David Chadwick MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I would like to continue the line of questioning on the importance of having a single regulator. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, have recently merged their cyber-security organisations. The Bill introduces expanded but sector-specific reporting requirements, to apply to regulators across different sectors. Do you believe that this fragmented reporting landscape risks preventing Government and regulators from forming a coherent a cross-sector picture of emerging threats—particularly when foreign actors may be probing multiple systems simultaneously? If so, what measures could be taken to mitigate that risk? It strikes me that, if one of the things that this legislation is to guard against is pre-positioning, and there are 14 parallel reporting systems in place, it could be the case that those pre-positioning attacks are not picked up as co-ordinated attacks from another nation state or organisation, because they are not pulled together in time. Natalie Black: I point to my earlier remarks about information sharing. You are right: that is one of the great benefits of the Bill. To be able to do more, particularly when it comes to pre-positioning attacks, is really important. You will have heard from the NCSC, among others, that that is certainly a threat that we are seeing more and more of. At the moment, it is too difficult to share information between us. The requirement to have an annual report to the NCSC is a good mechanism for consolidating what we are all seeing, and then for the NCSC to play the role of drawing conclusions. It is worth emphasising that Ofcom is not an operational organisation; we are a regulator. We look to the NCSC to provide threat leadership for what is going on across the piece. I think that that answers your question about where it all comes together. Stuart Okin: I fully support that. The NSCS will be the hub for that type of threat intel and communications, in terms of risks such as pre-positioning and other areas. The gateways will help us to communicate. Ian Hulme: Bringing it back to the practicalities of instant reporting, you said that there are potentially 14 lines of incident reporting because there are 14 competent authorities. How that can be consolidated is something to be explored. Put yourself in a position of an organisation that is having to make a report: there needs to be clarity on where it has to make it to and what it needs to report.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I have two questions. Why have electoral services provided by local authorities not been considered as critical infrastructure? Kanishka Narayan: As I mentioned at the outset, the scope of the sectors is focused on a specific test: are they essential services, the disruption to which could cause an immediate threat to life or have an extremely significant impact on the day-to-day functioning of the country? I do not mean to diminish the significance of electoral services, but, notwithstanding their significant impact on me as a candidate on election day, the test does not appear to be met.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for joining us. I have a very broad, open question: what other measures, both legislative and non-legislative, could the UK Government take to enhance the cyber-resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure? Chris Parker: That is an excellent question. The good news is that a lot is happening already. An enormous amount of collaborative effort is going on at the moment. We must also give grace to the fact that it is a very new sector and a new problem, so everybody is going at it. That leads me on to the fact that the UK has a critical role in this, but it is a global problem, and therefore the amount of international collaboration is significant—not only from law enforcement and cyber-security agencies, but from businesses. Of course, our footprints, as big businesses, mean that we are always collaborating and talking to our teams around the world. In terms of what the UK can do more of, a lot of the things that have to change are a function of two words: culture and harmonisation—harmonisation of standards. It is about trying not to be too concerned about getting everything absolutely right scientifically, which is quite tempting, but to make sure we can harmonise examples of international cyber-standards. It is about going after some commonality and those sorts of things. I think the UK could have a unique role in driving that, as we have done with other organisations based out of London, such as the International Maritime Organisation for shipping standards. That is an aspiration, but we should all drive towards it. I think it is something the UK could definitely do because of our unique position in looking at multiple jurisdictions. We also have our own responsibilities, not only with the Commonwealth but with other bodies that we are part of, such as the United Nations. It is not all good news. The challenge is that, as much as we know that harmonisation is okay, unfortunately everyone is moving. Things have started, and everyone is running hot. An important point to make is that it is one of the busiest sectors in the world right now, and everybody is very busy. This comes back to the UK having a particular eye on regulatory load, versus the important part that other elements of our society want, which is growth and economic prosperity. We talked earlier about SMEs. They do not have the capability to cover compliance and regulatory load easily, and we would probably all accept that. We have to be careful when talking about things such as designating critical suppliers. All of this wraps up into increasing collaboration through public-private partnerships and building trust, so that when the Government and hard-working civil servants want to see which boundaries are right to push and which are not, bodies such as the UK cyber resilience committee, which Carla and I are on, can use those collaborative examples as much as possible. There is quite a lot there, but something the UK certainly should be pushing to do is culture change, which we know has to be part of it—things have been talked about today by various speakers—as well as the harmonisation of standards. Carla Baker: I think we are in a really interesting and exciting part of policy development: we have the Bill, and we have recently had the Government cyber action plan, which you may have heard about; and the national cyber action plan is coming in a few months’ time. The Government cyber action plan is internally facing, looking at what the Government need to do to address their resilience. The national cyber action plan is wider and looks at what the UK must do. We are at a really exciting point, with lots of focus and attention on cyber-security. To address your point, I think there are three overarching things that we should be looking at. First is incentivising organisations, which is part of the Bill and will hopefully be a big part of the national cyber action plan. We must incentivise organisations to do more around cyber-security to improve their security posture. We heard from previous panellists about the threats that are arising, so organisations have to take a step forward. Secondly, I think the Government should use their purchasing power and their position to start supporting organisations that are doing the right thing and are championing good cyber-security. There is more that the Government can do there. They could use procurement processes to mandate certain security requirements. We know that Cyber Essentials is nearly always on procurement tenders and all those types of things, but more can be done here to embed the need for enhanced security requirements. Thirdly, I think a previous witness talked about information sharing. There is a bit of a void at the moment around information sharing. The cyber security information sharing partnership was set up, I think, 10 years ago— Chris Parker: Yes, 10 years ago. Carla Baker: It was disbanded a couple of months ago, and that has left a massive void. How does industry share intelligence and information about the threats they are seeing? Likewise, how can they receive information about the threat landscape? We have sector-specific things, but there isn’t a global pool, and there is a slight void at the moment.