Danny Kruger MP: speeches

Speeches

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The amendment would specify that individuals should comply with the codes of practice issued by the Secretary of State. I am glad that the hon. Member for Spen Valley agreed to accept an earlier amendment requiring the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice. That was a helpful step, but it is not quite sufficient, because it does not address the critical weakness in the Bill. Time and again, we have been told that amendments tabled are not suitable for the face of the Bill and that we should rely on codes of practice and guidance that will be issued subsequently. Now we are at this point, though, and it is clear that under clause 30(6) the code of practice is something that those “performing any function under this Act must”, simply, “have regard to”. We have been told repeatedly by the Minister that the Government’s preference is to leave things until later and not to address issues on the face of the Bill, because additional words, phrases and amendments would increase risk and be counterproductive. That is an argument that we have heard from the Government Front Bench repeatedly. Other Members have dismissed as embroidery suggested amendments to strengthen safeguards; it has been suggested that the more we write, the less safe the Bill will be. I do not think those arguments will survive the other place, if the Bill arrives there. There is a vast difference between something in the Bill that must be “complied with” because it is in legislation, and something that those providing assistance under the Bill must only “have regard to”. It is perplexing that the Bill does not clearly specify that practitioners should “follow” or “act in accordance with” the guidance. These words matter. The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel explores the choice of these different phrases in its guidance on common legislative problems. That guidance was produced by the drafter of this Bill, the former First Parliamentary Counsel, Elizabeth Gardiner. It is quite a deliberate policy choice to leave compliance with these codes of practice to the discretion of the individuals rather than to require it. The guide to making the legislation—the Cabinet Office manual, which the drafter would have been very familiar with—states: “A ‘code of practice’ is an authoritative statement of practice to be followed in some field. It typically differs from legislation in that it offers guidance rather than imposing requirements: its prescriptions are not hard and fast rules but guidelines which may allow considerable latitude in their practical application and may be departed from in appropriate circumstances. The provisions of a code are not directly enforceable by legal proceedings… Codes of practice are not to be used to define specific legal obligations. Where specific legal obligations are to be imposed, breach of which leads directly to civil or criminal liability, their content should be spelled out in primary or secondary legislation. A code of practice is not appropriate for this purpose, either to delineate the main obligation or to provide for exceptions or defences.” I do not think it appropriate that so much is being left to ministerial discretion. I find this perplexing. Not to make a party-political point, but we know how much Labour MPs distrust Conservatives, and yet they are seemingly willing—as indeed, Conservative colleagues in support of this are—

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge for the amendments that she tabled and to the work that she has been doing on our Committee. I regret her victory over my friend, the former MP for Penistone and Stocksbridge, but the hon. Lady is bringing a lot to Parliament and to this Committee. I am happy to follow the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford in supporting the amendments. I do not know whether the hon. Lady is in a position to respond with a further speech or by intervening, but I have some concerns about their operation. I recognise that the role of the independent advocate exists in our system already, very usefully and importantly: I see its value and appropriateness for an assisted dying regime. But if the amendments are accepted, we will be introducing the role of the independent advocate with the sombre recognition that it is necessary, in consequence of a Bill that will allow doctors to discuss ending the patient’s life as an option with anybody, no matter how well-equipped or ill-equipped that person may be to handle such a conversation on their own, and no matter how old they are—they could even be 18 years old. I support the amendments, but I do so in recognition of the very significant dangers that I think the Bill represents to all potential applicants. I want to ask the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, or perhaps the Minister or the Bill’s promoter, whether they feel that the amendments go to the heart of the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. I am pleased to hear that he is satisfied and will support the amendments, although I echo some of the suggestions of concern that he just made. New clause 25 makes it clear that the advocate is there to provide support if the person “is seeking to understand options around end of life care, including the possibility of requesting assistance to end their own life”. Amendment 517 addresses the need for a code of practice when a qualifying person is requesting assistance to end their own life. My question is whether the new clause and the amendment fully cater for a situation in which that individual is not requesting assistance to end their own life—when they are not seeking to explore that particular