Gregory Stafford MP: speeches

Speeches

• 16 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Sixteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I welcome the Minister back from her son’s graduation —I hope it went well. I rise to state my support for new clause 47, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a clear roll-out plan for fracture liaison services across England and report annually to Parliament on progress towards universal coverage by 2030. It is not about creating a new target, because the target already exists: both this Government and the previous Government committed to achieving 100% fracture liaison service coverage by 2030. The question before us, as proposed by the shadow Minister, is simple: how will that promise be delivered, and how will Parliament know whether meaningful progress is being made? Fracture liaison services are one of the most evidence-based interventions in osteoporosis care. They systematically identify people aged over 50 who suffer a fragility fracture; assess their bone health; initiate treatment where appropriate; and monitor patients to reduce the risk of subsequent fractures. Given that around half of patients who sustain a hip fracture have previously broken another bone, those services represent a vital opportunity to intervene before a life-changing injury occurs. The human cost is considerable. Osteoporosis affects millions of people, particularly older women, and fragility fractures can result in a loss of independence, reduced mobility, social isolation and significant pressure on health and social care services. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence estimates that around 180,000 fractures each year in England and Wales are attributable to osteoporosis. There is also a compelling economic case: the Royal Osteoporosis Society estimates that investing around £30 million in fracture liaison services could prevent approximately 74,000 fractures over five years, including 31,000 hip fractures, saving the NHS around £665 million and freeing up some 750,000 bed days. Few preventive interventions offer that combination of better patient outcomes and substantial savings for the NHS. The Government frequently point to their commitment to universal coverage by 2030, but as the shadow Minister pointed out, progress has been achingly slow. When the Secretary of State appeared before the Health and Social Care Committee last week, I questioned him on that issue directly. While he confirmed that the Department remains committed to meeting that 2030 target, which was first established by the previous Conservative Government, no plan—or indication of when a plan would come—was given. A commitment alone is not a delivery plan. There are also growing concerns that the Government have overstated the progress that has already been made. The Royal Osteoporosis Society has confirmed that more than 97% of the fracture liaison services counted by the current Government were already in place before the change of Government. So, rather than that representing any significant expansion in national coverage, this Government have gone slow. I think it is therefore very reasonable—to answer the question from the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket—for Parliament to be entitled to ask what additional progress has actually been made since the commitment was reaffirmed. New clause 47 would also require the Secretary of State to publish an assessment of access in every integrated care board area. It would also require annual milestones, because, at present, there is no publicly available timetable showing where the services will be established, or which areas will be prioritised or progressed between now and 2030. Crucially, the new clause would require the Government to set out how integrated care boards will actually be supported. Ministers rightly point out that fracture liaison services are commissioned locally by integrated care boards, but if the responsibility for delivery rests locally while responsibility for national targets rests with central Government, there clearly needs to be a well-thought-through national framework explaining how those boards will be supported through funding, guidance, workforce planning and accountability. This is, therefore, a straightforward request for transparency, accountability and, most importantly, delivery. If Ministers are committed to achieving this by 2030, they should have absolutely no objection to publishing a plan that shows how they intend to get there. For those reasons, I support the new clause.

