Gregory Stafford MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree. Some of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) may address that.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I obviously respect the hon. Gentleman, given his medical background, but as far as I am aware those substances have not yet been used for murdering people, which is what we are going to do here. That leads me neatly on—

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make a little progress before taking another intervention. No safeguards can prevent complications from taking medicines. As I am sure the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley) knows, there can always be complications. In this case, those could include regurgitation of the drugs, regaining consciousness and seizures.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am conscious of those comments and will try to limit my remarks to new clause 13 and some of the amendments to it. The Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Pathologists, the Association for Palliative Medicine and the British Geriatrics Society have all said that there are problems with this Bill, and I have heard nothing from its sponsor, the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater)—despite trying to intervene on her a number of times—about what she has done to ensure that their concerns have been addressed. This brings us directly to a fundamental concern: namely, the means by which assisted death would be carried out under new clause 13. The impact assessment for the Bill recognises that “The safety and efficacy of those substances used for assisted dying is currently difficult to assess”.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make a little progress, but I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of medical devices designed to induce death by the administration of gas, such as the Sarco suicide pod, which has been in the press recently. That device bypasses medical oversight entirely and presents an ethical rupture in our current framework. If the Bill proceeds without safeguarding against such methods, we risk opening the door to a deeply troubling precedent—one that would erode professional accountability and compromise the integrity of end-of-life care.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Lady give way?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause is a necessary reset— [ Interruption. ] Goodness, what a background noise! If only I had such a response to everything I said. The clause is rooted in the central recommendation of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, that the criteria for detention are too broad and being applied too inconsistently. Too often we hear stories of people being detained not because they pose a real and present danger, but because services are stretched, community alternatives are not available, or there is simply a lack of clarity on when detention is justified. This clause is necessarily corrective. It raises the bar by introducing a clear and structured risk threshold that requires the possibility of serious harm to health or safety, rather than vague concerns or subjective impressions. The inclusion of terms such as “likelihood” and the focus on actual risk mark a clear move towards the evidence-based practice that we want to see and away from overreach. For me, the key strengths of the clause include, first, a higher threshold for detention. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, detention for assessment is permitted only if serious harm may occur. That means that professionals must assess the nature and the degree of harm, as well as the likelihood, injecting rigour and proportionality into decision making. The clause also clarifies the treatment criteria. Under section 3 of the Act, detention for treatment is allowed only if serious harm may occur without it and if treatment is necessary, and, crucially, it must be available. That prevents people from being detained without any therapeutic benefit, a concern that has long plagued the system. The clause also aligns measures across the Mental Health Act: the new threshold applies not only to the initial decision to detain, but to emergency detentions and renewals. That brings consistency and coherence across the different parts of the legislation. The final key point among the strengths of the clause is the definition of the authorised person, which is vital. It ensures that those tasked with detention powers are properly trained and equipped to deal with the complex and often volatile realities of mental health crises. Whether a doctor, an approved mental health professional or a specially trained nurse, the provision ensures that detention is exercised by someone with relevant expertise, not by default by the police. Taken together, the changes significantly strengthen the legal framework around detention, reduce the risk of misuse and reaffirm the principle of least restriction, the idea that coercive care should be used only when no other alternative exists. The problems I have with Government amendments 26 to 29 are as follows. The Minister proposes to delete references to “a constable or other authorised person” from the clause. On the surface, that may appear to be technical, but in fact I think it is a profound and problematic shift. The amendments would weaken the very safeguards that the clause is trying to strengthen. We must be careful about how we frame this. The amendments risk undoing the clarity and purpose of the clause by making it ambiguous who can lawfully detain someone under the Mental Health Act. Instead of defining the responsibility clearly and ensuring that it is held by trained professionals, the amendments will strip the clause back to vague flexibility, with no guarantee that the right expertise is present in real-time decisions. The power to detain and to move individuals to a place of safety, in particular under sections 135 and 136 of the Act, is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. These provisions, while designed to protect the public, can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crises, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others. Furthermore, the clause as passed by the House of Lords would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise, while also reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police-led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensure that individuals are supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care, and maintain police involvement only where there is a clear and present risk to safety. In doing so, it would significantly strengthen the system and place mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement. Let me set out the key problems with Government amendments 26 to 29. First, I think that they will blur the lines of responsibility. The clause rightly states that detention must be carried out by a constable or other authorised person, namely someone who has been designated and trained to carry out this high-stakes task. The Government amendments will remove that requirement. In doing so, they risk creating confusion on the ground about who is permitted to act. In a moment of crisis, ambiguity costs time, and time costs lives.