David Simmonds MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be. Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to? The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere. There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being. Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it. Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Member give way?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 6 Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor. If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure. We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These amendments concern the remuneration of commissioners and have two purposes. There is a long-established principle within the arrangements for the remuneration of elected officials in local government that an independent panel, which is able to take evidence from the public and other good sources in the local area, will make a recommendation to the local authority about what the scheme of allowances payable should be. That brings a degree of transparency. Councils are currently required to consider the recommendations and to update their scheme from time to time, including voting to renew it each year. That has certain elements. One is whether commissioners—in this case, those who are appointed and are part of a mayoral combined authority—should be eligible for the local government pension scheme. We heard an announcement from the Secretary of State on this issue, and it is the view of the shadow team that it is a sensible step. Changing the local government pension scheme from a final salary scheme to an average salary scheme was led by councillors, and it was instrumental in convincing a very large body of appointed officials to move over to that scheme, saving the taxpayer millions of pounds. However, it is also important that those appointed as commissioners are considered for eligibility and that each mayor is transparent about the recommendations and advice they have undertaken around that. The second point to consider is around remuneration. We often hear it cited that there are people in the civil service, the NHS and local government who are paid more than the Prime Minister, which is used as a benchmark for excessive pay. Whether or not we agree with that—personally, I do not, as I recognise that there is a professional salary structure for these roles, in which those people will participate for the whole of their careers, that is very different from the context for politicians—it is none the less important to recognise that those who are appointed into mayoral roles should be subject to some degree of constraint. As is the case with local government, it seems reasonable that we do not see elected officials appointed on a very significantly higher salary than senior professionals who are advising in the same field. The amendments aim to bring a degree of transparency and rigour to that, and to ensure that, in the potential circumstance where a mayor chooses to stretch the limits of their powers of appointment, shall we say, there is some degree of constraint so that the public can see that the taxpayer pound is being carefully husbanded.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have significant concerns about the import of amendments 82, 76 and 79. We have made a number of references to some interactions with different elements of local government finance, but clearly the measures will open the door to very substantial tax rises through the vehicle of the mayoral precept. Worse than that, they open it up to being used for any purpose, in effect. In the sometimes tense relationship between central and local government, there are disputes about who should pick up the tab—for example, the ongoing debate about asylum costs. That is very much having an effect in my local authority, which has the highest number of asylum seekers per capita of any in the country. Such individuals are only a cost to the local authority, as a result of central Government policy. The Bill opens up the scope for mayors to directly tax people for the purposes of environmental legislation, or social care, which consumes around 70% of the budgets of local authorities, or any other function that authorities may choose to undertake—making Manchester a nuclear-free zone, or whatever it may be—despite the fact that those are not functions that mayors undertake by statute. I am sure we all agree that there should be an opportunity for politicians to speak up, but there needs to be some limit on it.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability. One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve. While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted. We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Again, I seek a point of clarification from the Minister. I understand the purpose of the clause, but clearly there is a distinction between a levy, where it is the constituent authority that is required to pay, and a precept, where it is the taxpayer who is paying for it through their council tax bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify, if necessary in writing, how it will work where there is a dispute about the payment. If we take London as an example, we have a London-wide concessionary travel scheme, but it is has very different application in different boroughs. It is easy to foresee a situation where, particularly if the purpose of the overall transport levy does not benefit the whole of the mayoral combined authority area, there will be a dispute about whether that is an appropriate way forward. Particularly if the levy is large, it would have a significant impact on the budget of the constituent local authority. Can the Minister set out how that type of process will be addressed in practice?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In our consideration of the issue, the Minister is asking the Committee to give a great deal of weight to the meetings she has described having had with various local leaders and Members with particular concerns about the impact on their local areas in terms of national identity, heritage and geography. Will she share with the Committee a little more detail on the substance of those discussions, so that before we vote we can understand what exact assurances may have been given to local leaders and what their understanding of them is, so that we are all completely clear?

• 14 Oct 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.

• 13 Oct 2025 · Private Rented Sector: People Granted Asylum · Hansard source

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  Despite that answer, it is clear that things are getting worse. Our councils are battling with the cost of this Government’s border failures. The 22% rise in small boat arrivals, combined now with Chagossians arriving in rising numbers, throwing themselves at the mercy of our local authorities as they escape Starmer’s sell-out, is stretching council housing budgets to breaking point. The Government have refused to answer my written questions about what financial support they provide to councils housing asylum seekers and refugees who are granted asylum in their areas. Can the Minister tell the House how much of the proposed rise in council tax is for the cost of the Government’s asylum failures, and will he publish the full costs and support in the interests of transparency?