• 9 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Huq. New clause 6 raises an important question on how we govern health data, which one of the greatest assets of the NHS. The development of the single patient record platform and database, and the wider use of the linked NHS data, present enormous opportunities. When used responsibly, healthcare data can support much more personalised care, improve NHS planning, accelerate medical research, enable earlier diagnoses and help develop new medicines and treatments. It can also improve efficiency and strengthen the evidence base for healthcare decisions. However, those benefits can be realised only if the public have the confidence that their data will be used safely, ethically and transparently. Public trust must be the foundation of any successful health data policy. NHS health data is currently overseen by NHS England, following the merger of NHS Digital into that organisation. With the Government proceeding with the abolition of NHS England and the transfer of its functions elsewhere, it is right that we consider future governance arrangements. In principle, I agree that an independent body may be needed to ensure and maintain the security, integrity and responsible stewardship of NHS data. There is definitely scope for an independent body to oversee the management and regulation of the public’s health data. That proposal places patient privacy at its heart, and would strengthen safeguards against misuse, give patients greater control over how their information is used, and provide meaningful mechanisms to opt out of certain forms of data sharing. It also promotes the use of anonymisation and trusted research environments, allowing valuable research to take place while reducing the risk of inappropriate disclosure. We have discussed inappropriate disclosure by a malign actor, or even inadvertent disclosure, during debate on other clauses. The Liberal Democrat new clause also seeks to address a concern that has attracted significant public attention: where commercial organisations derive substantial value from NHS data, the NHS itself should share in that benefit. Although we did not support a number of Liberal Democrat proposals because of the inadvertent implications of their drafting, I still have sympathy with the overall thrust of what they were trying to achieve. There is a strong argument that the value generated from the data contributed by NHS patients should help to support future patient care and research. Transparency is another important feature. Publishing data-sharing agreements, increasing openness around decision making and consulting the public on significant new data initiatives would help to strengthen public confidence. The proposed trust would bring those principles together by overseeing data use, monitoring compliance with governance standards, ensuring transparency and, where necessary, suspending access for organisations that misuse their data. Of course, any new governance framework must avoid creating unnecessary bureaucracy or delaying important research. To reassure the Committee that the framework would not create a block or dampener, or insert inertia into the system, will the hon. Member for North Shropshire tell us what evidence she found when drafting the new clause? If we are going to do something like this, the oversight should be proportionate, and it should complement, rather than duplicate or frustrate, any existing regulatory responsibilities. Ultimately, the new clause has potential benefits. It would establish a clear social contract for NHS health data, which would hopefully protect privacy, support research and innovation, maintain public trust and ensure that patients and the NHS share in the benefits arising from the responsible use of a very valuable national asset. In terms of what it could be used for, that data is probably second to none in the world, but I am concerned about adding extra bureaucracy and inertia to the system, when we want a vibrant life-sciences industry that is able to use the data for the benefit of British citizens and patients. What does the hon. Member for North Shropshire think would happen in that case?

• 9 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to support a lot of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston said. Across the Committee, I think we all agree that corridor care and care in other inappropriate settings should have no place in the NHS. No patient should be assessed, treated or left waiting in a corridor, in a cupboard or anywhere else because there is nowhere for them to go. We owe it to patients and our constituents to be honest about the scale of the problem and be serious about ending it. That starts with measuring it properly, because if we do not collect the data, publish the evidence and track progress, inappropriate care settings risk becoming normalised. In May, nearly 3,000 patients were in corridor care, which was a 2.5% increase from the same time last year. In the same month, 50,000 patients waited in A&E for more than 12 hours, which was a 17% increase from the same period last year. The Government continually miss their target on the 12-hour wait. I am not making a political point; this is a serious problem, and successive Governments are still struggling to ensure that it does not happen. We all know from our casework and our inboxes, and some of us know through personal experience or from loved ones, that too many patients are experiencing unacceptably long waits in A&E after a decision has been taken to admit them. That is bad for patients, bad for staff and bad for the wider functioning of our hospitals. New clause 56 in the name of the hon. Member for North Shropshire acknowledges that the causes of delays extend far beyond the emergency department itself, and I will touch on that in a moment. Challenges in social care, discharge processes, step-down provision and workforce capacity all contribute to bottlenecks that leave patients waiting longer than they should. Although there might be legitimate questions about the precise mechanisms proposed in the new clause, I do not think there is any disagreement among the Committee about the principle that patients deserve timely access to a hospital bed and that excessive admission delays should not be accepted as the norm. That is why I fully support new clause 84 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. Publishing data on avoidable deaths associated with waits of more than 12 hours would help to ensure that we, as a Parliament and as policymakers, remain focused on outcomes for patients, not just performance indicators. I am particularly persuaded by the proposal to publish that information at ICB level, notwithstanding the concerns raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, which I agree with entirely. It would at least give some allowance for those making decisions to look at the local variation and ensure that it is identified, however less local that will become. Hopefully, good practice will be able to be shared between different areas, and the areas that face the greatest challenges will be able to receive both appropriate scrutiny and appropriate support. Of course, collecting and publishing data will not by itself reduce waiting times, but we cannot effectively tackle a problem that we do not properly measure. Sunlight is often the best disinfectant in these cases, and greater transparency can be a powerful driver of improvement. At the heart, new clause 84 recognises the simple truth that every statistic represents a person, a family and a life, and if avoidable deaths are occurring as a consequence of prolonged A&E waits, we should have the courage to measure them, publish them and learn from them. That is why I support the new clause. As has been touched on in other speeches, and as I mentioned earlier, the issue of corridor care does not sit in isolation. In fact, it is not a cause of the problem; it is the symptom of many other problems within our health and social care network.

