Gregory Stafford MP: speeches

Speeches

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it. As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses. Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care. Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully. The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise. Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation. In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare. Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them. This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse. Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight. Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change? We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected? Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure? To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators. I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child. I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress. I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  You will be delighted to know that there will be no yoga from me, Mrs Harris. I rise to support clause 41 and schedule 3, which will expand access to independent mental health advocates to not only those detained under the Mental Health Act but informal voluntary patients. Like many Committee members, I am sure, a number of IMHAs in my constituency have approached me about this, and they welcome the expansion. I pay tribute to the amazing work that they do across Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook and the surrounding villages. Previously, only patients detained under specific sections of the Mental Health Act or subject to certain treatments were entitled to IMHA support. The clause reflects the recommendations of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and the 2021 White Paper, and aims to enhance patient rights and reduce disparities in access to advocacy. That clearly empowers more patients by giving informal patients access to advocacy support. It improves transparency and accountability in mental health care settings. It ensures proactive outreach so that patients are not left unaware of their rights or support options, and supports informed decision making and potentially reduces coercive practices. Clearly, there may be some resource implications for advocacy services, which the Minister may wish to touch on. Likewise, there may be some implementation challenges, which other hon. Members have raised, especially around ensuring timely and consistent notification and engagement. There could be potential delays in care co-ordination if advocacy processes are not well integrated. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that. This shift is long overdue. Too many vulnerable people, admitted voluntarily but feeling powerless, have lacked a clear, independent voice. The clause corrects that injustice by embedding advocacy deeper into the system, moving from passive availability to proactive engagement. Schedule 3 underpins clause 41 by putting clear duties on hospital managers and advocacy providers alike to ensure that patients are automatically offered support. It is opt out, not opt in. That clarity of responsibility will reduce coercion, increase transparency and ultimately lead to fairer treatment decisions. Schedule 3 operationalises the principles set out in clause 41 by embedding them in the structure of the Mental Health Act 1983. Like clause 41, it reflects recommendations from the 2018 independent review and the 2021 White Paper, aiming to reduce disparities in access to advocacy and ensure that all patients, regardless of detention status, are supported in understanding and exercising their rights. Like clause 41, it strengthens patient voice, reduces inequalities, improves compliance and encourages the early intervention and resolution of concerns. Let me turn to Liberal Democrat amendment 19, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Winchester. Clearly, its purpose is to extend the opt-out advocacy services in England to include informal patients under the age of 18. This ensures that children and young people who are not formally detained under the Mental Health Act, but who are receiving in-patient care, still have automatic access to an IMHA. Currently, opt-out advocacy provisions primarily apply to patients who are formally detained. However, informal patients aged under 18, who may be in hospital with parental consent, can still experience significant restrictions and may not fully understand or exercise their rights. This amendment seeks to close the gap by ensuring that young informal patients are automatically offered advocacy support, recognising their vulnerability and limited legal autonomy. My view is that this does strengthen patient rights. It safeguards vulnerable patients and promotes equality by aligning the rights of informal patients aged under 18 with those of detained patients. It supports informed decision making and helps young people to understand their rights and treatment options. If the hon. Member is minded to press the amendment, I hope that the Government will at least give it tacit support, even if they do not vote for it. That being said, I would welcome the Minister’s comments on why he does not feel that the amendment, or an alternative draft of the wording, if he does not like the specifics of it, should be included in the Bill. I do believe that this is important. Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 are relatively technical but important elements of the Bill that align provision in England and Wales. I have just a few questions for the Minister. Robust rights must come with realistic resources. How will the Government ensure that advocacy services are funded and resourced properly to meet the new wider demand? Although they are technical, the Government amendments will still have an impact. What steps will be taken to monitor consistency so that a patient in Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook or one of the villages surrounding my constituency has the same access to an advocate as a patient in Coventry, Aberafan or Swansea. We want to make sure that there is consistency. Finally, will there be clear standards for timely engagement, especially given the risk of treatment delays if advocacy is not well integrated? If the Minister can answer those questions, I think that this will be a good step forward for patient voice and fairness in mental health, and I would support the clause and schedule 3.

• 16 Jun 2025 · Child Sexual Exploitation: Casey Report · Hansard source

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  I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement that those who are convicted of such crimes will not be able to take part in the asylum system, and I suggest that she may want to extend that to all crimes against the person. The question that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch) asked was this: will the Home Secretary ensure that no fallacious human rights claims can be made that mean that these people cannot be deported if convicted of these crimes?

