Emma Reynolds MP: speeches

Speeches

• 22 Jan 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend flatters me. It is not that easy to explain in simple terms, but I will do my best. Essentially, if a small bank is in trouble, it is better for it not to go into insolvency but instead to go through resolution to protect its depositors. In the case of SVB, only 14% of deposits were covered by the financial services compensation scheme, because the scheme only covers deposits up to the £85,000 threshold. Had public funds been required to facilitate the sale of SVB to another purchaser—in this case it was HSBC, but it could have been another institution—it would have had recourse to public funds. We are seeking to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in all our constituencies are on the hook for the failures of small banks. Where a bank has high-quality assets, which was the case for SVB, we can avoid the insolvency situation and pay out to depositors who have deposits above the £85,000 threshold. That resolution would be funded by the financial services compensation scheme and ultimately the banks, which contribute to the scheme through a levy. I hope that answer helps my hon. Friend—I am sorry that it was a bit long. Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. We have to bear in mind what we are seeking to do, which is ultimately to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure that we do not have to have recourse to public funds.

• 22 Jan 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability. The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House. The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest. The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system. The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK. At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm. As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution. Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution. The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism. The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies. Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish. Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice. Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice. There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position. However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism. More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism. The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Money Laundering in Retail Businesses · Hansard source

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  It is right that we take a robust approach to money laundering, and we have a tailored approach to cash deposit limits to reflect the differences in needs and risk profiles across businesses’ customer bases. I am committed to working with the Financial Conduct Authority and others to ensure we strike the right balance—one that allows businesses to continue their operations but also ensures that we assess the risk posed by those who might be using their businesses to launder money.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Money Laundering in Retail Businesses · Hansard source

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  This Government are committed to tackling money laundering. Money laundering through cash-based high street businesses is a known issue, and the Treasury works closely with law enforcement agencies to monitor trends in criminality and ensure resources are deployed towards the most significant threats.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Money Laundering in Retail Businesses · Hansard source

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  We take this issue very seriously. The Treasury owns the money laundering regulations, but the FCA has a key role as a major supervisor, and we work very closely with the criminal enforcement agencies. Of course, those agencies are independent, but we are absolutely committed to clamping down on money laundering.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I am always happy to meet my hon. Friend, who is a near constituency neighbour. We absolutely agree that retail investment is crucial. I want more progress on the advice guidance boundary and targeted support. I will be working closely, in my new role, with the Financial Conduct Authority to take that forward.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  It is our view that it is absolutely right that the Bank of England has operational independence. That is in line with international standards and what is happening in jurisdictions around the world, including in the United States and the eurozone.

• 20 Jan 2025 · Draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024 · Hansard source

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  I cannot speak for the independent Bank of England, so I gently suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that if he has questions or concerns about the timing of the issuing of a press release on the Friday in March 2023, he should convey them to the Bank of England. I will take up the right hon. Gentleman’s recommendation to look into the issue more closely, but I also gently say to him that—due to the work of officials in the PRA, the Bank of England and indeed the Treasury—overall we had a good outcome, because by the Monday morning, before the markets opened, we had a smooth transfer from SVB UK into HSBC. My point is that in the end depositors were in a much better position on the Monday morning than they had been on the Friday; regardless of the choreography, we got to the right outcome in the end. I think that there has been consideration of the resolution process, although not necessarily of the timing of the events mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. Indeed, on Wednesday, myself, the shadow Minister—the hon. Member for Wyre Forest—and other hon. Members here present will debate the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill on Second Reading. That Bill has already been through the Lords. It seeks to ensure that in cases such as this one, we are protecting taxpayers. Indeed, what was good about this case was that SVB UK was in a relatively good economic position, but I could envisage a situation where that was not the case, and we will discuss such issues on Wednesday. I commend the order to the Committee. Question put and agreed to.