• 9 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Fourteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will give way to the hon. Lady after I finish my sentence, if I may. The public want to know what the solutions are. I think we could look back through history at successive Governments since prehistory and say, “They got some things right, and they got some things wrong.” What the public want to know now is what the current Government will do. On the point about social care, I was not a member of the last Government, but I stood on an election manifesto commitment, as the Labour party certainly did and I think most political parties did, that essentially said that the Dilnot review had decided how we were going to deal with social care, and we were going to get on with it. It strikes me as very strange that the last Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), decided to have another review; he has said himself in interviews since he resigned that it looks like the stalling on social care means that we will not get any movement on it before another general election. I do not think the public should put up with that.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T6. During the election, the Government promised to cut bills by £300; in fact, they have gone up by £300. With that level of financial acumen, the Secretary of State will fit right in, in his new job at the Treasury, but my constituents and local businesses want their bills cut now, not at some nebulous point in the future. When he gets to the Treasury, will he remove the taxes on our energy industry, to ensure that bills actually come down?

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before I address the clauses, I say for the record that 21 years ago this morning, 52 people were murdered and 784 injured by Islamist terrorists in London. I pay tribute to all the medical professionals who treated those people in such difficult circumstances. I will speak to clauses 59 to 63 together because they all concern one of the most significant structural changes proposed in the Bill: the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body as an independent statutory organisation, and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission. At first glance, that may appear a relatively modest machinery-of-government change. The Minister argues that HSSIB’s functions will continue, its statutory safe-space protections will remain and operational independence will somehow be preserved. However, when one examines the evidence presented to the Committee, and that given to the Health and Social Care Committee, of which I am a member, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the problem that this merger is intended to solve. Instead, what emerges is a remarkable degree of consensus among those with the greatest expertise in patient safety that this proposal carries significant risks while offering little measurable benefit. The question before us is therefore not whether HSSIB’s statutory functions can be transferred to another organisation, but whether Parliament should abolish an institution that it deliberately created to be independent. That distinction matters. Across public life, we recognise that effective scrutiny depends on institutional independence. Government expenditure is examined independently by the National Audit Office, citizens complain to independent ombudsmen rather than to the organisations about which they are complaining, air accidents are investigated independently by the Civil Aviation Authority, and rail accidents are investigated independently of the regulator. In each case, Parliament has recognised that organisations charged with investigating failures should not also be responsible for regulating, inspecting or enforcing against those they investigate. Healthcare should be no different. Indeed, if anything, healthcare should demand an even greater degree of independence. Learning from failure depends on the confidence of patients, clinicians and families that they can speak openly and without fear that the information that they provide will later be used for regulatory or enforcement purposes. That is precisely why HSSIB was created. Its purpose was never to attribute blame but to understand why systems fail, identify the underlying causes of patient harm and ensure that lessons are learned before similar tragedies occur again. That philosophy represented a deliberate shift away from a culture of blame and towards one of learning. It was modelled consciously on the air accidents investigation branch, whose success over many decades has demonstrated that independent, no-blame investigations produce better safety outcomes than investigations driven primarily by enforcement. It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government now seek to move away from the model that other safety-critical industries continue to regard as fundamental. Clause 59 would abolish that independent body and transfer its functions to the Care Quality Commission. In doing so, it would bring together two organisations with fundamentally different statutory purposes, different powers and, perhaps most importantly, different cultures. HSSIB investigates and the CQC regulates. One exists to ask why the system failed; the other exists to ask whether the organisation complied with required standards—those are not the same questions. Nor do HSSIB and CQC require the same relationship with those from whom evidence is obtained. An investigation depends on trust; a regulator depends on compliance. An investigator encourages candour; a regulator necessarily retains enforcement powers. The different roles are not a weakness of the system; they are precisely why Parliament chose to establish separate organisations. I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could