Emma Reynolds MP: speeches

Speeches

• 1 Jul 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  I assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are looking at that. We will make sure that firms can take advantage of suggesting targeted support to their consumers so that they are better off, can make more of their money and get a better pension, too.

• 25 Jun 2025 · Access to Banking Hubs: Hertfordshire · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful for the correction. I would not like to get in trouble with the hon. Members that represent different parts of Hertfordshire, not least our Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern), who also represents a constituency there. I have better knowledge of Buckinghamshire, which is nearby, but I thank her for that correction to the record. I do not want to get in trouble with the hon. Lady’s colleague, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins), who was very active in our previous debate on this issue. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), for his speech. I will come back to the points that he made in a moment. I also thank, for their interventions, my hon. Friends the Members for Hexham (Joe Morris) and for Reading Central (Matt Rodda), the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and the hon. Members for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) and for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (John Lamont). I have met some of them separately to this debate. I thank again the hon. Member for South West Hertfordshire—I was going to call him my hon. Friend; the debate feels very friendly. I have looked in detail at his constituency, thanks to his calling this debate, which is always a benefit of having such Westminster Hall debates, as he will attest to. I have had a look at Abbots Langley and Rickmansworth. I often go through his constituency on the way home, particularly the Rickmansworth area. They are very different parts of the constituency, from what I can see, in terms of the scale of the population and the number of shops in those areas. In Abbots Langley, I am told—he can correct me if this is not true—that there has been no community access request, as of our information. So if he does want to campaign for a banking hub there, it is open to him and his colleagues on the council he mentioned to request such a thing. Equally, I know he has an enhanced post office in Rickmansworth. Again, it is open to him or others in the community to make the application so that Link would assess the criteria.

