David Reed MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will speak in support of new clauses 13 and 15. My right hon. Friend has laid out quite a scary case study of what happens when international legal frameworks are used to affect our service personnel. New clause 13 deserves support because it reflects a clear and honest understanding of the legal position. While our long-term view is that the United Kingdom should not remain bound by the European convention on human rights, the reality is that the convention still applies today. Until that changes, the Government have a duty to use every lawful tool available to protect our armed forces, safeguard the national interest and uphold the integrity of operations overseas. The new clause would do that by requiring Ministers to consider derogation when significant overseas operations make it appropriate. This is not an acceptance of the status quo; it is a recognition of the conditions in which decisions are currently made. Our forces operate in dangerous, fast-moving and legally complex environments. They should not be constrained by frameworks designed for peacetime while Ministers fail to even consider whether the convention’s emergency provisions should be engaged when circumstances clearly demand it. Failing to do so is not leadership; it is a refusal to confront responsibility. A Government committed to the rule of law should also be committed to using the law as it is intended. Where a significant overseas operation is under way, the Secretary of State should be required to address the straightforward question: is derogation appropriate in these circumstances? That is a responsible approach. I raise this point because it has happened in recent history. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Government at the time derogated from article 5 of the ECHR, enacting part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which authorised the indefinite detention of foreign national terrorism suspects.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  That is exactly what the hon. Member just said. I will go back in Hansard to check what he just said.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  New clause 9 would provide a clear framework for an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation, training and capability development. The Committee has already considered the counter-drone provisions in the Bill, and we have had a good debate on that. The powers to detect, deter and, where necessary, disable unmanned aircraft that threaten defence sites are welcome and they have our support, but there is an obvious counterpart that has not yet been addressed. If our forces are to counter hostile drone activity effectively, they must also be able to train with, test and refine their own systems without legal uncertainty. That is the gap that the new clause would fill, and it would do so in a proportionate and practical way. It would establish a delegated authorisation process. The Secretary of State could designate authorised individuals within both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence civilian workforce. Those individuals could then approve drone use for defined defence purposes, namely testing, evaluation, training and capability development. Authorisations would have to be set out in writing, except in urgent situations where verbal approval would have to be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Authorisations would be time limited to a maximum of six months and would be granted in line with the established principles of necessity and proportionality. That is a balanced approach. It would ensure accountability through a clear chain of authority and defined limits, without creating unnecessary bureaucracy or introducing sweeping new powers. It would provide a structured basis for activities that are, in reality, already a routine and essential part of modern defence. As we all know, drone capability is no longer a niche area; we see it all around us. It sits at the centre of contemporary warfare. Recent operations in Ukraine have demonstrated how uncrewed systems now shape reconnaissance, strike capability, logistics and force protection. Our armed forces must be able to train continuously with those systems, adapt their tactics and develop their doctrine in step with rapid technological change. At present, the legal footing for such activity lacks clarity, but the new clause would address that. There is also an important industrial dimension. On Second Reading, concerns were raised about limited access to testing environments for small and medium-sized defence enterprises operating in the field. Many of those firms are producing highly effective systems and are contributing directly to allied capability, yet some are questioning whether the United Kingdom offers the right environment to grow and scale. I have seen Members from across the House of Commons raise that issue—namely the hon. Member for Plymouth Moor View (Fred Thomas) and my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), whose constituencies cover the national centre for maritime autonomy. They work hard on these issues because they have engaged with cutting-edge companies that want to go to tests and want to provide for UK defence, our allies and the export market, but are being hampered by regulation on the ability to train their devices. I have experienced that myself in the air. As a former wingsuit skydiver who has seen things from an aerial perspective, I realise how constrained our aerial environment is and how difficult it is to test aerial drones. There needs to be a clearer statutory framework for authorised drone use, which would support closer collaboration between industry and the armed forces. It would signal that the United Kingdom is serious about creating a regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation and supports the development of advanced defence technologies. The new clause is deliberately focused. It would apply to routine activities such as training and testing. It does not extend to wider operational use, nor does it seek to. There is an interesting point to add here about working with the Home Office and police departments, if the Ministry of Defence is not already. Having gone out recently with the Exeter drone units in Devon and Cornwall police, I see that they are going through the same operational issues we are trying to tackle in the defence space. The purpose of new clause 9 is to ensure that the essential groundwork for capability development takes place on a clear and secure legal