explain what assessment has been made of the impact on public confidence of the investigator and the regulator becoming part of the same statutory organisation. More specifically, what assessment has been made of the likely effect on clinicians’ willingness to speak openly if the organisation receiving confidential evidence also contains the regulator responsible for inspecting and enforcing standards? That concern has been expressed not only by the Opposition, but repeatedly by independent experts—and indeed, we just heard the hon. Member for Lewisham East asking similar questions. Even the Care Quality Commission has expressed reservations. Evidence that it submitted to the Health and Social Care Committee earlier this year acknowledged that a lack of clarity remains regarding the respective roles of HSSIB and the CQC. Rather than resolving that uncertainty, the proposed merger risks deepening it. The CQC warned that preserving an effective separation between its investigatory and regulatory functions would be essential if confidence in HSSIB’s safe space were to be maintained, and it recognised the genuine risk of perceived conflicts of interest if those functions become blurred. I think that should give the Committee pause for thought. When the organisation receiving the additional responsibilities is itself warning about the difficulty of maintaining the boundaries, we should listen very carefully. If the CQC believes that the risks exist before the merger has even taken place, what confidence can Ministers offer that those risks will somehow disappear afterwards? Similarly, the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, of which I am a member, has expressed concern that HSSIB should remain institutionally independent so that its evidence-based recommendations can continue to command confidence across the health system. Such concerns, as I said, are not confined to Parliament, nor are they confined to one political party. They are shared by patient safety organisations, healthcare professionals and those directly involved in investigating serious incidents. During our oral evidence sessions, I put a straightforward question to Dr Penny Dash. I observed that I could find almost no one apart from her and the Department who believed that moving HSSIB into the CQC was the right course of action. That was not intended as some sort of rhetorical flourish; it reflected the evidence before us. Former Secretaries of State, patient safety experts, independent investigators and numerous professional organisations have all questioned the proposal. Despite the breadth of concern, the Government have not produced compelling evidence that HSSIB, as presently constituted, is failing. Nor have they demonstrated that the separation between investigation and regulation is itself creating harm. Instead, Ministers have repeatedly assured us that HSSIB’s operational independence will remain, that safe space protections will remain and that independent investigations will remain. If that is indeed the Government’s position, an obvious question follows: if HSSIB will continue to operate independently, if its investigations will continue to be conducted independently and if its statutory protections will remain intact, why is it necessary to abolish the independent organisation at all? That question goes to the heart of clauses 59 to 63, and throughout the evidence presented to the Committee, I have heard no convincing answer. The Government ask Parliament to believe that everything that makes HSSIB valuable will continue unchanged, but at the same time, they ask Parliament to dismantle the very institutional structure deliberately designed to protect those characteristics. That is not merely an administrative contradiction, but a constitutional one. If institutional independence genuinely matters, it should be preserved. If institutional independence does not matter, Ministers should explain why Parliament was wrong to establish it in the first place. That question of necessity leads directly to the Government’s principal justifications for clauses 59 to 63, the Dash review. The Government have repeatedly relied on that review as the intellectual basis for abolishing HSSIB as the independent body, yet when one examines the report and the evidence given by its author to this Committee, the case becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Without doubt, the review identifies a genuine problem: it concludes that the patient safety landscape has become crowded and in places confusing. Dr Dash told the Committee that she had identified more than 150 organisations operating across the wider patient safety landscape, and that clinicians were spending considerable time responding to different organisations, requesting information, completing forms and participating in overlapping reviews. She said that the system had become “busy and confusing”, and that that was distracting clinicians from improving the quality of care.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes several key points, and he is absolutely right: what problem are the Government trying to solve here? If we believe in independence, believe in an investigatory body and believe it is working well—and it demonstrably is working well—why on earth would we change it? That goes to a further point: these clauses not only potentially provide for a transfer of HSSIB into CQC but add risk and failure in that procedure. My hon. Friend asks how we can be confident that the system is going to work if a patient or a clinician does not want to put their head above the parapet because they are frightened that there will be regulatory consequence. That is a fundamental problem with the Government’s proposal. As I have said several times in this speech, we have not had the answer to that and no answer seems to be forthcoming. I may touch on that in a bit more detail in a moment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash was clear on this topic when he gave evidence to the Committee: “My concern was that the NHS and actually health systems across the world are not very good at learning lessons when there are tragedies.