Iain Duncan Smith MP: speeches

4 Jul 2024–3 Jul 2025

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Our reporting years run from 4 July to 3 July, starting with the 2024 general election. They are not official parliamentary sessions. Office costs keep IPSA’s April–March financial years. Records may cover only part of a year; a missing record does not mean no work was done.

Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.

6 published records · newest first.

Speeches

  • 27 Feb 2025 · War in Ukraine: Third Anniversary · Hansard source
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    I beg to move, That this House has considered the third anniversary of the war in Ukraine. I have been working on Ukraine with many colleagues in all parts of the House for a considerable time—we have shared that work. The reality in this Chamber, which may mark us out slightly from other countries, is that we have been completely united in our support for Ukraine and the people of Ukraine, who are fighting for their freedom as we have had to do in the past. We therefore recognise their sacrifices and the risk that they have taken. To anybody who assumes that that is of no relevance, I say that the only relevant issue that pervades this debate is that we should always be on the side of those who believe in freedom and democracy. That is what we exist for. I recently came back from another trip to Ukraine. I have done a few trips there, helped by a charity called HopeFull. What it has done is quite remarkable and is another example of how people in Britain see things sometimes slightly differently from the rest of the world. When Russia invaded Ukraine and there was a serious danger of it taking Kyiv in those early weeks, the charity—which had been working in Scotland, in the area around Dundee, helping to support people in difficulty and in poorer circumstances—upped sticks and decided that its real cause was now to help those fleeing from the Russians at the border of Poland, which it did. In fact, the charity turned up two weeks earlier than even Oxfam managed, simply by getting trucks and driving across. That is a very British way of doing things. Eventually the charity crossed over the border, and over the past three years it has supplied many people, organisations, towns and cities with food. The way in which it has done that is to take pizzas in pizza trucks to feed them.

  • 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source
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    I will try to be as brief as possible, to allow others to speak. I wish to come to what the Bill is actually about, rather than what people say it is about, but first I want to dispel the idea that it would mean going backwards. The idea of mutual enforcement in fact originated, as others have said, in the EU itself at the time. It came from those who were tasked, as senior officials—British and others—to come forward with a solution, before the end of the Brexit debates and so on, with an alternative way to make the borders work and to take the heat out of what later became really quite powerful and ended up with a Government literally unable to move any motion at all and have it succeed. I have personal experience of this issue because, when there was a break in the negotiations between the UK Government—who handled it pretty badly at the time, by the way—and the Commission, I managed somehow to get a team of people together to go and see Monsieur Barnier directly. We sat at a table with all his negotiators, and a few of ours who were there, and we talked through the principles. This was before mutual enforcement became a concept, but we talked about what already existed in the EU with others from outside the EU and inside the EU, and how they traded. We ended up reaching very much the same conclusion as originally reached by Sir Jonathan Faull and others: that mutual enforcement was the better deal. Monsieur Barnier agreed with us. At the end of that agreement—I can see him following me out as I put my coat on—he said, “The principle behind any chance of this being agreed is that we must have trust. Without trust, we cannot have an agreement.” The sad part about it was that when I came back to the UK to speak to my Government, they did not want to take any interest in that as a departure. They had already got bogged down in other areas. Sadly, two weeks later, what actually happened was that the Government went back in and carried on with their complicated and hopeless negotiation, without first setting out the principle of what they wanted. I think Monsieur Barnier was open to that and I think the EU wanted mutual enforcement. At that stage, there was no question about weaponising the border; it was about how we could reach an agreement. We could have done much more then, and I still today think that this idea is it. The Bill, then, is not about going backwards in the sense that it destroys what we have done; it actually says something about what we have done so far in two stages. The protocol, it seems to me, could only ever have been temporary, and the Windsor agreement, which I did not support, opened up the negotiation again, which was good, but the ask was so limited, and in some ways rather restrictive, that we have ended up with the principle being there, but the practical bit does not work. That was the moment when we should have used the opportunity to go back into mutual enforcement. What is so wrong about that? The EU already uses the principle in its dealings with other countries. As I said in an intervention earlier, the classic example is New Zealand. The EU trusts the New Zealand veterinary officers—particular key ones, but they trust them all once they are registered—to say whether certain foodstuffs are, under SPS rules, packaged properly and agreeable under the EU rules. They are trusted to say that EU rules are met. That is a critical component. When those foodstuffs are shipped and arrive at Rotterdam, most often it comes up on the computer and they are waved through. Any checks that have to take place in Rotterdam for non-EU countries take place 30 km behind the border, and they are spot checks just in case something has happened en route or something else has changed on the way. In other words, things move smoothly through. But such arrangements were not agreed in the various agreements here. Eventually, in trying to draft this idea together, I sat down with others to try to figure out how we could make mutual enforcement work. I give credit to the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) for having brought forward the Bill, because it gives us a chance to debate the matter. I know very well what goes on in this Chamber and I know only too well how Fridays work, and the sad part is that if the Government do not want to have any further debate on something, they arrange for it to be talked out. It has happened on both sides; cynicism exists on all sides. I understand that. Lots of people will have come in, particularly from London because they are closer, and they will do what they have to do to talk this out. The Bill is not going to get through; I never expected it to. [ Interruption. ] Honestly, do not object; Government Members know very well that that is exactly what happens. Some will be here because they believe in something—I look across at my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy)—but the majority are not. Therefore, let us just understand fundamentally what we could have been discussing and what the current Government could now be engaged in; they could be talking to the EU about changing these arrangements. The current arrangements are damaging relationships and causing issues around Northern Ireland. We know that; nobody is arguing that that is not the case. If we have such problems that affect the constitution and the smooth running of businesses both in Northern Ireland and the wider United Kingdom, then surely any Government would want to make sure those are settled. It is not a polemic, it is not a right or left wing thing to do; it is called practical governance to try to figure out how this works. I did not agree with my Government when they brought forward the Windsor agreement in its final stages, and I voted against it. I voted against it because I thought they had lost a real opportunity. The EU had accepted that its imposition earlier on did not work and it had to change it, but what we ended up with was a de minimis change which did not solve the problems; in fact some of them have got worse. When we strip out all the politics, the key component is that mutual enforcement requires each side to make reciprocal legal commitments to each other and to enforce the rules of the other with respect to trade across the border. In other words, we would accept that where our exporters export to the EU, we are responsible if they breach EU regulations. So if the EU says a company or individual is exporting goods in breach of the terms of its trade, the UK Government will take the responsibility to proceed against them, and vice versa for the EU. That does not require no border, because there has always been a border in Northern Ireland; we just do not want a hard border. That was always the issue. People talk about borders, but they mean a hard border. I had some experience of that when I had to man one of the checkpoints there when I was sent to Northern Ireland. I hated doing it, but that was a hard border. We do not want a hard border and mutual enforcement obviates the need for a hard border. Borders will exist, and we talked about that in terms of currency and VAT.

