Iain Duncan Smith MP: speeches 2024

Speeches

• 16 Dec 2024 · United Front Work Department · Hansard source

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  Mr Speaker, I apologise if that was the case. Yang Tengbo—H6—was, in fact, not a lone wolf. He was one of some 40,000 members of the United Front Work Department, which, as the Government know, the Intelligence and Security Committee report last year said had penetrated “every sector” of the UK economy, including by spying, stealing intellectual property, influencing, and shaping our institutions. Our agents say they are now frustrated by the lack of action, but they do not seem to have the tools they need to deal with the issue. One of those tools is staring us in the face. Will the Government commit to putting China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and will they do it now? There is no need for delay. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, or IPAC, found that H6—Yang Tengbo—is already well known as a United Front member, and that he is known to others who are already deep in the political establishment. Parliamentarians are exposed to the United Front on a regular basis. Will the Minister remedy this today, and accept that China is our most prominent security threat and that all action must take priority? My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who was the previous Security Minister, has said publicly that the Home Office was ready to name China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which would have forced United Front members like H6 to register or face serious consequences. Given that doing so is an available option, why have we not done it yet? Is it true, as is being reported by papers, including The Times , that behind the scenes the Government are now under pressure from banks, the wider business community and Government Departments not to do it? When it comes to a member of the royal family, I simply say this: how was it that somebody who was known to the security forces was allowed to get so close to a member of the royal family without proper scrutiny exposing them? Finally, I note that the Prime Minister said today in response to the issue that we will “co-operate where we can”, particularly on environmental issues, and “challenge where we must”, particularly on human rights issues. If the Prime Minister means that, why are we still buying from China huge numbers of solar arrays that have demonstrably been made using slave labour? Surely his statement is clearly incorrect; far from challenging China on human rights, it now appears that we are turning a blind eye. Why is that?

• 16 Dec 2024 · United Front Work Department · Hansard source

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  (Urgent Question): To ask the Government if they will make a statement on the extent of the operations of the United Front Work Department within the UK.

• 11 Dec 2024 · Engagements · Hansard source

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  Ryan Cornelius has been detained in Dubai for 17 years. His property was seized in what was a very unjudicial process. The Prime Minister has been to the United Arab Emirates. When he went there, did he demand that Ryan Cornelius be freed, given that the United Nations concluded that his detention was arbitrary and in violation of international law? Will he make Magnitsky sanctions deliverable on those responsible for that after his release?

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will try to be as brief as possible, to allow others to speak. I wish to come to what the Bill is actually about, rather than what people say it is about, but first I want to dispel the idea that it would mean going backwards. The idea of mutual enforcement in fact originated, as others have said, in the EU itself at the time. It came from those who were tasked, as senior officials—British and others—to come forward with a solution, before the end of the Brexit debates and so on, with an alternative way to make the borders work and to take the heat out of what later became really quite powerful and ended up with a Government literally unable to move any motion at all and have it succeed. I have personal experience of this issue because, when there was a break in the negotiations between the UK Government—who handled it pretty badly at the time, by the way—and the Commission, I managed somehow to get a team of people together to go and see Monsieur Barnier directly. We sat at a table with all his negotiators, and a few of ours who were there, and we talked through the principles. This was before mutual enforcement became a concept, but we talked about what already existed in the EU with others from outside the EU and inside the EU, and how they traded. We ended up reaching very much the same conclusion as originally reached by Sir Jonathan Faull and others: that mutual enforcement was the better deal. Monsieur Barnier agreed with us. At the end of that agreement—I can see him following me out as I put my coat on—he said, “The principle behind any chance of this being agreed is that we must have trust. Without trust, we cannot have an agreement.” The sad part about it was that when I came back to the UK to speak to my Government, they did not want to take any interest in that as a departure. They had already got bogged down in other areas. Sadly, two weeks later, what actually happened was that the Government went back in and carried on with their complicated and hopeless negotiation, without first setting out the principle of what they wanted. I think Monsieur Barnier was open to that and I think the EU wanted mutual enforcement. At that stage, there was no question about weaponising the border; it was about how we could reach an agreement. We could have done much more then, and I still today think that this idea is it. The Bill, then, is not about going backwards in the sense that it destroys what we have done; it actually says something about what we have done so far in two stages. The protocol, it seems to me, could only ever have been temporary, and the Windsor agreement, which I did not support, opened up the negotiation again, which was good, but the ask was so limited, and in some ways rather restrictive, that we have ended up with the principle being there, but the practical bit does not work. That was the moment when we should have used the opportunity to go back into mutual enforcement. What is so wrong about that? The EU already uses the principle in its dealings with other countries. As I said in an intervention earlier, the classic example is New Zealand. The EU trusts the New Zealand veterinary officers—particular key ones, but they trust them all once they are registered—to say whether certain foodstuffs are, under SPS rules, packaged properly and agreeable under the EU rules. They are trusted to say that EU rules are met. That is a critical component. When those foodstuffs are shipped and arrive at Rotterdam, most often it comes up on the computer and they are waved through. Any checks that have to take place in Rotterdam for non-EU countries take place 30 km behind the border, and they are spot checks just in case something has happened en route or something else has changed on the way. In other words, things move smoothly through. But such arrangements were not agreed in the various agreements here. Eventually, in trying to draft this idea together, I sat down with others to try to figure out how we could make mutual enforcement work. I give credit to the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) for having brought forward the Bill, because it gives us a chance to debate the matter. I know very well what goes on in this Chamber and I know only too well how Fridays work, and the sad part is that if the Government do not want to have any further debate on something, they arrange for it to be talked out. It has happened on both sides; cynicism exists on all sides. I understand that. Lots of people will have come in, particularly from London because they are closer, and they will do what they have to do to talk this out. The Bill is not going to get through; I never expected it to. [ Interruption. ] Honestly, do not object; Government Members know very well that that is exactly what happens. Some will be here because they believe in something—I look across at my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy)—but the majority are not. Therefore, let us just understand fundamentally what we could have been discussing and what the current Government could now be engaged in; they could be talking to the EU about changing these arrangements. The current arrangements are damaging relationships and causing issues around Northern Ireland. We know that; nobody is arguing that that is not the case. If we have such problems that affect the constitution and the smooth running of businesses both in Northern Ireland and the wider United Kingdom, then surely any Government would want to make sure those are settled. It is not a polemic, it is not a right or left wing thing to do; it is called practical governance to try to figure out how this works. I did not agree with my Government when they brought forward the Windsor agreement in its final stages, and I voted against it. I voted against it because I thought they had lost a real opportunity. The EU had accepted that its imposition earlier on did not work and it had to change it, but what we ended up with was a de minimis change which did not solve the problems; in fact some of them have got worse. When we strip out all the politics, the key component is that mutual enforcement requires each side to make reciprocal legal commitments to each other and to enforce the rules of the other with respect to trade across the border. In other words, we would accept that where our exporters export to the EU, we are responsible if they breach EU regulations. So if the EU says a company or individual is exporting goods in breach of the terms of its trade, the UK Government will take the responsibility to proceed against them, and vice versa for the EU. That does not require no border, because there has always been a border in Northern Ireland; we just do not want a hard border. That was always the issue. People talk about borders, but they mean a hard border. I had some experience of that when I had to man one of the checkpoints there when I was sent to Northern Ireland. I hated doing it, but that was a hard border. We do not want a hard border and mutual enforcement obviates the need for a hard border. Borders will exist, and we talked about that in terms of currency and VAT.

