking assistance to die from a doctor who has doubts as to their capacity will have been referred. To my mind, it is unfathomable that that assessment, at that stage, would not be rigorous and would not satisfy every Member that it had been done to the correct extent practicable.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity. This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.
26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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Yes, there are safeguards and mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that and to protect from a culture that would incentivise this practice.
25 Feb 2025 · Doncaster Sheffield Airport · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend is making a characteristically tub-thumping speech about this airport. My constituency, and Maltby in particular, has many people who worked at and used the airport. My hon. Friend spoke about the opportunities for people to remain at home and still get on in life, which really strikes a chord with me when I speak to young people in Maltby. Does he agree that the airport is not just about flights, but about offering young people a future to remain at home, and a bright future to stay in Maltby?
25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source
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Can my hon. Friend clarify for me what she means by “reasonable certainty”, and how that differs from the clause as drafted? Can she also explain why, in her amendments, normal language around the burden of proof, such as “on the balance of probabilities” or “beyond reasonable doubt” is not used?
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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What I meant by a welfare decision is a paternalistic view, whereby medical practitioners and others say what is in the best interests of an individual, rather than the individual themselves.
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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The issue in this interesting debate between the hon. Member and the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire is whether the assessment is of the person making that decision—have they been coerced?—or of actions of a third party. Someone cannot themselves be encouraged; someone else encourages them. It may very well be the case that an individual making a decision has been encouraged to do so, but the issue for an assessing doctor, panel or judge is surely whether that person’s ability to make the decision has been affected. That is not about their being encouraged; it is about whether they have been coerced. That is the differentiation between the two concepts. The concept of coercion is a much better way of ensuring the assessment is about the person’s ability to make the decision, not about third-party factors.
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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My question was building on the intervention made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley. It was about whether there can ever be a selfless act.
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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I am very sympathetic to the amendment, which aims to tackle a mischief that we are all worried about, but there are two fundamental problems. The first, which builds on the intervention from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, is this issue of deciphering if an action is for your own sake or the sake of others. It is a philosophical question: is there ever really a selfless act? Even if we take an act that may be deemed to be for someone else, it may be because we want that person to receive some pleasure, joy or relief, so in my mind there is a danger that this could become a tautology. Secondly—I hope that you might be able to comment on this—is there not a danger that we are then putting it on doctors and others in this process to undertake an assessment of welfare? When you are deciding whether something is for an individual’s sake, you are making some determination, are you not, as to what is in their best interests? That directly conflicts with the principles of the Bill, which is all about autonomy and an individual’s choice, rather than others saying what you should and should not do.
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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The hon. Member said that my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge and I contradicted each other. I did not quite understand the logic of her argument; I do not deem that we contradicted ourselves one bit. I also want to push back on the point about process. Let us just step back: we have been debating for a number of hours some very sensible amendments, and that is exactly what this Committee is meant to do. I am new here, the hon. Member is new here, but it seems to me that it is exactly right. She has tabled an amendment, we have had good debates on all sides, and the Government Minister stood up and gave the Government’s view of the workability of the Bill and whether the amendment is necessary. Is that not what this process is meant to be doing?
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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Forgive me, Mrs Harris. I apologise profusely.
12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source
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rose —

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