option. Given that we have retained the right of medical professionals to raise the possibility of assisted dying unprompted with patients, I am concerned about whether, as I think the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford implied, the medical professional initiates the conversation, or the advocate themselves is supportive of assisted dying and they deliberately or inadvertently have the effect of encouraging the patient to consider that option. As I think the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said in her intervention on the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, new clause 25 creates the role of independent advocate to provide support to a patient, to help them to effectively understand and engage with all the provisions in the Bill. It does not specify that the advocate should be obliged, equipped or experienced in supporting the patient to engage with other options.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate; I very much agree with the points that she made, and I hope that Ministers will respond. I will try not to repeat her arguments. The hon. Member for Spen Valley says that clause 24 is, in a sense, the heart of the Bill. I agree. Without the clause the Bill would be ineffective, because the service that we are proposing to legalise would be illegal. We have heard many objections to the term “assisted suicide”, but the necessity of the clause exposes the fact that what is being legalised, at least in part, is assisted suicide. Calling it assisted suicide is therefore not improper; it is simply using the correct terminology, as I believe we should in this place. That is particularly important because the use of the euphemism “assisted dying” masks what this is really about and what the Bill would actually legalise: that somebody could help somebody else to commit suicide. It is no surprise that the euphemism is deployed, because support for what is called assisted dying is driven in part by a failure to realise what it actually is and what the words mean. I cite a 2024 Nuffield Council on Bioethics survey of the public, which found that 39% of people think that assisted dying means withdrawing life support, 19% think that it means providing people who are dying with drugs that relieve symptoms of pain or suffering, and 13% think that it means providing hospice care, all of which is legal currently and is good medical practice.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am conflating the two because they are conflated in reality. A care home where somebody lives is a residence, but it is also a community, a facility and a place where professionals work to support that individual. A clear demarcation between their living arrangements and the support they receive from the institution they live in does not exist in reality. That is why they are living there—because that distinction does not apply in their particular case. They require the support and help of the workers in the place where they live. I am afraid it is not enough simply to say, “This is their home, and they should have exactly the same rights and freedoms as they would have if they were living alone in their own flat or house.” We have to recognise the reality of the situation, which is that they are living in a community, and what happens in the community affects them all. That is the nature of communal living. This is not individualised healthcare in the way that the hon. Gentleman imagines it is, and that is fundamentally our point of difference. This is separate or adjacent to healthcare, and it is delivered, by definition, by somebody else. By virtue of the Bill, it would have a separate regulatory environment to other healthcare treatments. Of necessity, it should have an appropriate legal framework to protect other people who are impacted by assisted death in a communal setting. That is my crucial point: if someone is living in a communal setting, what they do affects their neighbours.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The concern is that it should be automatic. I just cite Professor Ahmedzai’s recognition of the frequent necessity, or the distinct possibility, of a referral to the coroner being appropriate. I suggest that it should happen as a matter of course. I would be grateful to understand from the hon. Lady or the Minister under what circumstances they feel it would be appropriate for a coroner to be involved. The difficulty is that we are putting a lot of emphasis on the role of the local medical examiner to decide whether it should be appropriate for the coroner to consider a case; I suggest that they should consider all cases. The obligation on coroners need not be over-burdensome. Some coroner’s inquests can be dealt with in as little as 20 minutes if matters are simple and not in dispute, which they would be in the great majority of the cases we are talking about. The presence of this jurisdiction—the ability of the coroner to investigate—would be a most valuable safeguard. It would help to identify whether matters have gone wrong in the act of self-administration and the process of dying, which could significantly assist whatever regulatory regime—we are yet to discover that—oversees the process. It could assist the continuous improvement of the regime. It would also help to identify issues relating to misdiagnosis, which we know happens often. It is remarkable—and worth pointing out in response to the suggestion that terminal diagnoses are always accurate—that one study found, after autopsy, that one in four cases had been misdiagnosed. Doctors might say somebody is dying of a certain condition, but it turns out they were not. I take the point that a coroner would not be prohibited by clause 29(1) from launching an investigation in appropriate cases, but given that we do not know what we do not know, it might be hard to decide when that is required. With a new scheme like this, it would be best to start with an investigation in every case. If, in a few years’ time, it appears that the safeguard is not needed, a future Parliament could change the law to reduce it, but I implore the Committee to consider the idea that we should start with the safest Bill we can.