Georgia Gould MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Apr 2025 · Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that His Majesty will appoint Paula Sussex CBE to the offices of Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman has an important role in holding public service providers to account and achieving justice for complainants. I thank Rebecca Hilsenrath KC, who stepped in as acting ombudsman following Sir Rob Behrens’s departure. She provided leadership and stability for the PHSO, ensuring a continued focus on the experience of its service users, while considering how to maximise the impact of the organisation in improving public services for the long term. On behalf of this House, I praise her for her hard work over the past 12 months, and wish her all the best for her future as the PHSO’s chief executive officer. Following the formation of a new Parliament, the process of recruiting a new ombudsman was relaunched in January. I thank the House and the recruitment panel, particularly the chair, Liam Laurence Smyth, for their speed in conducting the recruitment; they made a recommendation to the Prime Minister in March. The Government support Paula Sussex’s appointment to the role, as we believe that she has the ability and experience to lead the PHSO, bringing insights from her time in the public and private sectors. In accordance with section 1 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, and section 1 of the Health Service Commissioners Act 1993, I commend Paula Sussex to the House for the role of Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Health Service Commissioner for England · Hansard source

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  I will respond briefly to echo the thanks to the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) for his role on the panel, which was critical. It is important that this role has cross-party support and that this appointment has the confidence of the House, to ensure that this important role can be fulfilled with rigour and independence, that our citizens always have a voice in public services and that public service providers are accountable to Parliament. I recommend this appointment to the House. Question put and agreed to.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for raising the critical issue of whistleblowing. I assure her of how seriously the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions—my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston—myself, and both Secretaries of State take the issue of whistleblowing. I hope, as I set out our responses to the NAO report and our wider work, to offer the reassurance that the Opposition are looking for. When it comes to internal and external fraud against the public sector, Government Departments are responsible for their own whistleblowing arrangements and for overseeing arrangements in their arm’s length bodies. For example, the Department for Business and Trade publishes and regularly updates its guidance, “Whistleblowing: list of prescribed people and bodies”, which details who individuals can raise a concern with. The list comprises bodies and individuals to whom making a disclosure qualifies the individual who makes the disclosure for legal protections under the Employment Rights Act 1996—for instance, protection against being dismissed by their employer for the disclosure. Whistleblowers can report concerns about public sector fraud to bodies such as the NAO’s Comptroller and Auditor General, the director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Auditors General for Wales and for Scotland, the NHS Counter Fraud Authority and various other bodies listed on gov.uk. The NAO report that the hon. Lady referred to set out that between 2019 and 2022 fraud one of the most common concerns raised—I think it accounted for 40% of concerns. On the review of the existing processes, the key findings of the recent NAO publication related to the need to increase awareness of the channels for whistleblowing, to improve the experience of whistleblowers and to ensure that lessons are learned, as the hon. Lady set out. In the light of the NAO report, and with the intention of opening up as many avenues as possible for the reporting of public sector fraud, the PSFA will explore with the Department for Business and Trade whether it would be appropriate to add the PSFA to the list of prescribed organisations. That would go alongside the existing ability to raise fraud within a public sector body or Department. We will also use the findings of the report, as well as the NAO’s good practice guide to whistleblowing in the civil service, to inform our approach. The DWP has established processes by which members of the public and staff can report suspected benefit fraud. Members of the public can report fraud online at gov.uk, by phone or by post, while DWP staff follow clear internal guidance and processes. Given the intent to maintain the focus of this legislation, the recent work by the National Audit Office, the existing DWP processes and the steps the PSFA is taking to continue to improve the whistleblowing offer for public sector fraud, I will resist new clause 16.

• 18 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is the final group of clauses that the Committee will consider. I give massive thanks to the Committee for our constructive dialogue, which I am sure will continue—I look forward to a long afternoon and Thursday discussing these final clauses. Clause 99 covers how the Bill will be applied and limited by setting out the retrospective effect of the new powers, and makes some technical amendments to the Limitation Act 1980. There is a significant policy change in the clause, which is the extension of the existing six-year limit for civil claims relating to covid frauds. I think the Committee will agree that is critical. Although the application and limitation of the clause covers the whole Bill, and the powers can be used on existing cases, retrospective effect does not apply for clauses 96 and 97, which relate to non-benefit payment administrative penalties. Subsection (3) of clause 99 sets out that the time-limit change applies to amounts that an England and Wales public authority is entitled to claim from a person as a result of a fraud the person carried out. Subsection (5) clarifies what is meant by an England and Wales public authority, and explains that Scottish and Welsh devolved authorities are not included. Subsection (7) makes technical amendments to section 38(11) of the Limitation Act 1980. Clause 100 enables the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to ensure that the Bill works alongside all existing legislation. As is usual for Bills that may have provisions consequential for other Acts of Parliament, the power allows the Secretary of State and the Minister to amend other legislation to ensure that the Bill works effectively with existing Acts of Parliament. Clause 101 recognises that the Bill requires a money resolution, primarily because it confers new functions on the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Department for Work and Pensions. Clause 102 sets out the Bill’s territorial extent, while annex A in the accompanying explanatory notes provides a full breakdown of the territorial extent and application of its measures. The provisions in part 1 apply to England and Wales. Legislative consent is required for Wales for some parts of the part 1 provisions. The provisions in part 2 apply to England, Wales and Scotland in relation to reserved matters. As the Committee is aware, the UK Government do not generally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant devolved Governments. We have written to our counterparts in Scotland and Wales, and engagement with both remains ongoing, to seek legislative consent from Wales on the part 1 provisions that interact with Welsh competence and from Scotland on the part 2 provisions that interact with Scottish competence. Clause 103 is required to enable the provisions in the Bill to be implemented. It sets out how the Bill’s provisions will be commenced. Finally, clause 104 is straightforward and confirms that the short title of the Act will be the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025, to summarise the intent of the Bill captured in the long title. Having outlined the main provisions in clauses 99 to 104, I commend them to the Committee.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause is an important part of the Bill because the code of practice will set out how and why civil penalties will be calculated and imposed. This will help to ensure that those powers are used transparently and reasonably. I made a commitment as we went through the previous clauses to go into detail about what will be in the code of practice, which I plan to do now. The code of practice will set clear guidance and standards for authorised officers when using the powers. It will also help the general public to understand how those powers are exercised. To encourage co-operation with our investigations, allowing the PSFA to recover more from fraudsters in the most efficient way possible, it may be appropriate to offer discounted penalties to those who co-operate. We will consult on the code of practice and publish it ahead of the first use of the civil penalty powers to ensure sufficient time for Members to familiarise themselves with the measures. In the spirit of being helpful to the Committee, I want to give as much detail as I can on what the code of practice will contain so that the House has the opportunity to understand it, as well as the other place in due course. This will of course be subject to change if either House amends the Bill. The code of practice will set out the statutory obligation under which it is published, who the intended audience is, and how it should be used. It will set out the rights of anyone who is penalised, which will include appointing legal advisers or other representatives, and how to access legal aid, if entitled to do so. It