  • 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source
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    The real point is getting rid of the Irish sea checks; it is anathema that one part of the United Kingdom is now treated separately from the rest of the UK. That is surely a reasonable idea and if it is in this Bill then the Government should want to take it through to the next stage and debate it. This is what the Bill does. Mutual enforcement does not of itself remove customs duties; neither does it harmonise or require mutual recognition of standards. It works by inverting the usual approach to customs enforcement; duties may, for example, be imposed for anti-dumping reasons or due to subsidies that one party claims are injurious to itself or to companies as a result of goods failing to qualify for zero duty under rules of origin. That is what the Bill does. All the rest that has been talked about is not in this Bill; it is very simple and very practical. The trade and co-operation agreement between the EU and the UK already has an agreed mechanism, which is very important for identifying and addressing these distortions. If we are able to allow that and make changes, that is how it will work. There are other areas, too, which I will speed through as quickly as possible. Mutual enforcement can also under these terms accommodate the collection of customs duty. The detailed procedures are obviously beyond the scope of briefing papers and the Bill, but the reality is that we could have a system whereby an order of goods from the UK to the Republic of Ireland triggers a UK export declaration and an EU import declaration such that in terms of the EU’s customs data any sums owed are put into the goods invoice and paid by the importer to the exporter. There are many other ways ahead that can be facilitated, particularly now that almost all of this is done using modern technology, not large sheathes of paper and with a man standing at the border with a ladle to check whether the brandy being imported or exported tastes like brandy. That does not happen any longer, but from some of the debates it would seem somehow we have not moved on from 17th-century customs requirements. To ensure compliance with this regime, a penalty in this arrangement would apply to those parties who failed to follow the procedure. The penalty would apply to both exporters and hauliers, therefore incentivising all parties involved in the carriage of goods to ensure that appropriate EU customs duties are paid. By the way, the same would be required in the Republic for its importers. It should be noted—this is the important bit that has gone missing—that an analogous system would in any event be required for the red and green lane approach prescribed in the Windsor framework. Is this going back? No. It is using what we have and ultimately making it better. That seems to me the practical principle behind this idea of mutual enforcement. We should have started in this place, but we now have an opportunity to look at this issue and decide if there is a better way to do it that will take some of the good stuff already there and improve it by saying to the EU that we want a smooth process between the EU and the UK, because everything else then follows. Many EU members already agree; I have heard their discussions. I cannot remember who it was, but somebody got up and said, “Did we not think they were allies? Did we not think they were friends?” It is because we think they are allies and friends that we want to get rid of the things that make us have rows and arguments about the most practical issues that could be dealt with. That is the point of this mutual enforcement process: to get rid of the ludicrous arguments about who we are and who they are. We can then be very good allies and friends, which we are and will need to be over the next few years, as we enter arguably the most dangerous time that I can remember. I have a point for the Government. Given that almost identical rules apply in the EU and the UK, the EU could, and arguably should, negotiate an SPS equivalence agreement with the UK, as it has done for countries as far away as Canada and New Zealand, as I have said before.