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested in the hon. Member’s argument, but it seems to be entirely the opposite of the one he made when he intervened on me on Second Reading. He said then: “Sections 135 and 136 of the current Mental Health Act give the police the power to break into someone’s property or detain somebody in a public place where there is the possibility of the involvement of weapons. Does the hon. Member think that health professionals would be able to manage those kinds of situations? Would the police not be the best people to deal with those situations?” —[ Official Report , 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 815.] In that intervention, the hon. Member was pressing for police involvement; now, he seems to be arguing that he wants to take the police out of these settings. I am a little confused by his stance.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a clear point, but I want to add that there are clearly places and situations in which non-police professionals, such as mental health professionals, deal with extremely dangerous and violent patients. They are appropriately trained to do so. It is not in isolation that non-police public professionals are dealing with dangerous people. It is about the right situation, the right place and the right training.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross-governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I confess that I do not entirely follow the hon. Lady’s argument. My understanding is that the people she has listed—for example, hospital security staff—are not covered at the moment, so I do not think that that is the case. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, there are situations, in a number of settings, in which mental health professionals act in the capacity of restraining. With the correct and appropriate training, which is what I think all Opposition Members want, I do not think that the issue that the hon. Member for Thurrock is raising would necessarily arise. Having said that, if she really feels that the wording needs to be tweaked, I look forward to seeing and potentially supporting her amendment to the subsection, and I hope she tables it. The second key problem is the risk of returning the burden to police officers. We have heard from Members on both sides of the House in the debate, and from police forces up and down the country for years, that the police do not have the expertise, training or capacity to be the first responders to mental health emergencies. Clause 5 finally reflects that reality, helping to move the response from law enforcement to healthcare. The Government amendments would muddy that distinction. They would result in the police once again becoming the default responders—not because it is right but because it is unclear who else is meant to act. Thirdly, the amendments introduce legal and safe-guarding risks. Without a clear definition of who can detain, one risks inconsistency, poor practice and potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty. The amendments offer no alternative safeguards—just the deletion of the existing ones. That is not reform; it is abdication of responsibility. Finally, they undermine the spirit of the Bill. The Bill aims to modernise mental health legislation by making it more humane and effective, and more rooted in health than enforcement. The amendments point in the opposite direction. They strip away clarity, increase reliance on the police and risk compounding trauma for those already in crisis. It is not just about legislative precision; it is about protecting people. When someone is in acute mental health crisis, they are at their most vulnerable. Turning up with police officers, sirens and handcuffs does not calm the situation; it escalates it. It creates trauma, damages trust and can lead to long-term disengagement from mental health services. Clause 5 offers us a path out of that pattern. It allows approved professionals—such as paramedics, mental health nurses and crisis practitioners —to intervene early, with care and dignity. It does not exclude the police, where there is a genuine risk to safety, but it rightly repositions them as the last resort, not the first response. The Government amendments may be well intentioned, but they threaten to unravel that balance. We cannot allow vague flexibility to become a smokescreen for inadequate planning or under-resourced services. If the Minister pushes his amendments to a vote, and, as the parliamentary maths suggests they will, those amendments pass, what will he do to sort out the problem that we, on both sides of the House, have talked about today? He is currently planning to keep the status quo, which we all seem to agree is not appropriate. At least we and our noble Friends in the other place have attempted to improve the situation. What will he and his Department do? The clause is part of a broader rethinking of how we response to mental health need. It supports community-based care. It pushes for better training. It honours patient autonomy and it places the right people—clinicians, not constables—at the centre of care delivery. We all want a system where people in distress are met with compassion, not criminalisation. Clause 5 helps us to get there. The Government’s amendments drag us backwards. Clause 5 is one of the most thoughtful and necessary parts of the Bill. It raises standards, reduces harm and finally begins to close the gap between what the Mental Health Act allows and what good mental health care demands.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, Mr Vickers. I should say it was the Liberal Democrats who pointed it out to me; I do not want to take the credit from them.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Hear, hear!

