Danny Kruger MP: speeches

Speeches

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 527, in clause 40, page 24, line 14, at end insert “provided that such remuneration is not structured in a manner where it would be greater as a result of the registered medical practitioner approving the request.” This is the point at which the season of consensus is over; I am back to opposing. Amendment 527 would insist that any remuneration for taking part in assisted dying on behalf of the medical profession would not enable a system whereby a medic, practice or private provider would be remunerated according to approving the different stages of the process. I am trying to prevent the provision of any incentive in the system for moving people through it. We know that there can be a paid private service delivered under the Bill. The concern is that we will create perverse incentives in the system that will prejudice objective decision making. I take the points about the disinterested good faith of all medics; nevertheless, I do not want to put them in danger of feeling the pressure of perverse incentives. We must recognise the importance of keeping absolute financial neutrality in the operation of the Bill. There would be significant ethical red flags about a system that essentially enabled performance-related pay tied to approving requests for assisted dying, let alone paying doctors to provide referrals to a co-ordinating doctor. At the moment, I do not see that the Bill prevents that. Even if there were no such danger, I am not sure that patients would buy it. From the point of view of trust in the medical profession, we must bear in mind that any doctor could be involved. Any doctor could either raise the suggestion or be required to signpost a patient who raised it themselves—the whole of the NHS is essentially implicated in the proposed system. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley has reiterated today, she wants assisted dying to be an integral part of the NHS. Let us protect the NHS from the distrust of patients by ensuring that financial incentives are not in the mix for these life and death decisions.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I imagine that a doctor who works for the non-profit service I am envisioning would be paid a salary and do their work, but would not be paid on a per-client basis—they would not be paid a tariff for the number of people they passed through the system, let alone for the different chunks of the process. People need to be paid, but they should not be paid on a per-client basis, because that would introduce dangerous incentives into the system.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is the purpose of my amendment.

• 25 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 36 specifies that the NHS Act will require amendment. Is the Minister saying that that is not in fact the case?

• 24 Mar 2025 · Planning and Infrastructure Bill · Hansard source

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  I very much agree with what my hon. Friend is saying. Does he agree that more could be done to protect irreplaceable chalk stream habitats, particularly in the south of England? Does he also agree that one thing we could do is designate those chalk stream habitats to be irreplaceable and ensure that the Government specify clearly what permissions might be available there?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 30 Codes of practice

