Gregory Stafford MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not keep the Committee too long. We need to look closely at what the clause is trying to achieve, both on innovation, which I support, and on the prizes. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East asked a number of pertinent questions about the prizes, and I want to expand on that before I talk about the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. We have no idea what scale of prize we are talking about. Is it thousands of pounds, tens of thousands of pounds or millions of pounds? Will the prizes be given to individuals or to organisations? Will they be given to NHS bodies? I think not, or at least not exclusively, because the clause suggests that they could be for research. Will they be given to the private sector—I know that Labour Members have antibodies against the private sector—or to university research functions? It is very unclear who the prizes will go to. Even more interestingly, proposed new section 1CC(3)(b) says that prizes may relate to “work done at any time (including work before the commencement of this section).” So they could be given for something that happened prior to the Bill coming into force, but we have no idea how far back that could go. Are we talking months, years or decades? There is no clear outline about who will get the prizes, how much they will be, what innovations or technologies they will be for, or the point in time that is being referred to. Then the clause says that the Secretary of State may set up a committee. I have been in enough Bill Committees to know that civil servants do not write something into Bills unless they have an idea of what they want to do with it. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister what sort of committee it will be, how many people will be on it, how much remuneration they will receive and how they will establish themselves and fulfil the function that the Secretary of State gives them. If we do not know that, the proposal is so open-ended that I would have real concerns about letting it go forward in the manner in which it is currently written. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East suggested—I do not think he was joking—that the word “prize” made this sound like a game show. That is part of what we need to understand. Will the Secretary of State set up a competition in various areas of healthcare, technology, disease or treatment? Will they say, for example, “We want to find the best technology for dealing with cataracts”? Will a call go out for people to submit bids and say, “We have produced this amazing new laser treatment,” in order to win the prize? Or will it be entirely open-ended? Will people come into the Department of Health and Social Care to this new committee and say, “We have created this amazing piece of innovation—give us some money for having done so”? It is so unclear in the Bill. As I say, I am absolutely certain that the Minister knows the answer to those questions because this clause and subsection would not be in the Bill if she had no idea what she was hoping to achieve by them.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I do not want to go down the cataracts route, but she and the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket have both mentioned them. Clearly, cataracts are a relatively low-complexity, high-volume type of operation. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that some providers can do five or six operations per list, while other places are doing two or three. That is often about the private sector being able to move more quickly, which is obviously better for patients, as well as for clinicians, who want to do the surgery that they have trained for. Unlike the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, I think that competition can play an important role in driving improvement. When providers must attract and retain patients, they have a stronger incentive to deliver timely, high-quality services, and to innovate in how they provide care. In that sense, competition is not an end in itself but a means of improving outcomes and responsiveness for patients. If both sides of the Committee support clause 5, because we are interested in choice and competition, amendment 59 is the logical extension of that. The amendment is also clear about where the new obligation choices would apply. It covers a range of out-of-hospital services, including diagnostics, audiology, hearing-aid care, dietetics, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and so on. By clearly defining the services in scope, it provides a realistic and workable road map for implementation. As I said, the amendment is not about ideology—I think we all agree about choice and competition—but about ensuring that patients receive timely care and have a meaningful choice about where that care is delivered. By fostering healthy competition, making full use of the capacity in the system and putting patients at the centre of the decision-making process, it offers a practical route to improving access and raising standards of care. For those reasons, I support it and commend it to the Committee.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  What my hon. Friend describes is the real nub of the Bill. If we are to abolish NHS England and move most of its functions to the ICB level or to the Department of Health under a Secretary of State, it would be utter madness for us to, at best, move one set of bureaucrats from NHS England to the Department of Health and therefore gain no extra efficiency, or at worst, as seems to be the case in this clause, not only transfer the NHS England bureaucrats, but create a whole new set of bureaucrats and committees to continue the functions already performed under NHS England. We need to understand whether the Bill is really about making our NHS more efficient by removing levels of bureaucracy, as was the stated intent of the Minister and the previous Secretary of State, or whether it is simply a political power grab where we keep all the bureaucrats and the inefficiency of the current system.