Emma Reynolds MP: speeches

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Speeches

4 Mar 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source
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I am happy to meet the hon. Lady and look at the case she mentions, because I need to get more detail.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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The Government are committed to supporting people to save and invest, and we want to build a better investment culture. Currently, 85% of people with savings income do not pay tax on it. As we announced at the Budget from next month, we will expand the help to save scheme to all universal credit claimants in work.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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That sounds like a criticism of the previous Government. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that we are committed to innovation and to DIGIT.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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Cash savings provide a vital source of savings for a rainy day, and we recognise that. Equally, we want to build a better investment culture in our society, so that it is not just the 8% of people who can afford financial advice who can have the opportunity of better rewards by investing in British companies and others in our economy.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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I think that premium bonds do provide excitement, not least in my parents’ household, where they are very popular. They are already well promoted and popular, and we have seen annual investments in premium bonds increase by more than 50% since March 2019. The funds raised through them go towards supporting vital public services.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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I could not agree with one of my predecessors more. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. It is a great scheme and now that we are expanding it, we will take that opportunity to promote it better.
4 Mar 2025 · Saving · Hansard source
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We are committed to promoting savings and investment, as I said in an earlier answer. One measure we are looking at is the Financial Conduct Authority’s review of the advice guidance boundary. As I said in a previous answer, I do not want it just to be the 8% of people who can afford financial advice who reap the rewards of investing in our economy. We keep all taxes under review.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I thought that was what the shadow Minister was saying, but it is good to get some clarification. I think I am not the only one who was a little confused. As I said in my opening remarks, we do not support the amendment that the hon. Member for Wokingham tabled, but I understand the intent behind it and the concern that the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley raised. A couple of other issues were raised; they go slightly beyond the bounds of the Bill, but I will respond to them anyway. As the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley knows, there is a consultation by the Bank of England on the MREL thresholds. That consultation closed recently and, as he would expect, the Treasury is working very closely with the Bank as it looks through the feedback to that consultation. That is not in the substance of this Bill, but it is a relevant consideration and I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we are working closely with the Bank on this issue. I hope that I have addressed the concerns raised by Opposition Members, but I am sure that they will tell me if I have not done so.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I will briefly speak to clauses 6, 7 and 8, which cover the more technical aspects of the Bill. Clause 6 makes amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It ensures that, where the FSCS makes a recapitalisation payment to the Bank of England, its ability to levy the banking sector is extended to cover such a payment. This is key to recouping the FSCS’s funds, and thus achieving the Bill’s aim of reducing potential risk to public funds in a resolution. The clause also stipulates that credit unions are exempt from levies for this purpose, which I am sure Members will agree is a sensible and proportionate approach, given that credit unions are out of scope of the resolution regime. The rest of clause 6 makes minor amendments to existing legislation. It clarifies that a recapitalisation payment is not classed as a management expense of the FSCS, and it clarifies that payments that are made in error, in connection with the recapitalisation funds provided to the Bank of England, can be levied for, which is consistent with the approach for the other statutory functions of the FSCS. Clause 7 makes amendments to the Banking Act 2009. It makes it explicit that funds provided by the FSCS, in resolution in connection with the new mechanism, would not count as extraordinary public financial assistance, reflecting that the new mechanism is intended to reduce risk to the kind of public funds described within this definition. The clause allows the Bank of England to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when calculating the extent to which certain liabilities are bailed in, when the Bank of England exercises its bail-in tool alongside executing a transfer. Without this, the Bank of England would not be able to consider the funds provided by the FSCS in instances where it exercises its bail-in tool. That might mean that the Bank of England would have to continue to write down certain liabilities, potentially including uncovered deposits, where doing so could negatively impact and destabilise the continued operation of the failed firm. Clause 7 also gives the Bank of England the express ability to require the failing firm to