• 19 Jun 2025 · Public Sector Pensions: McCloud Remedy · Hansard source

  More

  I congratulate the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) on securing this debate. I am grateful for her speech, and agree that the people we are talking about keep us safe and well, and show true dedication to public service. I absolutely understand the point that she is making. I will talk a little bit about the background to McCloud, before talking about the progress that has been made to date and what further steps the scheme managers still need to take, as the hon. Lady outlined. The McCloud remedy is, by its nature, a complex undertaking, as I am sure she will appreciate. It applies to 20 public service pension schemes in the UK, and the scheme managers for those schemes are responsible for ensuring that the remedy is administered properly and in accordance with their statutory provisions. This issue, as the hon. Lady said, arises out of the introduction of new pension schemes for public sector workers in 2014-15. When introducing those pension schemes, the Government at the time gave what is called a transitional protection to older workers, but as she set out, in 2018 the Court of Appeal found that those protections gave rise to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of age, race and sex. In 2019, the Government announced that they would address that discrimination through the McCloud remedy. There are two main elements to the remedy. The ongoing difference in treatment between older and younger workers was removed by closing the older pre-2015 pension schemes and moving all active members into the new pension schemes in relation to employment after 31 March 2022. However, addressing the discrimination that occurred between 2014 and 2022 is considerably more complex, as hon. Members will appreciate, because whether individual members are better off under the older legacy schemes or newer reform schemes will depend on their individual employment histories and circumstances, and in some cases will not be certain until they retire. The remedy therefore gives a choice over legacy or reform scheme benefits, which is given at the point of retirement for active and deferred members, and is in the process of being rolled out for members who have already retired. Delivering the remedy to more than 3 million affected scheme members is also an intensive administrative challenge. There are many different elements to it, but the most crucial is that all those affected must be provided with individualised information about their pension entitlements during the 2015 to 2022 remedy period, through what is known as a remediable service statement or RSS. In addition, a smaller group of members, whose tax position during the remedy period may have changed, need to be provided with a remediable pension savings statement—an RPSS. Given the complexity of the McCloud remedy, schemes are also providing significant levels of guidance and online resources to help members understand the information they receive and the decision they need to make. That information is often very complex, as hon. Members know because many have been in the position of receiving it. There is also a dedicated HMRC digital service to allow members receiving an RPSS to understand their tax position. There are processes in place to allow members to pay additional tax or, as will be the case for the majority of members, to claim either a tax refund or compensation from the scheme where a refund is not possible. Providing these statements to members, together with the other aspects of implementing the remedy, is the responsibility, as the hon. Lady will know, of pension scheme managers. For the largest public service schemes, including the NHS scheme in England and Wales, the teachers’ scheme in England and Wales, and the civil service scheme across the UK, the scheme manager is the relevant Secretary of State. The local government, police and fire schemes are administered locally, which means each responsible authority, force or brigade has its own scheme manager, who is responsible for the operation of the scheme in that area. The devolved Administrations—this is pertinent to the concerns raised by the hon. Lady, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie)—have responsibility for administering their schemes. The Scottish Government, through the Scottish Public Pensions Agency, have responsibility for the police, fire, NHS and teachers’ schemes in Scotland. The Welsh Government are responsible for the firefighters’ scheme in Wales. Pension schemes in Northern Ireland are established under a separate legal framework and are the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government. This means that the picture on implementing the remedy across the different schemes is complex and may be subject to particular factors that affect one scheme but not necessarily another. The remedy itself varies across the schemes, reflecting the fact that the schemes themselves are specific to each workforce and have different benefit designs. This can be seen in the differing levels of progress that schemes have so far made. I am aware that across the police scheme in England and Wales, around 90% of the total number of RSSs have so far been issued, and I understand that the picture is similar in the police scheme in Scotland, with 97% of deferred choice and over three quarters of immediate choice RSSs already issued. Although that is not yet matched by other schemes, significant progress is being made elsewhere. For example, the civil service scheme in England and Wales has issued around 45% of immediate choice RSSs and the teachers’ scheme around 47%. It was always anticipated that providing RSSs to members would be challenging, and that is specifically recognised in the legislation governing the remedy. In particular, the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022 sets out that for the provision of RSSs, there is a deadline of 31 March 2025, or—here comes the qualification— “such later day as the scheme manager considers reasonable in all the circumstances in the case of a particular member or a particular class of member”. Given that I was asked about delays, I think it is worth reflecting that hon. Members have raised concerns about their constituents who are experiencing delays in receiving the remedy. I am standing in for the Pensions Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), but I used to be the Pensions Minister myself, so I have some knowledge of the issue, and I encourage scheme managers to take every step possible to resolve those cases as quickly as possible and to prioritise cases where individuals may be in particular need. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West reflected on a number of such cases in her excellent contribution. I assure anybody in this position that where there is an uplift in interest on pension payments, interest will be paid on arrears, so they will not lose out financially as a result of the delays, but I do understand that the delays are frustrating. As the hon. Lady will be aware, the overarching principle of the McCloud remedy is to put people back in the situation they would have been in if the discrimination had not occurred. In order to do that, it is necessary to apply interest where payments should have been made at an earlier date, whether by the scheme or the member. In this debate, we have heard more about the delays of the scheme towards the member. Interest is applied at 8% when the scheme owes money to the member. Where the member owes money to the scheme, interest is applied at the NS&I direct saver rate, which is currently 3.5%. I hope that reassures the hon. Lady to a certain extent. We think it is right that these decisions are made by scheme managers, as they are the only ones with full possession of all the relevant information. As I have said, with that information and the variety of different factors, the situation is complex. Having said that, the Government are committed to ensuring that all affected members are provided with the remedy they deserve as quickly as possible, including ensuring that members already in receipt of pension benefits or approaching their retirement are prioritised. Where scheme managers have exercised their statutory discretion to extend the deadline for providing some members with an RSS, it is therefore important that appropriate new deadlines are set out and that robust plans are in place to ensure the new deadlines are met. Scheme managers must ensure that the plans are properly communicated to pension scheme members to provide them with certainty. The Pensions Regulator must also be kept informed of plans and progress, and I know that schemes have been having these discussions with the regulator. Similarly, there have been delays in other aspects of the remedy, such as the provision of the RPSSs to those who need them. As I set out earlier, that affects a smaller number of people. However, it is difficult for those people if they are kept waiting. It is important that schemes keep members informed and provide them with appropriate resources and support. Although I am pleased to say that the process of sending out RPSSs in England and Wales is 90% complete and that some schemes have sent them to all affected members, I know that there are issues in other parts of the country. As I said, this is a very complex area. If I have not answered all of the hon. Lady’s questions, I am happy to write to her. Given the importance of delivering the McCloud remedy effectively, the Pensions Minister has recently written to responsible Departments, requesting details of their plans to issue remaining RSSs and RPSSs to all affected members. All those affected by the McCloud remedy can be assured that a robust and complete statutory remedy has been put in place and that schemes are working to ensure that members receive the information and support they need. I do, though, note the points that the hon. Lady has made about the impact of the delays on her constituents. They will have the opportunity to decide whether to receive legacy or reform scheme benefits in relation to their service. I again thank the hon. Lady for bringing this matter to the House. Question put and agreed to.