will set out how the civil penalty system will be overseen by senior officials and set out the roles of the oversight function and the “independent person” under clauses 64 and 65. The code will explain the scope of the power and how individuals, companies and other organisations will be treated. It will also set out the various kinds of penalties in the Bill, and that penalties may be applied to fraud that occurred before the Bill is enacted. It will cover the training that authorised officers will have undertaken before being authorised to issue civil penalties and the standards used by the Government’s counter-fraud profession. The code will inform the public about the investigative process in enough detail to give a fair understanding of how cases will be proven to the civil standard, without giving so much information that it would enable a fraudster to game the system. This will include how cases are referred to the PSFA, how authorised officers will be trained to assess individual vulnerability and how that will be assessed during the initial case assessment. The code will explain how the information powers in the Bill work, how they will be used, the safeguards for their use and how reviews may be requested. It will include how authorised officers will establish a claim, including in court, and how authorised officers will assess whether a case meets the civil burden of proof required to issue a fraud penalty. It will also test that assessment with others, including subject matter experts, specialists and legal advisers. It will explain the decision-making process, including who will make the decision about penalty calculation and imposition. The code will also set out the circumstances in which the PSFA will not apply a penalty, such as where there has been an error rather than fraud. Importantly, it will also make it clear that civil penalties will not be applied as an alternative to criminal prosecution but as a separate response to fraud. The code will set out how fraud penalty levels will be calculated. Penalties will be bespoke to the case they relate to, based on the individual facts. Penalties imposed will be reasonable and proportionate, and the code will set out what that means in practice. Penalty levels will be decided by reference to a variety of factors, based on the circumstances of each case. Those include, but are not limited to: the financial loss to the public authority; the time period and frequency of the offence, whether it is a one-off or a sustained fraud; the harm done to a public authority; the impact of the offence; the offender’s behaviour; whether the offender has acted alone or as part of a group; whether a position of trust held by those committing fraud has been abused. Separately, the code will set out how the penalties in the Bill for non-compliance will work, along with information powers and debt recovery powers, and the safeguards that will be in place. It will set out the criteria by which the PSFA may offer to discount a penalty for fully co-operating and disclosing fraud. It is beneficial to the Government to seek early resolution to investigation and enforcement action, and that kind of discount is used elsewhere to incentivise that. However, the code will also explain that there can be no discount without full co-operation. The code will set out the practical steps of issuing a penalty in accordance with the clauses in the Bill. That will include the issuing of notices of intent; how a person can access their right to make representations on any relevant matters; how penalty decision notices will be issued; and how to access the rights of internal review and of appeal to the tribunals. On that last point, the code will also help a person to understand what a tribunal is and how to appeal. It will not replicate the existing published guidance on the tribunals, which it will instead signpost people to. The code will set out when a penalty becomes payable, how to pay it and what will happen if it is not paid. That will include setting out how the debt recovery powers in the Bill will work, if their use is required, and other potential routes of debt recovery action. Finally, the code will make it clear how the PSFA will process, hold and share data, as set out in the Bill and with reference to the Data Protection Act 2018. The content of the code of practice, as I have set out, will give anyone affected by these powers a clear understanding of what will happen and why, their rights and responsibilities, and how the PSFA will act throughout the process. Having explained that, I commend clause 62 to the Committee.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I echo the shadow Minister and thank him for his constructive line of questioning. It has been helpful to look into this part of the Bill in such detail. As he set out, I hope we will continue to have conversations about a number of areas, not least some of the commitments I made to look at the provision on 28 days in parts of the Bill. I appreciate the support for the provisions in this area. On the process of establishing a statutory body, there is Cabinet Office guidance on the establishment of a public body that looks at a whole range of issues, and protections in the ministerial code require Ministers to maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety. Question put and agreed to. Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 2 agreed to. Clauses 70 and 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned . —(Gerald Jones.)

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will start by talking about clauses 64 and 65, and then I will address the amendment. It is absolutely necessary that there is appropriate independent oversight to ensure the powers in the Bill are used appropriately, and we welcome debate on that. That is why we have introduced the power to appoint an independent person, which might be one person—an independent reviewer—or an organisation such as His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services. They will augment the existing oversight structures laid out elsewhere in the Bill, such as the role of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, set out in clause 9, which will investigate the most serious complaints into the PSFA’s use of entry, search and seizure powers. Clause 64 mandates that an independent person appointed by the Minister undertakes reviews of the use of powers in the Bill. The independent reviewer will conduct reviews to consider whether the exercise of the powers is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance. They will produce a report of their findings for the Minister, including any recommendations they deem appropriate. The Minister is then required to publish the report and lay it before Parliament. That ensures there is both public and parliamentary accountability in the role of the independent person outlined in the Bill. As we state in the explanatory notes, we intend to make the duty imposed by the clause in two ways. First, the Government will commission His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to inspect the PSFA’s use of the new investigative powers, which can include the end-to-end investigative process and decision making. HMICFRS has a long-standing history, going back to 1856, and it independently assesses and reports on the performance of police and fire and rescue services in the UK, as well as other public bodies with investigatory powers, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. HMICFRS reports are already made available publicly, and are an efficient way to hold bodies accountable for their investigative practices. Secondly, the Government are creating a new position for an independent reviewer to whom the PSFA’s oversight team will report. The independent reviewer will assess how the PSFA exercises the powers given to it in the Bill. The independent reviewer will carry out reviews and report on whether the use of the powers is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance, as well as considering areas where HMICFRS or other oversight bodies have not already reported. The independent reviewer could, for instance, consider live case reviews or conduct supplementary reviews between those undertaken by other bodies, or look specifically at how the PSFA has taken forward recommendations from past reviews. The independent chair will have discretion in determining where to focus their resources. We do not believe it is necessary to legislate in the manner proposed by the amendment to ensure parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament will scrutinise the independent person’s report, which the Minister is obliged to lay in Parliament. There is also an established process for agreeing posts that should be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by Select Committees without the need for legislative provision. That process is to reach agreement on posts suitable for pre-appointment scrutiny between my Department and the Chair of the relevant Select Committee. We will be following that process for the appointment of the independent chair. We hope that offers assurance to the hon. Member for Torbay. The appointment of the independent reviewer will also fully comply with the governance code on public appointments which is overseen by the Commissioner of Public Appointments.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause is essential in protecting specific information, preventing potential harm to individuals and upholding ethical standards in situations where unauthorised sharing could cause damage. The clause ensures that the powers adhere to current data protection legislation by safeguarding data from misuse, damage and unauthorised access. It also ensures that a person’s legal professional privilege rights are protected. The clause safeguards an individual’s rights and prevents them from being forced to provide information that could incriminate them. Amendment 3 is necessary to clarify that this power applies to all processing of information, and to provide consistency with clauses 67(1) and (2). It would replace “disclosure, obtaining or use” of information with “processing”. It would create no additional effect and ensures clear comprehension that clause 67(3) applies in relation to all processing of information.