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  No, I am afraid I do not concede that. At the moment, it is not apparent from the Bill or the amendments that have been accepted that an organisation would be enabled to decline to facilitate the provision of assisted dying. No organisation will be compelled to do so, but if a resident were to request assisted dying in their care home, my understanding is that the care home would be obliged to facilitate it. It might well not be the intention behind the Bill, because I know that the hon. Member for Spen Valley and Members who agree with her recognise the importance of a conscience exception; they have been very clear on that, and I am grateful to them. Nevertheless, my concern is that on human rights grounds, as we have heard from the Minister, the likelihood is that there would be a claim on behalf of an applicant against the institution they reside in that assisted suicide must be provided to them in that place. I am afraid the Bill at the moment does not give an adequate exemption to institutions.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Nevertheless, the hon. Lady is proposing that this passes through Parliament, just through the negative procedure. If she thinks there is an appropriate rubberstamp by Parliament—that Parliament needs to approve this regime—why should it not have the opportunity to debate it?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I support the principle of insisting that inducing people by dishonesty, coercion or pressure to kill themselves should be illegal, but my understanding is that it already is. If it is not illegal, or if there are circumstances in which we need this additional offence that are not already captured by the Suicide Act or the law on murder, I would like to understand what they are. As I say, while it might be helpful to duplicate the offence, I understand that the very sensible convention in our law is that it is not helpful to have two offences relating to the same act because of the opportunity for offenders to play off one offence against the other. Having duplicative criminal offences can make prosecuting cases harder because the defendant can raise abuse-of-process arguments about whether they have been charged with the most appropriate offence. I understand that the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice are therefore usually very keen to avoid duplicative offences. Let me give an example of the difference in the treatment of the offence. It is proposed that this offence would be subject to a life sentence, which requires the consent of the DPP. But at least in the one case where it overlaps with murder, this would provide a more favourable treatment for the accused than the other obvious charge. Can that be justified? Duplicating criminal liability by introducing new offences has far-reaching implications that can disturb the coherence and certainty of criminal law. If one introduces a law that gives prosecutors two criminal offences to choose from to cover one act, some prosecutors will choose one and some will choose the other. This is generally undesirable; indeed, it is unprecedented in the case of homicide, where there is every reason to suspect that it could cause chaos for grieving families in search of justice. Such chaos is all too predictable, for a number of reasons. Let me give an example. A defendant proven to have procured a suicide by deception will be well advised to plead guilty to the offence contrary to section 26(2) and then contest any attempt to introduce murder proceedings. This matters profoundly. A decision to prosecute is an administrative decision and is subject to judicial review. This is not an academic point; it could cause real distress for bereaved families in deep turmoil seeking justice. Let us imagine that a person, A, is a new coercive and controlling partner of person B and procures by deception their suicide in order to profit from a will. The family of person B grow suspicious and provide the police with a convincing case for a murder prosecution. The CPS agrees and charges A with murder. A accepts that he procured the suicide by deception. On that basis, he appeals, seeking a remedy in judicial review, saying that the CPS should have charged him with a clause 26(2) offence, not murder. The JR is backed by wealthy pressure groups and is beset with administrative adjournments and so on. From the filing of the claim form to the final judgment of the administrative court within the High Court, the case takes 24 gruelling, painful, awful months for the bereaved family. Throughout this time, the lawyers for A, the defendant, tell him to stay the course and continue to offer the plea to section 26(2), because the family will be exhausted by the reality of litigation. The family have no legal aid, no support, no charity backing and no one interested in their case. The war of attrition in litigation finally defeats them. They advise the CPS that they will accept a plea under the section 26(2) offence, and not the murder that actually occurred. That is the reality of duplicating criminal liability. In that example, A has got away with murder by judicial review. We must be clear about what we are being asked to do. It is not simple. We are being asked to innovate in the law of murder. We are being asked to do so without the assistance of the Law Commission, without the careful eye of legal or judicial bodies alive to the difficulties of duplicating liability and without the input of any bodies that represent the victims of crime on how this might affect them. There are no Government consultations with such bodies before us. There is no expert assistance from judicial or legal figures on how the good intentions around clause 26(2) might unintentionally lead to serious and undesirable consequences such as those that I have described.