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will keep my remarks relatively brief. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth has pointed out, Members on this side of the House entirely support clause 8, mainly because of the change towards a therapeutic focus, which ensures that all compulsory treatment must have a clear clinical benefit. The clause is much more patient-centred; it gives legal clarity and stronger safeguards than currently exist in the law. I will also touch briefly on amendments 44 and 45, which my hon. Friend the shadow Minister tabled. The key point about amendment 44 is the promotion of the therapeutic environment, which is absolutely key to this. It aligns with the best practice in mental health care and supports recovery-orientated approaches. The key point about amendment 45 is the reinforcement of the compassionate, person-centred care that we are all trying to achieve. It ensures that responses to symptoms or behaviours are not punitive but supportive, and complements amendment 44 by applying the same principle to clinical interpretation of patient behaviours, which ultimately will encourage understanding of trauma-related behaviours, reduce risks of re-traumatisation and promote the psychological safety in treatment settings. I entirely support the view expressed by the hon. Member for Thurrock, my colleague on the Health Committee, that a requirement to consider other trauma factors could be added to the Bill, either now or at a future point. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that subject. I will also touch briefly on amendment 12, which was tabled by the Liberal Democrats, on treatment centres. Like my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, I support the overall context of what the amendment tries to achieve, but I have some concerns about how clinical decisions might be complicated if disagreements arise over the suitability of a treatment environment; and again, additional resources might be required to ensure that appropriate settings are available and accessible. When the hon. Member for Winchester winds up for the Liberal Democrats on that amendment, I will be interested to see whether he can assuage my concerns in that regard. Finally, we support clause 9. It brings the consistency that we want. The alignment, between the treatment standard for prisoners that would be used for non-prisoner patients, adds clarity. Again, it is rights-based, and I think it will reduce the possibility of misuse, thereby helping to prevent inappropriate or unnecessary hospital transfers.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mr Vickers. Just to be clear, I counted six Noes, and I think you announced five. Can we just check on that?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise briefly to dilate on clause 6, on Liberal Democrat amendment 11 and on Government amendment 30. Those of us on the Health and Social Care Committee recently had a fascinating panel about the disparities for black and minority ethnic groups in maternity, and it does not end there, as we can see from the evidence raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth and by the hon. Member for Shipley. When CTOs were introduced—for good reasons—the elements of controversy that hon. Members have raised were not predicted. The overuse of CTOs, especially among black and minority ethnic patients, should give us all concern, although I have to say that there is some limited evidence of effectiveness in reducing relapse or readmission. Will the Minister give us the Government’s view on that and how they might seek improvement going forward? What we are trying to achieve in the clause is to bring legislation in line with the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which recommended tightening the use of CTOs, or indeed abolishing them altogether for some groups. I support the clause because it brings in stronger safeguards, a clearer commitment and time limits to reduce the risk of indefinite or inappropriate use. It also improves patient involvement, because it requires a consultation and review, promoting shared decision-making, and increases accountability because it aligns with the code of practice and introduces external oversight. It focuses on the reality, ensuring that CTOs are used only where truly needed. I am slightly concerned about Government amendment 30, which will remove the detailed provision that would have introduced new statutory limits and review procedures for community treatment orders, specifically under subsection (3), and inserted new subsections (8) to (11) into section 17B of the Mental Health Act. The implication of removing subsection (3) is that essentially we will maintain the current legal framework, which does not impose a fixed maximum duration or the same level of structured review currently written into the clause. I am afraid that that would not bring in the safeguards and oversight mechanisms that would, at least to some degree, start to tackle the problems that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have been talking about. It may be seen as taking a step back from what campaigners and professionals who are advocating for stronger patient rights and accountability on the use of CTOs would like to see. I ask the Minister for the same reassurances that the hon. Member for Shipley asked for in this area. If the Government are to move Government amendment 30 successfully, we will need to see how they intend to deal with these issues going forward. Liberal Democrat amendment 11 would ensure that people subject to a CTO receive information about their right to advocacy. That is an entirely laudable aim, but I ask Liberal Democrat Members to answer a few questions. First, how do they see the administrative burden on clinicians to ensure that both oral and written communications are documented? Secondly, what additional training do they think those professionals might need to ensure that the information is both consistent and correct? Thirdly, might there be delays in issuing a CTO if, for some reason, advocacy information is not immediately available?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to talk briefly about clauses 13 and 14, which I generally and genuinely support. Clause 13 addresses a long-standing ethical and legal tension: how to balance the need for treatment with a patient’s right to refuse it, especially when they may have made advance decisions or have legal representatives. Let me expand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth made about the level of potential appeal around the compelling reasons test. If the patient he was talking about continued to have an episode where it was believed that they did not have the capacity to act and they did not have a legal representative or family members who could advocate on their behalf, has the Minister given any thought to there being an external or independent person who could advocate on behalf of that patient during that period of incapacity and who is not a medical professional? In the current drafting of the clause, that seems to be a potential loophole. When someone regains capacity, they could potentially instruct legal counsel, but that may be too late if the treatment they have received has had an adverse impact on their life. I would like to hear more on that element, if possible.