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The powers in the Bill are conferred on the Minister, but they will be exercised by officials specifically authorised by the Minister and termed “authorised officers”. The clause is an essential element of the legislation. It sets out the decisions that, if not made by the Minister personally, may be undertaken by an authorised officer only: deciding to give an information notice; deciding to give a recovery notice; deciding to make or vary a direct deduction order; deciding to make or vary a deduction from earnings; deciding to give a notice of intent to impose a civil penalty; and imposing a civil penalty. Furthermore, the clause details some fundamental safeguards on the use of the powers. First, to be appointed as an authorised officer, the individual must be employed in the civil service within the Cabinet Office. That is to ensure strict control over who may use the powers. The clause also defines who may conduct internal reviews, a protection offered widely in the Bill. Any internal reviews must be undertaken by an authorised officer at least one grade senior to the officer involved in the initial decision, or by the Minister. That ensures that officers cannot review their own decisions when challenged for an internal review. Authorised officers form the backbone of the Government’s approach to taking the powers. The officers will need to complete a rigorous bespoke training programme, which will cover all aspects of investigative practice, including the relevant powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for authorised investigators. That will be to the same standard as for other public bodies using the same powers. Only after the training conditions have been met will an individual be put forward to the Minister for authorisation to act as an authorised officer and then may use the powers. Their use of the powers must follow strict processes, guidance and codes of practice. They will be subject to internal and external independent oversight of their use of the powers. The clause is essential, as it provides a statutory gateway for PSFA officials to use the powers under the Bill. Without the clause, the Government’s intention to improve counter-fraud enforcement would either be impractical, or the powers would be given to more individuals than is absolutely required. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause creates potential for the Public Sector Fraud Authority to be established as an arm’s length statutory body, as defined in schedule 2. It contains provision for the establishment, constitution and operational framework of a new statutory body called the Public Sector Fraud Authority. It enables the transfer of the functions conferred on the Minister by the Bill to the new PSFA, and other practicalities. The policy intention is not to commence the provisions for the independent PSFA immediately, but at a later date once a review of the effectiveness of the use of the powers has been undertaken. Providing the ability to establish the PSFA as a statutory body allows for future flexibility in how the Government conduct their counter-fraud activities. However, the decision to establish the PSFA as a new arm’s length body should not be taken lightly, nor should any decision to create a new statutory body. The Government have assessed the case for doing so immediately and decided that it would be disproportionate at this time to do so, but that will be kept under review. The PSFA is running a pilot enforcement function. There are a relatively small number of staff and cases, so we judge that turning the PSFA’s limited enforcement function into an arm’s length body would be disproportionate at this time, given the significant cost and administrative burden involved in the short term. The Government intend to focus instead on ensuring that the powers conveyed in the Bill are bedded in effectively and the oversight is strong, so that the PSFA’s valuable work can benefit immediately from the additional investigative tools and debt recovery powers the Bill enables. The Government will review the position on the PSFA as a statutory body once a suitable amount of time has passed to fully understand the required scope and scale of such a body. Schedule 2 ensures that, at the appropriate juncture, the Government will have the tools needed to create that body. It provides precise detail on constitution, make-up and remuneration of a board. It enables the PSFA to appoint staff. Remuneration, pensions and other payments shall be determined subject to the approval of the Minister. Furthermore, the schedule imparts a duty on the PSFA to exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically. It allows for the PSFA to authorise a member of the PSFA, their staff authorised for that purpose, or a committee or sub-committee to exercise its functions. The independent PSFA must prepare a report on the exercise of its functions for the financial year, to be sent to the Minister. The Minister must lay the reports before Parliament and publish them. The Minister may create appropriate transfer schemes for assets and liabilities to enable the independent PSFA to exercise its functions. The schedule also provides a regulation-making power to transfer the powers conferred by the Bill to the new body. The schedule allows the Minister to amend part 1 of the Bill and other existing enactments amended by part 1. This is to ensure that part 1 of what will be the Act is fit for purpose when the PSFA is established as a statutory body. The Minister may make regulations that enable the Minister to give the PSFA general or specific directions regarding the exercise of its functions. This would allow the Minister to guide the PSFA’s strategic priorities to align with Government priorities, or to direct the PSFA’s future structural changes, for example.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 68 sets out how the powers in part 1 of the Bill variously apply or do not apply to the Crown, to Parliament and to the King and his estates, and in circumstances of grounds of national security. The clause sets important boundaries on the scope of part 1. As such, it is essential that it stands part of the Bill. The clause ensures that the Crown is bound by specific powers and provisions in the Bill. It applies in relation to premises used or held on behalf of the Crown —for example, a building owned by a Government Department—in the same way as any other premises. For instance, an authorised investigator could, if necessary, apply to a court for a warrant to enter, search and seize evidence from Crown premises. However, it does not bind the Crown in respect of some powers, specifically those in clauses 16 to 37, relating to recovery orders and recovery from bank accounts, and chapter 5, relating to civil penalties. If it did, the effect would be the Crown recovering money from itself or imposing a penalty on itself that it would pay to itself, simply moving money within its own accounts. Subsection (4) creates a power for the Minister to certify that it appears appropriate in the interests of national security that the powers of entry conferred by this part should not be exercised on Crown premises specified in the certificate. Authorised investigators could not seek a warrant to enter those premises to search for evidence. This carve-out exists because there are certain Crown premises where searching may compromise national security. It is important that this is respected. In that event, the PSFA would discuss with the relevant Department or agency what alternative approach may be possible. Finally, the clause states that the power of entry conferred by this part cannot be exercised on His Majesty’s private estates or premises occupied for the purposes of either House of Parliament. The King’s private estates are those held by His Majesty as a private person. This does not mean the Crown Estate—the sovereign’s public estates, which are managed by the Crown Estate commissioners on behalf of the Crown. In the incredibly unlikely event that evidence suggested that it was necessary to search the King’s private estates or either House of Parliament, the PSFA would request to be invited by the appropriate authority, which would be the Speaker or the Lord Speaker in the case of this House and the other place, respecting the privileges of Parliament. Clause 70 is the interpretation clause, which sets out the meaning of terms used in part 1. I do not propose to run through the whole list of terms. Many of them are straightforward and refer back to previous clauses we have debated, but some are important to understand the scope of this part or are used in a novel way. I will say a few words about them so that the Committee can understand them in the correct context. The first term is “authorised officer”, which we covered in clause 66. In this part, authorised officer has the meaning given in clause 66, which as we have already seen says that they must be employed in the civil service in the Minister’s Department. This means that other types of public sector workers, such as consultants or contractors, cannot be authorised officers, which is a safeguard on the use of the powers. The clause defines “fraud” as including “the offences in sections 1 and 11 of the Fraud Act 2006…and…the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud.” The Committee will recall that we discussed this in the debate on clauses 1 and 2, and I can repeat the assurances that I gave then. The definition sets the scope of fraud in relation to the core functions of a Minister in clause 1, and it covers the three main fraud offences: fraud by false representation, fraud by failing to disclose information and fraud by abuse of position. It also