• 14 May 2025 · Draft Pension Fund Clearing Obligation Exemption (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Pension Fund Clearing Obligation Exemption (Amendment) Regulations 2025. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. The draft regulations will remove the time limit on the temporary exemption that pension funds have from clearing over-the-counter derivatives contracts, such as interest rate swaps, through a central counterparty. The exemption will continue indefinitely, ending the need for the Government to renew it every two years if they conclude that it is necessary. The draft regulations will help UK pensioners by supporting pension funds’ ability to invest in assets that generate returns for their benefit. Maintaining the exemption is also in line with the Government’s priorities to increase productive investment by pension funds to support economic growth. Central counterparties are a type of financial market infrastructure that firms use to reduce risks when trading on financial markets. They sit between the buyers and sellers of financial instruments, providing assurance that contractual obligations will be fulfilled. They do so by collecting collateral, known as margin, from all their users, which can be used to cover any shortfall if a default occurs. The process of transacting through a CCP is known as clearing. In 2009, G20 countries agreed that certain standard derivatives contracts should be cleared through CCPs to reduce risks in the financial system. In the EU, this was implemented through legislation and is known as the clearing obligation. At the time, it was decided that pension funds should be exempted from the obligation because of the particular challenges that pension funds would face in meeting CCP margin requirements. CCPs require certain types of margin to be posted in cash. Pension funds do not usually hold large cash reserves, as they invest a large majority of their resources in assets such as gilts and corporate bonds to provide returns for pension holders, meaning that meeting the requirement to post margin in cash can be more difficult for pension funds than for other firms. Requiring pension funds to clear their derivatives could cause them to increase their cash holdings, reducing their investment in other assets and their ability to generate returns for future pensioners over the longer term. The UK assimilated the clearing obligation and the exemption into UK domestic law through the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which was passed under the previous Government. The exemption was initially designed as a temporary measure, but it has since been extended several times. At present, the Government need to lay secondary legislation every two years if they conclude that it is necessary to extend the exemption. The most recent extension was in June 2023, under the previous Government, who noted that “it would be desirable to put in place a longer-term policy approach and remove the need for future temporary extensions”. That is what the draft regulations seek to achieve. The Treasury has since conducted a review of the exemption, working closely with UK financial services regulators and with input gathered from industry stakeholders through a call for evidence, which was launched in November 2023. The review found that requiring pension funds to clear derivatives could bring financial stability benefits, such as reducing counterparty risk, and could enhance resilience to shocks by increasing pension funds’ cash buffers. However, it identified concerns from some market participants that removing the exemption could increase pressure on the liquidity management of pension funds, particularly under stressed market conditions, which could increase risks to financial stability. The review also found strong evidence that pension funds would need to hold more cash and reduce investment in more productive assets if the exemption were removed. That could reduce their returns, with a potential impact on the retirement benefits of future pensioners; it would also be inconsistent with the objectives of the Government’s wider growth reforms, including the pensions investment review, which seeks to unlock new productive investment by pension funds in things like businesses and infrastructure to support economic growth. Overall, the Government concluded that there was clear evidence that removing the exemption would reduce pension funds’ ability to invest in productive assets, and that that could have an adverse effect on the retirement benefits of future pensioners, while the extent to which removing the exemption would generate direct financial stability benefits was very unclear. The Government have decided that, on balance, it is appropriate to maintain the exemption for the longer term. However, we will keep the policy under review, in co-ordination with the financial services regulators. If there are changes to market dynamics or wider Government reforms that have a material impact on the value of mandatory clearing for pension funds, the Government may reassess the issue. The draft regulations will implement that policy decision by removing the time limit on the exemption, preventing it from expiring on 18 June this year, as is currently scheduled. They will also remove the Treasury’s power to extend the exemption by two years at a time if it concludes that that is necessary; as the exemption will have no time limit, that power will obviously no longer be required. Firms will not have to do anything differently as a result of the draft regulations, because they will maintain the status quo. This approach provides longer-term clarity and certainty for market participants on the policy position, which will support planning for their long-term investment strategies. The regulations will maintain this important exemption for the longer term. They will provide certainty for pension funds and will remove the need for the Government to renew the exemption every two years via secondary legislation. They will support pension funds’ ability to generate returns, which fund the retirement benefits of future pensioners, and align with the Government’s objectives to unlock productive investment to support economic growth. I hope that the Committee feels able to support the draft regulations and their objectives; I commend them to the Committee.