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not recognise the characterisation that the hon. Gentleman puts forward. He is essentially saying that, by allowing the private sector to carry out operations and procedures, we are somehow making the NHS unsustainable. The follow-on from that logic is that we remove all private sector providers and practice so that every single doctor, nurse and therapist is working in the NHS. I do not think that he is arguing for that situation, but it is the logical progression of his argument.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister has outlined a couple of hypotheticals for the future, when we have a different Prime Minister and a different Secretary of State. One might go down a route of more privatisation, another down a route of removing the private sector from health service provision. My concern is more practical and for the here and now: if the clause stands part of the Bill, it must be because the Government have some desire to do one of those two things now. Would it not be a good idea to hear from the Minister which of those two options it is?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to support amendment 47, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and to ask a few questions about clause 11. I completely understand the thinking behind the clause. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is probably the most politically impotent of all Secretaries of State: as my hon. Friend said, they pull levers and not much seems to happen, because they do not have the control over the health service that the public think they do—or indeed, that Members of Parliament think they do, judging by the number of us who stand up and demand that the Secretary of State do things in our local areas. I understand the Government and the Secretary of State’s desire to change some of that, but there is concern about the potential politicisation of NHS leadership. Integrated care boards were established in various forms under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 precisely to remove politicisation to ensure that decisions in our healthcare service were made for the benefit of patients on the basis of clinical evidence and the needs of the local population, not on the whim of any Secretary of State or Minister. More importantly, ICBs were brought in to make sure that local health systems, local authorities, clinicians and communities made decisions based on local need. Those politically independent ICB chief executives were expected to exercise professional judgment, make difficult decisions about priorities and resources and sometimes deliver messages that Ministers, and indeed local Members of Parliament, found uncomfortable. If those leaders know that their continued employment ultimately depends on the confidence of the Secretary of State, there is a real risk that the independence of their judgment will be weakened and that patient safety will diminish. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham tackles a core question: should an ICB chief executive focus solely on what is best for patients and the local health economy, or should they have to consider whether their decisions may attract ministerial displeasure? Even if the power is rarely used, and even if, as my hon. Friend said, there are currently some guardrails in the clause, its existence will change behaviour—it must do. Leaders will become more cautious, perhaps more risk-averse and potentially less willing to challenge national policy when local evidence points in a different direction. ICBs have benefited from the ability to speak truth to power. A system in which senior NHS leaders fear dismissal by Ministers risks discouraging precisely that kind of honesty. Do not get me wrong: there are good ICB chief executives and bad ICB chief executives, ones who understand their role well and ones who feel that they do not need to engage at all with their local communities. I have a very good ICB in what is currently Surrey Heartlands, soon to be a larger organisation, and an ICB that does not do the job as well—I will not name it, but any student of geography will be able to work out which one it is. Secondly, excessive ministerial power blurs the lines of accountability. The Minister, in her defence, has argued that Ministers need powers because Ministers are accountable. I get that argument, but one of the most important principles of effective public administration is clarity of responsibility. If the Secretary of State gains extensive powers to appoint and dismiss local NHS leaders, it will become increasingly difficult to know who is actually responsible for outcomes. When performance improves, Ministers will claim credit; when performance deteriorates, local leaders may be blamed. If Ministers possess the power to select and remove those leaders, they will inevitably become more directly responsible for those management decisions, so far from increasing accountability, this might dilute it by creating uncertainty about where true authority lies. Thirdly, there is a constitutional concern. Whether one likes it or not, the previous Act created a balance between democratic accountability and operational independence. Parliament rightly