covers the common-law offence of conspiracy, which requires that two or more individuals dishonestly conspire to commit a fraud against a victim. Together, these give the scope needed to tackle the key forms of public sector fraud. The clause defines “public authority” as “a person with functions of a public nature so far as acting in the exercise of those functions”. This sets out the scope of the Departments, bodies and agencies that the PSFA would be able to work with and on behalf of. The definition is deliberately wide to enable the PSFA to tackle public sector fraud wherever it may arise. It will allow the use of powers to investigate fraud against all central Government Departments and agencies—except HMRC and the DWP, because they already have existing powers—as well as local government and any arm’s length delivery mechanisms that deliver functions of a public nature. The clause defines “suspected fraud” as “conduct which the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect may constitute fraud”. We discussed this definition in the debate on clause 3. Reasonable grounds to suspect is an objective test meaning a belief based on specific evidence that a reasonable person would hold. It is not just based on the investigator’s own subjective opinion. It is a reasonable test that asks, “Would an ordinary, reasonable person”—like you or me, Sir Desmond—“being in possession of the same facts as the investigator, agree that it was reasonable to suspect that fraud had occurred?” This is a common standard to initiate an investigation. Finally, beyond the definitions, the clause clarifies references to “giving a notice or other document” and sets out how court proceedings are considered to be finally determined. The clause is essential to ensure the correct understanding and interpretation of key terms used throughout part 1 of the Bill. Clause 71 states that all regulations under this part should be made using statutory instruments. This ensures a structured approach to the regulatory framework. The clause allows for the creation of different types of provisions, such as consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving measures. This flexibility helps to adapt regulations to various circumstances. The affirmative procedure requires that the regulations be approved by both Houses of Parliament, which ensures that there is oversight and accountability. The negative procedure allows regulations to be implemented promptly, but they can still be annulled by either House of Parliament if necessary. The option to convert regulations from the negative to the affirmative procedure ensures flexibility in response to the significance of particular regulatory provisions. Clause 71 is essential for establishing a coherent and responsive regulatory framework in the legislation. By mandating the use of statutory instruments, it promotes a structured process that enhances accountability and keeps the regulatory system transparent.

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would indeed have been disappointed if the shadow Minister had not had lots of detailed questions for me on the operation of the powers. I agree wholeheartedly about the importance of safeguards. To take the questions in turn, we are confident of the legal robustness of the Carltona principle. It is how Government routinely works, and we are confident that the powers can be exercised by highly trained authorised officers. As the shadow Minister says, 28 days is a minimum. There are no plans at the moment to introduce a maximum, but the intention is for the team to work as quickly as possible to recoup public money. As we have discussed, there might be exceptional circumstances where people need more time, and the authorised officers will be able to provide that time on a case-by-case basis, always bearing in mind the need to return money that is owed because of fraud. We will talk shortly about the oversight and review process, but we want a separate team outside the PSFA that is answerable to an independent reviewer. It could look at the wide range of cases and ensure there is consistency and that powers are used proportionately. It could report to Parliament, so there would be ongoing scrutiny of the exercise of the powers. It is important to remember what will have taken place by the time we get to a penalty. In order to establish the recovery of a debt, if the individual did not agree, the matter will have gone to court. An authorised officer will have reviewed the case and submitted to a senior member of the team the rationale for a penalty to be imposed. There are a number of routes of review. The first is a review by another authorised officer of a higher grade in the PSFA team. If the individual is not satisfied with that, they will, as the shadow Minister set out, have the ability to apply to a court or a tribunal to have that reviewed. There are robust safeguards built in within the PSFA and outside the PSFA. Question put and agreed to . Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 57 to 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 60 Appeals

• 6 Mar 2025 · Public Procurement: Support for SMEs · Hansard source

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  As soon as I saw my hon. Friend’s name on the Order Paper, I knew that he would mention buses, because he has never missed an opportunity to raise this critical issue with me. The Government are absolutely committed to supporting the UK’s domestic bus manufacturing industry and ensuring that the procurement system recognises the high standards and quality of UK manufacturers. The new national procurement policy statement aligns with our industrial strategy and pushes us to maximise spend with SMEs. As a result, contracting authorities across the country must now consider how their procurement strategies can support the industrial strategy, including the bus manufacturing strategy.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the support for the clause. To clarify, the operational costs of running PSFA operations and investigations will not be included in reasonable costs. There is work being done through the test and learn period by the enforcement unit to inform those costs, and guidance will be published in due course. As I have set out previously, there will be independent oversight of the full use of these powers, by a team that will answer to an independent chair. They will report to Parliament and will look at all aspects of the use of these powers, including the cost. If it is not established by agreement, we will have to apply to a court or tribunal to determine what the debt is, so there will be that added aspect of independence. For asset seizing, we can apply for orders through the courts. In evidence we heard from the financial industry, there were questions about how the powers will work together, and there is work going on to respond to some of those questions. Our teams are working very closely with those financial bodies. Question put and agreed to. Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 15 Payable amounts Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 17 introduces direct deduction orders as a method to recover public funds lost to fraud and error from a liable person’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are a vital mechanism to recover funds from a liable person who can afford to repay their debt but refuses to do so. This debt recovery mechanism is not new to Government; the Bill seeks to bring powers that are used elsewhere into the PSFA, not to create brand-new powers for the PSFA. That provides assurance of their effective and proportionate use, and we are doing the same here. The introduction of direct deduction orders is essential to bolster the Government’s ability to recover public funds, ensuring that taxpayer money lost to fraud and error is reclaimed and redirected towards essential public services and the common good. To safeguard the use of these powers, direct deduction orders will be used after an investigation by the Public Sector Fraud Authority into suspected fraud against a public authority. The decision to make a direct deduction order will be made by trained and authorised officers in the PSFA who will work to the standards of the Government counter-fraud profession. The investigation must determine, to the civil standard of proof, that money is owed to the public sector as a result of fraud or error. As I have said, we will seek voluntary engagement and repayment, and only after those efforts have been unsuccessful will direct deduction orders be used. As outlined in clauses 12 and 14, there are clear restrictions as to when these powers become available, ensuring that their use is not unfettered.