issue new shares, allowing FSCS funds to then be used to pay for those shares, thereby injecting the funds into the firm. This will ensure that the Bank of England can move swiftly to recapitalise the failing firm. The clause also ensures that funds provided by the FSCS can be taken into account appropriately when deciding whether sale proceeds or compensation are due to those who owned the firm before it was transferred. This would avoid including value that was contributed by the banking sector in any assessment of the compensation payable to former shareholders and creditors, which would clearly be inappropriate and increase the cost of compensation to taxpayers. Finally, clause 7 disapplies a requirement for the Bank of England to notify the Treasury as to whether a certain condition for providing financial assistance to a failing firm has been met, otherwise known as the 8% rule. The 8% rule states that resolution financing arrangements may be used only where the shareholders and creditors of the bailing institution have made a contribution equal in value to at least 8% of the institution’s liabilities. The Government have disapplied that requirement in their updates to the code of practice, as it is unlikely that the condition could be met by small banks since they will not hold sufficient loss-absorbing resources to reach the threshold. As such, the statutory notification requirement is redundant. Finally, clause 8 sets out the procedural matters of the Bill, which I trust will cause no concern to hon. Members. At this point, I should note the Government’s second amendment, which removes the financial privilege amendment inserted in the other place. That is standard procedure and I trust that hon. Members will raise no objections. I hope hon. Members agree that the clauses are sensible provisions to ensure that the Bill works as intended and, as such, I commend them to the Committee.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Growth and competitiveness—
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I commend the Bill to the Committee.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 21, leave out subsection (3). This amendment would remove subsection (3), which prevents recapitalisation payments from being required where the Bank has directed a financial institution to maintain an end-state minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities exceeding minimum capital requirements.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Growth and competitiveness are fundamental priorities for this Government. Financial and economic stability are essential for growth and lie at the heart of the Bill. Risks to financial stability arising from bank failures, and the disruption they cause to continuity of critical services, can be seriously detrimental to growth and competitiveness. It is an obvious point, but one of the principal ways in which the authorities can impact economic growth is by maintaining financial stability. Amendment 4, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, seeks to ensure that the Bank of England considers competitiveness and growth when using the new mechanism in the Bill. It does so by introducing a new objective that the Bank of England would need to consider alongside the special resolution objectives. This objective would be to facilitate the international competitiveness and growth of the UK economy, subject to aligning with relevant international standards. The Government resist the amendment because we believe that, while well-intentioned, it may have profound consequences. I should start by noting that the aim of the Bill is to enhance the resolution regime, but in a way that avoids making more fundamental changes to the regime and the way in which the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers. As I said to the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley previously, this is more of a significant tweak than an overhaul, which it certainly is not. That is because the Government consider that, broadly, the regime works well, as demonstrated by the successful resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK. The Government believe that attaching a new objective such as this to the use of the mechanism in the Bill could complicate matters for the Bank of England in using the mechanism alongside its stabilisation powers. This is the key argument: we know that, when managing a firm failure, the Bank of England may need to take a decision at pace in a highly complex and uncertain environment. That is distinct from the regular policymaking of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority, which of course have a secondary growth and competitiveness objective—for which there is cross-party support—but one that is applicable in the context of their general rule-making and policymaking roles. It would be quite different to say that this objective should apply to the Bank of England when taking urgent crisis management action in relation to an individual distressed or failing firm. That reflects the different nature of the decisions that regulators take compared with the resolution authority, which has to act quickly and decisively in a crisis. It is therefore important that the Bank of England, as the resolution authority, has a clear and unambiguous basis on which to make such decisions. The Government believe that the special resolution objectives already provide that. As Members will appreciate, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure, and that any impacts on growth and competitiveness are properly considered. The Government believe that the existing framework strikes the right balance. I would add that the question around how the Bank of England and others support growth and competitiveness is a complex matter, and it is not one that the Government believe should be, or can be, addressed in the Bill. I hope that I have provided a helpful explanation of the Government’s view on this issue, and I respectfully ask that the hon. Member for Wokingham withdraws his amendment.