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My right hon. Friend seems hung up on this suggestion that there needs to be a plebiscite or communal decision making—some kind of citizens’ jury. I am not suggesting that for one moment. In fact, I am sure that I have said explicitly that what I want, and what the amendment would enable, is that the owner or occupier, who would probably be an individual or a board of directors, would decide what happens. If they are a decent, compassionate organisation, they might well consult residents—in fact, I would very much expect that to happen if they are doing their job properly—but I am talking about the importance of communal living; and the fact is that a communal living arrangement has leadership. The residents have signed terms and conditions, in a contract, under which they have agreed to abide by certain rules of the house. My suggestion is that if the charity, company or organisation that is managing a care home wants to stipulate that there shall be no provision of assisted dying in that care home, they should have the right to do so. I hope my right hon. Friend would acknowledge that that is consistent with English property rights. On my right hon. Friend’s second point, I am grateful to him and he might well be right. I am happy to consult my evidence pack, which I do not have at my fingertips, about the effect on the Australian workforce in consequence of the introduction of assisted dying. My memory is that we heard such evidence, or had it submitted to us in written form—his knowledge of the 500 submissions might be better than mine. Let us check and we will have it out, perhaps on social media; I know how much he enjoys those forums. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge meant the previous Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government—just to be strictly accurate.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It may well be that the Minister has clarified the case sufficiently, but will she explain something for my sake? She is suggesting that the pharmacist inadvertently but negligently caused the death of a patient, having performed the duties under the Bill and believing that they were doing so. Surely, they were performing duties under the Bill, so they would potentially be captured by the carve-out.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I respect the difficulty of the position that the Minister is in, but I am afraid that we have to consider hypothetical scenarios, because we are creating law. Does she acknowledge that, even if she cannot imagine, or cannot suggest to us, a case that falls under the provisions of this clause, but is not caught by the Suicide Act or law of murder, someone who is charged with murder could plausibly claim that, in fact, they should have been charged with the offence under clause 26(2) of the Bill? Plausibly, they could make a case, perhaps through judicial review, that the charging decision was wrong, and we would have months of litigation before we even got to the prosecution beginning. Can she envisage such a scenario happening?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Further to the intervention from the hon. Member for Bradford West, I would like to understand whether the Minister envisages an independent regulator of any sort being responsible for overseeing the regime? We currently do not know what that will be—a future Secretary of State will design it—but does he envisage that there will be some sort of regulatory body with that job, and if not the MHRA, who?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  These amendments were tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. As discussed, clause 29 requires the Registrar General to “prepare and lay before Parliament a report providing a statistical analysis of deaths” arising. We have spoken before about the paucity of data from other jurisdictions and the problems arising when data is not collected from the start; when data is collected only in relation to one thing, such as disability in Canada; when data collection is suddenly discontinued, as in Washington state as I understand it; or when data is insufficiently granular, so that we get only the headlines. I therefore think that this approach is valuable, and I welcome the Committee’s decision to support amendment 273 tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. Amendments 446 and 486 would ensure that we fix those problems from the start. Amendment 446 would give the Secretary of State the power to specify the datasets that must be made available, and those must be approved by Parliament. MPs would then be able to interrogate what data we are collecting and what questions that enables us to answer. Ensuring that that is determined by regulation places it in law, and ensures ministerial responsibility and parliamentary oversight. Amendment 486 sets out the data that must be included. That includes demographic information, including breakdowns by protected characteristics—and I acknowledge the conversation that has just been had on that topic—and the length of time between the taking of the approved substances and the time of death. It strikes me that that is a very important consideration. I hope that that would be specified in the data that the Registrar General will provide, but that is not clear at the moment. It is also vital that any complications are properly reported—not just recorded, but reported. I do not propose to push these amendments to a vote; I think that the argument has been sufficiently made. I am grateful to the Committee for supporting the previous amendment. However, I wish that things were otherwise and that we were specifying more clearly what data will be collected. I hope that perhaps this debate will encourage the Registrar General to ensure that the most comprehensive data is presented to Parliament.