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  The real point is getting rid of the Irish sea checks; it is anathema that one part of the United Kingdom is now treated separately from the rest of the UK. That is surely a reasonable idea and if it is in this Bill then the Government should want to take it through to the next stage and debate it. This is what the Bill does. Mutual enforcement does not of itself remove customs duties; neither does it harmonise or require mutual recognition of standards. It works by inverting the usual approach to customs enforcement; duties may, for example, be imposed for anti-dumping reasons or due to subsidies that one party claims are injurious to itself or to companies as a result of goods failing to qualify for zero duty under rules of origin. That is what the Bill does. All the rest that has been talked about is not in this Bill; it is very simple and very practical. The trade and co-operation agreement between the EU and the UK already has an agreed mechanism, which is very important for identifying and addressing these distortions. If we are able to allow that and make changes, that is how it will work. There are other areas, too, which I will speed through as quickly as possible. Mutual enforcement can also under these terms accommodate the collection of customs duty. The detailed procedures are obviously beyond the scope of briefing papers and the Bill, but the reality is that we could have a system whereby an order of goods from the UK to the Republic of Ireland triggers a UK export declaration and an EU import declaration such that in terms of the EU’s customs data any sums owed are put into the goods invoice and paid by the importer to the exporter. There are many other ways ahead that can be facilitated, particularly now that almost all of this is done using modern technology, not large sheathes of paper and with a man standing at the border with a ladle to check whether the brandy being imported or exported tastes like brandy. That does not happen any longer, but from some of the debates it would seem somehow we have not moved on from 17th-century customs requirements. To ensure compliance with this regime, a penalty in this arrangement would apply to those parties who failed to follow the procedure. The penalty would apply to both exporters and hauliers, therefore incentivising all parties involved in the carriage of goods to ensure that appropriate EU customs duties are paid. By the way, the same would be required in the Republic for its importers. It should be noted—this is the important bit that has gone missing—that an analogous system would in any event be required for the red and green lane approach prescribed in the Windsor framework. Is this going back? No. It is using what we have and ultimately making it better. That seems to me the practical principle behind this idea of mutual enforcement. We should have started in this place, but we now have an opportunity to look at this issue and decide if there is a better way to do it that will take some of the good stuff already there and improve it by saying to the EU that we want a smooth process between the EU and the UK, because everything else then follows. Many EU members already agree; I have heard their discussions. I cannot remember who it was, but somebody got up and said, “Did we not think they were allies? Did we not think they were friends?” It is because we think they are allies and friends that we want to get rid of the things that make us have rows and arguments about the most practical issues that could be dealt with. That is the point of this mutual enforcement process: to get rid of the ludicrous arguments about who we are and who they are. We can then be very good allies and friends, which we are and will need to be over the next few years, as we enter arguably the most dangerous time that I can remember. I have a point for the Government. Given that almost identical rules apply in the EU and the UK, the EU could, and arguably should, negotiate an SPS equivalence agreement with the UK, as it has done for countries as far away as Canada and New Zealand, as I have said before.

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  Does the Minister not agree that mutual enforcement is, in principle, about using what already exists in terms of trade? In the course of building on the Windsor agreement, might she consider influencing the EU to get rid of the border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom?

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Gentleman is addressing an important part of the Bill’s purpose—from all the rhetorical issues right down to hard tacks. The previous Government went into the negotiations on the Windsor framework because it had dawned on, and been agreed by, the European Union that the protocol was not working. It recognised that nothing is fixed; these things are about experience, and then tempering that experience and changing. Labour Members keep saying, “You’ve reached an agreement and you will breach it,” but the real principle behind that is to recognise that there are still fundamental flaws, and that we could agree a better way to harmonise everybody in that respect.