• 16 Sept 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q One of the issues that we aired in the debate when this subject first emerged on the Floor of the House was that at the Government’s chosen footprint of 500,000 minimum population, the Bill implies the abolition of 90% of the local elected representatives in each of those areas. I know the cross-party concerns about the risk of losing that community voice. With your experience at community, district and borough level, it would be helpful for you to spell out what you think is the impact of that potential democratic deficit, especially on contested issues such as planning. Sam Chapman-Allen: You will appreciate how busy your inboxes and mailsacks are, with the casework that you receive daily from your residents. When you begin to remove councillors, that casework does not disappear; it just becomes a bigger challenge for a single councillor. The risk is as we begin to get bigger those mega-councils, and we begin to think about how to ensure that those councillors can represent their communities. Does it become a full-time job? Does it then preclude other people from being able to stand to become community champions? The reason why local government and district councils work successfully, in the same way as London boroughs and Manchester metropolitan councils, is because they are hyper-local. There are circa 200,000 to 350,000 residents per council, and they have local councillors representing a couple of thousand people. As we move forward with mega-councils, the risk is that a single councillor will be representing some tens of thousands. The independent think-tank Localis has done some analysis of the current proposal for a 500,000 threshold. We could see 90% of councillors across shire areas removed overnight. That would be a democratic deficit and an absolute catastrophe. If we look back through the pandemic, as Justin has alluded to, community councillors were out every single day, just as you were as MPs, supporting the most vulnerable, making sure that communities could bounce back and, more importantly, giving support to local businesses to make sure that they could bounce back as well and grow from strength to strength. My concern is that if we begin to move ourselves to a distant model, there will be a democratic deficit and unaccountability, and the ability of a councillor to know that every resident, street, business and community leader will be lost.

• 16 Sept 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This is a question for both of our witnesses. The title of the Bill is the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. Both of you have very deep roots at community level in representing the voices of local people. Could you set out your views about how the measures in the Bill will impact on the ability of elected parish, district and borough councillors to exercise that power, control and voice on behalf of those residents and communities? Sam Chapman-Allen: To start off, at the DCN we are absolutely in favour of devolution as long as it is meaningful for our local community. I think the threat and the concerns that we have so far with what is presented in the Bill is that district councils, which are responsible as the planning and housing authority, have no seat round the table of the new strategic authorities that are being established. If we want to work in partnership with this Government, delivering 1.5 million homes, you need those planning authorities around that table. Beyond that, many things are missing. If we look at what is being devolved from Whitehall and those Whitehall Departments, it is very short in its forthcomings. Some of those powers are just about recentralisation. If we are going to achieve what devolution should be, which is a bottom-up approach where local residents get to shape what their local communities look like, and the centre truly devolving, you need to make sure that those constituent councils—which are the housing authority and the planning authority, and are in control of economic growth—have a seat round that table to drive that agenda forward. Justin Griggs: At the National Association of Local Councils, we have long advocated for a shift of power out of Whitehall and into our communities, but it is important that that devolution goes beyond the regional, sub-regional and principal authority levels, and into communities themselves. That is why we welcome the ambitions, taken together, that the Government have set out in the White Paper and the Bill. They provide some helpful recognition of the important role that parish and town councils play in their communities—as local leaders, with skin in the game, who know their places best, and providing a wide and growing range of hyper-local public services, such as using neighbourhood planning to plan for housing within their areas, tackling the cost of living crisis, stepping up to support communities during the covid pandemic and working with their communities on climate change. However, it is important that the Bill goes further and takes more steps to strengthen communities, and parish and town councils. It is helpful that there are measures in the Bill that seek to strengthen the relationship between strategic authorities, unitary authorities and parish councils. That could very much be strengthened. But there are a number of other areas that the Bill could be strengthening to support parish and town councils to do more for their areas, to work with mayors and strategic authorities, and definitely to support colleagues in principal authorities to deliver public services in what is a very challenging financial environment.