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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As we have already discussed in considering Government amendment 1, as well as amendments 3 and 4, clauses 1 and 4 introduce the recapitalisation payment mechanism that is the core of the Bill. Clause 1 inserts a proposed new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which will allow the Bank of England to use funds provided by the FSCS to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution. This proposed new section also allows the FSCS to levy the banking sector to recover such funds. Finally, the proposed new section requires the Bank of England to consult the FSCS before requesting funds, and it specifies the type of firms in the scope of the Bill. Clause 1 therefore gives the Bank of England the necessary power to protect taxpayers from risk when certain banking institutions fail. In turn, that will allow the Bank of England to protect financial stability, which of course supports the Government’s top priority of growth, by strengthening our economic stability. As has already been debated, clause 1 has been amended to remove a limitation on the scope of the mechanism, which was introduced in the other place. The Government are of the firm belief that, while this mechanism is not intended to be used for large banks, the unpredictable nature of bank failures warrants appropriate flexibility for the Bank of England to ensure that taxpayers and financial stability continue to be comprehensively protected. Clause 4 sets out that the Bank of England must reimburse the FSCS for any funds the latter provided that are not needed to cover the relevant costs of resolving an institution. This includes funds that were not required, either because the costs and expenses were lower than the Bank of England expected or because the Bank of England recovered some funds during the resolution—for example, through the sale of the institution. This will provide clarity on how excess and recovered funds should be dealt with, and it provides a mechanism for ensuring that the FSCS does not contribute more than is necessary in support of the resolution. This is important to ensure that the mechanism works as intended, and that there is a process for returning funds to industry where possible. Together, clauses 1 and 4 form the backbone of the Bill and put in place the mechanism to further protect taxpayers from risk. I therefore commend both clauses, as they now stand, to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 1, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Reporting Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I think we will get on to the amendment on growth and competitiveness i n the next stage of line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Question put, That the amendment be made.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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May I also take the opportunity to thank the officials of the House and you, Ms Jardine, as well as the Treasury officials who have worked so hard on the Bill? We still have some stages to go, but it is an opportune moment to do that. Question put and agreed to. Bill, as amended, to be reported.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Clauses 2, 3 and 5 relate to the reporting and accountability requirements on the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism. The Government added these clauses to the Bill in the other place, reflecting the understandable concerns raised about how the Bank of England will be held to account when using the new mechanism. Together, they aim to ensure that there is effective transparency and scrutiny when the mechanism is used, helping to provide important assurances following a resolution to the Chancellor, Parliament, industry and the public. Clause 2 requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor following its use of the mechanism. These reports must relate both to the exercise of the mechanism and the stabilisation option it is used in connection with. The “final report” produced by the Bank of England is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the mechanism, with the content and timing of the report to be specified by the Treasury. As alluded to in the published draft updates to the Bank of England’s code of practice, the Government expect such final reports to include a number of important points: first, an explanation of the choice to use the new mechanism; secondly, how the resolution conditions and objectives were considered and given regard to; thirdly, an assessment of the costs of using the mechanism compared with placing the firm into insolvency; and finally, an explanation of why any ancillary costs were considered reasonable and necessary. Clause 2 also requires the Bank of England to produce an interim report within three months of using the mechanism, if the final report has not been provided within that period. This guarantees that scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions takes place in short order after a resolution involving the mechanism. The Chancellor will be required to lay any reports before Parliament, ensuring that there is appropriate transparency and accountability regarding the use of the mechanism. The Chancellor, however, will have the discretion to omit certain information from such reports when they are published if doing so is deemed to be in the public interest—for example, if reports contain commercially confidential information, or if disclosure could potentially frustrate an ongoing resolution process. Clause 3 requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the Treasury Committee of this House and the Financial Services Regulation Committee of the other place as soon as is reasonably practicable after the recapitalisation mechanism has been used. This means that Parliament will be engaged promptly following the use of the mechanism. Finally, clause 5 requires the Government’s