determines the funding, priorities and legislative frameworks, and Ministers rightly set national policy, but operational decisions have been made by healthcare professionals and the statutory bodies established for that purpose. That distinction exists for a good reason. No Secretary of State, regardless of ability or commitment, or indeed their own background in the health service, can personally manage every NHS organisation in England, and I do not think they should. The more powers we concentrate at the centre, the greater the temptation for Ministers to become involved in operational matters that are better addressed through professional expertise and local knowledge. My hon. Friend’s amendment seeks to preserve that distinction in a singular and precise way. It recognises that Ministers should govern the NHS and be held accountable at the top by us as Members of Parliament and our constituents, but should not seek to manage every aspect of it. Fourthly, there is a practical problem. Supporters of ministerial intervention often point to examples of failure and ask what should happen when an ICB is underperforming. That is a fair question, but the answer is not that the Secretary of State must personally possess dismissal powers. A range of mechanisms already exist: ICB boards have governance responsibilities; NHS England has oversight powers; professional regulators oversee the conduct of clinicians; there are provisions in employment law for procedures when it comes to misconduct and capability issues; and auditors and inspectors can identify failings. It would be far better if the Bill strengthened those provisions to ensure that accountability was brought forward, rather than giving the Secretary of State the ability to fire and hire as he or she sees fit. Of course, none of those mechanisms of accountability will disappear if amendment 47 is adopted. The amendment would not create any kind of immunity from accountability; it would simply ensure that accountability is exercised through the established governance structures, rather than through direct ministerial intervention on a chief executive. Indeed, one might ask whether a Secretary of State is really the best person to assess the performance of an individual ICB chief executive. Such judgments often require detailed understanding of local service pressures, workforce challenges, demographic factors, financial constraints and so on. Those are matters better evaluated by individual organisations with operational expertise than by politicians operating at national level. Fifthly, I think the clause as drafted would present a risk to recruitment and retention. The NHS already faces significant leadership challenges. Senior leaders are expected to manage enormous budgets, oversee complex organisations and make difficult decisions under intense public scrutiny. If we create a system in which their tenure can ultimately depend upon ministerial whim, we may deter talented individuals from seeking those positions. As my hon. Friend said, the NHS needs leaders who are willing to innovate, take calculated risks and make difficult long-term decisions. It does not need a culture in which leaders are constantly looking over their shoulder, wondering whether a politically controversial but clinically necessary decision could threaten their position. Strong organisations attract strong leaders when governance arrangements are stable, predictable and professionally driven. They do not attract them through uncertainty and political intervention. Sixthly, we need to consider the precedent being established. Powers granted to one Secretary of State are inherited by the next, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said. Members may trust the intentions of the current Minister—I certainly do. They may also believe that these powers would be exercised responsibly—and at the moment I think they would be. However, legislation must be judged not on how it is going to be used by one individual, but on how it could be used by any future holder of the office. Therefore, the question is not whether the current Secretary of State or Minister would misuse the power, but whether Parliament wishes to establish a framework in which future Secretaries of State possess the ability to remove local NHS leaders whose decisions, views or priorities may conflict with their political objectives. That is a much more serious question. Finally, we must remember what ICBs were trying to achieve, even if we do not think that they have achieved it or performed in the way that we wanted them to. If we go back to the principle of why they were set up, they were designed to encourage collaboration rather than some sort of command-and-control structure. They were intended to bring decision making closer to patients and communities. They were established to support long-term planning across local health systems. Those objectives, I am afraid, are very difficult to reconcile with a model in which local leaders remain subject to direct ministerial dismissal. Partnership working flourishes when organisations have confidence in their independence and responsibilities. It is weakened when authority is increasingly concentrated at the centre. For all those reasons, I believe that amendment 47 in the name my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raises an important principle. It is not about protecting poor performance or shielding individuals from accountability; it is about ensuring that accountability is exercised through proper governance structures rather than political control. Expanding ministerial powers to hire and fire local NHS leaders risks undermining all of those principles.