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q We have heard concerns about definitions, particularly regarding incident reporting. What are your observations on the Bill as it stands, and those definitions? Richard Starnes: Throughout my career, I have been involved in cyber incidents from just about day one. One of the biggest problems that you run into in the first 72 hours, for example, is actually determining whether you have been breached. Just because it looks bad does not mean it is bad. More times than not, you have had indicators of compromise, and you have gone through the entire chain, which has taken you a day, or maybe two or three days, of very diligent work with very clever people to determine that, no, you have not been breached; it was a false positive that was difficult to track down. Do you want to open the door to a regulator coming in and then finding out it is a false positive? You are also going to have a very significant problem with the amount of alerts that you get with a 24-hour notification requirement, because there is going to be an air of caution, particularly with new legislation. Everybody and his brother is going to be saying, “We think we’ve got a problem.” Alternatively, if they do not, then you have a different issue.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do you know how you would do that information sharing at the moment? Ian Hulme: As we have already explained, the current regs do not allow us to share the information, which is a bit of a barrier for us. In the future, certainly, we will be working together to try to figure it out. I think that there is also a role for DSIT in that. Natalie Black: First, we currently have a real problem in that information sharing is much harder than it should be. The Bill makes a big difference in addressing that point, not only among ourselves but with DSIT and NCSC. Secondly, we think that there is an opportunity to improve information reporting, particularly incident reporting, and we would welcome working with DSIT and others—I have mentioned the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum—to help us find a way to make it easier for industry, because the pace at which we need to move means that we want to ensure that there is no unnecessary rub in the system.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q This feels like quite a big issue to be flagging up quite late in the day. In terms of the legislative process, do you think there has been a good enough consultation process between Government and business? Chris Parker: The consultation has been a best effort and I think it is a best effort as a function of three things. First, we have a new sector, a new Bill—something very new, it is not repeating something. Secondly, we are doing something at pace, it is a moving target, we have to get on with this, and so there is some compulsion involved. Thirdly, there are already some collaborative areas set up, such as techUK, that have been used. Would I personally have liked to have seen more? Yes—but I am realistic about how much time is needed; when you only have a certain resource, some people have got to do some writing and crafting as well as discussing. One thing that we could look at, if we did the process again, would be more modelling, exercising and testing the Bill until it shakes a bit more—that is something that perhaps we could do, if we were to do this again. With the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, that was done at length and collaboratively with industry, on a nearly fortnightly basis, for some time. Beyond that, I think that we are realistic in industry because we understand the pressures on the people trying to bring legislation in. A second point to remember is that we are all volunteers. Carla and I, and all those on the Cyber Resilience Committee, volunteer away from our day jobs—which are busy—to do all this. There is a realistic expectation, if you like—but I would say there has been a best effort. Carla Baker: I would like to look to the future. We have all the secondary legislation that is coming—and there will be lot—so we recommend early insights, and time to review and consult, in order to provide that industry insight that we are happy to provide. Let us look to the secondary legislation and hope that there is good consultation there.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q What about workforce? One thing we have heard today from the regulators is that they are going to have to expand their teams. Reportedly, there are thousands of vacancies across cyber-security, and there is more regulation coming that they will have to comply with. What should the Government be doing to improve and expand the size of the workforce that is available to do all of this work? Chris Parker: It is a national problem. We have had a lot of discussion on that at the techUK cyber resilience committee. We think it is not just about skills and bunging lots of training at people, because you have to work out cyber as a whole. A very small component of cyber is people at the wonderfully high-tech end, where they are coding and writing software. There are an awful lot of jobs in places out there that a lot of people are just not aware of, and perhaps would therefore not be volunteering or aiming towards it—even at their school. There are lots of jobs in cyber sales, marketing and analysis that do not require a very high level of mathematics, for example. Some of them do not need a very high level of mathematics at all. I think that some awareness needs to be built there. Personally, I would like to see more championing of the people who are in the sector at the moment. We have some fantastic young men and women in the sector, but we also need to make sure they are able to have chartered status. It is out there, now that we are starting, but it needs to gather pace, because we need to make sure these people are represented and feel professional, so that it can be reflected. Another thing to mention is that there is a lot of effort in the cyber growth partnership, which is run through DSIT and techUK. It is initiating an idea where people will be lent from industry into academia, to offer inspiration but also to improve lecture quality and standards, because things move fast and we are running so hot. It is very hard for academia to keep up. There is quite a lot that can be done to increase the workforce and skills, but going back to our original points, with greater public-private collaboration and discussion, we will get it absolutely right on focusing on the right places to spend resources.

