Jake Richards MP: speeches

Speeches

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful, Mr Dowd. The evidence that we have received is that this is a test. These are assessments that happen every day across the country. Now, there are more complex assessments, and there will without doubt be areas in which the assessment is not done as rigorously as it should be done, but that is why I am assured by the safeguards in the Bill that if there is any doubt—any doubt—as to capacity at first instance, there will be a full and thorough assessment by a psychiatrist. Let us think that through for a minute. Any competent psychiatrist trained in this area will no doubt have a sense of what the Mental Capacity Act says and of the normal test for capacity. Someone who is seeking assistance to die from a doctor who has doubts as to their capacity will have been referred. To my mind, it is unfathomable that that assessment, at that stage, would not be rigorous and would not satisfy every Member that it had been done to the correct extent practicable.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity. This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.

• 26 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes, there are safeguards and mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that and to protect from a culture that would incentivise this practice.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Doncaster Sheffield Airport · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a characteristically tub-thumping speech about this airport. My constituency, and Maltby in particular, has many people who worked at and used the airport. My hon. Friend spoke about the opportunities for people to remain at home and still get on in life, which really strikes a chord with me when I speak to young people in Maltby. Does he agree that the airport is not just about flights, but about offering young people a future to remain at home, and a bright future to stay in Maltby?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Can my hon. Friend clarify for me what she means by “reasonable certainty”, and how that differs from the clause as drafted? Can she also explain why, in her amendments, normal language around the burden of proof, such as “on the balance of probabilities” or “beyond reasonable doubt” is not used?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  What I meant by a welfare decision is a paternalistic view, whereby medical practitioners and others say what is in the best interests of an individual, rather than the individual themselves.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The issue in this interesting debate between the hon. Member and the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire is whether the assessment is of the person making that decision—have they been coerced?—or of actions of a third party. Someone cannot themselves be encouraged; someone else encourages them. It may very well be the case that an individual making a decision has been encouraged to do so, but the issue for an assessing doctor, panel or judge is surely whether that person’s ability to make the decision has been affected. That is not about their being encouraged; it is about whether they have been coerced. That is the differentiation between the two concepts. The concept of coercion is a much better way of ensuring the assessment is about the person’s ability to make the decision, not about third-party factors.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My question was building on the intervention made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley. It was about whether there can ever be a selfless act.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very sympathetic to the amendment, which aims to tackle a mischief that we are all worried about, but there are two fundamental problems. The first, which builds on the intervention from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, is this issue of deciphering if an action is for your own sake or the sake of others. It is a philosophical question: is there ever really a selfless act? Even if we take an act that may be deemed to be for someone else, it may be because we want that person to receive some pleasure, joy or relief, so in my mind there is a danger that this could become a tautology. Secondly—I hope that you might be able to comment on this—is there not a danger that we are then putting it on doctors and others in this process to undertake an assessment of welfare? When you are deciding whether something is for an individual’s sake, you are making some determination, are you not, as to what is in their best interests? That directly conflicts with the principles of the Bill, which is all about autonomy and an individual’s choice, rather than others saying what you should and should not do.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member said that my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge and I contradicted each other. I did not quite understand the logic of her argument; I do not deem that we contradicted ourselves one bit. I also want to push back on the point about process. Let us just step back: we have been debating for a number of hours some very sensible amendments, and that is exactly what this Committee is meant to do. I am new here, the hon. Member is new here, but it seems to me that it is exactly right. She has tabled an amendment, we have had good debates on all sides, and the Government Minister stood up and gave the Government’s view of the workability of the Bill and whether the amendment is necessary. Is that not what this process is meant to be doing?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Forgive me, Mrs Harris. I apologise profusely.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is making a powerful argument, but there is a difference between trying to control external factors that may affect an individual making a decision and primary legislation that tries to regulate a person with capacity making an assessment of what is in their best interest. Can he think of any other circumstances in our society or our law where someone with capacity is restrained from making a best-interest decision in primary legislation?

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My reading of the Bill—we are dealing with clause 1, but we will get to clause 24—is that clause 24(3) says: “In the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert”, followed by the provisions in new section 2AA.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am very happy to share my CV afterwards. I practised as a barrister mainly in family law and Court of Protection law, but back in the day I also practised criminal law as a very junior barrister in the magistrates courts up and down the land. I do not want to delve into the criminal element too much, because we are on clause 1, but it appears to me that the criminal offence set out in clause 26 is far stronger than the Suicide Act 1961, which talks of an act of encouragement. That is not included in clause 26, which talks about inducement—a much more holistic and wider concept than that of an Act probably drafted back in the late 1950s. In my submission, that brings the law far more up to date with modern concepts of coercion and pressure.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Yes. As I say, the amendments are perfectly reasonable; it is sensible to raise them and it is good that we are having this conversation. I have looked into this carefully and I take it seriously. I feel that the square is squared—or the circle goes all the way round, to mix my metaphors—but that does not mean that we should not look into this further when we get to the relevant clauses.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  With respect, I think my hon. Friend is wrong: it is certainly not an exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. The courts—this is why we have a common law system—interpret the language used in legislation.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My answer to the hon. Lady’s first question is yes. In my view, clause 26 covers undue influence and encouragement—I could go on to state why. My reading of the Bill is that clause 24(3) essentially removes from the Suicide Act persons who are by all the other criteria eligible for assistance in death under the Bill. The Act that will be created is, in my view, stronger in any event. That is why—I genuinely mean this respectfully, because the hon. Lady made good points in an impassioned speech—this argument about encouragement in the Suicide Act does not follow through. What we have here is a much safer and more modern piece of legislation, which is reflective of what we all think of when we think of coercion and pressure.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s. Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice. I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I did not draft the legislation, but my understanding is that the reason why the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26—I do not know whether the Minister wants to comment on this—is that when there is a criminal offence, there needs to be a mens rea. The person who has committed the offence needs to have been intentional or reckless in doing so. As I say, I was a criminal barrister only very briefly; I am sure my law tutors are shaking their heads.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This debate has been very interesting and has reminded me of my life before being elected. When I was a barrister in court, I was often junior counsel and, by the time I stood up, all the best points had been taken. I feel a bit like that this morning. I have some observations, the first of which is on what is in the Bill currently. My central submission is that the Bill does more than enough in this area, and that simplicity is what is required, especially when dealing with very complex and difficult subjects, which coercion is. There are two sides to the coin of coercion: one is about acts by third parties, such as family members or society at large, and the other is the individual making the decision. Clause 1 is clear that, as part of the assessment made by the doctor, judge or panel, the person must have “a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life” voluntarily. That precisely echoes words from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on whether to prosecute that is currently in operation. That guidance has been in use for some time, and it seems perfectly rational and logical to continue that. The focus of the assessment should be on the individual and whether they make the choice freely. Clause 1 makes that clear, and I presume purposefully echoes the language from the CPS guidance. It then says it must be established that the person has “made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.” That must of course be read with clause 26, which introduces a new offence: “A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, commits an offence.” That carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On the first point, in fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate was talking about a clause that we are going to consider and the link between two different criminal offences in the 1961 Act and clause 26 of the Bill. On the second point, the Bill—to coin a political phrase—needs to be fit for the future. The language used in legislation over the last decade when we are considering coercion—I use that word automatically because that is the language we use now—is much more appropriate than “encouragement”, which is slightly archaic, to be honest. Perhaps we need to look at the Suicide Act as well—although not in this parliamentary term; that is for the second term. [ Laughter. ] I have nothing further to add.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.