  • 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source
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    Does the Minister not agree that mutual enforcement is, in principle, about using what already exists in terms of trade? In the course of building on the Windsor agreement, might she consider influencing the EU to get rid of the border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom?

  • 6 Dec 2024 · European Union (Withdrawal Arrangements) Bill · Hansard source
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    I thought the hon. and learned Member might tempt me down that road. Whether we have a trade deal with the United States of America is way beyond my paygrade. No Government I could ever join would ever have me, so on that basis I will answer from my own perspective. Yes, there is a change in Administration in America. I understand one thing, because I negotiated a trade deal with the incoming President of the United States, about which I have never quite told the full story. It became very clear to me in those discussions that he wanted a trade deal, more than anything else, with the United Kingdom, and he said so. How we go about that is a complicated issue. There is an easy way to do it, through what are called sector-by-sector trade arrangements, which are agreed before moving on to the next area. That is made more difficult by the arrangement in which, somehow, part of the United Kingdom now seems to be partly inside the EU. That makes it difficult for them to understand whether any goods and so on would slip through into the EU. That will cause a problem—it is not my place to say whether it is insurmountable, but these are unnecessary difficulties. However, if we had mutual enforcement, that would not be the case. It would be very clear at that point that that would actually be a very good basis for a trade deal with the United States to smooth our arrangements with them. They are our biggest trading partner and, ironically, unlike the EU, one that we have a surplus with and not a deficit of some significant degree. I end on this point. In terms of what has happened over the last 30 or 40 years, there are big, deep gulfs and divides over anything that touches on Northern Ireland and its relationships with the UK and the rest of Ireland. I came here to look at the practicalities of a better way to sort out the trading relationships that leaves Northern Ireland as a solid part of the United Kingdom. Yes, it has a special place, because it is the one land border that we have with the EU, but that does not mean to say that we should treat it differently in terms of its arrangements with us here in Parliament. My worry is that we set those insurmountable problems ahead first and, at the end, we then do nothing. We could achieve this change. If the Government had their way, they would take all the bits from the agreement and try to discuss and implement them with the EU. The EU knows that that would not work. It is time to make some changes. Just talking out the Bill helps no one.

  • 23 Jul 2024 · Immigration and Home Affairs · Hansard source
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    I congratulate the right hon. Lady on her new position. Before the election was called, we had succeeded in a cross-party campaign to make cuckooing a criminal offence in the Criminal Justice Bill, which then sadly fell. I notice that in the crime and policing Bill, there is no mention at all of cuckooing. Does she support the idea of making cuckooing—using the homes of the most vulnerable in society for criminal behaviour—a criminal offence? If so, will she commit to introducing that process again? She would have my support, and I can guarantee that she would have the support of the previous Government, because I told them so at the time. Over to her.

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Contributions by debate topic

4 Jul 2024–3 Jul 2025. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained.

View as listCommunities and local government: 5Communities and local government5Culture, media and sport: 8Culture, media and sport8Defence and foreign affairs: 54Defence and foreign affairs54Democracy and constitution: 28Democracy and constitution28Economy and business: 39Economy and business39Education and skills: 1Education and skills1Environment and energy: 23Environment and energy23Health and care: 10Health and care10Housing and planning: 5Housing and planning5Immigration and borders: 6Immigration and borders6Justice and policing: 37Justice and policing37Social security and pensions: 4Social security and pensions4Transport: 11Transport11Unclassified: 48Unclassified48
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4 Jul 2024–3 Jul 2025. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained. Published records do not measure effort or effectiveness. Methodology.
Department or topicPublished records
Communities and local government5
Culture, media and sport8
Defence and foreign affairs54
Democracy and constitution28
Economy and business39
Education and skills1
Environment and energy23
Health and care10
Housing and planning5
Immigration and borders6
Justice and policing37
Social security and pensions4
Transport11
Unclassified48

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