• 2 Feb 2026 · Defence Spending: 2030 Target · Hansard source

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  10. If he will make an assessment of the potential merits of holding cross-party talks on reaching 3% defence spending by 2030.

• 2 Feb 2026 · Defence Spending: 2030 Target · Hansard source

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  Britain faces a once-in-a-generation threat to our national security, as Putin’s war continues in Europe and uncertainty grows about the future reliability of the United States. Will the Secretary of State therefore take up the Liberal Democrats’ proposal that we issue time-limited defence bonds? That would allow the public to invest directly in modernising our armed forces, raise billions for new equipment, and ensure strong parliamentary oversight of how the money is spent.

• 28 Jan 2026 · Local Authority Children’s Services · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. For obvious reasons, we often hear in this House about failure, notably in the tragic case raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr Forster)—I congratulate him on securing this important debate—but I will focus on a local authority that has been able to turn its children’s services around. In 2017, a BBC report warned that children in Powys were being put at risk because of serious failings in the council’s children’s services. Inspectors found missed safeguarding opportunities, weak oversight and poor follow-up—concerns so serious that Welsh Government intervention was actively discussed. That history matters, because it gives context to the progress that is now being made. Since 2022, under Liberal Democrat leadership of Powys county council, there has been a focus on rebuilding children’s services from the ground up—strengthening leadership, supporting the workforce and putting children’s safety back at the centre of decision making. That work is now being recognised independently. A recent external assurance review concluded that Powys children’s services are safe and improving, with no serious failings identified. The reviewer specifically highlighted stable leadership, strong advocacy for children through independent reviewing officers, and high-quality performance reporting—precisely those areas that were found wanting in 2017. Staff report feeling supported and proud to work in the service, and Powys social workers and safeguarding professionals have been recognised at regional awards for their work protecting children and involving young people directly in shaping services. No one is pretending that the job is finished. Pressures remain, particularly around funding and placements, but the direction of travel is clear and welcome. Powys has moved from a service once described as putting children at risk to one independently judged to be safe and improving. That is what sustained leadership looks like, and it is a positive example that this House should be willing to recognise. The overlying point is that vulnerable children need a strong state to look after them, and functioning children’s services that keep them safe are essential. That is why I hold the Conservatives and Reform in complete contempt, because they do not believe in our state. They have spent the last 40 years bashing and cutting the state; they attack it over and over again, spreading their cynical poison that a small state is desirable. Well, a small state will end up endangering our nation’s children. It is essential that these services are funded properly and well to keep our children safe. That is why I am proud to be a Liberal Democrat, and I am proud of what Powys county council has achieved over the past few years.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Support into Work: Health Conditions · Hansard source

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  Access to Work is meant to help disabled people to stay in employment, yet numerous constituents tell me they have been waiting more than nine months for an assessment, and a year or more for changes of circumstances. Those delays are putting jobs and incomes at risk. How many people has the Department assessed as losing work because of the delays and what urgent action is being taken to clear that backlog?

• 21 Jan 2026 · Clean Energy Projects · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State has been highly critical of the legitimate concerns that my constituents have raised about the numerous wind farm proposals across mid-Wales. Now the Ministry of Defence has raised its concerns that at least one of the proposed wind farms has the potential to form a physical obstruction to air traffic movements and military activities at the Sennybridge training area. If the Labour Government will not listen to the concerns raised by my residents, will they at least listen to their own military?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Mobile Phones and Social Media: Use by Children · Hansard source

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  Over the past year, I have spoken to hundreds of children in schools across my constituency as part of my safer screens tour. It has been very distressing to hear from them about the material that they have been exposed to, and to hear that social media companies have not come back to them when they have reported this harmful content. If the Secretary of State agrees that there should be a ban on children accessing harmful social media platforms, will the default age for accessing them be 16?