• 16 Sept 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Councillor Hicks, your point about audit is probably a good entry point for my follow-up question. We are aware that a very large proportion, more than half, of education authorities have a council-killing debt associated with the high needs block in their dedicated schools grant. The Committee has received many representations about the indebtedness of some authorities in areas that are proposed to be part of these mayoral combined authorities. Do you feel that sufficient attention has been given, and that there is sufficient assurance in the system that those debts and deficits will not be a financial barrier to delivering the ambitions that you all share for the new authorities? If so, could you tell us a bit about that? If not, how could that be addressed? Kevin Bentley: It is a constant conversation. With the high needs block, you are talking about a system that needs to be changed rather than just an issue at the money end—that is perhaps another conversation for another panel. It needs to be addressed soon for the sake of society. The debt question is a live one. The LGA and constituent councils within the DPP are talking to the Government about debt. Of course, there is good debt and bad debt. Asset debt means that a council is doing things, which is very good, and there are other debts that are not good. We are aware of the councils in that situation. It is a constant conversation. My view has always been that we cannot allow any new authority to start with a major deficit that it cannot cover. We must have that serious conversation with the Government, and we are having those conversations. Has enough attention been given to it? I would like to see more. Bev Craig: That is a fairly consistent point across Local Government Association members. A significant underfunding of local government has built up over the last 14 to 15 years. There is a big job in taking local authorities back from the brink, which is a conversation for another panel. It is one of the reasons why we will continue to make the point that a well-resourced, well-run local authority can transform and change communities, so they need to be resourced in a way that they can do so. Matthew Hicks: I echo that. From the CCN’s perspective, SEND is one of the biggest issues, and the growing DSG debt is a huge issue. The Government have said they are going to look at that imminently, and we would absolutely welcome positive changes. That debt is growing, and it is almost unspoken. It is critical that we understand that debt, but also understand the impact if we were to have fewer unitaries. That debt would be transferred to those new unitaries. How would very small unitaries cope with that?

• 16 Sept 2025 · English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I have a question on accountability for all three panellists. With the proposals for the new mayoral roles and the reorganisation of local government, a key challenge will be ensuring that the mayor, on a large footprint, is accountable at a local level. There are different systems in place in London and Manchester, for example, which are probably the best-known mayoral authorities at the moment. I would be interested in your reflections on what you think works well, and on what challenges the Government might need to fix in this legislation to ensure the accountability is really effective. Bev Craig: Good morning, I am Councillor Bev Craig. I am a Local Government Association vice-chair and leader of the Labour group. I am also the leader of Manchester city council, a city of 630,000 people. In my spare time, I am also the Greater Manchester combined authority deputy mayor for economy, business and international issues. In response to your question, the first thing to say is that, across the Local Government Association, we have been calling for devolution from Whitehall to communities for quite some time. We have spent a lot of time thinking through what accountability looks like in that context. As we move from combined authorities to strategic authorities, it is important to make sure that the Bill reflects not only the competencies of local authorities within new strategic authorities but points of collaboration. For example, in the Greater Manchester system, each of the 10 local authority leaders holds a portfolio. That is perhaps a key difference from the London model, where deputy mayors appointed by the Mayor of London hold a portfolio. From experience, looking across the country, we think it is really important to bind organisations that have different competencies in different areas into the same shared goal in a place. Many of our members have raised with interest what will happen in the move to majority decision making, rather than consensual decision making. From the LGA’s perspective, we have been quite keen to keep that under review. As it currently stands in Greater Manchester, it is consensual decision making that leads us into a place. A model that binds in local authorities from the beginning is really important. Let’s be honest, in my place, we are the ones building homes. My local authority and I are contributing to growing the economy, and Greater Manchester benefits when we work as one. Kevin Bentley: I am Kevin Bentley, the senior vice-chair of the LGA and leader of Essex county council. Also, Matthew is actually the leader of Suffolk county council, not Sussex county council. There is no such authority as Sussex county council, unless something dramatic has happened overnight that we are not aware of—that would be rapid devolution. I absolutely agree with what Bev has said, and we already have that form of scrutiny with police and crime commissioners, and it works well. That works on a model where constituent parts and people who are not necessarily in leadership roles actually have the ability to scrutinise. In the same way, we have scrutiny panels that could hold the mayor to account, which is important. Every action has a consequence, and every action should be challenged on behalf of the public. I absolutely believe there should be good scrutiny of mayors, and I think any mayor would welcome that good scrutiny. Matthew Hicks: I am Matthew Hicks, the leader of Suffolk county council and chair of the CCN since last Wednesday. Sorry I could not be with you today—diaries are still clashing a bit. I agree with my colleagues, as I think it is critical that we look at the mayoral commissioners and ensure they are subject to effective and proportionate scrutiny and accountability. Mayors can be voted out every four years, but genuine democratic accountability is really important. I think having structures in place on scrutiny, overview and audit will be key.