• 20 Jan 2025 · Draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. The draft order relates to the 2023 resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK. It confirms that the former shareholder of SVB UK, which was the Silicon Valley Bank US parent entity, is not entitled to compensation following the transfer of the bank’s shares to HSBC UK Bank plc. The order has already been approved in the House of Lords. In early March 2023, SVB UK experienced severe financial distress, resulting in rapid deposit outflows. That crisis, originating from its US parent entity, quickly spread to its UK subsidiary. By Friday 10 March, the Bank of England, acting as the resolution authority, declared its intention to place SVB UK into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful new information. Over the subsequent weekend, a private sector purchaser was identified. On Monday 13 March, the Bank of England exercised its power under the Banking Act 2009 to transfer the shares of SVB UK to HSBC UK Bank plc. The action was taken following consultation, with the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England reaching the judgment that the resolution conditions set out in the Banking Act had been met. The Banking Act requires HM Treasury to make a compensation scheme order when the private sector purchaser power is exercised. This order is a mechanism to establish in law what compensation, if any, is due to former shareholders of the resolved firm. The Bank of England undertook a provisional valuation when placing SVB UK into resolution. That valuation found that SVB UK’s shareholder would not have made any recoveries had the firm been placed into a bank insolvency procedure. The shares had no value at the point that the firm was transferred and therefore no compensation is due to SVB UK’s former shareholder. The Bank of England then commissioned an independent valuation of SVB UK, which confirmed that no compensation is due to the previous shareholder of SVB UK. The order before us today confirms in law the findings of those valuations: that the former shareholder of SVB UK is not due any compensation. I thank all staff of the PRA and the Bank of England’s resolution directorate for the swift and effective action they took regarding SVB UK, and indeed officials and Ministers at HM Treasury at the time. They worked tirelessly over the course of that weekend to deliver a solution that protected financial stability and achieved the objectives of the special resolution regime. The resolution of SVB UK shows that the UK’s resolution regime works well, as well as the importance of the UK having the necessary tools to handle bank failures effectively. The transfer of the firm to HSBC UK was a good result for SVB UK’s customers, who retained access to their money and the banking services they relied on; for taxpayers, with the firm being stabilised without any use of taxpayer support; and indeed for the UK economy, with the UK’s vibrant technology and innovation sector protected from severe disruption. The compensation scheme order for SVB UK is a necessary step to formalise and conclude the resolution process, and to confirm that no compensation is due to the former shareholder. This decision is based on thorough valuations and adheres to the legal framework established by the Banking Act 2009. I thank the Committee for its attention and welcome any questions that the shadow Minister or other hon. Members may have regarding this matter.

• 20 Jan 2025 · Draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024 · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, for his kind words—we will be spending a lot of time together this week. I also thank him for what he said about shareholders and the principle of risk and return. We know that there is a correlation between the risk taken and the return due, but that does not always work out. Proportionate regulation encourages considered risk-taking, which we are in favour of; we want to see entrepreneurship in our economy. Maybe this is a more philosophical debate that we could have on another occasion, but I agree with a lot of what he said about shareholders providing scrutiny. We certainly should not criticise them for being shareholders, because we need good shareholders for the functioning of the economy. Let me turn to the remarks of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire and attempt to answer all of his questions. Obviously, I was not in the Treasury that weekend—one of his colleagues was—so if he wants a very detailed description of those events, he probably should speak to the shadow Business Secretary, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). That is my first recommendation. Secondly, there is certainly no litigation in this case. It is for the Bank of England, as the independent regulator, to weigh up and balance the different trade-offs involved in this sort of decision making. I cannot speak for the Bank of England, but I point out to him that only 14% of deposits would have been covered by the financial services compensation scheme. He might think that that would have been a better eventuality.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Inflation: Pensioner Living Standards · Hansard source

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  Due to the Government’s steadfast commitment to the triple lock, pensioners will see an above-inflation increase of 4.1% in their state pension next year, which means that they will be up to £470 better off—and, over the course of this Parliament, over £1,900 better off.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Inflation: Pensioner Living Standards · Hansard source