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is good to see you this evening, Mrs Harris. I have no objection to the hon. Lady’s amendments. I think there is value in broadening the offence to include actions performed intentionally or recklessly, as that is critical for patient safety. Given the finality of the result of assisted death, there should not be any room for carelessness, and liability must ensure that not only deliberate misconduct but negligent record keeping is subject to legal scrutiny. I want to put on the record the evidence we had from the British Journal of Nursing , which has documented the serious risks of poor record keeping in medical practice. That demonstrates how inadequate documentation contributes to clinical errors. I think the hon. Lady recognises that this is not just a matter of bureaucratic tidying-up. The principle is straightforward: if the decision to assist in ending a life is to be lawful, the documentation supporting it must be unimpeachable. Expanding liability to cover reckless documentation is entirely consistent with existing legal and professional standards in the UK medical profession.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Sorry, Mrs Harris. I do not appreciate the sense of impatience in the Committee; these are very important matters.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 446, in clause 29, page 18, line 9, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must, by regulation, specify the data sets which must be made available by the Registrar General for England and Wales. (5) Any regulations made under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative procedure.” This amendment requires the Secretary of State to specify in regulations the data sets which are to be made available by the Registrar General for England and Wales.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  That is helpful and makes sense. The only justification for duplication must be that the duplication is only partial, which the Minister has just suggested it is. Not a complete overlap—some cases will fall into one category, but not into the other. I wonder if she could help us to understand with an example that would help the CPS when it makes its decisions about which offence to charge someone under—an example of an offence that would be illegal under this clause and not already illegal under the Suicide Act or the laws of homicide.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Members for Ashford and for Banbury. I entirely concur with their points, particularly those that derive from the expertise of the hon. Member for Ashford. This is a very important group of amendments, which concern what is in a sense the heart of the Bill—the management of the lethal drugs. The question of what drugs we are talking about remains open, which is a cause of deep concern to me, but whatever they happen to be, we need to make sure that the management— the regime of dispensing, transporting and prescribing —is safe. I will not reprise the details of all the amendments. Their purpose is to ensure a stricter, more transparent and safer regime for the management of the drugs. Amendment 521, which is in my name, would ensure that the regulations that we arrive at are laid before Parliament, and debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament. Amendment 485 in the name of the hon. Member for York Central would address the same issue. The amendments seek to address the dangerous absence of an adequate regulatory regime in the Bill for the lethal drugs and approved substances. Once again, significant questions are ignored in clause 28. Ministers will be given the power to make regulations for the prescription, dispensing, transportation, storage, handling and disposal of approved substances. The clause is envisaged as sufficient for an entire regulatory regime for approved substances. It is just 87 words. It is as if it is an afterthought—as, it seems, is the role of pharmacists, by the way. The regulations are subject to the negative procedure, which means they are highly unlikely to be debated at all or voted upon, for reasons given in my earlier complaints about the use of the negative procedure. Indeed, it is discretionary whether the regulations will be made at all. Last night, the Minister told us that the Government objected to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency approving the drugs or substances in amendment 465, which I had tabled. He said: “The Government’s assessment of amendment 465 is that it would significantly impact the legal and operational delivery of the Bill. The Government anticipate that all substances used for assisted dying will have existing licences from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for other indications, but the amendment would require the approved substances to be licensed by the MHRA specifically for the purpose of assisted dying.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Public Bill Committee, 18 March 2025; c. 1224.] That was indeed the purpose of that amendment. If there is anxiety that I am somehow straying from the relevant clause and amendments, which I detect from Members who are clearly looking forward to their dinner, I do insist—[ Interruption. ]