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before I go into the detail of the clauses, I want to take a minute, as we are entering a new chapter, to make some opening remarks about the wider powers. Chapter 4 of part 1 introduces debt recovery powers. In 2021-22, detected fraud and error outside of tax and welfare was £823 million, of which only £190 million—23%—was recovered. Alex Rothwell, from the NHS Counter Fraud Authority, told us in his evidence that the Department recovered only 12% of fraud and error. There is a long way to go in this space, which is why the powers are so important. We know that recovery of fraud-related debt can be challenging. Debt recovery powers are limited to a small number of organisations and are therefore not available across the public sector. The Public Accounts Committee, Home Affairs Committee and National Audit Office have all strongly challenged the Government to do more across the public sector to take action on fraud loss. As part of the Bill, we are bringing debt recovery powers into the PSFA to enable the Government to better recover fraud debt outside of tax and welfare. We heard from Alex Rothwell that these powers will be incredibly helpful for us to recover more money. The powers are not new to Government—HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service already have the power to recover debt from bank accounts, and DWP and the Child Maintenance Service can recover debt from earnings. We will utilise best practice from those organisations in operating the powers. Although we initially expect to use them in just a small number of cases, we hope that this will grow as and when the PSFA enforcement unit expands. We have consulted widely with a range of fraud and debt stakeholders, including public bodies, academics and non-public sector groups. Banks, charities and civil liberty groups have been engaged so that we can incorporate lessons learnt from the experience of debt recovery processes in Government. We know that those in debt can be in challenging situations, which is why the use of the powers will follow best practice across Government, including the Government debt management function standards, and guidance such as the debt management vulnerability toolkit. Importantly, the powers will only be used once efforts to engage and secure voluntary repayment have been unsuccessful. The only people and companies who will face the powers are those who have the means to repay, but who refuse to do so. Those affected by the powers will have the right to make representations, apply to vary orders, request an internal review, and finally, appeal to the tribunal. The powers will be used by trained authorised officers who will be subject to independent oversight. The debt recovery powers in the Bill balance the need to recover public money efficiently, while ensuring that recovery is fair and proportionate, with robust safeguards to protect those in vulnerable situations. Clause 15 refers back to clauses 1 and 13 to define a payable amount as: a payment made as a result of fraud or error, as discovered by an investigation into suspected fraud; a penalty under the civil penalty regime established by chapter 5; and, finally, relevant costs. This creates a limitation as to the debts that the Government will be able to use the chapter 4 recovery powers on, specifically, those determined by and during an investigation into suspected fraud, including from associated penalties. We seek these recovery powers purely to further the counter-fraud activity that we will carry out to tackle fraud against the public sector. We do not intend to become a general debt recovery agency for the Government, and clause 15 confirms that. It reflects the operational context and purpose of the PSFA and its focus on tackling fraud and error. Further to that, clause 16 confirms that we will be able to seek alternative recovery action through the civil courts. Although the Bill will provide the powers to seek recovery directly through bank accounts and PAYE earnings, these might not always be the most appropriate or effective recovery route. For instance, the liable person might hold significant other property assets or keep assets or money abroad. In those cases, it would be unfair for us not to seek recovery. We therefore wish to work through established legal procedures to ensure that we can seek to pursue recovery through the most appropriate and effective mechanisms—for example, liability orders. The importance of clause 16 is that it confirms that the Bill does not limit existing powers. I commend clauses 15 and 16 to the Committee.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me go through those points in turn. The first question was about why someone might need information before three months. There are two critical reasons why: one is to ascertain potential vulnerability and affordability plans—we have talked about safeguarding joint account holders so as to have more information—and the other is to prevent people from evading paying: if more information were needed to ensure that the assets had not been moved. Throughout, we have tried to balance ensuring fairness for the taxpayer and protecting vulnerability. I hope it will give some reassurance that such powers are used effectively elsewhere in Government. We have learned from best practice. I talked through the process of the first notice, and that will be where the individual is informed that that information has been requested. As we have discussed, a number of safeguards are built into the process, and the intention when recovering debt will be to work with the individual and to make it collaborative. If people refuse to pay, only at that point would we apply to the courts or a tribunal, where safeguards are of course in place. To the wider question of what safeguards hold the system to account, as I have outlined and as we will discuss in more detail later, a team answerable to an independent chair will oversee every part of the process, including the ability to look at live cases and at the patterns, to ensure proportionate use of the powers. That individual will report to Parliament. Separately, a fully independent body will review the full use of the powers. We expect that to be His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services. The Bill also includes a provision to make the PSFA a statutory body, and so fully independent of the Minister. While it remains in this smaller phase, where we are testing the powers, the independent safeguards are built in. On the point about the consultation with the finance bodies, I hope the Committee heard in the evidence that UK Finance was clear that we have been having a constructive dialogue on all of the issues. The PSFA has published an impact assessment, which suggests that, in the first instance, banks will need to look at a very small number of cases. We have committed to testing and learning alongside the process as the PSFA grows. There will be established practice for working closely with the banks. We expect the burden on banks for the application of the PSFA powers to be limited. I hope that gives some reassurance on oversight.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 37 will future-proof the Bill, so it is critical to the discussion we have just had. It establishes regulation-making powers concerning particular elements of the direct deduction order powers. For instance, it will allow regulations to be made on how notices and orders are given, and how notices and information are to be received; how to make deduction calculations, and how to determine hardship in meeting essential living expenses; the duty of banks in carrying out deduction orders and the administration charges they can apply for doing so; the interaction between direct deduction orders under the Bill and similar orders under any other enactment; and expanding the remit of direct deduction orders to cover other types of financial products or services, such as cryptoassets. The Bill sets out in detail the framework for how direct deduction orders will work. We wanted to set out this level of detail to add to the transparency of how this power will operate and to allow parliamentary colleagues the chance to scrutinise it properly. However, there are elements that are more appropriate to have as regulations. These are elements where we want a degree of flexibility to be able to update them to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes, as hon. Members have just raised. For instance, why specify how orders should be shared by the Minister when we know that technology changes so quickly? Why should hardship and deduction calculations be static when there are bigger economic forces in play that impact all of us? We are committed to avoiding undue hardship where possible, and flexibility here lets us introduce further mitigation where necessary. Why should we not go after cryptoassets, if we find that they are the preferred asset of fraudsters? We want to be able to pursue funds in the most effective way to return them to the public purse. Where necessary, we will consult, and we want to do so—indeed, this clause creates a requirement to do so in some instances. Finally, regulations will also be subject to either the affirmative or negative procedure so that Parliament is still able to scrutinise them appropriately.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for the range of questions, which give me the opportunity to clarify a number of points. First, what happens if a liable person sadly passes away before paying the specified amount? The PSFA will still seek to recover the money owed to the state through the people acting on the estate’s behalf, and it will be recovered using the normal processes. Although there are not specific measures in this Bill, the PSFA will be able to use other existing debt recovery measures. As for the decisions being made, who will be making them and the capacity of the Minister, as I set out, the decisions will be made by authorised officers under the Carltona principle, and the review will be done by a more senior officer than the officer making the original decision. Critically, on any of these measures, it will be possible to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, so an independent appeal route is built into the system. We do not think that there needs to be a separate independent route, but it is important to come back to the fact that this entire system will be overseen in two ways. First, that will be done by a team outside the PSFA, working with an independent chair who will review the use of all of these powers. Secondly, as we have said, there is provision in the Bill for independent scrutiny, which we expect to be delivered by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services. The ability to suspend and restart direct deduction orders gives flexibility to the authorised officers who lead the cases. Such circumstances might involve somebody being hospitalised and the orders needing to be stopped and restarted, or somebody agreeing to move to a voluntary repayment. Indeed, as the shadow Minister mentioned, they might bring forward information about their financial circumstances. As for going back to ask for further information from the banks, somebody might set out information about their vulnerability, financial circumstances or living standards, and there might be a need to check that with the bank—“The circumstances have changed, so we need to get more information from the banks.” So there is a provision to continue to gather that information. We will go through the appeals process on later clauses. It is possible that payments might be suspended as part of that appeals process, but critically, in changing and varying the order, a person will be informed of that and they can appeal the variation—the amount and the existence of the order will have already been set through a court process. The impact assessment goes through PSFA resourcing. As I have said, the savings are modest, and we have deliberately kept them modest because of the resourcing available to the team and the officers who are in place. There is resourcing to carry out 40 cases a year under the powers, and that is the expectation. These are new powers for the wider public sector. We hope that they will be effective, generate more income and recover fraud, and there is a strong evidence base for that as these powers are used elsewhere. If that is the case, it will then be possible to grow the operation of the team and increase the resourcing, but we are confident that the resourcing to deliver what is in the impact assessment and in the Bill already exists. Question put and agreed to. Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 29 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 34 Reviews