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to take the Minister back to her rejection of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham on the basis that—I paraphrase—she felt the definition of “patients” was too limiting because it would not count people who had not entered the health system at that point. The clause itself, however, refers to the benefit for the health service. Is the Minister suggesting that the health service, as defined in the Bill, includes what happens before people enter what I would describe as the health service? Is it something before that point? She seems to be saying that our definition is too narrow, but her definition in the Bill must apply to those who have entered some kind of formal setting. Or is the health service wider than that?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I agree heartily with the shadow Minister, and a couple of other things concern me about clause 8. On the one hand, the clause appears to bring more centralisation, but on the other hand it pushes things down to an ICB level at the same time. I am worried that if we have individualisation of ICBs, we will only exacerbate the disparity of services across regions. I would be interested to understand from the Minister how the Secretary of State’s functions will allow the independence of ICBs and, where an ICB understands its local population well, ensure that patients do not end up in a postcode lottery based on which ICB area they happen to live in. The danger here is that if the Bill does not deal with those problems and close regional gaps, it is not immediately clear from the clause how the Secretary of State could intervene to ensure that ICBs have the autonomy to make decisions based on their local populations and ensure at the same time that patients do not receive a worse service just because they happen to live in one ICB area rather than another.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I am particularly concerned about subsection (2)(a) of proposed new section 12DA. On examination, this provision raises significant concerns about the control of public expenditure and the efficient use of resources within the health service, and I find it rather vague. There is no definition of the terms used, no indication of scope and no express limitation on how the power is to be exercised. When read together with subsection (1) of proposed new section 12DA, the effect, as I read it, is to allow the Secretary of State to provide funding to an extremely wide category of recipients. That includes not only public bodies and established NHS providers but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has said, private entities, charities, individuals and any person engaged in activities that the Secretary of State considers to be beneficial to the health service. That breadth is not accompanied by a corresponding statutory safeguard. The clause does not set out criteria for eligibility, priorities for funding or principles to guide decision making. It does not impose limits on the sums that may be disbursed, nor does it require any structured process for allocating funds. There is no express provision for transparency, such as publication of decisions or reporting obligations to another body such as Parliament. That absence is significant. Control over public expenditure ultimately lies with Parliament, yet the clause delegates a wide and flexible spending power to the Executive with little direction as to how that power is to be exercised. While it may be said that Treasury rules, audit requirements and general public law principles continue to apply, those are external controls and they do not substitute for clear statutory discipline within the provision itself. The practical consequences of such a broad power need to be considered. The NHS is already under considerable financial strain; as we all know, demand is rising and resources are constrained, and there is a continuing need to ensure that funding is allocated in a way that delivers measurable improvements in outcomes. In that context, certainty, prioritisation and efficiency are essential. By framing this power in such open terms, the clause risks undermining those objectives. It will create the possibility of fragmented funding decisions, with resources distributed across a wide range of initiatives without clear and consistent frameworks, and it may lead to duplication of effort or to supporting projects with benefits that are uncertain or difficult to evaluate. Without clear criteria or structured oversight, it will become more difficult to ensure that funding is directed to the areas of greatest need.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend says that we do not know the effects, but a number of children have been put through this process via the now discredited Tavistock process. Why does she think that the NHS will not refer to the data linkage study and use the data that would have been gained from the children who were put through that process, in order to find out what the effects are before deciding to put a whole new cohort of children through what is clearly a damaging procedure?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  There is a third option, which is to get NHS England to motor ahead with the data-linkage study, so that we can use the data that has already been collected to find out the answers to the questions that the Secretary of State is posing. Only then, if the information is not there, should the trial go ahead. Why is he not pushing that third way?