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  On this particular point, it is worth pointing out that the EU already does it. In its agreements with New Zealand, for example, it trusts that specific veterinary practices to check lamb and other products arriving in the EU are done at the point of departure. By the time they get to Rotterdam, they are cleared straight through on the basis that they respect the checks done by those veterinary companies. They already did it for 40 years with UK companies where any subsequent checks had to be done. All this is already being done. The question is: why is it not being done for the arrangement we have at the moment?

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  We are moving slightly into the ridiculous; may I bring us back to the main point? The purpose of the Bill that the hon. and learned Gentleman has drafted is simply to provide a solution for what is currently an unworkable position. I say to Government Members that it is not about 27 nations hating the UK; ultimately, it is about function. Sir Jonathan Faull, who was the director general of the EU internal market service directorate, ended up as director general of the taskforce for strategic issues related to the UK referendum, and he and his team came to a simple conclusion: the only way to make the situation workable was to have, in essence, what is in the Bill. He has put out a statement today to say exactly that. It is a practical issue, and those who knew and understood the difficulties at the time said there was a way to do this, but they were ignored.

• 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source

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  I thought the hon. and learned Member might tempt me down that road. Whether we have a trade deal with the United States of America is way beyond my paygrade. No Government I could ever join would ever have me, so on that basis I will answer from my own perspective. Yes, there is a change in Administration in America. I understand one thing, because I negotiated a trade deal with the incoming President of the United States, about which I have never quite told the full story. It became very clear to me in those discussions that he wanted a trade deal, more than anything else, with the United Kingdom, and he said so. How we go about that is a complicated issue. There is an easy way to do it, through what are called sector-by-sector trade arrangements, which are agreed before moving on to the next area. That is made more difficult by the arrangement in which, somehow, part of the United Kingdom now seems to be partly inside the EU. That makes it difficult for them to understand whether any goods and so on would slip through into the EU. That will cause a problem—it is not my place to say whether it is insurmountable, but these are unnecessary difficulties. However, if we had mutual enforcement, that would not be the case. It would be very clear at that point that that would actually be a very good basis for a trade deal with the United States to smooth our arrangements with them. They are our biggest trading partner and, ironically, unlike the EU, one that we have a surplus with and not a deficit of some significant degree. I end on this point. In terms of what has happened over the last 30 or 40 years, there are big, deep gulfs and divides over anything that touches on Northern Ireland and its relationships with the UK and the rest of Ireland. I came here to look at the practicalities of a better way to sort out the trading relationships that leaves Northern Ireland as a solid part of the United Kingdom. Yes, it has a special place, because it is the one land border that we have with the EU, but that does not mean to say that we should treat it differently in terms of its arrangements with us here in Parliament. My worry is that we set those insurmountable problems ahead first and, at the end, we then do nothing. We could achieve this change. If the Government had their way, they would take all the bits from the agreement and try to discuss and implement them with the EU. The EU knows that that would not work. It is time to make some changes. Just talking out the Bill helps no one.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I completely agree. I have no problem agreeing on this matter. It has been a long-standing issue for families and Members of Parliament that, somehow, the FCDO puts a cloud of obscurity in the way of real knowledge about what is going on. For families, that can be incredibly difficult.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  This debate was long overdue, and we have used the time well. We should have regular debates on this issue; the Government should set aside time for Back Benchers to debate what is happening to constituents who have been arbitrarily arrested and, more widely, to British citizens who are unlawfully detained. That should be a regular occurrence, and there should be regular reports. In my opening remarks, I called for a regular report from the Government on the status of those individuals. I hope that the Minister will take that request away, and that Ministers will initiate debate on this issue, rather than waiting for Back Benchers to do so. That would give us a real sense of the concerns, and the direct action that is being taken. A number of issues were raised by colleagues from across the House. First, there was a call for a regular envoy who would be directly involved in these cases, so that the families always feel informed, and so that there is a go-to individual who everybody knows, and who possesses knowledge and understanding, including of the policy that the Government have initiated. It would be helpful if the Government made it clear that that is what they want to do. The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee spoke about making sure that we link this issue with trade, and that is very viable. We have different Departments; I was a Secretary of State once and we deal in separate little silos, and no one quite knows what the other is doing. It is clear from the debate that everybody shares the view that it is time for there to be a concentration of effort so that all powers are brought to bear on foreign Governments and every angle is used: trade, investments and, ultimately, sanctions. We have Magnitsky sanctions legislation. We know now from what has happened around the world that what really concerns individuals is the idea that they will be sanctioned—sanctioned by Governments in the democratic world who will refuse them access to their financial institutions and all the other pleasures they may derive from being in places like the UK, Europe or the United States. This is a very efficient tool, but it is not used much by the UK Government and it should be used more. In Hong Kong, China has trashed the Sino-British agreement and has arrested a number of people. It has just incarcerated 45 democracy campaigners in ghastly fashion, having held them for three years before eventually giving them their sentence. Jimmy Lai, in appalling treatment, languishes in isolation from others. And we, the UK, who set the agreement with China, have sanctioned not one single person responsible for any of the many abuses. America has sanctioned at least 12 of the highest officials. This shows—this is the main issue that arose from the debate—why people in Britain believe that British Governments of all hues, through the Foreign Office, do not do as much as they should. That has to be countered; whether it is correct or not, it needs to be answered. That was the final point of the debate. Finally, I want to stress on every given occasion that our British passport, given to those who are British citizens whether or not they are dual nationals, has on its inside page a demand, not a request, and sometimes we in this House wonder about that. As one Foreign Minister after another, whether Conservative or Labour, arrives on the Front Bench, none ever makes that statement. British citizens require and demand that right of access to the consulate—one of the Minister’s responsibilities—so that they can have their issues dealt with. We need to know that that has been demanded, not requested nor negotiated—demanded, as that is a right that we have. I hope the Minister will take away with him the sense that there is genuine concern here about the behaviour of successive Governments in this matter. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House is concerned by the number of arbitrarily detained British nationals at risk of human rights abuses abroad and the apparent lack of active support for those detained; and calls on the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to provide regular reports on when it last raised the cases of those people with its international counterparts.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I agree with my right hon. Friend. The point I am really getting at is that the days of the shifting jobs of generalists are long gone, I am afraid. I have often made the case, having run a Department, that the civil service and the Foreign Office need to catch up with what is happening outside. We need specialists in place, and we need that to be considered an important job. In cases where British nationals are detained abroad, the families of those detained have often found the UK Government reluctant to act to prevent torture or to seek accountability where it occurs. If they are acting, they do not relay that to the families, so the families are left believing that nothing has happened, even if something has happened. For instance, when Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, a British-Iranian dual citizen, was detained in Iran, her family first raised allegations of torture with the FCDO in 2017. It was not until May 2021—following outside pressure from Redress and others, by way of a submission to the FCDO of a medical report as evidence of her severe suffering—that the then Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, an old colleague of ours, acknowledged that she had been a victim of torture. Why did it take so long? It seems to me that this is pointless. In the case of Jagtar Singh Johal, a British national tortured by police in India, FCDO officials would only raise the allegations of torture with the Indian authorities once they had sought consent from him directly, which took two to three months. I know that the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Douglas McAllister) intends to speak about that case, but I just raise it generally as an illustration of what is going wrong. Families of detainees face significant challenges in their engagement with the FCDO. Many report vague or inconsistent communication, which breeds mistrust. There is a critical need for a designated point of contact for families, as happens in the States, to ensure transparency and accountability in the handling of cases. Without that, families feel abandoned by their own Government while simultaneously battling the detaining state with few tools. The FCDO also lacks a consistent policy on the treatment of dual nationals, often citing states’ refusal to recognise dual nationality as a barrier to action. That is a practical challenge, not a legal one, and it should not stop UK officials from attempting to access prisons or courts. When the Government fail to act, it risks sending a damaging message to dual nationals that they are less British and, by extension, less deserving of protection. For instance, that reasoning was used very much in the case of Jimmy Lai, who is a British citizen. China decided, because it does not recognise dual nationality, to call him a dual national. He has never been a dual national, and I have lost count of the number of times that I have literally shouted at Government Ministers in Westminster Hall that he is not a dual national. When they got up to speak, they just said that he is a dual national. He has never been a dual national. He is a proud British citizen. He got into Hong Kong long before he was of an age to have a nationality in that sense or a passport. He has been a British national non-stop since then.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I could not agree more with the right hon. Lady, and I welcome her to the debate as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. She is absolutely right, but the problem in this case is that dual nationality was used as an excuse for why the Government did not want to raise the matter, because China did not recognise that British citizenship. She is right that if someone is a British citizen, they are a British citizen, and the inside of the passport tells us why that is important. It seems to be ignored too often. We know that sanctions are a vital tool for deterring and punishing state actors involved in arbitrary detention, yet that tool is often underutilised by UK Governments. I will touch on that later, because compared with the Americans, we fail to utilise it as a possible way to leverage changes to what is going on outside. Another area of concern is the inconsistent application of Government policy regarding international legal standards. When the Minister comes to the Dispatch Box, will he confirm the Government’s official definition of arbitrary detention? How does it align with international legal standards, such as those established by the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention? I have never been able to get an answer out of any Foreign Minister yet, but I ask him, given his experience in the Department, to kindly find out the definition for us and let us know. I said I would raise specific cases, so I will run through some of the list. Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen unjustly detained in Dubai for more than 16 years, originally in isolation. His case represents an egregious violation of human rights and, importantly, of due process. He was arrested in 2008 on false fraud allegations relating to a $500 million Dubai Islamic Bank loan, and his 10-year sentence was extended by 20 years in 2018 through retroactive application of a new law without proper legal proceedings. The bank seized assets worth $1.6 billion from Mr Cornelius, far exceeding the original loan amount. The UN working group on arbitrary detention has ruled categorically that Ryan’s detention is arbitrary and in violation of international law, calling for his immediate release and compensation. However, there still appears to be FCDO resistance. Mohammed Ibrahim Al Shaibani became DIB chairman shortly before Mr Cornelius’s arrest. He appears to have orchestrated Mr Cornelius’s continued detention and the asset seizure. Mr Al Shaibani holds influential positions in Dubai’s Government, indicating an abuse of power. Mr Cornelius is now 70 and has suffered severe health issues in prison, including tuberculosis that went untreated for 18 months. Meanwhile, his seized property, originally claimed to be “worthless” by the bank, is now being redeveloped as a luxury project called The Acres, worth, strangely, $3 billion. Under the last Government, I raised Mr Cornelius’s case finally with the former Prime Minister Lord Cameron while he was Foreign Secretary. Subsequently, he engaged personally in seeking clemency for Mr Cornelius. He met the family, raised the case with the UAE Foreign Minister and wrote personally to the ruler of Dubai. That was a first, because everybody else seemed to have shied away from this one, not wanting to upset the UAE, it appears. To be fair to Lord Cameron, he