Graeme Downie MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  After holding a series of stakeholder events with local businesses and charities and an online survey attracting more than 1,000 responses, I have recently published the results of a city centre survey for Dunfermline. That survey highlighted that people are very proud to live in Scotland’s newest city and ancient capital, but that improvements are needed in the city centre itself to improve aesthetics and attract new businesses. Does the Leader of the House agree that the people of Dunfermline deserve to see improvements in their city centre, and will he help me deliver that for my constituents?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Steel Tariffs: Northern Ireland · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his work and engagement on this issue over the last few weeks and months. I have been contacted by a range of defence and aerospace companies both in my constituency and across the UK—including some with a footprint in Northern Ireland—that are concerned that some of the quotas and exclusions do not take into account some of the relevant codes suggested by industry, which could lead to increased costs, project delays and threats to jobs in the future. Will he assure me that he will meet the industry again to discuss the codes that it feels are outstanding? Will he or his officials meet me to discuss this issue in more detail?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  That is not something I want to be drawn on in the Chamber. I have not seen the news report, and I believe that the answer to that question would have to come from the Government. As well as making sure that we are speaking to the public about the things that matter to them, we must broaden out the conversation. When we talk about national security and defence readiness, we are not only referring to Ministry of Defence budgets; we should also be talking about what it means for energy security, food security and everything else that makes our country safe—from economic security to delivering the skills and apprenticeships that we need for the future. We must engage the public on why this subject matters to them. If we say that we must spend more on protecting our North sea or national grid infrastructure, we must also say that if we do not, it will put up household energy bills by even more and cause blackouts—those are the consequences. When it comes to, say, energy infrastructure, we must always be clear that some things cost money. If we want a more energy-secure, resilient nation, people will be asked to pay more, in one way or another. That is the nature of defending our nation properly and effectively. I am very proud of the steps that this Government have taken to prepare our armed forces for the future, having been left a hollowed-out armed forces when they took over. The Conservatives have talked about parties across the House not spending on defence since the end of the cold war, and to a point I agree with what they are saying, but the threats were there in 2014 and beyond, and there was no mass drive from any party in government to increase in defence spending. The warning signs were there already. It is this Government who have had to pick up the mantle, move forward and make the kind of changes that we need. We have awarded 1,400 major defence contracts since July 2024. In Scotland, we have a £10 billion frigate deal with Norway that will secure jobs on the Clyde. We have been pressing for the £8 billion Typhoon deal with Turkey, and for the upgrading of Typhoon jets. We must look after our people as well, so I am very proud that this Government are updating recruitment policies, and making sure that we have better recruitment and retention. As the Minister mentioned, recruitment is up and pay is increasing. We are turning around the decade of decline under the Conservatives; there has been a cumulative pay award of 10.5% since July 2024—the largest on record—and new recruits are receiving a pay boost of 35%.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), who is both gracious with his time and entertaining to listen to. I thank him for that. I begin by thanking all armed forces personnel who are protecting our country at the moment. Importantly, this debate is taking place in Armed Forces Week; I give credit to the Opposition—this once at least—for bringing forward this debate today, though I am not sure that we have quite reached the level of consensus across the House that we might hope for on defence.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  I was slightly concerned that I was going to have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman at this early stage, but I absolutely agree with him. Any politician who wraps themselves in a flag, without there being any substance to their reason for doing so, is not worthy of leading any constituency or party—and certainly not any country. As I have mentioned previously in the House, I grew up in Berlin from 1987 to 1990, and I was there when the Berlin wall came down. That gives me an unusual insight for someone of my age. I grew up hearing Russian artillery one mile away, and seeing Russian helicopters testing and firing. I was there when Rudolf Hess died, and I saw the various security measures in place. That makes me unusual among people who are my age or younger, most of whom have not seen what a cold war threat is. Most have been used to a safe world, and have not seen the necessity of increased defence spending, unless they have a member of the armed forces in their family, or have served in the armed forces themselves. The majority of people in this country who are my age or younger do not know what a threat from Russia, or indeed any other country, looks like. I have said before that I believe that the UK is already in a conflict with Russia. Not only that, but we are a frontline nation and should always consider ourselves as such, whether we are talking about our RAF jets taking off from Lossiemouth or Coningsby to defend our airspace, or our Royal Navy ships and Royal Air Force aircraft in the High North protecting our subsea cables from Russian threats. This country is in conflict with Russia, and Russia considers itself to be in conflict with us. We must always respond accordingly. The attacks extend into cyber-space. Every day we see thousands of attacks, whether on private businesses or on our defence and energy infrastructure. The threats