basis. There is a wider point: legislation must evolve alongside capability. The Bill recognises the changing nature of the threat, and the new clause recognises that our response must also adapt. Effective defence requires practice, experimentation and confidence, built through regular and lawful training. Without that foundation, operational effectiveness cannot be sustained. New clause 10 would introduce a practical and long overdue measure. It would enable authorised defence personnel, whether members of the armed forces or civilian Ministry of Defence staff, designated by the Secretary of State, to designate areas of sea and associated airspace as defence drone offshore areas for authorised unmanned aircraft operations. It would also require that, before any such designation is made, the authorised person must consult the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and any other relevant maritime authority. In addition, it would allow conditions to be imposed on unmanned aircraft operations in those areas. That matters because the context is clear. The Bill already addresses the threat posed by rogue drones to onshore defence sites, and that is welcome. We have seen the facts and figures throughout this Committee: reported incidents near military bases more than doubled last year, rising from 126 incidents in 2024 to 266 in 2025, which is a significant jump. That is a concerning trend, and the provisions in the Bill to allow authorised personnel to respond without waiting for police assistance are both sensible and necessary. However, the threat does not end at the shoreline. Defence activity at sea faces growing exposure. Naval exercises, offshore patrols, protection of undersea infrastructure, amphibious operations and a wide range of authorised unmanned aircraft activities all take place in the maritime environment, where there is currently no equivalent legal mechanism for Defence to designate and manage operational airspace. That gap represents a real vulnerability. Legal uncertainty slows decision making, and delay in the operational environment carries risk. Commanders should not be left in any doubt about their authority to protect personnel and missions when operating offshore. New clause 10 would provide that clarity. It is also important to be clear about safeguards. These are not broad or unchecked powers. Only individuals formally authorised by the Secretary of State may designate such areas. There is a clear requirement for consultation with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other relevant maritime bodies before any designation is made. I have spoken to a few of those agencies throughout the passage of this Bill, and they are fully aware that regulation needs to be tightened up. On a separate matter, it does not seem to be applied evenly across the space. I have done a small amount of paramotoring before coming into Parliament, and doing it in British airspace is almost unregulated, yet we seem to be in a really contested environment for drones, which definitely needs to be opened up. To raise an extra point, I understand the limitations. We are bringing in autonomous systems, and we are not always completely sure how they will behave in the airspace. The current regulation deals with aircraft or maritime devices that are human-operated, so dealing with automation adds extra layers of complication, but it is one of those knotty problems we need to work out. New clause 10 would ensure proper co-ordination and protect both aviation and maritime safety. The ability to impose conditions on operations in designated areas would add a further layer of control. It may be argued that existing maritime or airspace regulations already offer sufficient flexibility, but that is not the case—I refer back to my point about automation. The current framework was not designed with defence unmanned aircraft operations in mind, and the absence of a clear statutory basis creates a gap that could offer areas to be exploited. The Government have taken important steps to strengthen counter-drone capability and protect onshore sites through this Bill. New clause 10 is the logical offshore extension of that work. I now move to new clause 11. The regulatory barriers facing uncrewed systems across the maritime and land domains are significant. They are already harming British industry and slowing the adoption of technologies that our armed forces urgently require. I recently travelled down to Plymouth to meet representatives of a company called MSubs. They have working for them really innovative people—very smart people. They are able to raise funding to grow their company, yet they cannot actually test the equipment that they are trying to build, so they are looking for opportunities to move abroad. I have now heard it said repeatedly that if you want to grow, you have to go. We should not be in that position. We have some of the smartest people in this country. We have brilliant research universities. We should be in a position to offer our defence industry access to those people and give them the opportunity to grow in that space. This new clause is straightforward. It would simply require an annual review of the regulatory framework, with findings reported to Parliament. Given the speed at which the technology is advancing and the rate at which both our allies and potential adversaries are deploying it, that would be a reasonable and proportionate step. The need for such a review is clear. At present, regulation in this area is fragmented. Responsibility is spread across several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Transport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Oversight is further divided among bodies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Military Aviation Authority and Ofcom. Each operates within its own remit, but no single authority is responsible for ensuring that the overall framework supports the development and testing of systems required for defence. In practice, that creates a patchwork that acts as a brake on progress. This issue has already been acknowledged by Ministers. For smaller firms, it is not a minor inconvenience. If a company cannot test its system, it cannot demonstrate its capability, and without that, it cannot secure contracts. The consequence is a loss of both innovation and industrial capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises are at the forefront of innovation in this sector. They are agile, willing to take risks and often responsible for the most promising developments. However, they are also the most vulnerable