code of practice, which sets out how the resolution regime is expected to work in practice, to include guidance on the contents of the reports of the Bank of England, which it is required to produce under clause 2. Clause 5 places an important obligation on the Treasury to ensure that there is transparency over what the Bank of England should expect to include in such reports. At this point, I note that the Government published draft updates to the code of practice, which set out the sorts of things that are expected to be included in reports by the Bank of England. For example, reports would be expected to include an explanation of the choice to use the recapitalisation mechanism, as well as an assessment of the costs of using the mechanism compared with putting the failing firm into insolvency. The Government will issue a full update to the code of conduct in line with the provisions in the Bill that are coming into force. As mentioned at the start, these clauses provide important clarity for the Bank of England, industry and Parliament on the accountability mechanisms that apply when the recapitalisation mechanism is used. I therefore commend clauses 2, 3 and 5 to the Committee.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, but I am sure not the last, Ms Jardine. Government amendment 1 ensures that the Bank of England will have the flexibility to use the mechanism provided in this Bill in a broad range of circumstances. It does that by removing the provision added in the other place that prevents the Bank of England from using the new mechanism in relation to firms that have been directed to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, also known as MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities. I will also speak to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, which aims to ensure that the mechanism is used only for small banks. I appreciate that this issue is of interest to many hon. Members, as we discussed it on Second Reading, and also to those in the other place, where it was debated. However, the Government’s position on the matter is clear: as I set out on Second Reading, the intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily to support the resolution of smaller banks. The Government reaffirmed that position in their draft updates to the code of practice to which the Bank of England must have regard when using its resolution powers, and in the written statement that my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Tulip Siddiq), made to the House on 15 October 2024. The Government appreciate the intent of the amendment passed in the other place and of amendment 3, and are conscious of the intent to preserve flexibility to use the mechanism on firms transitioning towards holding their full allocation of MREL. I also appreciate the remaining key concern that, without restriction on the scope of the mechanism, the Bank of England could use it on the largest banks. I make it absolutely clear that that is not the Government’s primary policy intention. The Bank of England should always, first and foremost, rely on a firm’s MREL resources, ensuring that its shareholders and investors bear the losses, rather than turning to this mechanism. However, having considered the matter carefully, the Government believe that it is still not desirable to limit the mechanism’s scope in the Bill. That would in effect hardwire in legislation the principle that the mechanism is unavailable for larger banks, and it is that hardwiring that the Government are concerned about. As we have seen and experienced, bank failures are highly unpredictable. The Government’s concern is that if the legislation is overly restrictive, that might mean that the mechanism is unavailable in the very unlikely circumstances of large bank failures in which public funds may still be exposed. We must remember, in relation to this Bill, that the primary objective is to protect the taxpayer. The Government consider it important that the mechanism’s use is not overly constrained in the legislation, ensuring that it provides comprehensive protection for public funds—that is, the taxpayer. To explain the Government’s thinking on this issue in more detail, I will make three points. First, there may be very limited circumstances in which the flexibility to use the mechanism on larger firms would help to protect public funds. The largest and most complex firms are required to hold additional resources to be bailed in—known as MREL—which aim to provide a robust level of self-insurance for larger firms. The Bill’s mechanism can be used only where a firm is transferred to a buyer or a bridge bank upon failure—something that is not envisaged for a large bank, which is expected to be bailed in instead. To take the points together, large banks should therefore have sufficient of their own resources to meet their recapitalisation costs, and the mechanism is unlikely to be available for use on large banks, even with the scope in the Bill remaining broad. However, it is theoretically possible that circumstances could emerge for which a larger bank is not sufficiently resourced, although these are highly unlikely. One example would be if the firm were subject to a large redress claim, resulting in a higher recapitalisation amount than envisaged. Another example would be if the market value of the firm’s assets changed over time. That could result in more losses than expected at the point of failure—again, resulting in a higher amount of recapitalisation. Those examples, however unlikely they may be, show that there is a clear benefit in having the flexibility to source additional resources from the mechanism, having already written down the firm’s available MREL. Restricting the scope in the Bill would prevent the mechanism from being available in these types of scenario, leaving public funds and therefore the taxpayer exposed instead. Secondly, I reiterate that the Bank of England would first look to write down or otherwise expose to loss available MREL and would then