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 29, Q52.] That is the problem that HSSIB was created to address and why I struggle with the Government’s argument. If the problem is that the NHS does not learn lessons effectively, the answer should be to strengthen the organisation designed specifically to help it to learn, not to weaken the independence of that organisation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash identified the precise part of the system that remains broken. He said: “the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”. –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.] That is the crucial point. The Government’s justification for the merger appears to be based on a concern that there are too many recommendations, too many reviews and too much duplication, but the evidence of my right hon. Friend highlights a different problem. The issue is not that we do not know what needs to change but that we too often fail to act on what we already know. The answer to that problem is not fewer independent investigations but stronger accountability for implementing recommendations. Indeed, my right hon. Friend made that point powerfully in his evidence. He explained that “What there needs to be is a formal system with a legal obligation on the Government.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q53.] He warned that too often recommendations disappear into what he described as “agree in principle”, which allows organisations to acknowledge a problem without committing to a timetable for fixing it. The Government are proposing structural change because recommendations are not always acted on, but the problem is not the existence of HSSIB; it is the absence of sufficient accountability when recommendations are made. The Government appear to be addressing the wrong failure. There is another important point from my right hon. Friend’s evidence. He explained that one of the long-term purposes of HSSIB was to reduce the need for expensive public inquiries. He told the Committee that “Ideally, when something goes wrong, what you want is for there to be an investigation and for lessons to be learned, so that grieving families can say, ‘Well, at least we are confident that this wouldn’t happen again.’” However, because families often lack confidence that lessons will actually be learned, they understandably seek public inquiries. My right hon. Friend explained: “families still think the only way they can get real change is through a public inquiry” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 32, Q56.] That is an important warning. If confidence in HSSIB is reduced, the unintended consequence may be more public inquiries, not fewer—more cost, more delay and, most importantly, more time before lessons are learned and acted on. That is the opposite of what the Government say they want to achieve. The Government’s second argument is that safe space can be protected through legislation. I accept that Ministers intend to preserve those protections; however, the evidence we have heard demonstrates that the issue is not simply one of statutory wording but of culture and confidence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash gave a particularly important example: he explained that the CQC plays a vital role because it rates healthcare organisations. Hospitals and GP practices care deeply about whether they are rated “outstanding”, “good”, “requires improvement” or “inadequate”. His concern was this: “If a staff member is talking openly to HSSIB about a failure of governance in their organisation, and that is the same organisation that could decide whether they get stripped of their ‘outstanding’ rating and downgraded to ‘good’ or ‘requires improvement’, my concern is that some people may worry and say, ‘Maybe I shouldn’t be open, because this could affect my hospital’s rating.’” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 33-34, Q59.] That is the practical problem: the Government’s argument relies on the assumption that staff will distinguish perfectly between different parts of the same organisation, but the concern is that a frontline clinician may not see those internal distinctions. They may simply see that the investigator and the regulator now sit under the same roof. When people are deciding whether to disclose something that may have consequences for themselves, their colleagues or their organisation, perception matters. As my right hon. Friend said, “we have to be really careful that people still have confidence in the safe space function if this merger goes ahead.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 34, Q59.] A similar point was made by Professor Carl Macrae from the University of Nottingham. While giving evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee, he said that it is difficult to conceive how legislation alone could overcome the fundamental conflict created by merging an independent safety investigation body with a regulator, given that the two organisations perform inherently different functions. The Government’s case depends on trust surviving that merger, but the evidence tells us that trust is precisely what is at risk. Dr Benneyworth made a similar point from HSSIB’s perspective. She told this Committee: “There needs to be much more clarity about governance and how that will work in the legislation to protect independence.” She went further and suggested that if the Government proceed, there would need to be much stronger safeguards, including “a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 