• 14 May 2025 · Draft Pension Fund Clearing Obligation Exemption (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

  More

  I thank both hon. Members. As I expected, the shadow Minister agrees with the policy of the previous Government. He asked a couple of questions, and I will take them in the wrong order. The shadow Minister is right that there is a very slight difference between ruling clearing out completely and making the exemption permanent, but the outcome, which is what we are focusing on, is exactly the same. We have said that we will keep the policy under review if we need to, but overall we think that a permanent exemption gives the industry a lot more certainty than having to roll the exemption over every couple of years. I hope that that gives him some comfort. In a way, the shadow Minister has answered his own question on divergence from the EU. Our pension systems and the UK defined-benefit market are structurally different from those in other jurisdictions such as the US and the European Union, so we think it entirely appropriate to take a different decision on this issue. The Government are committed to maintaining our high standards of regulation and financial services, including adhering to relevant international standards where appropriate, but we do not think that this will create a divergence that is worrying in any way. I completely concur with the hon. Member for St Albans that the focus should be on pension outcomes. Maintaining the exemption over time will give certainty to those in the industry, so that they can invest, over the longer term, in assets that will produce returns for their members and therefore pay out the defined-benefit pensions that they are contractually obliged to provide for their members. I hope that I have answered all the Committee’s questions. Question put and agreed to.

• 24 Apr 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Cummins. I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) and for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for their amendments and their constructive engagement throughout the Bill’s passage. The Bill will ensure that the Bank of England remains equipped with the necessary tools to effectively manage bank failures in a way that minimises risk to the taxpayer and to UK financial stability, protecting the taxpayer. While there may be some disagreements on the finer detail of the Bill, what we have heard today, and on Second Reading and in Committee, demonstrates that there is cross-party support for the principles and overall objectives of the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the hon. Member for Wokingham for supporting those. The amendments cover a broad range of issues, and I will explain the Government’s position on them in turn, but first I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) for setting out his experience of the banking crisis and stressing that the mechanism we are seeking to provide through the Bill must allow the Bank of England, in close consultation with the Treasury and other financial services regulators, to act with speed and flexibility at times of crisis. There are hours, not days, in which to make decisions during crises, and at the forefront of our minds when discussing the Bill should be that they often happen over the weekend, as happened under the previous Government with Silicon Valley Bank. I will turn to that example shortly, but I wanted to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon for setting out his concerns about the amendments that would essentially stymie the effectiveness of the Bill. I note that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, raised a number of issues on new clause 3, on the Bill’s impact on credit unions. Some were not strictly relevant to the Bill, but I will come on to them. As he noted, the Government absolutely support credit unions. They play a vital role in providing saving products and affordable credit in local communities across the country. However, they are not in scope of the resolution regime that we are discussing, and therefore not in scope of the new recapitalisation payment mechanism introduced by the Bill. That is a benefit to the credit union sector. Indeed, it asked the Government to ensure that it was not included in the payment mechanism. Credit unions will therefore not be liable to pay towards the cost of a failure where the mechanism is used.