consider use of the mechanism only if a sale to a buyer or transfer to a bridge bank were needed. Funds from industry are therefore not expected to be used to cover a large bank’s full recapitalisation amount. Instead, they are expected to be needed only for an additional shortfall over and above that which the firm’s resources could fulfil and once these resources have been written down or exposed to loss. Use of the mechanism would simply be a “top-up” to achieve recapitalisation, rather than covering all of a firm’s recapitalisation costs. Thirdly and finally, the Government agree with the intent behind amendment 3, in that it is important for there to be sufficient safeguards to prevent any inappropriate use of the new mechanism on larger firms. I reassure the hon. Member for Wokingham that a range of safeguards is already in place, which the Government believe provide the necessary checks and balances. For example, the Treasury is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers through being consulted about whether conditions for resolution have been met. The Treasury would also need to approve any resolution action with implications for public funds. If the Bank of England requested a large sum from the financial services compensation scheme, which it could not provide through its own resources, it would have implications for public funds, as the financial services compensation scheme would need to borrow from the Treasury. This means that, in practice, Treasury consent would be required if the Bank of England had requested a large sum. The Bill also includes some important mechanisms to ensure transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. For example, the Bill now requires the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor on the use of the new mechanism, and it requires the Chancellor to lay those reports in Parliament. The Bill also requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees—namely, the Treasury Committee and the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee—following the use of the mechanism. Those measures will ensure that Parliament can scrutinise the Bank of England’s actions in relation to the new mechanism. They were added to the Bill during the debate in the other place. I hope that my explanations go some way to providing reassurance that the Government’s approach is the right one, and that ultimately, flexibility in the legislation is better for economic and financial stability, and for limiting the risk to public funds, which is what the Bill is all about. As a result, I hope that hon. Members can support the Government’s amendment, and I ask the hon. Member for Wokingham not to press his amendment.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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Coming on to the amendment, I am a little bit confused by the shadow Minister, because he rightly says—I agree with him about this—that it would not have been possible to use a negative SI, for example, during the weekend when everything was happening with Silicon Valley Bank. The Government at the time and the Bank of England rightly moved during that weekend to reassure the markets and everything was sorted, really—well, I say everything was sorted, but there was still more to do. However, the big decisions were made over that weekend. If the Government had to lay an SI in order to give the Bank the permission to do that, it would not have been a good scenario. I think the shadow Minister is saying that he will back the other amendment, but not this one. I am a bit confused by his position.
11 Feb 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Dorking and Horley for their contributions. Let me turn to the last point made by the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley and the first made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, the shadow Minister: the Government continue to have confidence in the regime for managing the failure of larger, more complex banks. The bail-in regime remains the right strategy for such firms to ensure that a firm’s shareholders and investors, rather than taxpayers, are on the hook if it fails. The hon. Member for Dorking and Horley asked why we are doing this now, The reason we are doing this now is, first, the lot opposite started it—and we agree with them. [ Laughter. ] No, to put it more formally: the previous Government started down this track of reviewing what happened with Silicon Valley Bank. Rightly, in our view, they looked at what happened over that weekend; the shadow Minister has mentioned this. The case of Silicon Valley Bank shows us a couple of things, and we were keen to learn lessons from it. First, the resolution regime works pretty well. However, we were fortunate that Silicon Valley Bank was an attractive proposition to HSBC. In the end, therefore, although these things are never easy, there were officials in the Treasury and the Bank who worked all weekend, and Ministers were involved; one of them is now a shadow Minister and one of them is a Back Bencher. However, if SVB had not been an attractive proposition, things might have been different. And this measure is to protect the taxpayer in that scenario. We do not wish to throw all the pieces up in the air and see where they land; we are not doing a wholesale reform of the resolution regime. This is an important tweak but, in the scheme of things, a relatively minor tweak to what is a much broader regime to deal with these circumstances. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley. And we note that he had nothing to do with the global financial crash. [ Laughter . ]
6 Feb 2025 · Low-income Countries: Debt Cancellation · Hansard source