26, Q44.] That evidence is significant because it is not a witness arguing that change is impossible; it is the organisation at the centre of this proposal telling this Committee that the legislation, as drafted, does not provide sufficient reassurance. The Government’s response cannot simply be that they intend to be careful. The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), said that the integration would be approached with “enormous care”, but we have to ask what that actually means in legal terms. Where are the enforceable safeguards? What prevents a gradual erosion of independence once HSSIB is part of the regulator? History tells us that institutional safeguards matter precisely because they protect against future changes in culture, leadership or priorities. A body can begin with the best of intentions, but still drift over time—that is why Parliament creates independent institutions in the first place. It is not because Ministers are untrustworthy; it is because good governance recognises that structures matter. In this case, the structure matters enormously. Those concerns become even more significant when we consider the legal framework around protected information and the practical operation of safe space. The Government’s argument appears to rest on the belief that if the right protections are written into legislation, the independence of HSSIB can be preserved, but the evidence we have heard suggests that the challenge is much more fundamental. The question is not simply whether information is legally protected but whether staff, patients and families will continue to believe that it is protected. That distinction matters. During our evidence session, Dr Benneyworth highlighted a very specific concern about the drafting of the legislation. She explained that, at present, the clauses related to connected individuals could create uncertainty about who in the CQC might have access to protected material. She said: “The legislation needs to be much clearer around the protection of protected disclosure materials, to give the system confidence in our ability to hold and not share confidential information.” — [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.] That is the crucial point: the success of HSSIB depends on confidence that information provided in confidence will remain within the investigation process. If there is uncertainty about whether information could move elsewhere in the organisation, the very existence of that uncertainty risks undermining safe space. Dr Benneyworth went further. She explained: “There needs to be a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.] That is a remarkable admission. The organisation whose functions are being transferred to the CQC is telling Parliament that the Bill, as drafted, does not provide that sufficient certainty. The Government’s response cannot simply be that everyone involved will act in good faith. Good governance requires more than good intentions; it requires a structure that protects independence, regardless of who happens to lead an organisation in future, who is Secretary of State or who is in government. That is why Parliament creates these independent bodies in the first place. There is also a practical issue that cannot be dismissed. Dr Benneyworth explained that HSSIB is unique because it can investigate every part of the healthcare system, including national bodies. She told the Committee: “At the moment, we have the ability, being an independent organisation, to investigate any part of the system where there is a concern.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 23, Q38.] That includes looking at how national systems operate, how regulators function and how different parts of the health service interact. That independence is important, because sometimes the problem is not the provider delivering care; sometimes the problem is the system around it. A regulator may look at whether an organisation has complied with standards; an independent investigator may ask a different question: why did the system make it possible for failure to happen? The questions are complementary, but not interchangeable. Dr Benneyworth made precisely that point when discussing national failures. She explained that some problems cannot be solved by regulating an individual organisation, because the underlying issue sits elsewhere in the system. She said that is not something that can be changed by a regulator—a fundamental distinction. Regulation can identify whether standards have been met and independent investigation can identify whether the system itself needs to change. Both functions are necessary, but combining them risks weakening both. Those concerns sit within a wider challenge on candour in healthcare. The statutory duty of candour was introduced following the Francis inquiry into the failures of the Mid Staffordshire health trust. The duty’s purpose was straightforward: when something goes wrong, patients and families should receive an honest explanation. Despite that legal duty, however, evidence remains of a defensive culture within parts of healthcare. Legal advice can sometimes encourage organisations to think first about liability, rather than about learning. Administrators can understandably become concerned about litigation risk—and where fear dominates, openness suffers. That is precisely why the safe space matters. HSSIB was created to provide an environment where the priority is not defending an organisation, but understanding what happened. If we weaken confidence in that environment, we risk making the wider culture of candour even harder to achieve. The irony, of course, is that the Government argue that the merger will strengthen patient safety, and yet the evidence suggests that it could weaken one of the most important ingredients of patient safety: openness. I also want to express concerns shared with me directly by people working within HSSIB. During a meeting with some of my constituents who work in the organisation, individuals involved in patient safety investigations raised significant concerns about the proposed move. They believe that bringing HSSIB into the CQC represents a backward step for patient safety. They also expressed concern that the rationale for the merger has shifted. Initially, the argument appeared to focus on streamlining and reducing duplication; increasingly, however, it appears to be about reducing the number of safety recommendations being made. That misunderstands the problem. As I have pointed out before, the challenge is not the existence of recommendations but ensuring that those recommendations lead to action. Indeed, I was informed that HSSIB has already been developing a recommendations monitoring system, specifically designed to improve implementation and oversight. In other words, the organisation is already working to address the very issue now being used as justification for restructuring it. That brings me back to the evidence given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash. He identified what I believe to be the central weakness in the Government’s argument: “the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”. –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.] That is the point that Ministers need to answer. If recommendations are not being implemented, strengthen implementation; if accountability is weak, strengthen accountability; and if learning is not embedded, create mechanisms to ensure that learning happens—but do not weaken the independence of a body responsible for identifying those lessons. The risk is that the Government solve the wrong problem. They will remove the independence of the investigator, while leaving untouched the failure to act on what investigators discover. After considering the evidence presented to this Committee, the evidence that we heard in the Select Committee and my conversations with my constituents and others, I remain unable to support clauses 59 to 63. That is not because I oppose reform or believe that the patient safety landscape cannot improve—of course it can. The NHS must continue to learn, adapt and improve, but improvement requires honesty about what is working and what is not. The evidence suggests that HSSIB’s independent investigative model is one of the things that is working and that failure lies elsewhere. It lies in whether recommendations are being implemented, whether organisations learn quickly enough and whether staff feel safe enough to speak up. The answer to those problems is not to remove independence, but to strengthen it. The creation of HSSIB represented a recognition by Parliament that healthcare needed the same principles of independent safety investigation that serve aviation, rail and other high-risk industry so well. Those principles exist for a reason: when something goes wrong, society needs an organisation that people trust to ask what happened, why it happened and what must change to prevent it from happening again. That organisation must be separate from those responsible for regulating the system. It must be able to investigate without fear or favour. It must command the confidence of patients, families and healthcare professionals. The Government say that the protections will remain, but the evidence we have heard overwhelmingly demonstrates that confidence in those protections is precisely what is at risk. Once institutional independence is removed, it simply cannot be recreated through internal guidance or assurances. The structure matters, the culture matters and the trust matters. For those reasons, I urge the Minister to reconsider clauses 59 to 63. If the Government believe that improvements can be made to co-ordination, accountability or implementation, discussions on that should absolutely continue and the Opposition would welcome them. However, the clauses go much further. They remove the independent status, which is so important. Given the enormous human and financial cost of avoidable harm in healthcare, Parliament should be extremely cautious before weakening one of the few mechanisms specifically designed to prevent it.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Obviously, I have sympathy for what the hon. Member is trying to achieve—ensuring that our data systems are free from potential hacking by either state or non-state actors is very important—but I cannot see anything in new clause 4 about the size of contracts. Does his suggestion relate to any contract, however small, that was given to a non-UK-based company? It is not clear what he means by a non-United Kingdom company. Is that one that is headquartered here, one that is listed on our stock exchange, or one that has a CEO who is a British citizen? I am not quite sure what he means by a UK-based company, but if we can define an outside-based one, is he saying that any contract of any size given to such a company will have to come to Parliament?

• 6 Jul 2026 · Civil Service Pensions · Hansard source

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  I currently have 11 unresolved cases in my constituency and the numbers are going up. My constituents deserve certainty about these unacceptable delays. During Cabinet Office questions on 25 June, I raised these failures with the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Southampton Test (Satvir Kaur), who assured the House that “all…levers” were being used to ensure that Capita met its end of June deadline. Can the Minister tell us what those levers were, given the fact that they appear to be attached to nothing—Capita has still failed to meet that deadline—and what levers he will pull when the August deadline is, inevitably, not met either?