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Committee for the range of questions and the opportunity to provide clarification. The decision on the set-up of the system was made on the basis of existing best practice in Government, particularly in His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, so there is precedent for its working. The intention of the PSFA is to recover debt as quickly as possible, but in a way that is proportionate and does not leave anyone in financial hardship. If an individual applies to vary the amount they are paying back, the internal review and the more senior officer will look to resolve that matter in a proportionate way, and to avoid things needing to go to a tribunal. However, it is important to have independent safeguards in place. We expect cases to be resolved successfully by teams that are well trained, have all the information available to them and can take a case-by-case approach that is fair and proportionate, but in the event that an individual is unhappy with the outcome of the initial review, they can appeal to the tribunal. We expect the initial impact to be very small: our expectation is that we will be dealing with four DDOs, so even if they all go to tribunal, it is a small number, and this is an established process. We have deliberately chosen the first-tier tribunal because it is the most accessible and fastest part of the justice system. We hope that these powers are successful and can be grown, and I think we will learn a lot from the first phase of working in this way. We think the powers will be particularly focused on high-value and severe cases of fraud, and the team will work to ensure that we prioritise those cases. This feels like a proportionate use of resources, and we have consulted the Ministry of Justice, which has agreed that the first-tier tribunal is the most appropriate forum to hear DDO appeals. On the 28-day point, I said in my previous answer that we want to recover fraud as quickly as possible and are keen to not have undue delays, but the points about exceptional circumstances are well made. I appreciate the questions and I am happy to take them away and ensure that there is appropriate flexibility. On the wider point about exceptional circumstances, the important thing about these powers is that they will be exercised by authorised officers, highly trained in investigation and debt recovery, who will have due regard to the best practice on debt within Government and the wider system and will take a case-by-case approach to individual circumstances and respond to exceptional circumstances. That is why we have multiple and independent points of review. Again, I have referred repeatedly to the independent oversight that will look at all those processes and report into Parliament. Question put and agreed to. Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 36 Meaning of “bank” etc Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The shadow Minister in his previous comments raised a number of concerns about there being too much flexibility in the Bill, but amendment 20 seems to contradict some of those points. I have been very clear as we have gone through the Bill that we want to draw on existing powers and protocol in Government to ensure that we are taking on practice that we know has worked elsewhere. The 40% cap is in place in other circumstances, so we think that it is fair and proportionate, and it aligns with other practice. We have already discussed this issue, as part of the debate on amendment 19, but we strongly sympathise with the desire to recover money quickly from fraudsters. The total deductions in an affected period must, as with a regular direct deduction order, not exceed either 40% or 20% of a liable person’s net earnings—40% is the maximum for frauds, and 20% the maximum for error. These direct earnings orders apply only to individuals, not companies, as the shadow Minister indicated. These powers are not new; we are making them available to the PSFA, rather than creating brand-new powers, which provides assurance of their effectiveness and proportionate use. The total deduction maximum of 40% is in line with the DWP’s existing direct earnings attachment powers and the Child Maintenance Service’s deduction from earnings orders powers. This appropriate and necessary flexibility in approach is provided for in the Bill under the direct deduction powers in two ways. First, the previously discussed lump sum direct deduction orders are not capped. If funds are available and the proposed deduction does not cause hardship, we can seek a higher level of deduction. Secondly, a lump sum direct deduction order can be issued and then a regular direct deduction order can be established. That is a better route than allowing for a high level of deductions; it builds on established practice and remains proportionate yet impactful. Crucially, it limits the disincentive to earn that an uncapped deduction from earnings order would create, consequently resulting in ineffective and inefficient recovery of public funds. I hope that I have provided reassurance: authorised officers can apply the appropriate debt recovery method to ensure efficient recoveries. Clause 41 provides the conditions under which a deduction from earnings order may be made. We have ensured that the amount of debt we collect is fair. A key consideration throughout the creation of the debt measures was to robustly prevent hardship, learning from best practice across Government. We have also ensured that there is proportionality in the way we approach fraud-related debt versus debt accrued due to error. The definitions are set out in the Fraud Act 2006. The challenge was to balance these needs with the necessity to send a strong deterrent message to those who have the means to pay their fraud and error-related debt to Government but refuse to do so. That is why we have established maximum limits based on whether debt was accrued due to fraud or error. Clause 41 caters for this by ensuring that the terms of the order will not cause the liable person—or person living with, or financially dependent on, the liable person—hardship in meeting ordinary living expenses. The terms of the order are also required to be otherwise fair in all circumstances. The hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire raised a number of questions on the training of authorised officers. One very positive step of the setting up of the Public Sector Fraud Authority under the previous Government has been the professionalisation of those who work in fraud across Government. PSFA authorised officers will be trained to professional standards and will use clear best practice standards. We will set out further details in regulations and public guidance, but what is critical and I hope offers some reassurance is that this provision will follow the Government debt management function standards, which are publicly available and which I will share with the Committee after this sitting.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  How the Bill is exercised in terms of the deduction calculations and the notices is future-proofing the Bill and ensuring that it meets its stated objectives of preventing hardship and so on, which sit on the face of the Bill. This is about how we do that, not the aims that exist. The regulations will come before Parliament in a proportionate way, as is the normal practice. Even under the negative procedure, parliamentarians will still be able to come back on any of these points. It is a statutory duty of consultation, which ensures that the results of the consultation will be taken seriously and published. I hope that that gives some reassurance. On the question about subsection (2)(c), the hardship considerations are for PSFA and not for the banks. That is why they are excluded, but we will take them very seriously, and I have talked at length about the way they will be embedded in every part of this process. The word “Schedule” can be changed to “clause” in a Government amendment, as that is what it means. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for pointing that out. Question put and agreed to. Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 38 Deduction from earnings orders Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Some points of clarity: the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire asked who would do the reviewing. A more senior officer from within the PSFA would complete that review, not the Minister themselves. The entire process would be overseen by a separate team who are accountable to an independent chair, and critically, who will report into Parliament to provide that level of independence. The other important context is that the Bill also—we will come to this later—provides for the PSFA to become a statutory body, fully independent from the Minister. In the meantime, it is incredibly important that we have this process of oversight and the independent chair, as we discussed. All these issues are important for balance. We have to avoid giving fraudsters the ability to abuse the review process and frustrate investigations. As John Smart told the Committee on Tuesday, months is far too long, and adding a further route to appeal to the tribunal at that very early stage would add months, if not years, to our investigations into suspected frauds. We have tried to balance this very carefully to ensure that there are appropriate routes to review that sit within a system that is independently overseen. I believe that we have found the right balance in the Bill, and I have explained those layers of review. They include internal review, which is the appropriate route that strikes the right balance between fairness and avoiding fraudsters frustrating the process. As I said, the internal reviewer will be a separate authorised officer, who will be—this is a requirement in clause 66—an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker. The way that these reviews are performed will be subject to oversight/ We will talk later in more detail about the oversight in the Bill, but it will include the inspections by HMICFRS and the day-to-day oversight by an independent chair, which could include live cases. I explained in the previous debate—I did not go through the detail, but I can do so—the stages of an information notice going through if someone still does not agree that they should provide the information. Ultimately, it is really important that if a penalty is issued for non-compliance, the information provider can appeal to the relevant court against that penalty, so there is a formal appeal to a court at the end of the information-gathering process if it gets to that place. However, the intention of the powers—as I said, this will be written into the code of practice—is very much to work alongside those organisations that are gathering information, and to be proportionate to their size and the requests put forward, so I believe we have found the right balance.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome those probing amendments, because they give me an opportunity to provide some clarity and reassurance on those important points. I will respond to them in a second, but on the question of safeguards, as I said in my introduction, we have thought very deeply about them and we are really mindful of the responsibility of these powers, so a broad range of safeguards has been built into both sides of the Bill. On the PSFA measures, all the use of powers will be overseen by a separate team that will be accountable to an independent chair who will transparently report their findings annually to Parliament. The use of the wider powers will be overseen and reviewed by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, which has a lot of experience in this. There are various routes of appeal and review built into the powers, as well as times when applications to court are needed, and we will deal with those in some depth as we go through the clauses. Oversight is absolutely critical, and that is why we have put such a robust oversight system in place. On clause 3, currently any information needed from first parties or connected third parties can be asked for only if they refuse to provide it, and there is no way for the PSFA to compel the information to be produced without having to go through the civil court. The clause enables authorised officers in the PSFA to compel information to be produced that is not excluded, where it is necessary, proportionate and in line with the data protection legislation, from individuals and businesses as part of a civil fraud investigation. As we discussed on Tuesday, those authorised officers will all be highly trained and subject to professional standards and a code of conduct. In particular, clause 3 extends the Minister’s powers to include taking copies of information and requiring the individuals to provide information in a specified form. The power includes imposing duties on an individual to retain information that they already hold for longer than they would normally be required to. For example, that might apply where the PSFA requests contractual notes as part of an investigation that a person may retain for only three years. Where the request is made just before the end of that period, the information notice would also explain that any failure to supply the specified information might result in a civil penalty being imposed. The clause details the requirements of the information notice, including the format, the timeline for compliance and the location for submission. A similar approach is used by HMRC. In practice, authorised officers would engage, where possible, on a voluntary basis before issuing an information notice. The clause also ensures that there are restrictions on the information notice from demanding “excluded material” or “special procedure material”, as defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. I will turn to the amendments, and as I said, I am very grateful for the opportunity to explain how this clause works, which I hope will provide some reassurance. Clause 3(1)(a) and (b) set out a test for issuing an information notice. An authorised officer will have the power to compel information only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and only when the information being requested relates to a person whom the authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud. On that basis, PSFA authorised officers will request the information only when there are reasonable grounds to do so. The question that amendment 10 raises is, “What is meant by ‘reasonable grounds’?” It must be objectively reasonable for them to suspect fraud, given the information available to them. An authorised officer must genuinely suspect that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and that belief will be based on facts, information and/or intelligence. Reasonable grounds cannot be supported on the basis of personal factors such as those listed in the amendment, or a hunch. It is critical to set out that authorised officers will be using those facts and will be bound by the public sector equality duty and the Equality Act. The reasonable grounds test is a standard, widely accepted test used by various organisations, including the DWP, the Serious Fraud Office and the police. Further to that, to ensure that the reasonableness test is applied properly in practice, the PSFA will have built in place safeguards. For example, authorised officers must consider all the facts of a case known to them at that time when they decide what is reasonable. Authorised officers must ensure that each decision made relating to the use of the powers is documented and available for checking. Management checks will ensure that those procedures are followed correctly. Information holders can also request a review of a decision to issue an information notice if they feel that there were no reasonable grounds. As I said, there will also be independent oversight of the use of powers by an independent body such as HMICFRS or the new independent chair. I am setting out this detail on the record now, but we will also be transparent about this for those who do not leaf through Hansard . The code of practice envisioned by this legislation for the PSFA elements of the Bill relates to civil penalties. As civil penalties are the mechanism for ensuring compliance with the information gathering powers, we will also set out in the code of practice, and in further published guidance if necessary, how the information gathering powers will be used in practice, as I am doing today. We will also fulfil the commitment that we made on Tuesday to talk about what will be in the codes of practice as we reach the relevant parts of the Bill. Let me turn to the period of compliance. Our approach in the Bill accommodates the variation in size and type of fraud investigations that the PSFA is likely to take on. As such, the Bill allows information providers a minimum, critically, of 10 working days to comply. However, in practice, the information notices will be tailored on a case-by-case basis, with each being judged on its merits and with the time period applied appropriately. Similar approaches are used in HMRC. That, in turn, protects the information holder from being asked to produce information in an unreasonable timescale. On Tuesday, we heard from John Smart, who said: “Some of the smaller organisations might struggle to meet that 10-day requirement”. That is why we will be tailoring the requirement. But, he also said, “I still think it is a reasonable starting point. If you do not start with a reasonable starting point, for the larger organisations you end up deferring decision making and action being taken. I think 10 days is reasonable.” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 46, Q81.] As I said before, that is the minimum. Again, we will set out the commitment to tailoring to ensure that we are proportionate and reflect the different types of organisations and individuals who might be asked for information in the code of practice or published guidance. Alongside the time period for compliance, an information provider will have the opportunity to request a review, which would include the ability to vary the time period for compliance if it was considered that a longer timeframe was needed. The current drafting outlines a five-layered process for information holders to request a review of an information notice that they have received. I can go through that detail if Committee members want me to, but I hope that that provides some reassurance on hon. Members’ points.