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I am not sure that is something we are actively considering, but I will check and write to the hon. Gentleman. In December 2024, we were the first country to publish our self-assessment against the G20’s operational guidelines for sustainable financing. In line with those guidelines, we publish annual reports on the total stock of debt owed to the UK, including reports on our new sovereign lending transactions. Finally, we are committed to provide sovereign financing on sustainable terms, adhering to the OECD’s sustainable lending principles. My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green also suggested creating a private sector transparency register. The UK supports all initiatives to improve debt transparency and is open to considering proposals for such a register. We also acknowledge the ongoing work by Georgetown University in this area. The UK has led the way in promoting debt resilience through the introduction of contractual innovations, an approach that the IMF has found to be working well. Under our G7 presidency in 2021, the UK developed two contractual innovations together with private sector stakeholders. The first relates to external shocks, which my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green mentioned in his speech. Climate resilient debt clauses help to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable countries by suspending debt repayments in the wake of external shocks, which frees up fiscal space for the country. The UK has led the way by including CRDCs in our own lending and calling for all lenders to adopt CRDCs by the end of this year. Second, the UK helped to develop majority voting provisions, which are for use by the private sector specifically for syndicated lending. MVPs allow a majority of creditors to bind the minority to the terms of a restructuring and thereby mitigate the risk of a minority of creditors holding out in a restructuring scenario, which hon. Members mentioned in their contributions, and enable more efficient debt restructuring processes. On Monday, at her speech at the London Stock Exchange, the Minister for Development, my right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), announced that the FCDO will provide technical assistance for borrower countries that intend to include majority voting provisions in their contractual agreements with private sector lenders. I will now turn to a couple of questions that were asked during the debate. I apologise if I do not get to answer all the questions in the time available; I promise to write to hon. Members if I do not get to all of them. My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green asked about reforming the governance of international organisations. We agree that more needs to be done. First, we must change the international financial system in order to deliver a fairer deal for developing countries, including by using our board seats at the IMF and the World Bank, for a bolder approach on unsustainable debt. Secondly, we need to ensure that our system is more representative of those most in need, so we will make the case for not only fairer outcomes, but fairer representation in how we represent them. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton, asked whether the Government would return to spending 0.7% of GDP on development, which the last Labour Government were very proud to commit to and reach. This Government remain committed to restoring ODA spending to 0.7% as soon as fiscal circumstances allow. Although the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts show that the tests have not yet been met, we continue to monitor these forecasts closely and remain one of the top ODA providers in the G7. There were a number of questions about climate, including from my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill, and I want to make a few comments about that. To strengthen the resilience of vulnerable countries and free up fiscal space when responding to shocks caused by climate change, the UK has led the way in encouraging the broader adoption of climate resilient debt clauses, which suspend debt repayments, on a cost-neutral basis, in the wake of exogenous shocks. We welcome creditors who have committed to providing CRDCs, and encourage others to follow suit. My hon. Friend also said that the common framework should be expanded to middle-income countries and offer an automatic suspension for countries that apply for restructuring. The UK is fully committed to making the common framework a success. We support expansion of the framework to middle-income countries and providing automatic debt standstills for countries that apply for restructuring under the framework. We continue to push for those reforms in the G20. I hope that answers her question on that point. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Romford, for his contribution—I think this is the first time that we have debated this way. He asked about reassurance on sound economic policy and preventing corruption. We agree that any lending and policy must be agreed on a sustainable basis. First, the scale of debt treatments is set under the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis. Secondly, the UK is committed to acting in an open and transparent way, as we have shown by publishing our own self-assessment against G20 guidelines. The hon. Gentleman asked a number of other questions. He was talking about open-ended commitments and sustainability. I think we all agree we want to reduce the reliance of low-income countries on foreign debt. That is what this debate is about, and we want a sustainable solution. He asked about the role of China specifically. I am happy to write to him, in a follow-up to his questions, on that. All I will say now is that it is really important that we work with all international partners on this issue, because only by working multilaterally will we have success in the sense of providing sustainable solutions. We do not think we can act alone. I thank all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions during today’s important debate. Together with the international community, we must work actively and urgently in order to address the significant debt challenges faced by vulnerable countries, and the Government are committed to doing just that.