are there. We also see misinformation peddled online that seeks to undermine our democracy. This country is in conflict with Russia. In order to respond effectively to that, the public need to understand the direct implications for them. They must recognise that a cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover has consequences for our economy. A cyber-attack on Marks & Spencer has consequences for people’s ability to buy a jumper, and for the staff working there as well, but these attacks also have a direct impact on our economy and society every single day. It is always slightly daunting to be in the Chamber for debates like these—there are Members present who have served in the military, and who know far more than I do—but I believe that there is a conversation that we must have across this House. We must, wherever possible, draw lines between the threats that we face, and the detailed military programmes that we talk about, and what they mean for the day-to-day lives of people in this country. Otherwise, those people will not grant any Government the licence to increase defence spending and capability in the way that Members from across this House want.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman always picks out the issues that really matter to our people. The Ministry of Defence’s Op Courage does exactly the kind of work that he is talking about. I am sure that Members from across the House see correspondence on that in their constituency mailbag all the time. We must make sure that we are properly protecting our veterans. Not only is it important because of our responsibility to them, but it is how we ensure that we have effective recruitment and retention in the future. We must be a nation that looks after our serving soldiers. I have mentioned that I believe we are already in a conflict with Russia. I praise the focus of, and work done by, the previous Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), on the joint expeditionary force in the High North. We are a frontline nation, and our frontline is in the North sea—the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. We need to tackle the threats we face there. We have a partnership with Norway on the Type 26 frigates; that is exactly the type of capability that we must focus on, as well as focusing on the other work done with joint expeditionary force nations. I want to ensure that the debate about defence in the House, and about budgets, does not become focused solely on a number. We must not think that just because we have hit a particular number by a particular date, our country is safe. It is not. The country is safe when we have the right capabilities in each domain to fight against the threats that we face, be it in the air, on land, at sea, in cyber-space or in any other domain. In our discussions, we must focus on capability. If we have the correct capabilities to defend our nation, we will have spent the amount of money we should spend to defend our nation. I believe that amount is higher than what we are spending at the moment, but the discussion must stay on capability, and should not be about spending money for its own sake. The Government are doing a good job on defence procurement, and on turning issues over to ensure that is not the case, but I urge hon. Members from across the House to please keep that point in mind when we discuss defence spending. When it comes to defence spending, I hope that we will continue to focus on consensus, where possible, and protecting our nation. I end by again thanking those serving in the armed forces, and all those veterans who served in the past.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I would be more than happy to work with the Government on something that will provide specific protections against cellular internet-of-things modules. What assessment has he made of the specific threat of internet-of-things modules, and what protections are there against that in the legislation?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way on that point?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  As ever, my hon. Friend is correct. How many of us have had some bit of technology break because the firmware is no longer allowed to be updated, meaning that something no longer works, it is no longer supported and it breaks down immediately? To add to that, by its nature, something that is not regularly updated becomes more vulnerable to attack by hackers. They may not be state sponsored, but they may take advantage of a weaker part of a technology. That was pointed out to me on a recent visit to Taiwan. Its semiconductor industry is incredibly strong, but it builds the more high-tech elements of semiconductors. I was told that it would not bother to commit to manufacturing other types of technology because they were too cheap and simple to make and could be mass produced. On that note, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests about the trip to Taiwan. I did not intend to raise it during my speech, but there was an opportunity to do so. The third element of risk is data extraction, as was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Under the Chinese national intelligence law, companies and organisations are legally required to assist state intelligence agencies and to hand over data upon request, creating a systemic risk in the UK that any data accessible through a cellular internet-of-things module could ultimately be accessible to the Chinese state. Modern vehicles, especially electric and autonomous vehicles, are effectively computers on wheels, continuously collecting data on drivers, surroundings and infrastructure. The US Select Committee on China recently warned that Chinese EVs are “rolling data collection devices” and argued that restricting Chinese-made components is a national security imperative. The US Department of Commerce has now moved to limit the deployment of software and communications equipment sourced from adversary Governments in connected vehicles. Those who are worried about China’s reaction to such measures should be aware that it has already taken precisely these steps against the west. Tesla cars have been banned not just from entering Chinese defence, bases but from various Government agencies and authorities. In the meeting mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), I was concerned that there was a suggestion by one of the officials that there was no need to concern ourselves about the threat of Chinese internet-of-things modules because the threat was merely “theoretical”. As I and others have shown today, these examples are not just theoretical. Frankly, most threats are theoretical until they are not theoretical. This is happening now across critical sectors and national infrastructure. Other countries, such as the US, Australia and those in the EU, are all moving to toughen up their legislation specifically on cellular internet-of-things modules, and I believe that the UK must take action as well. My amendments would ensure that the Bill explicitly covers these risks and gives Ministers the clarity and authority to act when necessary. If this Bill is to truly strengthen the UK’s cyber-resilience, it must not leave one of the most serious threats to our modern and increasingly digital world outside its scope. I ask the Government to work with me to address the threat of cellular IOT modules.