• 22 Apr 2025 · Retail Investment · Hansard source

  More

  It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse; congratulations on your appointment to the Panel. Thank you for presiding over this very good-natured Westminster Hall debate. I wish everybody a happy Easter—I do not know about everybody else, but for me, it is the first day back from a nice Easter break. I hope people got some rest over recess, and lots of Easter eggs to boot. I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham and Bletchley (Callum Anderson) on securing this debate. He brings great expertise to the House on the issue and many others, and it is great to respond to his thoughtful contribution. He was right to draw attention to the benefits of retail investors to consumers and the country as a whole. As he said, it is a win-win situation: if we get this right, it will benefit savers, who will get better returns, and it will bring benefits to British business by unlocking more capital to boost economic growth. I will shortly respond to the four points that he raised. Before I do that, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Joe Morris) for his thoughtful contribution. He spoke about the lack of financial education and targeted support for entrepreneurs in rural areas. Like him, I want to ensure that our Government, in our drive to increase economic growth, pursue that in a way that brings about inclusive growth, across the country, in urban and rural areas. I heard what he said about access to cash; I was not in the privileged position of Minister when he secured his Adjournment debate on that issue, but if he would like to meet to discuss it, I would be happy to do that, because it is obviously a concern in his constituency. I also pay tribute to an excellent speech, as ever, from my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Kanishka Narayan), who talked about five categories; I will not go through them all, but I am passionate about the pensions dashboard, having worked on it in my previous ministerial position. It could be game changing in terms of ensuring greater visibility. He rightly said that many people, even if they are not directly invested in the stock market, are invested via their pensions. The dashboard will give them much greater awareness of what they are invested in, what their likely pension income will be in the future, and what they might need to do to top that pension up. I was interested to hear what he said about that and about the culture of investing in North America—but I have a section about that at the end of my speech, so I will not pre-empt it. I thank the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper), who rightly said that London and the UK are a strong international financial centre. We should celebrate the fact that we attract a lot of investment from international investors, including international pension funds and others. She and my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham and Bletchley both noted that the amount that our own pension funds and investors invest in the UK has decreased, which is worrying. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) for his many, many questions—I am giving some thought to them as I proceed. He was absolutely correct to say that people think there is a risk to investing in stocks and shares, but particularly in a high-inflation environment—we are not in one now, but in recent memory inflation got as high as 11%—holding savings in cash is not a risk-free option, because inflation will erode the value of the money over time. If people have additional cash above the rainy day savings that the hon. Member for St Albans talked about, there is some merit to looking at what they might do to invest for the long term. Members from across the House talked about long-term investing. My hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham and Bletchley set out the scale of the challenge and the potential opportunities. As he noted, the UK is an outlier compared with our international peers. He rightly said that the UK is the third worst in the G7—that is probably the simplest way of putting it—in terms of the amount of money that people hold in cash, over everything else. We are behind only Germany and Japan in terms of the amount of cash that people hold in savings. Do not get me wrong; we know there is a role for cash savings, but we have to look at the balance between saving in cash and investing in equities. The research by Aberdeen found that, within the G7, UK consumers have the lowest appetite for investing, which is very concerning. Many of us hold all or almost all of our savings in cash. The Financial Conduct Authority reported in 2023 that almost 12 million consumers had more than £10,000 in investible assets held mostly or entirely in cash. Of that group, more than 5 million indicated some appetite to invest. I suppose our job as a Government, and as parliamentarians, is to look at what we can do to give people confidence to take that first step into investing. Of course, the Government understand that people need cash savings for a rainy day buffer. Many of us have those; I lost my seat in 2019, and thankfully I had a cash buffer at that time. Beyond that, there are risks to holding more savings in cash, as I have suggested, given the impact of inflation, and there is an opportunity cost of holding money in cash savings when there are higher returns to be had from investing, and particularly investing in the long term, if that is open to individuals. The Government want more people to take part in capital markets. The hon. Member for St Albans talked about democratising capital markets—I like that phrase; it is a good thing that we can all agree on—and about the benefits from the returns and long-term financial security that investing in those markets can provide. To make that happen, we need to build a stronger investment environment in this country, and a better investment culture that helps people to engage confidently with investing. My hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham and Bletchley made four policy suggestions, which were also mentioned by other hon. Members. I will address in turn. First, he called for reform of the ISA system. There was some debate across the House; there was mostly cross-party support for that proposal, but it was nice to see some discussion and constructive disagreement between the Liberal Democrats and my hon. Friend. He suggested that we should consolidate and simplify ISAs, while the hon. Member for St Albans suggested that we should ensure the choice remains available. We said in the spring statement that we are looking at options for reforming ISAs to get the balance right between cash and equities. I cannot comment on any tax changes or changes to the ISA or savings landscape today, but I can say to the hon. Lady that we will take representations into account very seriously. I will say—I think for the third time in this speech—that cash savings obviously play an important role in ensuring that people have a financial buffer in case something goes wrong.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source