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will respond quickly. My concern is that, as Thomas Teague said, without clause 29 the coroner would be under a statutory duty to investigate. I recognise that there is an opportunity for an investigation if a family member or the medical practitioner decides to refer it to the coroner. It is unlikely—although they might—that the medical practitioner who has overseen the death would suggest that they themselves had somehow failed in their duty or that there had been a complication they could not have dealt with. The fact is that the only way a coroner would get involved under the Bill as it stands is if they conclude that there is something wrong on the basis of not knowing what has happened, because they have not performed any investigation. The purpose behind the amendment is to ensure that there is a statutory duty for the coroner to review the death. It is also a point of principle that it is appropriate to record the death as suicide, because that is what has happened—assisted suicide. Nevertheless, given the state of the debate, and that I suspect I am not in the majority in supporting the amendment, I will not press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful, Mrs Harris. Earlier, I cited evidence about an exodus of care workers from the Australian care system. Members challenged me on that—fairly. I have been looking since, and I could not find the evidence that was in my mind. I think I was confusing it with evidence about the number of palliative care professionals who said that they would not want to work in the sector if assisted dying were performed by their organisations. The only evidence I have got on Australia was from Robert Clark, the Attorney General, who, rather than referring to statistics, gave his own evidence on how many professionals are leaving the Victorian hospital system in consequence of the introduction of voluntary assisted dying. I thought I had statistical evidence to show an exodus, but I did not. I am correcting the record and I apologise to the Committee.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We look forward to the amendments that the Government are working on, but, as part of that process, does the Minister envisage that there will be amendments to NHS legislation itself?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to clause 25 as a whole. First, though, I welcome the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, because I recognise that she is attempting to fix a problem with the Bill. However, I am afraid that my objection remains: the fact is that no other assisted suicide law in the world—including in common law jurisdictions similar to our own, such as Australia or New Zealand—has such a clause. There can be no justification for it. If, in the course of providing assistance under this Bill, a doctor commits a civil wrong, they ought to be liable for it in the usual way. I am glad the hon. Lady has realised that a total exclusion of civil liability is not justifiable, but her change does not go far enough. Her amendments would preserve civil liability where an act was done dishonestly—not in good faith—or for liability in tort, based on the breach of a duty of care, or in other words the tort of negligence. However, it is worth noting that that still excludes civil liability in other respects, and we should ask whether that is justifiable. First, the clause would still exclude civil liability under a contract, so a patient who has received improper care in breach of contract would not fall within either of the exceptions of proposed new subsection (1A). I take the point that, in the case of negligent care, there would often be a concurrent liability under the tort of negligence, and that that is preserved by new subsection (1A)(b), but that is not the case for other forms of contractual arrangements. That might be particularly relevant in the situation of subcontracting. An example would be where an outsourcing company is tasked with transporting the lethal substance. Given the risks involved, the contract specifies strict rules that must be complied with, but the company does not comply with those rules. Under clause 25, even as amended, my concern is that they could not be sued for that breach of contract. What is the justification for excluding civil liability in contracts? Secondly, there is the tort of trespass to the person, which is commonly relevant to medical practice, as it is under such torts that cases where there was no consent or capacity are handled. Those torts can be committed recklessly, but recklessness is not the same as bad faith or dishonesty, so liability could not be established under new subsection (1A)(a). Such torts are also different from negligence—they do not involve a duty of care—so they would not be covered by new subsection (1A)(b). I appreciate that, in many cases, liability could also be established under the tort of negligence, but that would not be the case in all cases. So I ask again: what is the justification for this