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Access to Dental Services: West Sussex · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I thank the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) for securing this important debate, and for outlining the issues that her constituents—and, indeed, many constituents across the country—are facing. It is something of an irony that I find myself speaking on NHS dentistry for the second time in as many days, having co-sponsored yesterday’s Backbench Business debate on precisely this issue, but if anything, that underlines the scale of the issue we are dealing with. The hon. Member for Chichester will know that West Sussex borders my constituency, which spans Surrey and Hampshire. Many of my constituents in Haslemere and the surrounding villages routinely access services across that boundary, and would regard West Sussex as part of their natural health economy. I am sure the same is true vice versa, because dentistry does not respect administrative lines, and access to care either exists or it does not. Let us be clear about the scale of the problem. Oral health is not a luxury issue; as my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Alison Griffiths) set out so clearly and passionately, it is fundamental to dignity, confidence, employability and overall health, yet access to NHS dentistry has become a postcode lottery. Nearly 14 million people are struggling to access care, and in many areas more than 70% of practices are not accepting new NHS patients, including children. As far as I can tell, not a single dentist in my constituency of Farnham and Bordon is accepting new NHS patients. It is often suggested that we simply have a workforce shortage, but the issue is not that we do not have enough dentists; it is that, understandably, too few are willing to work within a contract that no longer makes sense. The 2006 NHS dental contract, introduced under the last Labour Government, is based on units of dental activity. It pays the same whether a dentist carries out one filling or six, rewards volume rather than complexity, and actively discourages preventive care. That contract is central to why the system is struggling. The Government came into office promising a dental rescue plan, including urgent appointments, contract reform, workforce expansion and a greater focus on prevention. Those commitments were clear and repeated, yet delivery has not matched the rhetoric. In practice, the additional appointments that have been rolled out amount in many cases to only a small increase in urgent capacity. According to the British Dental Association, they are equivalent to a couple of extra slots per dentist per month. At the same time, the long-promised NHS workforce plan has still not been published and, without it, there is no credible road map for how capacity will be met. Warm words about recruitment are no substitute for a clear and funded strategy that tells practices and patients what the future looks like. We also need to recognise inefficiencies within the current system. In some practices, around one in seven NHS appointments is missed, costing individual surgeries tens of thousands of pounds a year. That is not just a frustration for clinicians—it is lost capacity in a system that is already under extreme pressure. However, rather than addressing the structural incentives that contribute to this, the Government’s response has been piecemeal. The consequences of all this are not evenly distributed; rural and coastal communities are particularly badly affected, with some having as few as 10 NHS dental practices per 100,000 people. These so-called dental deserts are not accidental, but the predictable outcome of a system that does not align funding, workforce planning and local need. There is a striking example of underused capacity in my local area. In Haslemere, the hospital contains a fully equipped dental suite that remains unused despite clear local demand. That facility could serve patients across the West Sussex border, given the natural geography of where people access care. Instead, it sits idle. I think everyone in this Chamber agrees with prevention in principle, and with the need to move away from a purely treatment-based model. The challenge is delivery. Likewise, workforce expansion is essential, but announcements without a credible plan do not translate into appointments. Ultimately, what is required is straightforward in principle, but urgent in practice: a properly funded and credible workforce plan, contract reform that rewards prevention and complexity rather than volume, and a serious strategy to address dental deserts that reflects real geography and need. We should also acknowledge the previous efforts of the Conservative Government, including the dental recovery plan, which did attempt to address these issues through recruitment incentives, training expansion and support of overseas qualified dentists. I accept that some measures had limited uptake, but they were at least an attempt to respond to a growing crisis. The question now is whether this Government build on what works or continue to drift without clear direction. Patients do not care which Government designed which contract or which plan; they care about seeing a dentist when they need one. I end with three straightforward questions that I asked the Minister in yesterday’s debate, but to which I did not get an answer. When will we see a fully funded and credible NHS dental workforce plan? How many additional dentists, hygienists and therapists are required to meet demand? What is the plan to ensure that dental deserts do not become a permanent feature of our healthcare system? Patients deserve these answers not in the future, but today.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the answer was, “We are.”