• 19 Jan 2026 · Arctic Security · Hansard source

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  To say the very least, Donald Trump’s actions in Greenland and the related sanctions on the UK are not befitting of a trustworthy ally. Does the Foreign Secretary now accept that President Trump does not respond to weakness, and that, as Canada has shown, we must stand firm against this bullying behaviour and, as the Liberal Democrats have argued for months, work more closely with our EU allies?

• 7 Jan 2026 · Rural Fuel Duty Relief · Hansard source

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  Not a single part of Wales benefits from the rural fuel duty relief scheme, while rural areas in England and Scotland do, simply because of how the previous Conservative Government designed it. Does my hon. Friend agree that that unfair anomaly should be corrected and that the scheme should be extended to places such as Powys?

• 7 Jan 2026 · Meat Exports to the EU · Hansard source

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  I agree with my right hon. Friend. The Government would do well to listen to his wisdom and knowledge, and indeed to that of the farmers, because they are the people experiencing these problems at first hand.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Meat Exports to the EU · Hansard source

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  The economic impact of this issue is being felt across the United Kingdom, and that is because there is still no settled SPS agreement. That has resulted in uncertainty, and uncertainty is poison for trade. Many smaller producers have already been cut out of EU markets, unable to cope with the administrative burden and added cost. There is also a clear imbalance in how trade is being managed. Under the border target operating model, checks are meant to be risk based, yet medium-risk products of animal origin imported from the EU into Great Britain face physical inspection rates of around 1%, while equivalent UK exports to the EU face inspection rates of between 15% and 30%. That is not a level playing field. It places heavier costs on UK farmers, while leaving them exposed to unfair competition from imports. That imbalance is compounded by repeated delays to the UK’s own border controls. The transitional staging period for the border target operating model has been extended again, this time to January 2027—the sixth delay already. Farming unions have warned that, without effective border checks, the UK remains vulnerable to animal disease. Those concerns have been echoed by Parliament’s own Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee. None of this is accidental. These barriers exist because the UK chose to leave the single market. That choice was driven by a Conservative party that was willing to sacrifice British farming, and it was championed by Reform, who promised farmers frictionless trade while delivering friction at every stage of the export process. Welsh farmers were told that they would keep their markets, that nothing would change for them and that they were taking back control, but what they got was more paperwork, higher costs and fewer buyers. In Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, farming underpins entire communities. When lamb exports become uneconomic, investment stalls, confidence drains away and young farmers begin to question whether there is a future for them. Rural Wales is hollowing out through constant, grinding pressure on farming communities and the wider supply chains that they support. Efforts to restore relations with our nearest trading partners and pursue an SPS agreement with the EU are welcome, but such an agreement must be developed in close collaboration with industry, and it must be delivered urgently. Farmers cannot wait indefinitely while negotiations drag on. Any agreement should be concluded as soon as is practical and no later than the end of this Parliament, in order to protect market access and prevent further damage to the sector. Welsh farmers were promised certainty, continuity and opportunity. Instead, they got the Conservatives’ and Reform’s Brexit, and a deal that still does not exist. This debate is about facing that reality, owning the consequences and finally doing right by the people who feed this country and sustain our rural communities. Backing Welsh and British farming means more than slogans; it means restoring access to markets.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Meat Exports to the EU · Hansard source

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  I am going to continue for a bit. Welsh lamb is not a niche export; it is foundational to the rural economy. Welsh food and drink exports were worth £813 million in 2023, with around three quarters going to EU markets. The EU remains the destination for around a third of Welsh lamb exports, around 90% of Welsh beef exports and the vast majority of Welsh dairy exports. Markets such as Germany and the Netherlands matter because they are the natural entry points into the European food system, but lamb cannot sit at borders while paperwork is argued over. A delay of hours can strip value from a load; a rejected consignment can wipe out profit for a week. Farmers tell me it is now easier to export lamb thousands of miles away than to our nearest neighbours. That is not control; it is self-harm. No doubt Ministers will point to headlines claiming that red tape has been slashed, but the reality for farmers tells a different story. Export health certificates are still required, veterinary sign-offs remain mandatory and checks are still taking place. Costs are still being borne by producers, and that eats into their profit margins. Because there is no settled SPS agreement, enforcement continues to vary from port to port and country to country.