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I do not disagree that drugs are used for different things; that is not the thrust of the argument that I am making. What I am saying—relatively clearly, I hope—is that when the drugs we would potentially use in these situations have been used, there have been unintended consequences and side effects. We must ensure that the drugs we use, if the Bill passes, are absolutely effective in what they are intended to carry out: namely, the end of the life of the individual.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Can I just finish this point? During the 27 years that the law in Oregon has been in place, data is available for only about 36% of cases. However, within that, 59 incidents of regurgitation are known to have occurred and nine people are known to have regained consciousness. Different drug protocols have been used in those 27 years but the efficacy and safety of the drugs are unknown, with a time range between ingesting the drugs and death ranging from one minute to nearly six days. The lack of defined protocols for the regulation, supply and administration of life-ending substances is precisely why I have tabled my amendment (c) to new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater).

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  My right hon. Friend is entirely correct. The Royal College of Physicians has said: “Medicines prescribed and administered in assisted dying must be regulated for safety and efficacy for this use.” If that is a requirement of the Royal College of Physicians, we in the House should take it seriously and put it into the Bill. I will now draw my remarks to a close, but I should say that I also support amendment 99, which would require a report on the drug’s effects before Parliament approves the regulation, as well as a number of the other amendments, which hopefully would remove the wide-ranging Henry VIII powers currently in the Bill. In the light of all that I have said, I remain deeply sceptical as to whether the Bill, in its current state, provides the robust, protective and operationally sound framework that such a profound societal change deserves.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  This is the last intervention that I will take, as I must make progress.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree. Some of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) may address that.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I obviously respect the hon. Gentleman, given his medical background, but as far as I am aware those substances have not yet been used for murdering people, which is what we are going to do here. That leads me neatly on—

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make a little progress before taking another intervention. No safeguards can prevent complications from taking medicines. As I am sure the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley) knows, there can always be complications. In this case, those could include regurgitation of the drugs, regaining consciousness and seizures.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am conscious of those comments and will try to limit my remarks to new clause 13 and some of the amendments to it. The Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Pathologists, the Association for Palliative Medicine and the British Geriatrics Society have all said that there are problems with this Bill, and I have heard nothing from its sponsor, the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater)—despite trying to intervene on her a number of times—about what she has done to ensure that their concerns have been addressed. This brings us directly to a fundamental concern: namely, the means by which assisted death would be carried out under new clause 13. The impact assessment for the Bill recognises that “The safety and efficacy of those substances used for assisted dying is currently difficult to assess”.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make a little progress, but I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of medical devices designed to induce death by the administration of gas, such as the Sarco suicide pod, which has been in the press recently. That device bypasses medical oversight entirely and presents an ethical rupture in our current framework. If the Bill proceeds without safeguarding against such methods, we risk opening the door to a deeply troubling precedent—one that would erode professional accountability and compromise the integrity of end-of-life care.