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Dr Dash, in her evidence, said that—I am slightly paraphrasing, so I hope I have not got this wrong—NHS England has a number of investigatory bodies that it has established recently, and that although they were not perfect, they were much better, and they could be doing this job. What is your response to that? Dr Benneyworth: NHS England has an investigations unit that commissions regional and national investigations, sometimes from private organisations. We work very closely with the NHS England patient safety team. As I said, we have supported their work in rolling out local investigations around the patient safety incident response framework. We have been instrumental in supporting the training and education around that. We are the only safety investigator with protected disclosure. There is no other body that is like us and can do the same type of investigations in this country, and we are internationally looked at. In fact, I am doing a podcast with Canada tomorrow. Numerous countries are looking at us and saying, “We want the same thing.” There is a handful of investigators like us in Finland and Norway, and they have excellent safety outcomes for their patients, but the rest of the world is looking at us and trying to learn from us, and I am frequently asked to speak internationally about this.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Would you agree with that, Mr Lant? Jacob Lant: Yes. I kind of think, as the debate goes on, that—with the changes to Healthwatch in particular—you could achieve so much without legislation. You could beef up the internal functions for listening to a patient and engaging with them without legislation—there is no requirement for that. You could invest more resource in that, and you could do the same with Healthwatch. You could think about the resourcing of the structures and the support they receive, so you could make that whole system better without legislating to get rid of it. As Sarah said, the NHS changes are a distraction at a time when we should be moving on with focusing on patient care.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I should declare that I am a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety. Apologies, Dr Dash, I have questioned you on this many times, but I am going to continue to do so. When the King’s Fund, the Nuffield Trust and the Health Foundation were in front of the Health and Social Care Committee and they talked about bringing HSSIB into the CQC, all three of them said very clearly: “Don’t do it.”. In fact, I can find almost nobody apart from you and the Department who thinks that moving HSSIB into the CQC is a good idea. Does that give you any pause for thought about whether you are recommending the right thing? More specifically, if, as you said to the Health and Social Care Committee, the safe space element would be retained and HSSIB would operate as an independent organisation, how can you square the fact that it would remain independent and yet be part of the CQC? If it does remain independent, what is the need to bring it into the CQC? Dr Dash: The point of bringing it into the CQC, as I said before, is that we are trying to simplify this landscape. There are so many different organisations continually commenting and doing reviews—often replicating the same reviews that other people have done. The concern is that it is distracting rather than enabling. The hope that I had when I made the recommendation, and still have now, is that by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two. For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—“Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seems to be a particular challenge?” It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS with particular areas, but also to supplement the work of the NHS. I would like to point out that since HSSIB was established, the NHS has established its own much more rigorous, much more robust investigatory teams and processes. Of course, I am not saying that they are perfect—we can all see that—but I encourage all colleagues here today to look at the work they are doing, the specific areas they are reviewing, the outputs of those reviews and the ways in which those are leading to improving care. That feels to me to be a much more systematic way of addressing the concerns of patients, families and staff in the place where those concerns happen, having mechanisms to escalate those through the NHS so you can bring them to regions—some investigations get done at the NHS England level—and having the CQC as an independent body that can separately review and spot if there are problems but also ensure that those investigations within the NHS are happening well.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What happens if the problem is the CQC? Dr Dash: Well, we then have to deal with that as a problem. That is the same as saying, “What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?” We have 150 organisations—150. What if the GMC is a problem? What if the Nursing and Midwifery Council is a problem?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Just so that I am clear, you have internal protocols that would raise stuff if you saw something criminal, and if you were investigating something and potentially could not share the information, that would not prevent any of the multitude of other regulators that we have out there from investigating on their own something similar. Your investigation would not preclude them from being able to investigate as well. Dr Benneyworth: No.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q You are saying that you are a world leader. Dr Benneyworth: We are—