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  That proves why we need more awareness of the threat that we face. It is not necessarily a case of banning certain components or technologies, but we must be more aware and ensure that the Government have the powers they need to respond where possible.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I refer Members to my registered interest as parliamentary chair of the Campaign for Secure Technology, which I thank for its work in preparing my two amendments as well as my speech. I echo the comments of my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) about the scale of the threat that we face from cyber-attack. We must ensure that we are having that national conversation about the nature of the threats we face, and who those threats come from. In many ways, this country is already in conflict with Russia, and in more than what we could call competition with China—something that the public are not fully aware of. We must do more to ensure that they are fully aware of that threat, and that they hold our feet, and those of the Government, to the fire, and ensure that we are taking the kinds of measures in this Bill, and beyond, that we need to protect our economy, our military and our democracy more widely. I will limit my remarks to amendments 4 and 5, which I tabled. It is always difficult to speak at this point in a debate, because people with far more experience and knowledge than me have said a lot of the things that I was planning to say, and have done so with far more eloquence and knowledge than I have. Amendments 4 and 5 seek to deal with part of our digital infrastructure that is almost entirely invisible to the public and rarely discussed in Parliament—other than this afternoon—yet is essential to our national security: cellular internet-of-things modules. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) described, cellular IOT modules are small electronic components, about the size of a credit card, and they allow a device to connect to the internet over a mobile network. They sit inside everything from smart meters, CCTV cameras and traffic lights to industrial sensors, medical devices and parts of our energy grid. They are the connective tissue of our modern digital economy, and we all rely on them every day. Despite their importance, however, very little is known publicly about what they do and the potential harm that they could cause. Today, more than 70% of all cellular IOT modules used globally are manufactured in China, and that dominance creates strategic vulnerabilities that the Bill must address. Amendments 4 and 5 would ensure that the Bill covers the risks created by embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK. Amendment 4 would ensure that the Secretary of State can treat the provenance of those components as a cyber-security risk, and amendment 5 would allow Ministers to require operators of critical systems to identify and mitigate those risks. In short, the amendments would give the Government clear authority to act where foreign-made modules create known vulnerabilities. Why is that necessary? Because the modules present three major security threats. The first is dependency. When one country controls the overwhelming supply of a critical technology, that is by its nature a structural risk. If supply is disrupted, whether for geopolitical leverage or commercial pressure, our energy systems, transport networks and emergency services could be left without essential replacement parts. We have already seen that threat with Huawei and our 5G network—a mistake we must not repeat. The second reason is disruption—as colleagues have said, that is increasingly referred to as the “kill switch”. Internet-of-things cellular modules contain firmware that can be updated remotely. If a manufacturer is subject to state influence—and in China we know that they are—it could insert a kill switch or back door that allows it to disable devices at scale and at will. It could push out malicious updates, insert malware or remotely disable devices. That could mean vehicles being turned off, cranes and industrial machinery being halted mid-operation, or financial terminals suddenly going offline. We could even see disruption to areas such as NHS refrigeration, affecting drugs and blood supply. The concern with that type of module is that it might not happen overnight or be something we immediately see. It could be hidden for a number of weeks or months in different technologies and across different parts of our economy, and it would be incredibly difficult—nigh on impossible—to prove exactly what had happened and who had done it, and to tie it to any one state actor with certainty. It is certainly not something that could be done quickly, allowing for a full response. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said earlier, there are a number of examples of that from around the world. Perhaps the best known was when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and tried to steal more than two dozen John Deere tractors and ship them to Chechnya. The US company intervened to switch them off. It remotely locked the thieves out of the equipment, rendering the tractors useless. That is the kind of action we could see China take in the event of a future crisis. Closer to home, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington mentioned that Norway tested two of its Chinese-designed electric buses, one manufactured in the Netherlands and one built in China, to discover exactly the same kill switch technology.