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Lady give way?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause is a necessary reset— [ Interruption. ] Goodness, what a background noise! If only I had such a response to everything I said. The clause is rooted in the central recommendation of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, that the criteria for detention are too broad and being applied too inconsistently. Too often we hear stories of people being detained not because they pose a real and present danger, but because services are stretched, community alternatives are not available, or there is simply a lack of clarity on when detention is justified. This clause is necessarily corrective. It raises the bar by introducing a clear and structured risk threshold that requires the possibility of serious harm to health or safety, rather than vague concerns or subjective impressions. The inclusion of terms such as “likelihood” and the focus on actual risk mark a clear move towards the evidence-based practice that we want to see and away from overreach. For me, the key strengths of the clause include, first, a higher threshold for detention. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, detention for assessment is permitted only if serious harm may occur. That means that professionals must assess the nature and the degree of harm, as well as the likelihood, injecting rigour and proportionality into decision making. The clause also clarifies the treatment criteria. Under section 3 of the Act, detention for treatment is allowed only if serious harm may occur without it and if treatment is necessary, and, crucially, it must be available. That prevents people from being detained without any therapeutic benefit, a concern that has long plagued the system. The clause also aligns measures across the Mental Health Act: the new threshold applies not only to the initial decision to detain, but to emergency detentions and renewals. That brings consistency and coherence across the different parts of the legislation. The final key point among the strengths of the clause is the definition of the authorised person, which is vital. It ensures that those tasked with detention powers are properly trained and equipped to deal with the complex and often volatile realities of mental health crises. Whether a doctor, an approved mental health professional or a specially trained nurse, the provision ensures that detention is exercised by someone with relevant expertise, not by default by the police. Taken together, the changes significantly strengthen the legal framework around detention, reduce the risk of misuse and reaffirm the principle of least restriction, the idea that coercive care should be used only when no other alternative exists. The problems I have with Government amendments 26 to 29 are as follows. The Minister proposes to delete references to “a constable or other authorised person” from the clause. On the surface, that may appear to be technical, but in fact I think it is a profound and problematic shift. The amendments would weaken the very safeguards that the clause is trying to strengthen. We must be careful about how we frame this. The amendments risk undoing the clarity and purpose of the clause by making it ambiguous who can lawfully detain someone under the Mental Health Act. Instead of defining the responsibility clearly and ensuring that it is held by trained professionals, the amendments will strip the clause back to vague flexibility, with no guarantee that the right expertise is present in real-time decisions. The power to detain and to move individuals to a place of safety, in particular under sections 135 and 136 of the Act, is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. These provisions, while designed to protect the public, can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crises, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others. Furthermore, the clause as passed by the House of Lords would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise, while also reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police-led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensure that individuals are supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care, and maintain police involvement only where there is a clear and present risk to safety. In doing so, it would significantly strengthen the system and place mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement. Let me set out the key problems with Government amendments 26 to 29. First, I think that they will blur the lines of responsibility. The clause rightly states that detention must be carried out by a constable or other authorised person, namely someone who has been designated and trained to carry out this high-stakes task. The Government amendments will remove that requirement. In doing so, they risk creating confusion on the ground about who is permitted to act. In a moment of crisis, ambiguity costs time, and time costs lives.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested in the hon. Member’s argument, but it seems to be entirely the opposite of the one he made when he intervened on me on Second Reading. He said then: “Sections 135 and 136 of the current Mental Health Act give the police the power to break into someone’s property or detain somebody in a public place where there is the possibility of the involvement of weapons. Does the hon. Member think that health professionals would be able to manage those kinds of situations? Would the police not be the best people to deal with those situations?” —[ Official Report , 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 815.] In that intervention, the hon. Member was pressing for police involvement; now, he seems to be arguing that he wants to take the police out of these settings. I am a little confused by his stance.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a clear point, but I want to add that there are clearly places and situations in which non-police professionals, such as mental health professionals, deal with extremely dangerous and violent patients. They are appropriately trained to do so. It is not in isolation that non-police public professionals are dealing with dangerous people. It is about the right situation, the right place and the right training.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross-governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I confess that I do not entirely follow the hon. Lady’s argument. My understanding is that the people she has listed—for example, hospital security staff—are not covered at the moment, so I do not think that that is the case. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, there are situations, in a number of settings, in which mental health professionals act in the capacity of restraining. With the correct and appropriate training, which is what I think all Opposition Members want, I do not think that the issue that the hon. Member for Thurrock is raising would necessarily arise. Having said that, if she really feels that the wording needs to be tweaked, I look forward to seeing and potentially supporting her amendment to the subsection, and I hope she tables it. The second key problem is the risk of returning the burden to police officers. We have heard from Members on both sides of the House in the debate, and from police forces up and down the country for years, that the police do not have the expertise, training or capacity to be the first responders to mental health emergencies. Clause 5 finally reflects that reality, helping to move the response from law enforcement to healthcare. The Government amendments would muddy that distinction. They would result in the police once again becoming the default responders—not because it is right but because it is unclear who else is meant to act. Thirdly, the amendments introduce legal and safe-guarding risks. Without a clear definition of who can detain, one risks inconsistency, poor practice and potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty. The amendments offer no alternative safeguards—just the deletion of the existing ones. That is not reform; it is abdication of responsibility. Finally, they undermine the spirit of the Bill. The Bill aims to modernise mental health legislation by making it more humane and effective, and more rooted in health than enforcement. The amendments point in the opposite direction. They strip away clarity, increase reliance on the police and risk compounding trauma for those already in crisis. It is not just about legislative precision; it is about protecting people. When someone is in acute mental health crisis, they are at their most vulnerable. Turning up with police officers, sirens and handcuffs does not calm the situation; it escalates it. It creates trauma, damages trust and can lead to long-term disengagement from mental health services. Clause 5 offers us a path out of that pattern. It allows approved professionals—such as paramedics, mental health nurses and crisis practitioners —to intervene early, with care and dignity. It does not exclude the police, where there is a genuine risk to safety, but it rightly repositions them as the last resort, not the first response. The Government amendments may be well intentioned, but they threaten to unravel that balance. We cannot allow vague flexibility to become a smokescreen for inadequate planning or under-resourced services. If the Minister pushes his amendments to a vote, and, as the parliamentary maths suggests they will, those amendments pass, what will he do to sort out the problem that we, on both sides of the House, have talked about today? He is currently planning to keep the status quo, which we all seem to agree is not appropriate. At least we and our noble Friends in the other place have attempted to improve the situation. What will he and his Department do? The clause is part of a broader rethinking of how we response to mental health need. It supports community-based care. It pushes for better training. It honours patient autonomy and it places the right people—clinicians, not constables—at the centre of care delivery. We all want a system where people in distress are met with compassion, not criminalisation. Clause 5 helps us to get there. The Government’s amendments drag us backwards. Clause 5 is one of the most thoughtful and necessary parts of the Bill. It raises standards, reduces harm and finally begins to close the gap between what the Mental Health Act allows and what good mental health care demands.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, Mr Vickers. I should say it was the Liberal Democrats who pointed it out to me; I do not want to take the credit from them.