exclusion? Finally, and most concerning, we were told in previous debates that if it turned out that the criteria for an assisted death were not met, one could always apply for an injunction. Leaving aside the practical and financial obstacles involved in seeking an injunction at the last minute, which we have discussed before, my concern is that a private law injunction requires that a civil wrong either has been committed or is about to be committed. However, in a case where the doctors consider, in good faith and without negligence, that the criteria have been met, but the family has new evidence to show that that is not the case, the effect of clause 25, even as amended, would be that no civil wrong has been, or would be, committed in that instance, so the test for a private law injunction would not be met. I might be wrong, so I would be interested to hear whether the Minister or the hon. Member for Spen Valley disagree with that analysis. I would be grateful if they could point out how the private law test for an interim injunction is met in such an instance. All this could be much simpler if clause 25 were left out of the Bill entirely. Australia and New Zealand do not have such a clause or a civil liability exemption for practitioners of assisted suicide, and I am not aware of that having caused problems for practitioners, so I would be interested to understand why we need such a measure here.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady. I worry a little about the magic powers of the training fairy, whom we frequently invoke to resolve all the anxieties. We are putting the resolution of difficult tensions on to future professionals and imagining that through training we can resolve all the difficult challenges. However, given the absolute and obvious value of an independent advocate for the people who need that role in the process and given that the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge has asserted that it is important for the role to be fulfilled at the earliest stage possible, which I entirely agree with, I am happy to support the amendments.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Engagements · Hansard source

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  Q9. Having had 14 years to get ready, Labour came into power with no plan to reform welfare. Now, in a panic because of their economic mismanagement, the Government are cutting benefits for disabled people without consulting them at all. It probably says in the Prime Minister’s folder that the High Court ruled that the Conservatives’ consultation was too short, but at least we consulted. The Government are not consulting at all. Will the Prime Minister explain why he is doing things to disabled people and not with them?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Well, we have been over the whole question of palliative care and alternatives to assisted suicide; nevertheless, I wanted to challenge that scenario. On the suggestion that there is a comparison with an abortion service no one is suggesting that a woman who goes into a refuge, discovers she is pregnant and wants to have a termination is somehow obliged to have it on the premises of the refuge, which does not believe in abortion. That is not a scenario that could happen, because that is not how abortion operates. What we are suggesting is that somebody who arrives in a care home or hospice that does not want to facilitate assisted suicide would not be able to receive such assistance there. There is no objection to their believing in or desiring an assisted suicide; the point is to protect the institution. I recognise the difficulty with the specific case the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge raised. Nevertheless, the alternative is to have blanket permission for any resident of any care home or hospice to insist that they can receive an assisted death in that home or hospice, despite what the rest of that community and the management might want. Indeed, the patient might have signed a contract specifying that they will not seek an assisted death in that home or hospice. There is much more to discuss, but I hope that that is helpful for the hon. Lady.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Lady clarifies the point very well. I concede—that is right. When someone goes to live in a care home, they yield, by necessity, a whole set of freedoms that one has in one’s own home. That is the consequence of the stage of life they are at, the conditions they have, and indeed their own choice to live in that particular care home.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Obviously, the sentiment that we should work with hospices and let them set their own policy is absolutely right—that is the purpose of the amendment—but does the hon. Lady acknowledge that the Minister just said that if any hospice attempts to prevent assisted dying from taking place on their premises, there will be human rights claims? They can have all the consultations and conversations they want, but unless the Bill specifies that they are allowed to opt out, they will be forced to do it.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  There is much to get into, and I will try to respond a bit more when I speak again. I do not want to revisit the whole question of palliative care but, on the scenario set out by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, the strong advice that I have received from palliative care professionals is that it is not accurate to say that somebody’s pain cannot be palliated. It might well be that there is a difficulty with particular opioids, but there are other palliative care options available to everybody. No palliative care doctor ever says that there is nothing they can do.