David Pinto-Duschinsky MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Jun 2025 · Serious Fraud Office · Hansard source

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  I am sorry to hear about what has happened to my hon. Friend’s constituents. She is of course right that these kinds of crimes must be investigated—we must see consistent and robust investigation, a point I will touch on later in my speech. The figures are stark. Under the last Conservative Government, fraud surged at every level. Between 2010 and 2024, reported fraud cases in the UK more than doubled, making it the single most prevalent crime type in the country. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, fraud now accounts for more than 40% of all crime. That is more than 4.1 million incidents in 2024 alone—or, put another way, one incident every 10 seconds. It is a sign of how ubiquitous fraud has become that we have almost stopped noticing the fraud attempts we all face every day—the dodgy emails and texts, the suspicious phone calls, the fake listings on online marketplaces. Many of us now just accept the regular attempts to defraud us as part of the weft and weave of modern life. The economic impact has been enormous. UK Finance estimates that more than £1.1 billion was stolen by fraudsters last year, including nearly £460 million in authorised push payment scams. The public purse has also come under attack, with up to £55 billion in public money lost to benefit and procurement fraud and other types of economic crime. But it is not just about the economic cost: the human cost has been enormous too, paid in the currency of suffering and lives turned upside down. It is hard to overstate how shattering fraud is for its victims. This explosion in scams, great and small, has been driven by increasingly sophisticated, increasingly transnational and increasingly organised criminality, and sharpened by rapid innovation and technological evolution. Some 67% of all fraud in the UK is now cyber-enabled. Fraud is no longer just about opportunistic criminals and simple phishing emails; criminals have become highly sophisticated, harnessing the power of technology in alarming ways. The use of artificial technology and deepfake technology is now commonplace, not just in social media, but in the execution of daring scams against major companies. For example, in February last year, a company lost more than £20 million as a result of a chief executive officer scam, where AI was used to fool executives into thinking that they were dealing with their boss. Meanwhile, sophisticated fraud-as-a-service websites such as Russian Coms have helped domestic criminals to use advanced technology to defraud the public. Our institutions are caught in a never-ending arms race against ever more adept and advanced criminality. All too often, the growth of fraud has also been enabled by the inaction of some players across the ecosystem. Banks and financial institutions have generally stepped up their efforts to limit retail fraud, and last year stopped more than £1.4 billion of fraudulent payments, as well as paying out £1.2 billion in compensation. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for major tech companies. They have often failed to take sufficient steps to combat the fraud propagated on or through their platforms and have not put in sufficiently robust “know your customer” and transaction monitoring controls, or even used the systems they already have. Their failure to act has left the social media and online commerce landscape vulnerable and has exacted a large price on others. Law enforcement has also struggled to keep up with the threat. Under the last Government, despite its accounting for almost half of all crime, fraud received only between 1% and 2% of police budgets, and enforcement was often hamstrung by poor infrastructure and limited collaboration between forces. The story on major fraud, bribery and economic crime shows strong parallels. The threat has grown significantly and is increasingly transnational in scope. Just as the authorities have historically struggled against the evolving fraud we see in our daily lives, so the institutions focusing on major fraud and the enforcement of our anti-bribery laws, in particular the SFO, have often struggled as well. I need not rehearse here some of the challenges the SFO has faced with failed prosecutions, insufficient powers, questions over leadership and a lack of resources. However, in recent times under the current Government, we are beginning to see real change. The Government are driving a strategy to tackle the fraud challenge. There is renewed focus on tackling the frauds that affect us all. The police and the National Crime Agency are seeking to invest in increased capacity and strengthen inter-force collaboration to tackle cross-country and transnational threats. Central Government are also strengthening the tools available to combat fraud in the benefit and procurement systems with, for example, the measures in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill, which had its Third Reading in the Commons recently. After years of the previous Government failing to update the powers that Departments such as the Department for Work and Pensions had, leaving them with 20th-century powers to fight a 21st-century problem, this Government are finally getting the modern, anti-fraud tools they need. Critically, the SFO is