6 Feb 2025 · Low-income Countries: Debt Cancellation · Hansard source
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Thank you for calling me, Ms McVey. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, and I am sure not the last. I thank the hon. Member for Southgate and Wood Green (Bambos Charalambous) for drawing attention to these issues and for bringing this debate on debt cancellation to Westminster Hall today. I also thank the other Members, whose speeches have made for a rich discussion on this issue. I will mention them briefly and then hope to come to everyone’s questions, should time allow. I thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for his kind words about my appointment—I am still early in my time in this role. I also thank him for underlining the importance of the role of charities in the development work that they do in low-income and vulnerable countries. My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Dr Sandher) spoke with great passion about his experience working in Somaliland. He brings great insights to the House after working in that capacity previously. I thank the hon. Members for Melksham and Devizes (Brian Mathew) and for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding) for stressing that the UK needs to restore our leadership on international development. I will come to some of their questions later in my contribution. I also want to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) for raising crucial points about the situation that many low-income countries vulnerable to the impacts of climate change find themselves in. I will say a little more about that, too. The Government are highly concerned by the debt challenges faced by many low and middle-income countries, with 3.3 billion people living in countries that spend more on servicing their debt than on health or education—a point made by many hon. Members. Among low-income countries, 10 are currently in debt distress and 25 are at high risk, and there is an urgent need to address the vulnerabilities. As a Government, we are fully committed to tackling unsustainable debt burdens in a way that supports development needs and helps countries address those vulnerabilities. We are acting in three key ways. I will attempt to answer questions, particularly from my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green who secured the debate, when discussing the three key ways. The first is on addressing liquidity challenges; the second is on ensuring effective debt restructurings; and the third is on promoting debt resilience. First, on addressing liquidity challenges, we are working with international partners to address immediate liquidity pressures facing many countries, which are crowding out vital spending on climate, health and education. We support the IMF and World Bank’s three-pillar approach, which is designed to support countries with high debt repayments. The first pillar is focused on action from vulnerable countries to improve revenue mobilisation and implement sound economic policies. The second focuses on ensuring that countries receive new flows of finance at concessional rates from international financial institutions and other development partners. The final pillar looks at providing case-by-case action to reduce the cost of existing debt burdens where needed. Secondly, we are working to address debt vulnerabilities through improving the effectiveness of debt restructurings for countries in debt distress. The G20 common framework remains the best mechanism for co-ordinating debt restructurings to address unsustainable debt burdens, but further progress is needed. The UK is working closely with the G20 and other international partners to ensure the framework delivers more timely, orderly and predictable debt restructurings. I know that is high on the priority list of the South African G20 presidency this year. The UK will be pressing for rapid implementation of the lessons learned from the common framework, which were agreed under the Brazilian presidency of the G20 last year. The private sector, which has been mentioned by many hon. Members, must also play its part in debt restructuring efforts. We are actively engaging with private sector partners—for example, through the global sovereign debt roundtable—to ensure continued private sector support for addressing the debt challenges faced by countries, leveraging the City of London’s leading role in sovereign debt markets. Several Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green, mentioned the issue of private creditors and whether we needed legislation to force them to participate. The Government are not currently seeing evidence that private creditors are refusing to participate in debt restructurings. Recently, private bondholders have agreed to debt treatments for common framework countries, including Zambia and Ghana. We are working closely with the private sector through bilateral meetings, engagement with representative institutions and Paris club discussions. Hon. Members also raised the issue of comparable treatment by private creditors. I reiterate that both Zambia and Ghana have reached agreements on debt restructurings with their private bondholders. Official creditors have deemed these comparable with their own restructurings. My hon. Friend the Member for Southgate and Wood Green raised the need for UK leadership on debt relief, and we heard that from others, too. I highlight that the UK has a strong track record of pushing for effective and holistic solutions to debt challenges, including supporting the IMF’s three-pillar approach for countries facing liquidity challenges and pushing for more effective co-operation and co-ordination under the G20’s common framework. The UK also co-ordinates debt treatment through our membership of the Paris club and our commitments to the G20 common framework in partnership with other creditors. This is a key point: unilaterally writing off debt owed to the UK would not be in the interests of the UK taxpayer—the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), mentioned the UK taxpayer, of course—which would be subsidising ongoing payments to other creditors if done unilaterally. The Government are therefore working closely with borrowers, official and private creditors, and the IMF and World Bank to strengthen the wider debt architecture and provide timely and co-ordinated restructurings for countries, where needed to support holistic debt sustainability for low-income countries. The third way that the Government are pursuing this issue is through tackling unsustainable debt by promoting greater resilience in debt markets. In response to the shadow Minister, I mention that the UK is committed to provide sovereign financing on sustainable terms and to act in an open and transparent manner to support global debt sustainability. We are playing a leadership role internationally in several key ways. The hon. Members for Melksham and Devizes and for Esher and Walton asked what the UK was doing to provide leadership.