got the issue and he started to tackle it, and that was important. The present Foreign Secretary, who replaced Lord Cameron in July, failed to raise Mr Cornelius’s case in his recent visit to the UAE in September, which perplexes me, given that it had already been raised. That just encourages a country like the UAE to carry on and to double down. I do not understand why. In response to my written question to the Foreign Secretary, I received this answer: “The Foreign Secretary raised the importance of consular issues, although not this specific case, during his visit to the UAE on 5 September and first meeting with Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed.” I understand that on Sunday, the Prime Minister is expected to visit the UAE and, I think, Saudi Arabia. Will the Minister make it clear to the Prime Minister— I believe this is the view that will be expressed in this debate—that he must not only raise the case, which is important, but demand categorically that Ryan Cornelius is released into the hands of his family without delay? I hope that whatever is summarised from his meetings, that specific issue is there in black and white for this House to record. The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) raised Mr Cornelius’s case several weeks ago in an Adjournment debate, when he was reassured by the Minister for Development, the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), that: “the case will continue to be raised with the UAE authorities”, —[ Official Report , 19 November 2024; Vol. 757, c. 241.] and yet it was not. If Ministers give assurances in this House, Madam Deputy Speaker, do you not agree that they should actually back up those assurances? I wonder if the Minister present will explain why that was the case. Although individual cases are raised with international counterparts, often no concrete action follows. I hope the Minister agrees that once a case is raised, it will be followed up. In Mr Cornelius’s case, I believe the path could culminate in sanctions, so there is a process. It is clear that raising the case with the UAE authorities has yet to produce a result. What we want is a real record that the authorities are now being warned that should they fail to take action, individual sanctions under the Magnitsky rules will follow. Will the Minister therefore now look to imposing targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for Mr Cornelius’s arbitrary detention and asset seizures? There are a number of them: His Excellency Mohammed Al Shaibani, who was the chairman of the DIB; Yahya Saeed Ahmad Nasser Lootah, the vice chairman of the board of directors; Hamad Abdulla Rashed Obaid Al Shamsi, who was a board member; Ahmad Mohammad Saeed Bin Humaidan, a board member; Abdul Aziz Ahmed Rahma Mohamed Al Muhairi, a board member; Dr Hamad Buamim, a board member; Javier Marin Romano, a board member; Bader Saeed Abdulla Hareb Al Mheiri, a board member; and Dr Cigdem Kogar, a board member. All were involved in this case; all are eligible for Magnitsky sanctions. Mr Cornelius should now be released immediately, or sanctions, I believe, should follow. I will deal reasonably quickly with the case of Jimmy Lai, and then I will give way to others in the debate. Jimmy Lai is a renowned pro-democracy campaigner, journalist and media owner. I wear the badge to free him with pride. This man has been treated abominably—he is a hero, and we should recognise that. He is 77 and a proud British citizen. He is also a Catholic, and has been denied the normal communion that he would expect as a believer in Catholicism; it has been shut off from him for a long time, which matters a great deal to him. He is a prisoner of conscience. He could have fled Hong Kong after the Sino-British agreement was trashed, but he chose to stay. Why? He wanted to set an example for the many who could not flee and who were going to be arrested—that he was not going to run away just because he had money. This is a brave man. Mr Lai is currently on trial in Hong Kong for alleged offences against national security and alleged sedition, said to arise out of his work as a newspaper publisher and his pro-democracy activism. His case is emblematic of the crackdown on the media in Hong Kong, civil society and the rule of law. On 15 November 2024, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published its opinion that Jimmy Lai is being unlawfully and arbitrarily detained and called for his immediate release. The working group found multiple violations of Mr Lai’s rights and freedoms, expressed alarm at his prolonged detention in solitary confinement and stressed that he should not be on trial at all. This case, I say to the Minister, is very urgent. Mr Lai has been arbitrarily detained in prolonged solitary confinement for nearly four years, often in insufferable heat during the summer months. Securing Jimmy Lai’s release requires effective action across the Government to bring him home and reunite him with his family in London. At the moment, he is bravely giving evidence in his trial—at which, by the way, a number of Members present have been named. I have been apparently named. I am already sanctioned by the Chinese, but I have also been named as being party to the case being brought against him. I have to say publicly that I have, sadly, never met Jimmy Lai or corresponded with him. I wish that I had. I wish that I could tell him what a brave man he really is. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Will the Minister outline today what urgent steps the Foreign Office is taking to secure Jimmy Lai’s release? I remind the Minister and others that what we see in front of us now is a rise in hostage taking by nation states. The biggest abuser of this process is, of course, Iran. I worry about this abuse growing more and more in Iran. In January 2023—we must not forget about this—Iran executed British-Iranian national Alireza Akbari, who was arrested, charged and executed on spying charges, which he denied and which were totally untrue. It was the first execution of a dual national since the 1980s. Only four months later, the Iranian authorities executed a second dual national, Swedish-Iranian Habib Chaab. In October 2024, it executed a third dual national, German-Iranian Jamshid Sharmahd. At least one more dual national, Swedish-Iranian Ahmad Reza Djalia, has been sentenced to death since 2023. I conclude on the simple basis, as I raised at the beginning, that we can no longer go along with the idea that we somehow lose influence if we raise these cases publicly. We can no longer go on with this idea that we can manage a generalist approach to this in the Foreign Office. As has already been raised, we need a much more professional, deliberate and permanent status in the Department to deal with this matter. Finally, we have in our hands the Magnitsky sanctions legislation. With the case of Ryan Cornelius and others, it is high time that those who were party to the arrest and incarceration of innocent British citizens find themselves facing Magnitsky sanctions, unless they recant and that individual is released. That at least gives us a tool. I ask the Government to get to the Dispatch Box, when the time comes, and commit to that process.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  Freedom of religion and belief is important. The case of Jimmy Lai is illustrative because they do not have to, but the Chinese authorities have locked him away from any involvement with his faith. He cannot receive communion and he cannot give confession. For those who do not believe in it, I note that that really is powerful for a Catholic. He has had to endure that, which, although petty and pointless, is a way of trying to break him. Would the hon. Gentleman like to comment on that?