undergoing positive change. Under new leadership, the organisation has published a five-year strategy focused on upgrading its capabilities, making smarter use of intelligence and driving co-ordinated enforcement. There are more reforms on the table aimed at further improving its reach and effectiveness, from enhancing international co-operation to bringing in financial incentives for whistleblowers. There is of course further to go, but the Serious Fraud Office is evidently becoming more effective, and has recently achieved some notable successes. However, if we are to tackle fraud and economic crime at all levels, these welcome improvements in policy and institutional effectiveness will need to be matched by changes across the whole anti-financial crime landscape. We will need to see stronger partnerships and collaboration, including among the police, better implementation and some actors, especially the big tech firms, stepping up to the plate. Online platforms should, for example, implement effective identity verification for commerce, enhance their monitoring and takedown procedures and, crucially, contribute to compensation when fraud occurs. I am sure that, over the course of the debate, we will hear discussion of many facets of this problem, and I am conscious that I have not had the opportunity in my remarks to touch on issues ranging from the policing of money laundering to making progress on issues such as ultimate beneficial ownership. However, all these points ultimately have in common the essential nature of this fight. This is a national challenge. The human cost of economic crime is devastating. We cannot afford to treat small fraud as trivial, or grand fraud and economic crime as inevitable. Both are corrosive; both must be tackled, and that must be done across Government and in banks, big tech and law enforcement. It is a necessary fight that this Government are already taking on, and a fight we can ill afford to lose.

• 24 Apr 2025 · Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in opposition to amendments 1, 3 and 4. Under the previous Government, the country was subjected to years of economic chaos. This Government have made restoring stability a cornerstone of our strategy to boost long-term growth. Ensuring macroprudential stability, underpinned by an effective recovery and resolution regime, is a key part of that. Changes undertaken in the UK and globally through the Basel III reforms have made our large banks safer and more resilient, and we should welcome that. The reforms have improved solvency and reduced risks for the taxpayer. However, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in 2023 has demonstrated the need for new tools to help minimise the risk to consumers, taxpayers and broader financial stability posed by small bank failures. We need an approach that goes beyond the bank insolvency procedure, and that is why the proposals in the Bill enjoy so much support across our financial services sector, as I know from my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on financial markets and services. But in designing this new approach, we must make sure that the proposals reflect the lessons of experience. In all candour, I am concerned that the amendments do not do that, and will impede the functioning of the new regime, rendering it less effective at moments of crisis. I was an adviser in the Treasury to Alistair Darling during the global financial crisis, when we had to resolve and recapitalise a number of major banks. The action that the Labour Government took then—often in the face of resistance from Conservative Members—helped to save our financial sector from catastrophe and stabilise not just the UK, but the global economy. There are many lessons to be learned from that period, but in relation to the Bill, one stands out. When we had to act to save our banking sector, we learned that successful resolution relies, among other things, on two key factors: speed and flexibility. It was the combination of those factors that was so important in 2008, and since then, I would argue, they have only become more important. In 2008, we watched banks’ liquidity and solvency deteriorate by the day, but now, as the collapse of Signature Bank in the US in 2023 shows, the combination of banking apps and social media mean that a full-scale banking run can develop in hours or even minutes. If we are to resolve banks successfully, regulators must be able to move as quickly. Speed has become more important than ever. So, too, has flexibility. As we see increasing financial innovation and diversification among banks, with new challengers, new forms of institutions and new types of markets and assets emerging, allowing regulators sufficient flexibility has become more essential, not less. The value of flexibility was demonstrated in the case of Silicon Valley Bank’s UK subsidiary. The creative use of powers to resolve that bank through a sale, rather than putting it into the bank insolvency procedure, protected consumers, minimised market turbulence and shielded the public purse. Contrast that with the US regulators’ approach to the parent company, SVB. There, rigidity and a mechanistic failure to apply major bank rules led to failures of regulatory oversight that contributed—as US regulators have acknowledged—to the bank’s failure. I raise this matter because I fear that amendments 1, 3 and 4 will militate against speed and flexibility, and