David Reed MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  To start, I reiterate the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) made in his opening speech: we are at a major crossroads in this conflict and the stakes could not be higher. On the line is Ukraine’s sovereignty, the freedom of its people and the wider security of Europe—in truth, the security of all of us. It can be easy in this House to speak in abstractions, such as the rules-based order, hybrid threats or deterrence, but the reality is brutally concrete. When Russia is allowed to advance by force, the consequences do not remain on the eastern flank; they spill into energy markets, cyber-attacks, disinformation and sabotage. Most importantly, they shape the calculations of every hostile actor watching to see what the west will tolerate. We all know that Russia is waging a sustained and hostile campaign against all of us and we must therefore be prepared for long-term tension. The outcome of the war in Ukraine remains central to dealing a decisive blow to that wider threat. I will touch on a number of the points that we have heard from right hon. and hon. Members across the House today, kicking off with the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) spoke powerfully about the lion heart and resolve of the Ukrainian people, talking about their day-to-day life and how they have been attacked repeatedly by the brutal regime in Russia. She talked about energy and the barbaric nature of Putin’s regime and what it is forcing on the Ukrainian people, which needs to stop. She also raised a number of points about the shadow fleet, which I will comment on later. The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary), raised an important question about deployments of British troops to Ukraine. I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s response. The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (David Taylor) spoke of an almost unified position across the House, with the exception of a few parties. I really hope that the parties that do not support that unified approach take a long, hard look in the mirror and work out whose side they are actually on. I want to align myself with the hon. Gentleman’s words about former Defence Secretary Sir Ben Wallace, who played a decisive role in the early few years of the Ukrainian war. The Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), made the point that Ukraine’s fight is our fight—a point that we mainly agree on. We cannot consider giving Putin territory that he has failed to capture over the past four years. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Johanna Baxter) talked powerfully about the 20,000 stolen Ukrainian children. To put that into context, that is 20 schools-worth of children who have been taken over the Russian border. It is a disgusting and almost inconceivable practice, and we must not allow the world to forget what Putin’s regime has done. My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) has raised the issue of Ukraine numerous times over the past few years; I think we can all agree that when he speaks, everyone listens. He raised the diplomatic efforts that Russia is now trying to push along, which are so intense because, I think, it has worked out that militarily it cannot win. We know that is the rule of the game now, so we must increase pressure on the Russians and play them at their own game. The chair of the Ukraine APPG, the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel), talked about the pressure that the Ukrainians are currently under, again referring to heat and energy. I thank him for the work he has done to connect Ukrainian MPs with Members across this Parliament. I know how cold it gets in Arbroath, so when the hon. Member for Arbroath and Broughty Ferry (Stephen Gethins) talks about it getting down to minus 20° in Kyiv and says that it is a bit nippy, I know that he speaks from experience. The hon. Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia) made a number of important points about the fact that we all want peace, but that it cannot be peace at any cost. That is a point that we must continue to discuss. My hon. Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson), who is a former soldier and a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, raised really important questions about the nuts and bolts of the politics. I will discuss troop deployments later in my speech. There were valuable insights and contributions from the hon. Member for Glenrothes and Mid Fife (Richard Baker); from my constituency neighbour, albeit separated by an estuary, the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley); from the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Tom Hayes); from my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), who has done a great deal for Ukraine over the years; and from the hon. Member for Rugby (John Slinger). My hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) talked about the generosity of her constituents who had welcomed Ukrainians into their homes—a story we have heard across all our constituencies—and the hon. Member for Honiton and Sidmouth (Richard Foord), who is also my constituency neighbour and a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, talked powerfully about Russian intent. We all thank the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan) very much for his service and his willingness to deploy if there is a deployment to Ukraine. Lastly, the hon. Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones) talked about war crimes. We need to remember that and enforce the law once there is peace. We all want this war to end, but we have seen delay, obfuscation and maximalist demands from Putin when it comes to peace—a familiar strategy designed to divide allies and buy time. So I say to Ministers: pursue diplomacy, of course, but do so with your eyes wide open. As Churchill warned, “You cannot negotiate with a tiger when your head is in its mouth.” It is important to state that if a weak settlement is reached, it simply starts the clock on rearmament. Putin will not stop. As has always been the case, it is for Ukraine to decide its own future, and any settlement must involve Ukraine, to secure a just and lasting peace under its terms. What matters most is that Putin cannot emerge strengthened. Conceding territory rewards aggression and sets a dangerous precedent far beyond Europe. Nor should Putin’s regime be welcomed back into the international fold, as if this was some sort of misunderstanding. This is a war of choice, an imperial project, and Putin has not abandoned his ambition to subjugate Ukraine. That brings me to sanctions, assets and energy, where rhetoric must now become action. Although we welcome the £2.26 billion loan to Ukraine taken from profits from immobilised Russian sovereign assets, I believe we need to go further—a number of points were made on that today. Several points were made about the Russian shadow fleet, and I welcome the reports that the Government are exploring a clearer legal basis to detain stateless vessels. But what matters now is resolve. Sanctions that are not enforced are not sanctions at all; they are merely suggestions. As the Minister for the Armed Forces and I know all too well, Britain has world-class maritime forces in both the Royal Marines and special forces, with near unrivalled experience in complex boarding operations. We should be working with allies to deter, disrupt and degrade the Russian fleet. A number of unfolding situations are linked to Ukraine. The regime that is currently in power in Iran has been funding the Ukrainian war. Will the Minister say a few words on the unfolding situation in Iran and on UK troops being taken out of middle-eastern bases? I visited the United States shortly before Christmas, and a congressman made a point to me that should land in every European capital: Americans cannot care more about European security than Europeans care about their own security. The gap between ambition and readiness cannot be closed by speeches. We have heard comments today from the Chief of the General Staff about the separation between the strategic defence review and the need to increase defence spending. We must now match moral clarity with seriousness. Putin will not stop because we ask; he will stop when he is made to stop. This is the moment to get real and do the right thing. We stand with Ukraine and we will ensure that Ukraine wins the peace as well as the war.