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I absolutely agree. That case will be raised today. All of us who want to speak in the debate have agreed that we will make sure that individual cases are raised in detail. I will touch on some to summarise them, and I will detail a couple of them. The hon. Lady is quite right. What has happened is appalling, and we need to ensure that more is done—that is critical. Those who fall prey to detentions are too often let down by British Governments. I say, without let or hindrance, that that includes the Conservative Government who were in office previously, the Labour Governments before that and the present Labour Government. I hope that will now change. The Foreign Secretary recently confirmed that there are 28,000 prisoners in the system, yet the Foreign Office refuses to disclose exactly how many are British nationals who are being arbitrarily detained. Why not? What is so ground-shaking about discovering who the British nationals are, for goodness’ sake? I hope the Minister will agree that it is essential that the Government publish data on the number of British citizens who are arbitrarily detained or held hostage abroad. Sadly, there are British nationals in arbitrary detention in repressive countries all over the world. Quite often, we are not aware of them. As I said in response to the hon. Lady, those cases will be raised. With your indulgence, Madam Deputy Speaker, I remind the House that family members are watching this debate from the Gallery. I will quickly name them, if that is all right with everyone here. We are joined by Omar Robert Hamilton, Alaa Abd el-Fattah’s cousin, and Sanaa Seif, Alaa’s sister. We are joined by supporters and family members of Ryan Cornelius. I am deeply sorry that Ryan’s wife, Heather Cornelius, is unable to join us today, but Ryan’s brother-in-law, Chris Pagett, and his wife Diana are with us, as well as Ryan’s sister-in-law, Wendy Thompson, and her husband David. Also sitting in the Gallery is Matthew Hedges, a victim of arbitrary detention in the United Arab Emirates, and Peter Humphrey, a former prisoner of China. Too often, families feel that they are fighting two battles: one against the foreign state that has detained their loved one, and another against the UK Government, who do not seem to prioritise the case. I am deeply sorry that that should be the case, and today’s debate is about, hopefully, sowing the seed of change.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I was going to say it, but as the hon. Member has raised it, I will do so now: we must not forget those hostages. What has happened to them is appalling, and he is right to raise it. Families across the UK listening to this debate will be appreciative of that. A critical issue is the lack of a clear and proactive response strategy from the FCDO. There is no centralised approach for dealing with arbitrary detention cases, and that absence of structure adds to the stress for families, who feel unsupported and often ignored.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House is concerned by the number of arbitrarily detained British nationals at risk of human rights abuses abroad and the apparent lack of active support for those detained; and calls on the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to provide regular reports on when it last raised the cases of those people with its international counterparts. I am enormously pleased that the Backbench Business Committee agreed to find sufficient time to debate this issue. Too often, the issue of British citizens detained abroad gets washed away in all the other debates, no matter who is in government. As I have said before, regardless of who is sitting on the Government Benches—be they Conservative, Labour or whatever—I tend to find myself in opposition on issues such as this, as do many Members here. We have serious concerns that the issue is not raised enough, and cases are locked behind a wall of silence. I want to change that today. My intention is to call on the Government, first of all, to provide regular reports—something they never do —on when the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office last raised the cases of British nationals who are arbitrarily detained abroad and at risk of human rights abuses. Individuals detained abroad are particularly vulnerable to torture, ill treatment and other serious human rights violations from the moment that they are detained. At least 100 UK nationals are tortured or ill treated abroad every year. In 2023, the FCDO received 188 new allegations of torture and mistreatment from British nationals overseas. It goes on and on. Arbitrary detention and hostage-taking are devastating, but are practised by a number of regimes, chief among those being Iran. That is devastating for the individuals affected and their families. Survivors bear the physical, psychological and socioeconomic scars of their captivity. Survivors’ families also endure significant psychological distress, often facing vicarious trauma as they fight for their loved ones’ release and feeling that they are fighting a losing battle against even the establishment here in the United Kingdom. The support that the British Government can provide to their nationals in these harrowing circumstances is crucial. They are sometimes the only link between the individual and the outside world.