30 Jan 2025 · Finance Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic. The purpose of CBAM, as I have said, is to ensure that if a product is produced using carbon in another country, we do not have leakage across the border. The overall impact will vary depending on the sector’s exposure to CBAM imports relative to the overall input costs and the extent to which it can substitute them. CBAM imports make up only a small proportion—about 1%—of average UK industry input costs. CBAM liabilities are expected to be small initially, and reliance on inputs of goods within scope across the economy is limited overall. I am not sure that I follow the logic that imposing CBAM on imported fertilisers will somehow have the effect that the hon. Lady suggests. The UK emissions trading scheme is the UK’s primary carbon pricing mechanism. The scheme was established to increase the climate ambition of the UK’s carbon pricing policy while protecting the competitiveness of UK businesses. The UK CBAM will be implemented only in sectors where it will effectively mitigate carbon leakage risk and where delivery is deemed feasible. Other sectors that give rise to carbon leakage will be considered for future inclusion.
30 Jan 2025 · Finance Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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Clause 78 legislates for the new rates of the soft drinks industry levy, to apply from 1 April 2025. The levy came into effect in April 2018—it was introduced by the previous Government, with cross-party support—and is considered a successful mechanism for changing behaviour and encouraging reformulation of packaged soft drinks, resulting in reduced sugar content. That is seen through the levy’s significant success in reducing the sugar content in UK soft drinks by 46%. The levy applies to packaged soft drinks containing added sugar. It has a lower rate, which applies to drinks with a total sugar content of 5 grams to 7.9 grams per 100 ml, and a higher rate for drinks with 8 grams or more per 100 ml. Producers, manufacturers and importers of liable soft drinks must register, report, and pay the levy on the volume of liable soft drinks packaged in and imported into the UK. The levy rates have not been increased since their introduction many years ago, in 2018, and so have gradually reduced in value against inflation. In 2018, SDIL made up approximately 11% of the price of a 330 ml can of full-sugar Coca-Cola; in January 2025, it makes up only 6%. Uprating the levy in line with inflation will ensure that it remains effective and continues to encourage reformulation, by protecting its value in real terms. Clause 78 amends section 36(1) of the Finance Act 2017 to reflect the new rates of the levy to apply from 1 April 2025. Those are £1.94 and £2.59, per 10 litres of prepared drink, for the lower and higher bands respectively. The new rates reflect forecasted changes in the consumer prices index in the year to 1 April 2025, as well as an additional increment to help to catch up for previous inflation. The catch-up reflects the 27% CPI change between 2018 and 2024 and will be spread evenly over the five rate increases from 2025 to 2029. That is to support soft drink manufacturers to adjust to the higher rates. The rates have also been adjusted to apply per 10 litres rather than per litre, so that rate changes can be made in smaller increments to reflect changes in CPI inflation more precisely. To illustrate using the current lower rate, 18p per litre becomes £1.80 per 10 litres—I think people could have probably worked that one out. We do not accept new clause 9, which would require the Chancellor to make an additional statement about the impacts of the measure. The Government do not consider that necessary, as a tax information and impact note detailing the anticipated effects of the measure was published at autumn Budget. I would also highlight that the Government are taking a gradual approach to restoring the original real-terms value of the soft drinks industry levy. From 1 April, the levy will still be worth significantly less, compared with general prices, than it was in 2018. Clause 78 will protect the real-terms value of the levy and build on its significant success, by increasing both the lower and higher rates in line with inflation.
30 Jan 2025 · Finance Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source
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In my view, a cryptocurrency is a type of cryptoasset, but I will check that. Question put and agreed to. Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 82 Duty on vaping products

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