• 13 Jan 2026 · Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

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  Making the same mistake repeatedly is a form of stupidity. As a country, we keep doing the same thing. If we cast our minds back to the debacle with Huawei, we will remember that we let the Chinese Communist party essentially into our 5G network. We did not listen to our national security advice, but we stopped and pulled back, and we have done the exact same thing with civil nuclear. The Minister has responsibility for this matter; he can step in and pull the plug. At what point will Ministers wake up and realise that we are making the same mistake again?

• 13 Jan 2026 · Storm Goretti · Hansard source

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  I place on record my thanks to the Met Office, which is based in my constituency, for its sterling work throughout Storm Goretti and all year round. It has international expertise and is a real asset to our country. One of the main issues that comes up when we have big storms such as Goretti is rail in the south-west. Our main line from Paddington was cut off, and many constituents from across the south-west were unable to get home. There are practical solutions to put in place, such as a passing loop on the Waterloo line. I have raised that directly with the Rail Minister and the Prime Minister, and although I get warm words, no action seems to be taken. From a Cabinet Office perspective, what more can be done to add resilience to our train infrastructure?

• 13 Jan 2026 · Iran · Hansard source

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  What assessment has the Foreign Office made of the Iranian regime employing foreign militias from countries such as Iraq and Lebanon to crush internal dissent? If that is happening, what is the international community doing to limit this activity?

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way on that point?

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  We talk about sovereign capability, but how can we have fully sovereign capability when we do not own the means of production of most advanced chips?