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Sarah, when we were at the Health and Social Care Committee, you and your fellow panellists seemed to suggest that the Government could achieve what they needed to in the 10-year plan without this reorganisation. Could you delve into that a bit more and tell us why you think that is the case? Sarah Woolnough: The Government have an incredibly ambitious agenda, which is partly articulated in the 10-year plan. Our ongoing concern has been that some of the biggest-ticket items that the Government rightly want to achieve to fundamentally shift power to patients—delivering a shift towards prevention, moving care closer to home and allowing more digital enablement—do not require this kind of legislation or a reorganisation. I go back to my first answer: what is honestly the opportunity cost of doing some of this at the expense of more focus and attention on, for example, delivering care closer to home? There is a lot of energy and activity in that area, but the Government want to make really good progress over the next few years. To take that example, if you are really serious, you need to understand what the barriers are to delivering more care in the community, closer to people and patients, and wrapping services around patients. It requires you to flow money differently and to have a different incentive scheme, but that is nowhere near this piece of legislation. Our worry has been about what is not in the Bill, and what is the rightly and fantastically ambitious agenda to improve health for people and patients, versus the opportunity cost of a largely technical piece of legislation that reorganises some central functions.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I reiterate that I am a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety. Dr Benneyworth and I have had many conversations about this issue. I have two questions. The first is about the safe space. We have seen written evidence, and we have heard when others have attended the Health and Social Care Committee, about the fact that if HSSIB is placed inside the CQC, you could have the farcical situation of one set of CQC lawyers, who are representing HSSIB, suing or attempting to sue another set of CQC lawyers, who are looking out for the CQC situation, because they are trying to get information out of part of their own system. Is that parody or is it a possibility and real problem? Dr Benneyworth: It is a problem and something that potentially could happen. I hope that we would work effectively to try to avoid that. Essentially, and just to reassure the Committee, if we see something of a criminal nature, if there are significant regulatory concerns, we have protocols in place to be able to escalate that. But there is a real risk that potentially, if we held information that the CQC needed in part of its regulatory function, in its enforcement function, we would not be able to share that, because of our legislation, and we would not want to share it, because we want to maintain the trust in the system. It would need to go to the High Court to be able to get hold of it.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Russian Oil Sales · Hansard source

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  4. What diplomatic steps she is taking with international partners to help prevent the sale of Russian oil to companies in China, Turkey and India.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Russian Oil Sales · Hansard source

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  While diplomatic pressure on China, India and Turkey is essential, we must also do more militarily to disrupt the shadow fleet carrying Putin’s oil. I pay tribute to our armed forces who, this weekend, boarded a Russia-linked tanker in UK waters under new Government powers. Since those powers were announced in March, 184 sanctioned shadow fleet vessels have made 238 journeys through UK waters, including 94 journeys into territorial waters, without a single interdiction until now. What is the Department doing with the Ministry of Defence and international partners to ensure that this is a sustained approach, rather than a one-off?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Can you give a couple of examples? Maria Higson: To take one example, I would love to see an NHS where we step away from short-term activity metrics, and towards outcomes—that is mentioned in the Bill. The constant firefight on activities is quite challenging, so how can we move that dialogue to ensure genuine transformation? That is an example of where we could potentially go further than the Bill suggests, but I am conscious that I am supposed to comment on the Bill, not give my own random thoughts.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This question is to the Royal Berkshire. In response to my colleague, you talked about the benefits of your council of governors. As a foundation trust, you have significant autonomy. The Bill will allow the Government to cap your day-to-day spend, strip away your FT status and make governance changes. What impact will that have on how your boards can carry out their duties? James Blythe: With a lot of foundation trusts, as the NHS has moved into a period of increasingly tight financial control and as we have needed to recover from the covid pandemic, far closer working has been required between all NHS providers and the centre, to manage both the financial implications and the pandemic’s implications for patient access and patient quality. Having recently moved from a senior leadership, board-level role in an NHS trust to two roles as chief executive in a foundation trust, I do not feel that in the day-to-day relationship with the centre and with our local and regional representatives there is an enormous difference in how we balance quality, finance and performance now. Those foundation trust freedoms were most relevant when we were in a system in which expenditure on health could grow and we were not trying to recover from the challenges that we have had recently. Day to day, the relationship between NHS trusts and foundation trusts feels quite consistent now, so I am not sure that the changes proposed in the Bill will necessarily make a huge difference. As I said in response to an earlier question, it depends entirely on whether the provisions of the Bill are used to set a small number of priorities and let NHS organisations get on with delivering them, or whether they are used more regularly to intervene more directly in our day-to-day operations. A lot comes down to how the regime is operated.