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  Before the Minister concludes, there is something that many Members have called for that he has not touched on. We passed an Act on Magnitsky sanctions some time ago. Should those sanctions not be part of our attack on hostage-taking and on people being detained abroad for no reason? Why are those involved not being threatened with sanctions, and not having sanctions applied to them? Why are the Government—all Governments—so reluctant to use this tool?

• 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source

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  I and a number of others wrote to the Prime Minister before he departed for Baku, urging him to raise that case. I understand from the Foreign Office that he did not raise it with his hosts.

• 4 Dec 2024 · Northern Ireland: Legacy of the Troubles · Hansard source

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  I, like a number of others, served in Northern Ireland. We did not ask to go, and I lost a very good friend there—and others, at the same time. That man’s parents died without ever knowing what had happened to him, but it turns out that he may well have been dismembered and disappeared completely. There is no closure for them, and there is no chance, unless Ireland opens up its books and looks into this, that we will ever get any justice for him. He had a family as well, and many friends who wonder what happened to that brave man, and there are many more like him. So I say on their behalf: yes, let there be justice for families, but let us not forget all those soldiers who will now, in some cases, be hounded for no reason at all—those who lost their friends and their children and who did not want to go there in the first place. Where is the justice for them?

• 3 Dec 2024 · UK Supply Chains: Uyghur Forced Labour · Hansard source

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  I welcome the right hon. Gentleman to his place, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion)—she is my hon. Friend in this case—on raising a really important issue. I also welcome another person on the Government Front Bench, who will remain nameless—I am sure that Hansard will pick them out. The problem with all this is that it does not seem to matter who is in government; the Foreign Office and other Departments try to block everything to do with slavery. I was one of the people who drove through the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which we know is long past its sell-by date with regard to modern slavery. I tried to co-operate with the Government when they were in opposition, and we need to change the law, because we have real problems with net zero. Right now, we have polysilicon arrays coming in from Xinjiang in massive quantities, and nothing is being done about it. This is not just about Xinjiang; there are a quarter of a million people from Tibet in forced labour. The only way to address the issue is to do what we did with the Health and Care Act 2022, which we amended to ensure that the Department of Health and Social Care had a duty to eradicate slavery. In America, supply chains are checked using forensic science provided by Oritain, but we do not do any of that. Will we move towards checking all supply chains, and put legislation in place to make it a criminal offence to have anything to do with slave labour?

• 28 Nov 2024 · Taiwan: International Status · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for securing this debate and for giving way. The comparison point is important. The figures he has given for what would happen should Taiwan be blockaded or even invaded are worth relating back to the Ukraine effect from when Russia invaded Ukraine. We had a hit of about $1 trillion to the global economy. The hon. Gentleman is talking about nine or 10 times that effect on the global economy—this is our neighbour, rather than a far and distant land.