  More

  The Government are committed to supporting people to save and invest, and we want to build a better investment culture. Currently, 85% of people with savings income do not pay tax on it. As we announced at the Budget from next month, we will expand the help to save scheme to all universal credit claimants in work.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, but I am sure not the last, Ms Jardine. Government amendment 1 ensures that the Bank of England will have the flexibility to use the mechanism provided in this Bill in a broad range of circumstances. It does that by removing the provision added in the other place that prevents the Bank of England from using the new mechanism in relation to firms that have been directed to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, also known as MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities. I will also speak to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, which aims to ensure that the mechanism is used only for small banks. I appreciate that this issue is of interest to many hon. Members, as we discussed it on Second Reading, and also to those in the other place, where it was debated. However, the Government’s position on the matter is clear: as I set out on Second Reading, the intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily to support the resolution of smaller banks. The Government reaffirmed that position in their draft updates to the code of practice to which the Bank of England must have regard when using its resolution powers, and in the written statement that my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Tulip Siddiq), made to the House on 15 October 2024. The Government appreciate the intent of the amendment passed in the other place and of amendment 3, and are conscious of the intent to preserve flexibility to use the mechanism on firms transitioning towards holding their full allocation of MREL. I also appreciate the remaining key concern that, without restriction on the scope of the mechanism, the Bank of England could use it on the largest banks. I make it absolutely clear that that is not the Government’s primary policy intention. The Bank of England should always, first and foremost, rely on a firm’s MREL resources, ensuring that its shareholders and investors bear the losses, rather than turning to this mechanism. However, having considered the matter carefully, the Government believe that it is still not desirable to limit the mechanism’s scope in the Bill. That would in effect hardwire in legislation the principle that the mechanism is unavailable for larger banks, and it is that hardwiring that the Government are concerned about. As we have seen and experienced, bank failures are highly unpredictable. The Government’s concern is that if the legislation is overly restrictive, that might mean that the mechanism is unavailable in the very unlikely circumstances of large bank failures in which public funds may still be exposed. We must remember, in relation to this Bill, that the primary objective is to protect the taxpayer. The Government consider it important that the mechanism’s use is not overly constrained in the legislation, ensuring that it provides comprehensive protection for public funds—that is, the taxpayer. To explain the Government’s thinking on this issue in more detail, I will make three points. First, there may be very limited circumstances in which the flexibility to use the mechanism on larger firms would help to protect public funds. The largest and most complex firms are required to hold additional resources to be bailed in—known as MREL—which aim to provide a robust level of self-insurance for larger firms. The Bill’s mechanism can be used only where a firm is transferred to a buyer or a bridge bank upon failure—something that is not envisaged for a large bank, which is expected to be bailed in instead. To take the points together, large banks should therefore have sufficient of their own resources to meet their recapitalisation costs, and the mechanism is unlikely to be available for use on large banks, even with the scope in the Bill remaining broad. However, it is theoretically possible that circumstances could emerge for which a larger bank is not sufficiently resourced, although these are highly unlikely. One example would be if the firm were subject to a large redress claim, resulting in a higher recapitalisation amount than envisaged. Another example would be if the market value of the firm’s assets changed over time. That could result in more losses than expected at the point of failure—again, resulting in a higher amount of recapitalisation. Those examples, however unlikely they may be, show that there is a clear benefit in having the flexibility to source additional resources from the mechanism, having already written down the firm’s available MREL. Restricting the scope in the Bill would prevent the mechanism from being available in these types of scenario, leaving public funds and therefore the taxpayer exposed instead. Secondly, I reiterate that the Bank of England would first look to write down or otherwise expose to loss available MREL and would then consider use of the mechanism only if a sale to a buyer or transfer to a bridge bank were needed. Funds from industry are therefore not expected to be used to cover a large bank’s full recapitalisation amount. Instead, they are expected to be needed only for an additional shortfall over and above that which the firm’s resources could fulfil and once these resources have been written down or exposed to loss. Use of the mechanism would simply be a “top-up” to achieve recapitalisation, rather than covering all of a firm’s recapitalisation costs. Thirdly and finally, the Government agree with the intent behind amendment 3, in that it is important for there to be sufficient safeguards to prevent any inappropriate use of the new mechanism on larger firms. I reassure the hon. Member for Wokingham that a range of safeguards is already in place, which the Government believe provide the necessary checks and balances. For example, the Treasury is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers through being consulted about whether conditions for resolution have been