• 27 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 7 and schedule 1 cover the investigative powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Clause 8 will give the PSFA a legal route to apply to a court for an audit in relation to property that has come into its possession in the course of a fraud investigation. Clause 9 will bring the PSFA under the oversight of the Independent Office for Police Conduct for serious complaints about its use of PACE powers. Clause 7 will designate authorised investigators with the necessary authority to use limited provisions from PACE within the remit of public sector fraud investigations. These include powers to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize evidence, and special provisions to apply to the courts to gain access to certain types of material that are regarded as excluded material or special procedure material. These are criminal investigation powers and will only be used in criminal investigations to enable all reasonable lines of inquiry to be followed and all relevant evidence to be collected. PSFA staff must be specifically authorised by the Minister before they can use the powers in the clause. Authorised investigators will be able to access and process evidence under the same conditions applicable to the police, ensuring that robust investigative protocols are followed. PACE has its own code of practice, and authorised investigators will adhere to the provisions that apply to the PSFA’s PACE powers, in particular PACE code B, which deals with the exercise of powers of entry, search and seizure. Clause 7 is fundamental in reinforcing the Bill’s objective of combating public sector fraud effectively by equipping investigators with powerful investigative tools, governed by long-standing safeguards. The provision of such powers is essential and reflects our commitment to holding to account those who defraud public resources, maintaining the integrity of public administration. Schedule 1 will modify the provisions of PACE adopted in clause 7 so that they apply to authorised investigators within the PSFA when they are conducting criminal investigations into fraud offences committed against the public sector. Clause 7 will enable these modifications to have effect; they include equating authorised investigators with constables for the relevant sections of PACE, clearly defining the range of their responsibility and authority. An amendment to replace “articles or persons” with “material” in schedule 1 is specifically intended to clarify the scope of investigations conducted by the PSFA. By defining the term more narrowly with reference to “material”, it reflects the fact that the PSFA will not be conducting searches of individuals. While detailed stipulations regarding the retention and handling of seized material are set out in PACE, schedule 1 will provide the essential adaptations necessary for the authorised investigators to carry out their roles effectively while adhering to established legal safeguards. Overall, schedule 1 is necessary to equip authorised investigators with precise, tailored powers from PACE so that they can enforce the legislative aim of combating fraud within the public sector. Clause 8 will give the PSFA a legal route to apply to a court for an order in relation to property that has come into its possession in the course of a fraud investigation. The order will determine who the property should be returned to and whether changes need to be made to the property before it is returned or, if appropriate, destroyed, subject to suitable safeguards. The PSFA will not routinely need to use this power. It will use it only in three specific situations: first, when there is conflicting evidence as to who the property should be returned to; secondly, when it is not possible to return property to its owner, and the PSFA is otherwise liable to retain it indefinitely; or, thirdly, when it has been identified that the property could be used in the commission of an offence. Clause 8 will protect the PSFA in situations in which it could otherwise face having to retain property indefinitely, at ongoing cost to the taxpayer, and where it cannot return the property to its owner. It will ensure effective management and disposal of items, helping to prevent misuse while reducing the administrative burden. The use of a magistrates court to determine the appropriate course of action is a critical safeguard. This external judicial oversight ensures transparent and lawful disposal decisions. A mandatory six-month waiting period is built into the process before property can be disposed of or destroyed. This period will allow any interested parties to make claims on the property. However, if a magistrates court orders that the property be returned to its owner, there is no waiting period for that return. Further application to court can be made if initial orders do not resolve ownership or disposal issues, ensuring ongoing flexibility and fairness in property management. Equipping the PSFA with these powers is vital for appropriately concluding fraud investigations and reflects similar practices in other Government Departments. I turn to clause 9. The PSFA’s use of PACE powers will be subject to robust internal and external scrutiny. Elsewhere in the Bill, clauses 64 and 65 set out provisions under which His Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services will work with the PSFA. Clause 9 amends the Police Reform Act 2002 to extend the functions of the director general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct to include oversight of public sector fraud investigators and enables them specifically to consider the PSFA’s use of PACE powers and associated investigations. In doing so, this clause enables the IOPC to be engaged where necessary to investigate death, serious injury, accusations of staff corruption or serious complaints against the PSFA’s use of PACE powers, although we hope that none of those will come to be. The amendments made by clause 9 also include allowing the Minister to issue regulations conferring functions on the director general in relation to these investigations. In practice, this enables the Minister to detail in due course the specific remit of the IOPC in relation to the PSFA. This clause represents a typical approach to engaging the IOPC in legislation, similar to that of other law enforcement agencies. The clause will also enable the sharing of information between the director general, the Minister and those who act on their behalf. Additionally, it will enable the sharing of information with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration to facilitate potential collaborative investigations with the IOPC. The clause will ensure that any information sharing complies with existing data protection and investigatory powers legislation. Incidents and complaints will be either self-referred from the PSFA or referred to the IOPC via a third party. Any potential cases of serious injury or death that occur in the exercise of the PSFA’s PACE powers would be automatically referred to the IOPC for review. The use of the independent complaints function offered by the IOPC is a key element of the oversight landscape, ensuring that the PSFA is held accountable to the highest standards in the exercise of PACE powers, and providing confidence to the public that the Government take their responsibilities in using the powers seriously. I went through a lot of detail there, but I know that the Committee is concerned about the proper oversight of powers, as it should be.