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  I very much welcome the opportunity to speak on Second Reading. The Bill addresses one of the most defining national security challenges of our age and we have heard many valuable contributions from right hon. and hon. Members across the House. Before entering Parliament, I spent several years working to protect our country from cyber-risks. My background in software engineering gave me a rare view under the bonnet of the systems that now underpin almost every aspect of our daily lives. I saw first-hand how our digital infrastructure works and just how vulnerable much of it remains. I really loved that work, and I am proud to say that as a country we are genuine world leaders, but I would be dishonest if I said that it did not leave me deeply worried at times. That is not because of any single threat or actor, but because of the sheer scale, complexity and relentlessness of the cyber-risks we face. Those risks are only accelerating with advances in artificial intelligence, automation and the advent of quantum computing. Those technologies will, as we have heard today, revolutionise our lives in ways that we are only just beginning to understand. We must adapt alongside them if we are to remain a serious technological and economic power. Our lives are now dependent on digital systems at every level. From water treatment plants and electricity networks, to transport, financial markets, healthcare and the wider economy, it is fair to say that we are no longer merely supported by digital infrastructure, but built upon it. And when those systems fail, the consequences are not abstract. They are immediate, they are human and they can be devastating. We have already seen that reality play out in this country. If we cast our minds back to May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack tore through the national health service. Tens of thousands of computers were infected, and staff were locked out of patient records, diagnostic systems and telephony. Ambulances were diverted, and thousands of appointments and operations were cancelled, including urgent cancer referrals. The estimated cost to the NHS was £92 million, but the human cost—the stress, disruption and loss of confidence—cannot be measured in pounds and pence. The crucial point, which we have heard made in contributions today, is that while the attack was not targeted at the NHS, it was particularly vulnerable, because it was reliant on outdated and unpatched systems, and on the fragmented digital assets it owned. It was a warning shot that should never be forgotten. More recently, the private sector has faced similarly sobering lessons. Capita was recently fined £14 million following a cyber-attack that compromised the data of more than 6 million people. British Airways and Marriott International suffered major breaches affecting hundreds of thousands of customers, resulting in substantial penalties and lasting reputational damage. These are not small firms, but sophisticated organisations with scale, expertise and resources, yet still they were exposed. That is why the Bill matters and why I want to work constructively with the Government to ensure that we get it right first time. Crucially, we must build the ability to adapt and update the framework as technology and threats continue to evolve, while—I refer to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden)—not making that burdensome on businesses and organisations. As the UK’s first piece of legislation to include the words “Cyber Security” in its title, the Bill represents an important step forward. It modernises the network and information systems framework; brings new sectors into scope, including data centres, managed service providers and critical suppliers; strengthens incident reporting requirements; enhances enforcement powers; and allows Government to act decisively—I hope—where national security is at risk. I welcome those objectives and, in particular, the recognition that managed service providers and supply chains are now critical attack vectors. That is absolutely correct. Cyber-threats do not respect organisational boundaries, and our regulatory framework must reflect that reality. However, the Bill must not be treated as some sort of elixir. Cyber-security is not solved by regulation alone. The Bill strengthens protections for critical national infrastructure but leaves significant questions unanswered—questions that we must address if we are serious about national resilience. One of the most pressing concerns raised by industry is the growing complexity of incident reporting. Organisations already face overlapping obligations under data protection law, sector-specific regulation and, soon, economy-wide ransomware reporting requirements. Add to that multiple voluntary reporting channels, and the landscape becomes fragmented and very confusing. Having been a small business owner, I know that, when dealing with marketing, advertising and payments to staff, having extra layers of complexity, with reporting added on, is a difficult position to be in. The first hours of a cyber-incident are chaotic: systems are down, decisions are time-critical and staff are under immense pressure. Forcing organisations to navigate multiple reporting regimes in that moment risks distracting them from the most important task, which, as we all know, is containing the attack and restoring services. A unified reporting framework with a single point of contact and aligned timelines would reduce burdens on businesses, while improving the quality of information available to Government. The Bill should move us closer to that outcome, not further away from it. I look forward to working with the Government at the next stage of the Bill to ensure that happens. We must be honest about the limits of sector-based regulation—the Minister referred to this in his opening remarks. The Bill focuses, rightly, on critical national infrastructure, but many of the most damaging attacks in recent years have occurred outside its scope. Manufacturing, retail and consumer services have been heavily targeted. The attack on Jaguar Land Rover, which many right hon. and hon. Members have referred to today, is estimated to have caused up to £2 billion in economic damage across the company and its supply chain. That is a stark example. I want to put on the record my deep concern about the precedent being set: the British taxpayer is effectively being required to act as insurer of last resort for major companies that have failed to adequately defend themselves. For large firms that are critical to our economy, the expectation that the public will step in cannot become the norm. Responsibility must sit squarely with the boards and executives to invest properly in cyber-security resilience or face the consequences. I am glad to see that the Government have taken the initial steps to have that conversation with industry. At the same time, small and medium-sized enterprises, which make up the vast majority of our economy, are particularly exposed. They often lack the skills, budgets and capacity to implement proportionate cyber-defences, yet they sit deep within critical supply chains. A single weak link can have cascading consequences far beyond the organisation directly attacked. If cyber-security is economic security—I think we all agree that it is—we need a whole-of-economy approach. That means combining regulation with incentives, and support and standards that uplift resilience across UK plc, not just at the very top. That should include stronger, secure-by-design requirements for technology products, embedded through procurement and standards, and practical, accessible support for smaller businesses, potentially including consideration of a national first responder model to help small firms recover quickly from cyber-attacks. We must also address the skills challenge head-on, as cyber skills shortages are already undermining resilience and compliance. If we are to give them more investigatory powers, the regulators themselves will need additional technical and enforcement capacity to deliver the expanded responsibilities set out in the Bill. That capacity cannot be assumed; it must be planned for, funded and developed far in advance. Finally, I want to raise the issue of cyber-crime law. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 dates from a time when fewer than 1% of the population had access to the internet. Its blanket prohibition on unauthorised access fails to distinguish between malicious attackers and legitimate cyber-security professionals acting in the public interest. That matters: vulnerability research and threat intelligence are essential to defending our systems, yet many professionals in the industry operate in a legal grey area when carrying out work that ultimately strengthens our national security. Updating that framework, including by introducing protections for reasonable research, would modernise the law without weakening it. In conclusion, the Bill is an important foundation. It strengthens protections for critical services and sends a clear signal that cyber-security is a core responsibility of the modern state. However, legislation alone will not deliver that resilience; it requires co-ordination, clarity, capability and sustained investment, as well as an honest understanding of where the Bill must be strengthened as it moves through Parliament. Cyber-threats do not stand still, and neither can we. I support the direction of travel set out in the Bill and urge the Government to engage constructively as it progresses so that we can deliver a framework that provides real, lasting protections for our country, our economy and the British citizens.

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  We have talked about the regulators having new powers to designate critical national infrastructure in regard to cyber-security threats, but who actually has accountability? The Bill refers to “regulations made by the Secretary of State.” Which Secretary of State is that, given that this is a cross-departmental and cross-Government approach?

• 5 Jan 2026 · Venezuela · Hansard source

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  I have listened to the Foreign Secretary for the last hour and a half and the Government’s foreign policy position on Venezuela is still completely unclear to me, so I will ask a more direct question: does the Foreign Secretary agree with the United States’ Donroe doctrine?