met. The Treasury would also need to approve any resolution action with implications for public funds. If the Bank of England requested a large sum from the financial services compensation scheme, which it could not provide through its own resources, it would have implications for public funds, as the financial services compensation scheme would need to borrow from the Treasury. This means that, in practice, Treasury consent would be required if the Bank of England had requested a large sum. The Bill also includes some important mechanisms to ensure transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. For example, the Bill now requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor on the use of the new mechanism, and it requires the Chancellor to lay those reports in Parliament. The Bill also requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees—namely, the Treasury Committee and the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee—following the use of the mechanism. Those measures will ensure that Parliament can scrutinise the Bank of England’s actions in relation to the new mechanism. They were added to the Bill during the debate in the other place. I hope that my explanations go some way to providing reassurance that the Government’s approach is the right one, and that ultimately, flexibility in the legislation is better for economic and financial stability, and for limiting the risk to public funds, which is what the Bill is all about. As a result, I hope that hon. Members can support the Government’s amendment, and I ask the hon. Member for Wokingham not to press his amendment.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Finance Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  These clauses make changes to pension schemes established in, or administered by, persons resident in European economic area states and bring them in line the rest of the world. Currently, individuals can transfer some or all of their UK pension savings to an overseas pension scheme, provided it is a qualifying recognised overseas pension scheme. Certain transfers to such schemes are subject to the overseas transfer charge, which is a 25% tax charge on the value of the transfer. However, provided they do not exceed the overseas transfer allowance, UK or EEA residents are excluded from this charge for transfers to qualifying overseas pension schemes in the EEA and Gibraltar. That exclusion was introduced to comply with EU fundamental freedoms that were in place at the time. As a result, some pension scheme members can benefit from double tax-free allowances by taking tax-free entitlements from both their UK scheme and their qualifying overseas pension schemes. The changes made by clause 32 remove that exclusion from the overseas transfer charge for transfers from 30 October 2024. As a result, transfers will be subject to the overseas transfer charge unless another exclusion applies—for example, if the transfer is to a scheme established in a country where the member is a resident. That will reduce the number of tax-free transfers made and help to keep up to £1 billion of pension savings in the UK over the next five years. Clause 33 concerns the requirements for schemes to be considered as overseas pension schemes and recognised overseas pension schemes. When the UK was a member of the EU, the requirements for schemes based in the EEA were different from those for schemes based in the rest of the world. The changes made by clause 33 mean that a non-occupational pension scheme established in the EEA must be regulated by a pension schemes regulator in that country—provided there is such a regulator—to be considered an overseas pension scheme. If there is no such regulator, the scheme provider must be regulated for the establishment and provision of the scheme. Furthermore, to be considered a recognised overseas pension scheme, a scheme based in the EEA must be established in a country with which the UK has either a double tax agreement that allows for exchange of information or a tax information exchange agreement. The changes will take effect from 6 April 2025. They will align the requirements for schemes in the EEA with those for the rest of the world, and bring the requirements for non-occupational schemes in line with those for occupational ones. Clause 34 concerns the requirements on administrators of UK registered pension schemes. Under the existing rules for such schemes, the scheme administrator can be a resident in the EEA, which can make enforcement of tax debts from the scheme difficult and costly for HMRC. The changes made by clause 34 would mean that, from 6 April 2026, all scheme administrators of UK registered pension schemes will need to be UK residents. That requirement will support HMRC’s enforcement activities, as there will be a UK resident for it to engage with. In conclusion, the changes made by these clauses will bring the tax treatment of transfers to EEA and Gibraltar pension schemes, the conditions that EEA overseas schemes need to meet, and the requirements for EEA administrators of UK schemes in line with the rest of the world. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Finance Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. I hope to answer all of them and, if I do not, I promise to write to him with clarification. He asked some questions about the number of individuals. I can tell him that in 2023-24, there were 7,100 transfers to qualifying recognised overseas pension schemes, and the value of those transfers was £1.14 billion. There is an increasing risk that these transfers were being made tax free and that some of these individuals would have been benefiting from the double tax-free allowances. I note the hon. Gentleman’s support for eliminating the risk of that and not allowing people to benefit from double tax-free allowances, which is obviously the main intention of these clauses. He asked about HMRC being prepared and the operational challenges that it might face as a result of the changes. Treasury Ministers and officials work very closely with HMRC—we are in the same building—and these changes have been drafted and consulted on with HMRC, so I suspect that I can reassure him that everything is in order.