• 4 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T2. Farmers in my constituency are concerned about tariff suspensions and the Government’s need to strike a balance between quite rightly reducing costs, and protecting and actively encouraging domestic production capacity. What discussions is the Minister having with Treasury Ministers about the principles and direction of travel of future tariff suspensions to ensure that domestic production is not harmed, but is in fact encouraged?

• 4 Jun 2026 · National Farmers’ Union of Scotland · Hansard source

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  Given that many of the key pressures facing farmers in Scotland, such as food security, input costs and trade policy, are determined on a UK-wide basis, will my right hon. Friend commit to continuing that contact and to regular, structured and direct engagement with NFU Scotland, as well as other devolved unions, to ensure that their expertise and the distinct needs of Scottish agriculture are properly reflected in UK decision making?

• 4 Jun 2026 · National Farmers’ Union of Scotland · Hansard source

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  11. When she last met the National Farmers’ Union of Scotland.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I absolutely agree. We need to make sure that we are preparing clear information about the risks that we face, what a climate emergency means in reality, and how communities can help respond to that fully and effectively. We also need to make sure that we are providing practical guidance for individuals and communities, as well as a shared understanding of what resilience is.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I agree with my hon. Friend. We have discussed that issue many times, both in the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee and outside. The need for collective action is required and we must make sure the public are a key part of that. They must understand why certain crises are happening. Sometimes they are outwith Government control; we are affected by what happens in the world and we must make sure that we are bringing them along in that conversation.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I thank everyone for participating in the debate this afternoon, in which we heard the different range of threats that the UK is undoubtedly facing. I urge the Minister to continue to work across Government wherever possible, particularly on the threats to energy infrastructure, subsea cables and other items that were brought up by Members. We must ensure that such work is co-ordinated through Government, and that the public are fully aware of the level of threat that we face. I thank the Minister for his response. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered preparedness for national emergencies.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I am about to go on to that point; I will mention the need for resilience to be across Departments and involve the public. The impact of these events is often not immediately dramatic but gradual, cumulative and enduring. One crisis flows into another, as I am sure Ministers feel every day. We must think of preparedness as being not just for an event but for a different type of world altogether. In that context, I refer to article 3 of the North Atlantic treaty, which is often overlooked but is highly relevant. It puts a duty on nations to maintain and develop their capacity to resist attack through continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. Article 3 refers to an armed attack, but I believe that in the unstable world we live in we should read that in the broadest possible terms. Attacks no longer happen instantaneously, as they did when NATO was created, and neither do they come just from other states.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I could not agree more. A lot of planning had gone into severe weather events in Fife over the years, but it had never been tested. A lot of it was out of date, and staff had moved on. For example, in High Valleyfield, a former coal-mining village, there was an almost 10-year-old resilience plan that said that the local community centre would be opened. The community knew about the plan, but the council had totally forgotten about it. They did not even know who had the keys for the community centre, so the community figured it out for themselves. Broader lessons were also highlighted during that event, such as vulnerable customer data not being shared, confusion about support for care homes, a lack of generators, limited logistical capacity to deploy that provision, and access to temporary accommodation. Those are very practical failings, but they had very real consequences. The challenges we face now are broad and evolving—cyber-attacks, infrastructure sabotage, supply chain disruption, hybrid threats from hostile states, climate-related events and health and bio-security emergencies.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I absolutely agree; that is a point I will come to later. We must engage with the public if we want their permission to plan for resilience. Article 3 tells us that preparedness must be constant and not confined to defence Departments. It must be collective, but it requires active participation across the system. I would be grateful if the Minister picked up on how resilience is being embedded across Departments in the areas of threat highlighted by the national security strategy.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely correct: we need to ensure that we are preparing for all these eventualities, regardless of what causes them—I believe that individual case was caused by one driver shortage. The need to plan and have contingencies in place is vital.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  As ever, I agree with the hon. Gentleman—I always agree with his interventions, particularly when they are made so well. There is a need to make sure that we break outside of the M25, frankly, when we talk about resilience. We also need to look seriously at the resilience of our critical national infrastructure. What is striking about many of the risks we now face is that they do not require a full-scale conflict. They can arise from hybrid threats, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South (Gordon McKee) mentioned: those are much below the threshold of war but are capable of causing real and widespread disruption. In a recent discussion with senior officials about the threat of Chinese-manufactured cellular internet of things modules, in my role as chair of the Coalition on Secure Technology, it was suggested to me that because the threat from such modules was theoretical—even though it was acknowledged that it was clearly feasible and would have a significant impact—there might be no need to prepare for it. Most risks are theoretical until they are very real, and the public then wonder why we were not prepared. I ask the Minister to specifically say what conversations he is having about the threat of cellular modules to the UK. Which Departments have been involved in those discussions? I move on to our energy system—a key and particularly sensitive part of our infrastructure. We have seen how Vladimir Putin has used energy as a weapon against ordinary Ukrainian people, and he would be more than willing to do the same to British people as well. Without reliable energy, hospitals cannot function, communication systems begin to fail and supply chains break down. The Energy Security and Net Zero Committee, which I am a member of, will hold an evidence session on this very topic tomorrow. I have raised the issue with Defence Ministers before, but I believe that there are areas where we lack clarity on the legal position when it comes to hybrid attacks on our offshore infrastructure. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on what role the Cabinet Office can play in resolving that, as there seems to be an unclear boundary between the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the Ministry of Defence in particular. I turn to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford about the importance of the devolved Administrations. Emergencies are experienced locally, as I highlighted at the beginning—they are managed locally, and resilience must be built locally. Too often, the UK’s national security infrastructure can feel as though it is concentrated within the M25 and shaped in central Government rather than fully embedded across all parts of the United Kingdom. I do not believe that that is intended, but it does create a risk: if preparedness is genuinely to be a whole-of-society effort, it must extend beyond Whitehall. In those areas, security, advice and expertise do not always flow consistently to devolved Administrations and local partners. At the same time, those Administrations do not deal with national security issues with the same regularity as central Government. That creates a potential blind spot—due not to a lack of commitment, but the structure of the system. It is exactly the kind of gap that hostile actors could seek to exploit. I hope the Minister will address what more can be done to ensure that security advice and capability are fully embedded across the devolved Administrations and local authorities, and how we can ensure resilience is genuinely UK-wide, rather than only inside central Government. Finally, I turn to a topic that is becoming a bit of a hobby horse of mine: the requirement to trust the public when we are developing our national security and resilience. Preparedness cannot be delivered by the Government alone; it must involve the public.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I am sorry to hear that the hon. Lady’s constituents are having that issue; that is terrible. Again, it is why we must make sure that we are preparing for all different types of resilience. That must be at the forefront of the minds of the public and different levels of Government when we consider the different challenges that we face, whether internal or external and whether beyond our control or very much within our control, as it sounds that example was. The national security strategy tells us that the assumptions underpinning UK security are being challenged to an unprecedented degree. We must not hide from the public the scale or nature of the threats that we face. We must trust people with information that we might previously have chosen to withhold and we should worry less about causing alarm and more about appearing to hide the truth. If the public do not feel and understand that, they will not support and force us to carry out the investment and actions required to address the challenges. Any Government who have not undertaken that work with the public at its heart will have very large political price to pay. I have not even had time in this speech to touch on the threat to the public and the need to prepare for ongoing misinformation. If we lose trust with the public, resilience will be weakened. Preparedness for national emergencies is not a single policy or programme; it is a system—more than that, it is a mindset. When the next crisis comes, and it will, the question will not be whether plans existed on paper. It will be whether, on the ground, the Government did enough to prepare and make sure that our communities were ready.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered preparedness for national emergencies. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker, and I am grateful to colleagues for coming to this important debate. As the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has set out, the assumptions underpinning UK security are being challenged to an unprecedented degree in what it describes as “an era of radical uncertainty”. This is not a distant or theoretical challenge; it is happening now, and it is shaping the lives of our constituents already. We are rightly beginning to recognise that resilience at home—across our infrastructure, our communities and our economy—is vital. In opening this debate, I want to do four things: reflect on a recent example of where preparedness fell short; set out the changing nature of the threats we face; address the need for stronger co-ordination across Government; and reflect on the role of the public. During Storm Éowyn in January 2025, thousands of homes across my constituency lost power, many for several days. That came during a period of cold weather, leaving people without heating, electricity and, in some cases, access to essential medical equipment. People did not know where to turn, but they were receiving inconsistent information and had very little clarity on when the situation would improve. What stood out to me was not a lack of commitment, as energy companies, emergency services, local authorities and community organisations worked tirelessly. What it showed was that when the system came under real strain, the weaknesses were clear. Preparedness cannot be about having plans on paper; it must be about whether those plans work when they are actually needed.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Deep Geothermal Energy · Hansard source

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  West Fife has huge potential for geothermal. In particular, the Comrie colliery development, at a former mining site, is now being regenerated to create leisure facilities, housing and other mixed-use development. It has been exploring the possibility of using deep geothermal from the former mine. Will the Minister meet me to discuss this in more detail, and perhaps come to visit the site to see its huge potential?