• 28 Nov 2024 · Taiwan: International Status · Hansard source

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  We will see if we can ascertain one in passing. I congratulate the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Blair McDougall) on securing the debate. That is not easy, as he knows, and it is really good to see so many hon. Members in attendance. As you pointed out, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am one of nine political sanctionees, and it is always worth reminding ourselves that there are two others outside Parliament who are also sanctioned. They spoke to me the other day and said, “We’re often forgotten in this matter, but we can’t do business. It’s very difficult.” I wish to remember them, while we are at it; they were unnecessarily sanctioned. Everything that the hon. Gentleman said is absolutely correct. The problem is that we are dealing with a power that is growing in potency and totalitarianism while it also grows in other ways. Let me add something on the size of the growth in its military capability. He mentioned China’s naval capacity; right now, China has 230 times the capacity for naval shipbuilding of the United States. Any one shipyard in China outbuilds the whole of the United States in naval shipbuilding. Someone please tell me that that is for a peaceful purpose. I have no conception of why it would need that many naval ships if its purpose was peaceful. The answer is that it is not. This whole business of Taiwan has been obscured constantly by refusals from Administrations from both sides of the House. I say to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, the hon. Member for Hornsey and Friern Barnet (Catherine West), who will respond to this debate, that I am not having a go at this Government; I have been having a go at every Government for a long time. It seems that whoever is elected, I am in opposition. She should not take personally the point I am about to make gently to her. Politicians are elected to take decisions based on the principles that we govern by. Our principles are simple: we believe in free speech, base freedom, the rule of law and human rights. We may debate the elements and range of that, but we believe in the fundamental right to decent treatment. I was sanctioned, along with you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and others, for raising the then undiscovered genocide that was going on in Xinjiang, which has now become public knowledge. This Parliament—Members on both sides—voted to agree that the genocide was taking place, although the Government said that they could not vote to agree with that, or do anything about it, because that action would need to be taken at the UN, through the International Court of Justice. That is never going to happen, because it gets vetoed, straight off. The Labour party, in opposition, agreed that genocide was taking place, and agreed on many occasions with those of us who had real problems with China’s treatment of people and of human rights; the Labour party was constantly in support of our position. I simply say that as a base reminder, because this is really about what we believe. From one Government to the next, we have genuinely, deliberately obscured the question of Taiwan’s status. People have argued with me that the question was settled by resolution 2758, which is often misquoted. They say that it somehow settled the status of Taiwan. They have argued that it was clear from that resolution, now that the PRC was responsible for China at the UN, that Taiwan was a part of China. It said no such thing, as the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire said. In fact, it was deliberately obscure about that idea; it was not settled. Under the whole reign of the Communist party in China, Taiwan has never been a part of a Chinese Administration or a Chinese Government. Taiwan right now is a democracy and an upholder of human rights. It has an agreement, as we do, that the freedom of individuals to speak out without let or hindrance, and without fear of arrest—we see such arrests in Hong Kong—remains important. The Government should speak out in Taiwan’s defence and argue that China has no right to extinguish that, unless there is a deliberate indication that Taiwan wishes to be part of China. Taiwan has never wished that, and the last election demonstrates that is still not the case. Taiwan does not wish to join China, as it has never been part of China. This military build-up is not for a general purpose. It is ultimately to try to displace the US’s position in the Pacific, so that it will be unable to act, should China decide at some point to blockade or invade. The incursions that are taking place would not be tolerated anywhere else in the world. There are huge numbers of planes overflying Taiwan. Ships are threatening it by coming right up close, past the border of Taiwan. They are deliberately provoking, in the hope that action will take place that allows the Chinese to take action themselves. If we move our gaze slightly further south, we come to the South China sea. China has occupied it and declared it to be a historical part of China. The UN has said that that is not the case, and has told China categorically that it has no right to occupy or build military fortifications in the South China sea. What has China’s reaction been to that? Nothing. It said that the UN has no right to interfere, and now it is trying to blockade. In fact, US navy ships still sail through there, but every other ship, including recently the Philippines coastguard, has been hounded out of the area. Ships have been rammed and threatened, and military naval vessels from China now occupy that space. We know what China thinks of these things. We know what it plans to do, because it has already done it. We wonder: if we do not say very much, will that obscurity allow China to back away? The Chinese have no intention whatsoever of backing off. That is part of their absolute creed now. In fact, it is clear even from China’s constitution that it sees Taiwan as part of China. I do not know how many more indications the Foreign Office needs of China’s direction of travel. What do the Government plan to do about this? To what degree will the Government challenge the misinterpretation of resolution 2758 publicly, and recognise that Taiwan has a right to self-determination, as we and all other democratic nations do? Will the Minister take the opportunity to state Government policy clearly from the Dispatch Box? Will she agree to make a public statement to the House about what is going on in Taiwan? The hon. Member for East Renfrewshire asked for that, and I back him up. We would love clarity from the Government on the fact that what is taking place in and around Taiwan is utterly unacceptable; we should even think about moving to a sanction at the Security Council. China will veto that, we know, but it is important for the world to understand China’s position. To return to covid, we remember when all that happened as a result of a failure in China, but we were unable to get any figures about what Taiwan was doing—and that was rather important, because it had advanced methods of dealing with covid that we could have learned a lot from. We were not allowed to get those figures; they all had to come through China. China refused to let us know what was going on as it embarrassed China, because it had taken very little action early on, and the result was millions dying around the world. My point is that when we acquiesce and give way, as we did at the World Health Organisation, where we no longer insist on these things, that weakness is seen as a success for China. The Chinese take that and move on. How do we know that? Because back in the 1930s, every time we acquiesced to a new demand by Hitler’s Germany, it took that and moved on. We do not appease communist or fascist dictators by saying, “Well, if we are reasonable, in due course they will be reasonable.” By definition, a dictatorship is not reasonable. Fascist Germany told us what it was going to do, and China tells us categorically all the time what it will do. We in the west do not want to believe that. We think that if we are reasonable, the Chinese will be reasonable. They are not reasonable. They intend to take Taiwan back one way or the other. Today and going forward, the question for us and for the Foreign Office, the unelected body that sits across the road, is: why do not we get serious about this, understand it, and say all this? If we do not tell the Chinese that there are limits, they assume that we do not believe that there are any, and they go ahead. The financial chaos that would ensue from merely a blockade—not even an invasion of Taiwan—would be devastating to our economies. I had an argument the other day with one of my colleagues, who shall remain nameless— [ Interruption. ] There we go; he is not in the Chamber. That individual said to me that Taiwan has nothing to do with us; it is a long way from us, and we have no arrangements with it. When I made the point to him that the whack to our economy would be enormous, I added one other figure, which is that 72% of everything made in the world is made in the area around the South China sea, including China. I said to my colleague that it is not far away; it is our neighbour. Without Taiwan—if anything happens to Taiwan—we go down, too. The real point of this important debate is to try to persuade the Government to be much bolder about this matter and to recognise the threat, to recognise the need for a British Government to say enough is enough, and to recognise that what happens to Taiwan is not just a matter of interest to us, but a matter of vital importance. Many Members were at the conference in Taipei recently, where we heard about all the terrible problems that Taiwan now faces as a result of China’s actions. One only has to be there to realise just how devastating this situation is to many Taiwanese people, whose lives are genuinely threatened by it. With this huge build-up, the clear threat that China poses, the brutality it has already demonstrated in the South China sea and the illegality of its actions, and its complete failure to take any actions other than those it wishes to take, it is important for us to demonstrate stage by stage, at every moment and at every opportunity, that we regard China’s behaviour as unacceptable and that we will oppose it. One way this Government could start doing that would be to go back and look again at the risk register that we started under the previous Government. We should now move China on to the higher tier of that risk register. That would send a very strong signal to the Chinese Government that we are serious about our behaviour. I will end simply by saying the following to the Minister. I know the Government want to increase and improve trade with China, and I understand why they want to do that. My concern, at the end of it all, is that we cannot detach our desire for commercial engagement from the real engagement, which is about the way a state treats the people who live there and the way it behaves to its neighbours. We did so in the past, and look what happened: 60 million people died because we ignored what was going to happen. They told us what was going to happen, but we wanted to do business with them. This time we have to learn that appeasement does not work. There is no chance it will work this time. We need to be clear to China, as America is and as others are, and say that this shall not stand, that we in the UK will stand for the freedom of those people whose self-determination is always a matter of high concern to us, and that we will defend it at whatever cost.

• 28 Nov 2024 · Taiwan: International Status · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady raises a really important point. Practitioners of Falun Gong talk about arrests, incarceration and illegal organ harvesting from people who are still alive, and about the high levels of state-based attacks and murders. It is quite staggering that China exports more organs than any other country in the world, and I wonder where it gets them from.