• 23 Jan 2025 · High Streets: Autumn Budget 2024 · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Member pre-empts my next sentence, so I thank him for that. We have committed to reforming business rates, because we need a fairer system, fit for the 21st century. That important part of our reforms and plans will, I hope, benefit the businesses that the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted spoke about.

• 22 Jan 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability. The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House. The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest. The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system. The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK. At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm. As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution. Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution. The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism. The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies. Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish. Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice. Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice. There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position. However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism. More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism. The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Inflation: Pensioner Living Standards · Hansard source

  More

  Due to the Government’s steadfast commitment to the triple lock, pensioners will see an above-inflation increase of 4.1% in their state pension next year, which means that they will be up to £470 better off—and, over the course of this Parliament, over £1,900 better off.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

  More

  I place on record my thanks to the 160 local authorities that have worked with the Department for Work and Pensions to raise awareness of applying for pension credit, and also to the various charities around the country that have worked with us. The number of people claiming pension credit has doubled—a record number—and we are processing those claims at pace.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my hon. Friend for that question, which is indeed an interesting idea. It is one that was put forward recently by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and I will consider it. In the pension schemes Bill, which we will introduce next year, low earners with multiple small pots will have those pots consolidated, so that the money works better for them and gives them a better retirement in the future.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for that question. A number of ideas have been put forward by think-tanks and research institutes. One such idea is a sidecar savings account, which could be used for a pension, but could also have some money set aside for a rainy day should somebody fall into debt. We are considering that. He raises a very important question, because some of those on low incomes sometimes cannot afford to put in those contributions, but there may be a way between opting out and remaining in the scheme, and we are looking at that.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

  More

  Due to the introduction of auto-enrolment, which is at least one policy that has cross-party support—it was legislated for by the last Labour Government and was taken forward by the coalition Government—there has been a 92% increase in the number of employees saving into a workplace pension scheme since 2012, which is over 10 million people saving for a pension who were not saving previously.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

  More

  Indeed, we have taken forward the biggest awareness campaign for claiming pension credit that has ever been seen. We are determined that those on the lowest incomes should claim pension credit and be awarded it, which will passport them to winter fuel payments and other related benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

  More

  Under the last Conservative Government, an estimated 880,000 of the poorest pensioners eligible for pension credit were not claiming it. We have launched the biggest ever pension credit awareness campaign and written to 120,000 pensioners on housing benefit, urging them to apply. As a result, claims for pension credit have more than doubled, and those who receive pension credit will also receive winter fuel payments and other related benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

  More

  The Government remain absolutely committed to supporting low-income pensioners. We are supporting them through the household support fund, which local authorities can use to help people on the lowest incomes with their bills. The Minister for Energy Consumers, my hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Miatta Fahnbulleh), has also raised £500 million from energy suppliers to help those most vulnerable consumers in debt. We also have the warm home discount and the warm homes plan to help those on low incomes to heat their homes.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

  More

  Claims have more than doubled—they have increased by 145% since late July—and we are working at pace to process those claims. We have deployed an additional 500 staff to ensure that those on the lowest incomes get the pension credit that they need.

• 3 Dec 2024 · Support for Pensioners · Hansard source

  More

  I am a Minister in both the Treasury and the DWP, so I have conversations with officials about this all the time. We are absolutely determined that those who are eligible for pension credit should be aware that they can apply for it, given our big campaign to raise awareness—only last week we launched a TV campaign on the issue. We have also deployed an additional 500 staff to process those pension credit claims. Thanks to our campaign there has been a 145% increase in the number of claims, which is why the processing is taking a little longer, but we are absolutely focused on speeding it up and ensuring that those who are eligible receive the help they need.

• 3 Dec 2024 · Support for Pensioners · Hansard source

  More

  Thanks to our steadfast commitment to the triple lock, more than 12 million pensioners will benefit from a 4.1% increase in their state pensions next year, and over the course of this Parliament they will be better off by £1,900. Pensioners also benefit from free bus passes, eye tests and prescriptions.

• 12 Nov 2024 · Social Security Advisory Committee: Winter Fuel Payment · Hansard source

  More

  I do apologise for the delay in responding to the committee’s letter; it is regrettable. The initial delay, as I set out, was because we were waiting for the OBR to come forward with its costings of the policy. Then there was another, unexpected delay. There has been a delay— [ Interruption. ] I do not know why I am being heckled; I am trying calmly to explain why there has been a delay, for which I do apologise. We will issue a response very shortly, and certainly by the end of the week. It is important that we respond to that letter. I respect that the hon. Lady is asking that question. Regarding the public sector equality duty, we have done everything in line with the duty, which is to provide an equality analysis of the decision that we have taken. As hon. Members will know, that analysis was published in September. However—I say this gently—after the election we found ourselves in a situation of having a £22 billion black hole, with Treasury reserves spent three times over. The OBR has said that its assessment of the previous Government’s Budget would have been materially different had it known the pressures on spending and the real situation in the Treasury. I note that the hon. Lady does not come with an apology. We have had to take the decision to means-test winter fuel payments. We did not want to do that, but we have had to take some difficult decisions to clear up the mess, to tackle our fiscal inheritance and to start rebuilding our public services, which pensioners across the country and many others rely on.