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are trying to future-proof the Bill as much as possible. Does my hon. Friend think that the clause has enough future-proofing to deal with mental health issues that we are currently unaware of, or issues whose nature or treatment we do not fully understand?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to pick up on a few points made by my gallant and learned hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. He talked about people who, like many of us, have seen the benefits of assessments online. There could well be benefits from clause 19 for that. He also talked about how some people did not find that an appropriate way to have their assessment. My understanding is that if someone has a physical ailment, they might be pushed strongly down a route to have an online assessment for whatever reason, whether that be at a primary care setting or at a secondary care or acute setting, but that if they wanted to see a doctor—for example, a GP—physically to talk about their ailment, although it might take them a little bit of time, they had the right to do so. My concern about the clause is the suggestion that in certain circumstances, some patients would not have the right to a face-to-face assessment. The Minister talked about where things will be taken into account, where it is appropriate and where “it would be discouraged”. “Discouraged” is not the same as “it will not happen”. We need clarification, either within the Bill or very strongly in the code of conduct, so that a patient has the right to a face-to-face consultation. I would be very keen to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and Liberal Democrat amendment 13 to clause 18. I note the hon. Member for Winchester is not here; I do not know whether he intends to push amendment 13 to a vote but, just in case he does, I shall speak to it. As colleagues across the Committee have said, ECT is a very controversial treatment, particularly when administered without consent. Under current law, it can be given to patients who lack capacity, but concerns have been raised about insufficient safeguards, especially where the treatment may conflict with prior decisions or a legal representative’s view. Clause 15 responds to recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and aims to ensure that ECT is used only when absolutely necessary, with independent oversight and respect for patient autonomy—something that everyone in this House can agree with. I have a couple of questions for the Minister on clause 15. Clearly, the Opposition support the intention of the clause, but I would like to ask him about the challenges in interpretation. For example, determining whether a decision conflicts with an advance directive may be complex, so has he or his Department given any thought to how we might deal with some of those potentially complex, conflicting points of view? Likewise, clause 17 updates section 62 of the Mental Health Act, allowing for urgent treatment without consent in specific circumstances. Once again, I welcome this provision because it gives some new legal clarity, supports clinical judgment, safeguards capacity and, most importantly, protects life and health. However, without strict oversight, there is a risk that the urgent treatment exception could be overused. What discussions has the Minister had with both his Department and, more importantly, campaign groups and mental health professionals to ensure that the urgent treatment exemption is understood and put forward in a way that satisfies both those undertaking the treatment and those receiving it? Clause 18 also changes section 62 of the Act, which I again support; I mention this clause only because I wish to talk briefly about Liberal Democrat amendment 13. Like other Members, I believe that this amendment is extraordinarily well intentioned, but I have some questions about its wording. Specifically, subsection (c) says “the treatment is reversible”, but I do not necessarily know what the legal or medical definition would be of a reversible treatment. I cannot think how ECT could in any way be reversible, so paragraph (c) of the amendment would potentially mean that nobody could receive ECT. I do not fully understand how it could ever possibly be reversible. I think I have made that point as strongly as I possibly can but, if the Liberal Democrats are going to move the amendment, I ask for some understanding of what definition—either legal or medical—is being used for paragraph (c).

• 10 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her helpful intervention. If that is correct, I will draw my comments on that point to a close. Amendment 6 concerns CETR frequency. It seeks to change the timetabling of these reviews. The same issues, both positive and negative, run through it as in amendment 3. Amendment 7 would strengthen the legal obligation on integrated care boards and local authorities by requiring them to implement recommendations from the care, education and treatment reviews rather than merely considering them. That would ensure that review outcomes lead to concrete action and improved care. I do not think that anyone in the Committee could possibly disagree with that point. It would lead to greater accountability and would ensure that CETR recommendations are not ignored or delayed. That would clearly improve outcomes, because it would increase the likelihood that patients receive timely and appropriate care. The amendment would also introduce stronger legal clarity. By removing “must have regard to” and replacing it with “have a duty to carry out”, it would remove ambiguity around the responsibilities of the ICBs and local authorities, supporting the rights-based care and the principles of transparency and enforceability in service provision that we all support. I hope that the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford will be able to clarify the problem of resource pressures, which applies to all these amendments. Local authorities and ICBs may struggle to implement all the recommendations due to funding or capacity constraints. What would be the legal sanction for ICBs and local authorities if, through no “fault” of their own—although one might argue that they should have the necessary resources in place—they genuinely do not have the resources to implement all the recommendations? I would hope that such a sanction did not put them into further financial difficulty. The reduction in flexibility concerns me. It may limit professional discretion in cases in which recommendations are impractical or outdated. It may require new systems for monitoring and enforcement, and if recommendations are not implemented it could increase the likelihood of legal challenges.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve with these amendments. My question is about how she would ensure, within the context of the provisions, that the patient’s confidentiality would be maintained where it needed to be.