to regulatory delay. Unlike larger firms, they do not have the extensive legal resources or the financial resilience to withstand prolonged uncertainty. When delays erode limited funding, companies fail. New clause 11 would recognise that reality by requiring any review to assess the impact on SMEs directly. There is also a clear international dimension. Key allies are moving very quickly. The United States is integrating uncrewed systems across its armed forces at scale, supported by a regulatory environment that enables rather than restricts innovation. If we look at the geography and topology of the United States, it has much more airspace and access to a larger maritime area, and I understand that it would be an easier process for the United States to be able to designate an area and do testing. We need to find a similar way to do that here in the UK. NATO partners are developing standards that will shape future interoperability. The United Kingdom has strong advantages, including a world-class defence technology base and a long maritime tradition, but those strengths will translate into success only if our regulatory framework keeps pace. If it does not, companies will either fall behind or choose to develop their technologies elsewhere. We refer back to the point that if you want to grow, you have to go. We need to get out of that mindset as quickly as possible and improve things in this country. For that reason, a requirement to assess developments in allied regulatory frameworks would be particularly important. It would ensure transparency and enable meaningful comparison. Parliament would be able to see clearly whether the United Kingdom was keeping up with its partners, rather than relying on general assurances of progress. The Government have recognised the importance of this agenda, and the creation of a new uncrewed systems centre of excellence is a positive step. However, co-ordination alone is not sufficient. There must also be accountability. New clause 11 would provide that by ensuring regular reporting to Parliament. If the current framework is effective, the review would confirm that. If it is not, Parliament would be informed and the Government would be expected to respond. That would be a realistic expectation and one that supported both our defence capability and our industrial base. New clause 14 would give the Secretary of State the power to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships under domestic law. This is a necessary and forward-looking measure, and one that reflects the pace of technological change and the realities of modern defence. The Royal Navy has long been defined by its ability to adapt. From the wooden walls of a sailing ship to the silent deterrent of nuclear submarines, each generation has embraced innovation to protect our shores and project stability beyond them. We now stand at the threshold of another transformation. Being so close to Plymouth, with the history of that dockyard which has been there for more than 500 years, this new wave of automation coming in and bringing back that cultural heritage is fascinating to see.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Member has a Royal Marines base and a large veteran community in his constituency. This has been an issue, and I want it to be quashed as quickly as possible. If Ministers in the Department for Transport have not been able to confirm it, I really hope that the Minister in this Committee can stand up and say that there is no issue around these points and that the veterans railcard will continue to be in play. Hopefully, we can give it more support through the passage of this Bill so that it has a statutory footing. Without a statutory foundation, Parliament would have no formal role in protecting the veterans railcard; that is the point I am raising. The position is hard to justify when set alongside other concessions in the rail system: discounts for younger passengers, older people and disabled travellers are already underpinned by legislation. The reasoning for that approach is clear and sensible. It is therefore difficult to see why the same principle should not apply to those who are serving, or have served, in the armed forces. If the argument rests on trusted Ministers—I look across at the Minister and he is extremely trustful—that is not a standard applied consistently elsewhere, nor is it one that we should be asked to rely on. The new clause is carefully framed and constitutionally sound. It ensures that any future changes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which is exactly where decisions belong.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I raised a point about clearances when we first started discussing the Bill, and that is one of the sticking points we need to get right. If people have secured security clearances—enhanced developed vetting—in the military, but then go into an organisation that does not hold that clearance and it elapses after three, six or however many months, they are lost. If they then want to go into the defence industry where they might need developed vetting—and we want those people to be going into the defence industry—they have to start the process all over again. They might waste 12 or 18 months, or two years, getting cleared again. Can something be done to hold clearances in a sort of bucket—I know other organisations do that—to make that zig-zag process a lot easier?

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Given that my colleagues have very ably gone through amendments 21 to 24, I will just comment on amendment 20 before handing over to the Minister. Amendment 20 would increase the maximum age for service in the reserve forces from 65 to 67, which is important in bringing the reserves in line with the age of retirement, which now sits at 67. Parliament has decided that is the threshold at which the working life of a British citizen typically ends, and it makes no obvious sense to retire reservists two years before the age at which we expect the rest of the working population to stop. As the Minister and other colleagues have said, the knowledge of a cyber specialist, a military medic or a logistics officer does not expire on their 65th birthday. We are legislating at a moment when the security environment is more dangerous than at any point since the cold war, if not world war two. War has broken out across the European continent, and there are wars in the middle east and across Africa. Technological change is speeding everything up, and climate change is increasing volatility. The threats that we face, whether