will reduce the effectiveness of the Bill, especially in acute crisis situations. Let me start with proposed amendment 4. This would require the Bank of England to consider competitiveness and the growth impact on the market before directing resolution through the FSCS. However well-intentioned the amendment is, it could have a catastrophic effect. At a time of crisis—policymakers have sometimes just hours to act—it would place a duty on them to make a market assessment, which, by the way, could presumably be challenged. This is simply impractical and could fatally slow down action to restore financial stability. As someone who has sat in the room during a bail-out process, I have to tell the proposer of the amendment that spending time on this kind of exercise during a disorderly bank failure is simply a luxury that we do not have. I am also concerned that such a requirement would have a chilling effect, staying regulators’ hands when they have to act quickly. This could not only increase the risk of disorderly collapse, but raise the cost to the FSCS of a recapitalisation if it does proceed. Experience tells us that the longer we put off a resolution, the more expensive it becomes. This is a recipe for higher risk and higher cost. Moreover, leaving aside the practical difficulties, the underlying logic is flawed. First, in seeking to analyse the market before deciding on whether to resolve an institution or wind it up, we are putting the cart before the horse. Surely a much better course of action is to prevent the potentially disorderly collapse of the institution, and then to work out its long-term future and the role, if any, it should play in the market. Secondly, the amendment fails to take into account other objectives that the Prudential Regulation Authority should properly consider in deciding whether to act, including the protection of retail savers, the prevention of contagion and the safeguarding of macroprudential stability. As drafted, the amendment, however well-intentioned, could distort PRA decision making. Its intentions may be good, but its impact might not be. The same is unfortunately true of amendments 1 and 3. Both seek to circumscribe the use of the FSCS via statute, to prevent it being used to bail out larger institutions. The amendments would rob regulators of the flexibility to use the instrument in unusual or unforeseen circumstances, in the name of solving a problem that does not exist. The powers provided by the Bill are already aimed squarely at smaller banks, and there are various safeguards in the Bill to prevent the use of those powers for larger banks in most scenarios. For example, the Bill states that the FSCS-funded resolution may be used only for institutions that are placed in a bridge bank or transferred to a new institution, and this would not be applicable for larger bank in most scenarios, as they are expected to be resolved through an MREL bail-in. The Bill also provides for de facto Treasury sign off, requires the Chancellor to report to Parliament on the use of the powers and mandates the bank to inform the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees whenever an FSCS-funded resolution is undertaken. As such, it is already well-policed and circumscribed. There is little danger of this approach being regularly or routinely used with large banks. Adding a statutory prohibition on using this approach with firms meeting their minimum MREL thresholds would add little, but it would create risk. My experience in the Treasury during the global financial crisis, and in my work across financial services since then, is that we cannot say that the highly improbable will never happen, and we cannot always predict what form the next crisis will take, or what will trigger it. Conservative Members should surely understand this lesson better than most. After all, it was Liz Truss’s disastrous mini-Budget that sparked market chaos through a product—liability-driven investments—that most people had never even heard of, and were thought to be very stable and low risk. Given this, it would be exceptionally unwise to statutorily bar the Bank from being able to use all the tools at its disposal in exceptional circumstances. There are eventualities that, however unlikely, are possible, such as a well-capitalised bank suffering a very rapid deterioration of its position due to a mass redress event. We must allow the Bank flexibility to access the tools that the Bill provides in exceptional circumstances, in order to ensure stability and protect the taxpayer. We must not bind its hands in a crisis. The power of the Government’s proposals lie in their ability to be deployed rapidly and with flexibility. That is what will give them their traction and help safeguard our financial stability. It is critical that we preserve those facets of the Bill. For that reason, I urge the House to join me in rejecting the amendments.

• 14 Oct 2024 · Reporting Ministerial Gifts and Hospitality · Hansard source

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  If brass neck were an Olympic sport, the Conservatives would all be gold medallists. They presided over a carnival of corruption. Does the Minister agree that it was their partying in Downing Street, their contracts for their mates and their constant failure to deliver that undermined trust in government, and will she join me in calling on them to apologise for their years of mismanagement?