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  We will not reconsider that decision, because as a result of the £22 billion black hole that we inherited from the Conservative party, we have had to take tough decisions in a very tight fiscal environment. However, my hon. Friend has given me the opportunity to remind people that they have until Saturday to make a pension credit claim, which can be backdated and will passport them to winter fuel payments and other related benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Inflation: Pensioner Living Standards · Hansard source

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  The Chancellor launched a landmark pensions review in July, which I am leading. It has two objectives: to boost returns for future pensioners, so that when they save into private pensions, they get better returns, the likes of which we see in Australia and Canada; and to boost investment in the UK economy.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I was the first Minister for eight years to meet the WASPI campaigners to listen to their concerns. The ombudsman took six years to investigate six cases. We are working at pace on this issue. We hope to come to the House soon—if the hon. Gentleman will listen to my answer—to update him and the public on what we will do next.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I place on record my thanks to the 160 local authorities that have worked with the Department for Work and Pensions to raise awareness of applying for pension credit, and also to the various charities around the country that have worked with us. The number of people claiming pension credit has doubled—a record number—and we are processing those claims at pace.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for representing the concerns of his constituent. The Department is working closely with the Pensions Regulator. We are looking to gather information on the number of schemes that provide discretionary increases on pre-1997 benefits and those that do not. At the moment, the trustees of those schemes have discretion over the decision to index those benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  There are unfortunately many such cases in which people are preyed on by scammers. I would be happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the case further.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for that question, which is indeed an interesting idea. It is one that was put forward recently by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and I will consider it. In the pension schemes Bill, which we will introduce next year, low earners with multiple small pots will have those pots consolidated, so that the money works better for them and gives them a better retirement in the future.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for that question. A number of ideas have been put forward by think-tanks and research institutes. One such idea is a sidecar savings account, which could be used for a pension, but could also have some money set aside for a rainy day should somebody fall into debt. We are considering that. He raises a very important question, because some of those on low incomes sometimes cannot afford to put in those contributions, but there may be a way between opting out and remaining in the scheme, and we are looking at that.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Pensions Auto-enrolment: Lower Earners · Hansard source

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  Due to the introduction of auto-enrolment, which is at least one policy that has cross-party support—it was legislated for by the last Labour Government and was taken forward by the coalition Government—there has been a 92% increase in the number of employees saving into a workplace pension scheme since 2012, which is over 10 million people saving for a pension who were not saving previously.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

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  Indeed, we have taken forward the biggest awareness campaign for claiming pension credit that has ever been seen. We are determined that those on the lowest incomes should claim pension credit and be awarded it, which will passport them to winter fuel payments and other related benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

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  The Scottish Government have been given a record settlement in the recent Budget. As the hon. Member knows, winter fuel payments and other benefits are devolved to the Scottish Government.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

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  Under the last Conservative Government, an estimated 880,000 of the poorest pensioners eligible for pension credit were not claiming it. We have launched the biggest ever pension credit awareness campaign and written to 120,000 pensioners on housing benefit, urging them to apply. As a result, claims for pension credit have more than doubled, and those who receive pension credit will also receive winter fuel payments and other related benefits.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

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  The Government remain absolutely committed to supporting low-income pensioners. We are supporting them through the household support fund, which local authorities can use to help people on the lowest incomes with their bills. The Minister for Energy Consumers, my hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Miatta Fahnbulleh), has also raised £500 million from energy suppliers to help those most vulnerable consumers in debt. We also have the warm home discount and the warm homes plan to help those on low incomes to heat their homes.

• 16 Dec 2024 · Winter Fuel Payment: Pensioner Poverty · Hansard source

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  Claims have more than doubled—they have increased by 145% since late July—and we are working at pace to process those claims. We have deployed an additional 500 staff to ensure that those on the lowest incomes get the pension credit that they need.