hybrid, cyber or conventional, are growing in scale and sophistication. The Armed Forces Minister himself, in introducing the Bill’s Strategic Reserve measures, said: “we live in a…fragile environment”, and the United Kingdom needs “to be able to recall experienced people faster and more effectively” should the country need to prepare for war. That is an honest assessment of where we are. If we accept that framing, as I think we should, the case for retaining every capable, willing and medically fit reservist for as long as possible follows directly from it. We should not be narrowing our pool of trained people by two years for no compelling reason. The strategic defence review is explicit that we need to grow the reserves by 20%, but that ambition runs directly against the policy of letting experienced people go earlier than we need to. At a Royal United Services Institute event in December 2024, General Gary Munch described the current approach as “decommissioning” personnel—the same word that we use for retiring ships. He was making a pointed observation: we would not withdraw a capable platform from service simply because it has accumulated years, and we should apply the same logic to people. The amendment would not impose an obligation on anyone; it would remove an arbitrary ceiling. That is a proportionate ask.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  To back up the shadow Minister’s point, I was an air cadet for a number of years —[Interruption.] I know he is laughing at that, but in my experience, it was not about recruitment or a pathway into the armed forces. It was really powerful to have, as a youngster, the opportunity to do adventure training, shooting and flying, and to have a link with the military. As we ask citizens across the UK for more taxes to increase armed forces spend, our young people having that link to the military will be important, so I completely agree with my right hon. Friend.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will just pick up on a point I raised this morning, which I discussed with an hon. Friend who has experience in this space. Take, for example, a crime that is committed while a person is serving that is not serious enough to warrant their being remanded into custody—it goes over the six months because it is a knotty case. Because there is zero tolerance on drugs, someone might say, “Right, this is a knotty case. I am going to get into trouble for it, and I am going to get kicked out regardless, so I will just take some drugs. I will be kicked out within a very short space of time”. If they then let those six months elapse, what is the process for that?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clauses 28 and 29 are practical and proportionate reforms. Clause 28 defines rehabilitation periods for certain service punishments under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Sanctions such as reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority and service supervision and punishment orders will no longer be treated as spent. Again, that is a good approach. Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will expand on clause 30. I pay tribute to my near-ish neighbour in Cornwall, the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, for her work on the issue and how she has progressed it in the House of Commons. I think that clause 30, which will extend the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to include the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reflects a clearer understanding of the role of RFA personnel and the part they play in our national security. It will ensure that those who serve in this unique capacity are afforded a basic safeguard: an independent route through which serious welfare concerns can be raised and addressed. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel. I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important. There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient. Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way. The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege. I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office. Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go. Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one. However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth. These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling. The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Clauses 21 to 24 cover powers to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention. We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 27 aligns the service justice system with the civilian courts and introduces a constructive way for offenders to reduce their disqualification period through completion of an approved course. On our side of the Committee we see that as a practical and proportionate reform that supports rehabilitation, encourages personal responsibility and delivers greater consistency across both systems, and we are happy to support it.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will make that intervention now, and then we can carry on that conversation. If there is zero tolerance of drugs, and if the person who has committed a crime knows they will be kicked out—as they should be—it would be good to hear from the Ministry of Defence if there is a loophole in which someone could say, “I will do this act knowing full well that I will be kicked out very quickly”. It would be good to understand what the process is. Does that person continue to be housed by the armed forces? Where do they stay? Are they still part of their unit? What happens to them?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters. My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people. We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output. Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out. Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate. This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify. Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed. New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence. New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable. The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be. Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter. It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon. The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces. Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere. Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward. I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.