• 7 Jan 2026 · Meat Exports to the EU · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered meat exports to the EU. It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I am grateful for the opportunity to open this debate on the export of meat to the European Union, and in particular on the ongoing difficulties faced by farmers and producers in constituencies like mine when exporting to markets such as Germany and the Netherlands. This debate matters, because a system that worked well for Welsh agriculture has been replaced by one that is more expensive, more bureaucratic and far less reliable. It has become clear that, although progress has been made, a fully settled and implemented common sanitary and phytosanitary arrangement is not yet in place, and will not be in place in the immediate future. As a result, exporters remain subject to many of the same requirements introduced after Brexit, and those requirements are having real consequences on the ground. Right now, there is only an intention to negotiate a framework for talks and announcements about what might happen in the future. But intentions do not move meat across borders, announcements do not pay veterinary bills, and frameworks do not stop lorries being delayed. That is what Welsh farmers are struggling with right now. Before Brexit, exporting Welsh lamb to Europe was straightforward: there were no export health certificates, no mandatory veterinary sign-off and no routine border control checks. Welsh lamb moved freely into its natural markets, allowing farmers to plan, invest and grow with confidence. Since Brexit, that has changed completely. Today, a single consignment of lamb can require export health certificates, official veterinary approval, customs declarations and SPS checks at EU border posts. Every step adds cost, delay and risk, especially for a perishable, time-sensitive product.

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  Cyber-attacks are a growing menace for British businesses. They cause chaos for all types of businesses and organisations, both small and large. The consequences of those attacks have hit our economy hard. The disruption caused by the cyber-attacks on Jaguar Land Rover, M&S and the Co-op were felt by many businesses further down their supply chains; for instance, the disruption that hit JLR resulted in a freeze for its steel supply chain, much of it in Wales. So much of our economy relies on well-functioning digital platforms. Last year, many Lloyds bank customers found themselves unable to access money or pay their bills due to app outages, with that problem compounded by its decision to close high street branches. Yet, bizarrely, Lloyds decided still to pay its chief executive officer Charlie Nunn £5 million in 2024. I make that point to illustrate the lack of accountability we see in positions at the top of these organisations despite massive numbers of people being reliant on those services. A successful cyber-attack often ends in people having their personal data stolen. That is why it is welcome that the Bill highlights sensible requirements to ensure that businesses properly consider supply-chain risks and their usage of managed service providers, as well as many others. On the other hand, it will be a mystery to many why sectors such as finance, food and drink and retail have not been included, particularly considering how those sectors have been hit hard recently. The Government would clearly like to achieve security. To do that, it would help if the Bill could be improved to provide greater certainty and clarity for businesses. For instance, how are businesses supposed to manage relationships with managed service providers? For five years, I worked in the cyber-security industry, starting with the introduction of the GDPR, which happened at the same time as the original NIS directive. I found that the cyber-security sector is a well-connected community underpinned by a welcome commitment to sharing knowledge and best practice. For instance, Cyber Wales is a representative body that brings together the Welsh cyber-community. It is an industry that requires input from academia, law enforcement agencies, defence and businesses. There are clusters of success across Wales, including in my constituency. Partnerships built in academia often create spin-off companies that generate jobs. For instance, in Wales, the University of South Wales and Swansea University have done a lot to build up our local cyber-security ecosystem. As the Bill progresses, the Government would be wise to continue to consult regularly with this very engaged community. It would be helpful to hear what sort of consultations, and how many, have taken place so far. It would also be helpful to hear the Government respond to the Information Systems Audit and Control Association’s proposals, particularly around giving regulators the power to suggest mandatory penetration testing. The growing cyber-security sector should be a route for much needed economic growth and well-paid jobs in Wales. Many such jobs can be done remotely from anywhere with an internet connection. Recent research from Infosecurity suggests that there are 17,000 vacancies in the cyber-security industry right now, with that figure growing at 10% to 12% a year. That is a huge opportunity for a country like Wales. Having an effective skills base is one way in which we can guard ourselves against cyber-attacks. Keeping Britain safe from cyber-attacks requires a trained workforce who can marry technical expertise with regulatory competence. I have seen in my professional experience how many people from many other sectors were able to retrain and upskill to work in cyber-security. People with experience in project management or managing processes are very capable of retraining to work in the cyber-security industry. Special thought should be paid to military veterans in particular, who are well suited to those jobs. One of the questions for the Government should be about how to help more British people into those jobs while ensuring that our education system is equipped to help children pick the sector. That is why I call on the Government to ensure that funding is available for all schools in Wales to take part in the highly successful CyberFirst Wales scheme.