Diana Johnson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that. I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated. I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000. Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution. Introducing a requirement to notify the police in writing or orally would add an unnecessary and impractical layer of and risk excluding individuals with legitimate defences simply because they did not, or could not, provide prior notice, and could result in the criminalisation of innocent people on procedural grounds. The current legal framework strikes an appropriate balance between public safety and individual rights. Amendment 51 would undermine that balance without offering meaningful enforcement benefits. New clause 34 seeks to import directly into the Public Order Act 1986 the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. The shadow Minister has indicated that the rationale for the new clause is to seek to mitigate the effects of the Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgment in June 2021. The 2023 regulations amended and clarified the meaning of “serious disruption to the life of the community” for the purposes of the police’s powers to imposes conditions on protests under the 1986 Act. They did so by amending the examples of cases that may constitute serious disruption, specifying that the cumulative impact of protests in the same area, and all relevant disruption, may be considered by police, even when it is not protest-related, when they assess the impact of a particular protest for the purpose of imposing conditions. The serious disruption regulations also defined the term “community”. The example of cases that may constitute serious disruption aligned the use of the term with the definition provided in section 34 of the Public Order Act 2023. The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case established that the protection afforded to protesters by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights extends to circumstances in which the disruption caused by protesters is the intentional obstruction of others. However, the extent of the disruption, and whether it was intentional, are relevant factors in the assessment of proportionality. Let me take the subjects in turn. First, the shadow Minister will be aware that Liberty successfully challenged the serious disruption regulations in May 2024. This Government disagreed with the High Court’s ruling in that case, particularly in relation to the Court’s finding on consultation. Accordingly, we have appealed the Court’s decision, and await the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which is expected shortly. Secondly, the provisions in the serious disruption regulations are not discernibly impacted by the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case. That judgment relates to the reasonable excuse defence, and more recent case law, such as R v . Hallam and Others, has since made clear the limitations of such a defence. I recognise the positive intention of new clause 34 to ensure that the changes made by the serious disruption regulations remain available to police forces in their policing of protests, but we consider that we cannot seek to address the issue—should there be one—until the Court of Appeal’s judgment is received. In short, it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In the meantime, the regulations remain in force until the judgment is handed down. It remains open to the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court’s quashing order, should the judges find in favour of the Government. We will consider our response to the Court of Appeal’s judgment once it is available. New clause 53 seeks to insert a statutory right to peaceful protest into the Public Order Act 1986, by requiring public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. The rights that it outlines are already firmly established in UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with a convention right. Introducing a parallel provision risks legal duplication, confusion and inconsistent interpretation, potentially complicating the enforcement of public order. Rather than adding legal clarity, the new clause might create uncertainty without offering any new protections. I hope that I have been able to persuade Opposition Members that their amendments are not necessary or are premature. I ask that the hon. Member for Windsor withdraws amendment 51.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims. Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence. Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud. Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts. SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities. Clause 80 provides examples of what may be a good reason to possess a SIM farm, including the provision of broadcast services, the operation or maintenance of a public transport service and the operation or maintenance of an electronic communications network. The list of good reasons in subsection (3) is not exhaustive and it would be open to a person under investigation for, or charged with, the offence to argue that they have another good reason for possessing a SIM farm.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day. Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority. A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London. The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both. We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses. Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices. Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft. That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation. Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime. All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime. Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements. The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police. Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen. Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences. The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning. In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police. Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it. Collaborative efforts include significantly boosting data and intelligence sharing to better understand this complex problem, increased police-intensification activities, and ensuring that all parties work together to drive joint solutions. To complement these actions, the legislative reforms in the Bill will enable the police to investigate more swiftly those who conduct mobile phone and other forms of theft. Currently, the police have no general power to enter and search premises solely for the purpose of searching for and seizing stolen property without a warrant. We know that when items can be tracked to specific locations, they are quickly moved on or sold, limiting the window in which the police can act.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully. I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending. These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result. As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers. Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96. Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer. Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it. Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 90 War memorials Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person “wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity” in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that “A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that— (a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality, (b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and (c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”. Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that “the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,” and that “it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”. The majority of protests are peaceful and would not be captured by these clauses. The use of these powers and the management of protests is also an operational decision for the police, and we would expect them to consider the nature of the protest, including those who are likely to be present, before deciding to designate an area using this power. I hope that deals with the point raised about protestors from the Hong Kong community, and of course others. As I have set out, the constable at the rank of inspector who designates a locality must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to notify the public that the designation has been made, the offences created under clause 86, the locality and the period for which the designation will be enforced. Clause 88 sets out the procedure for designation, including what must be specified. Clause 91 is the interpretation section for part 9 of the Bill. In recent years, as a number of Members have said, the police have faced significant challenges in policing large-scale protests. While the majority of those attending these protests are exercising their rights peacefully and within the confines of the law, unfortunately we have seen a minority of individuals behave in a criminal manner while hiding their identity. It is vital that the police are able to identify those who commit criminal offences during the course of these protests, because those who commit criminal offences should face justice for their crimes and because preventing criminality at protests ensures that peaceful protestors and the wider community are protected from harm.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation. We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts. The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them. With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 80 Possession of a SIM farm Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government. Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms. The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement. On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility. Question put and agreed to. Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 10 agreed to. Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 86 Offence of concealing identity at protests

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest. The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work. The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay. The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert “, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”. This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine. In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v . Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business. Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management. The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that. Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority. The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies. Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism. The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO. Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments. New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs. Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people. This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel. Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered. I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert— “(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false. (1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements) , it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.” This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister. Question put and agreed to. Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 130 Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place. Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups. The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence. Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed. As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity. There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism. The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel. Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings. Question put and agreed to. Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 124 Management of terrorist offenders Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”. See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime. The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful. Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation. Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be “just and reasonable to make such an order” against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister. Question put and agreed to. Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).— (Keir Mather.) Ordered , That further consideration be now adjourned. —( Keir Mather .)

• 29 Apr 2025 · Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO. Amendment 53 agreed to . Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert— “‘relevant offence’ means an offence which— (a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021, (b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and (c) is not specified in— (i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or (ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”. This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection. Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert— “(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence— (a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” — (Dame Diana Johnson .) See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54. Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 112 Content of youth diversion orders