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I acknowledge the point that the Minister is making. To the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, we are talking not about two categories of offence within the same legal framework, namely GBH, but about two different legal frameworks altogether, the law of homicide and the law on assisted dying. Does the Minister agree that the clause as it is to be amended will create the opportunity for a murderer who would otherwise be convicted of or charged with murder to claim that, in fact, he was committing an offence under the assisted suicide law? We are creating a new opportunity for someone who would otherwise, were it not for this law, be legitimately charged with murder to claim that they are committing this offence instead.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I was just concluding my remarks on the amendment. I will quickly finish responding to the hon. Member for Spen Valley and others, who suggested that it would be improper to deny people living in a care home, hospice setting or other communal environment the right and opportunity to request assisted dying. I was suggesting that that right needs to be tempered by an acknowledgment that they do not live there alone, and that there are also rights, properly held, by the occupier of the premises, the individual’s neighbours and others. My concern is that, just as suicide itself is contagious, so the practice of assisted suicide will have social ramifications. We fully recognise that, if the Bill is passed, people will have the absolute right to request the service in their own home, but when someone is living among others, that right needs to be tempered by the consideration that the occupier should ultimately decide whether he or she is prepared to allow the practice to take place on his or her premises. Some hon. Members suggested that, if an institution receives public funding, it would be appropriate for it to be obligated to deliver the service. I am concerned about the implication of that, which might be that institutions that did not wish to provide or facilitate assisted suicide but did receive public money, for instance care homes or hospices, would be at risk of losing that money—essentially being defunded—on the grounds of their conscientious objection to participating in assisted dying. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley or Ministers would confirm that it is not their intention to penalise bodies that do not deliver assisted dying by withdrawing public money. On the impact on staff, I am grateful to the hon. Lady for acknowledging that we might need to tighten the Bill to ensure that it is clear that people will not be required to participate in any stage of the process of assisted dying, and not just in the actual provision of assistance towards the final act. Nevertheless, my concern is that if we do not give institutions the right to opt out of provision, there will be an exodus of staff who object to being involved in any way with, or working for an institution that facilitates, assisted dying, as has happened in other jurisdictions where assisted suicide is legal. I point particularly to evidence we heard from Australia. We were told that, in consequence of assisted dying being legalised in Australian states, there was an exodus of workers from the healthcare system—nurses and others—and the social care system. It was therefore no coincidence when one of the Australian witnesses who supports assisted suicide declared breezily that, although there were significant objections among the care workforce to the introduction of assisted dying when the law was first debated, five years later there was overwhelming support for assisted dying among them. Well, that is no surprise, because all the objectors had left, and I am afraid that is what we will see here. A comparison would be the exodus of care workers that we saw after the last Government mandated covid vaccination. Some 40,000 care workers left their jobs rather than accept compulsory vaccination. If they were prepared to do that on those grounds, I fear we might see a similar phenomenon if we mandate that institutions facilitate assisted dying.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will be grateful if the Minister or the hon. Member for Spen Valley can explain the situations in which behaviour criminalised by clause 26(2) would not also amount to an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act, as amended, or indeed to murder. What behaviour would be criminalised here that is not already criminal? Can the hon. Lady think of any instance in which there would be no crime under section 2 of the Suicide Act, but there would be an offence under clause 26(2)? If there is no such instance—I cannot think of one—it strikes me that, at least in respect of coercion and pressure, the offence being created here is redundant and duplicative. Ministers have rightly stressed the importance of their duty to the statute book. My understanding is that having redundant or duplicative legislation, or indeed duplicative offences, would be inconsistent with our duty to the statute book. One might ask, “What does it matter? Wouldn’t it be helpful to have additional belt-and-braces safeguards in the Bill?” I agree in principle, but I note that when other Members have deployed that argument in relation to adding terms such as “undue influence”, the neutral Ministers have rebuked them by appealing to the duty that we are supposed to have to the statute book. I think the point cuts both ways. Why are we embroidering the statute book with duplicative offences?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mrs Harris. Before I move the next amendment, I wish to correct the record. I do not know if this is the moment to do so, but I wish to correct a mistake I made earlier today.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The point I am making is that we are suggesting that some future Secretary of State, in a different Government of which we know nothing, might decide to issue codes of practice that will determine how this process is delivered, but I will leave that point. We must address the weak status of these codes of practice. I regret that they are being left in this weak form. At a minimum level, we should require that they are properly complied with. This cannot be remedied after the Bill has passed. No matter how strong the language in the codes of practice, that language cannot override or change the nature of a statutory duty. Any enhanced duty has to come from a source external to the document being considered itself—namely, the statute. I ask the hon. Member for Spen Valley, why not insist that practitioners comply with the relevant provisions of the code?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 524, in clause 30, page 18, line 40, leave out from “have regard to” and insert “comply with”. This amendment would require individuals to comply with the Codes of Practice issued by the Secretary of State.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not know what those might be, but I would be interested to hear. That might well be the case. I am afraid that no hard-and-fast rules can be clearly applied here; or, rather, we have to apply hard-and-fast rules in the knowledge of the grey areas, the exceptions and the situations in which we might feel that the law is unjust in particular cases. We have heard examples of that, such as the evidence about the lady in Australia cited earlier by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I can well imagine the distress involved if someone suddenly finds themselves in an institution that does not permit an assisted death, but they want one and are in their last days. The alternative, however, is a different blanket rule. If we were to have a blanket rule that we can do an assisted death anywhere—that is one situation—there would be significant knock-on effects. Serious moral injury would be suffered by other professionals and residents. I recognise that my amendment could lead to someone having to relocate if they want to have an assisted death—I am sorry for that—but I think that we have to draw the line in a way that makes most sense.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Lady. That is very helpful. That is my concern: we need to ensure all necessary support for the patient at the earliest stage possible.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Absolutely; that is what I am doing. I referenced the debate we had last night, which I hope is within scope, because the suggestion has been either that the Bill insufficiently addresses the need for a regulatory regime for the approval of drugs specifically for the purpose of assisted dying or, as the Government are saying, that the drugs’ existing licences are sufficient for these purposes. Is the Government’s position that there will be no regulator involved and that this will sit entirely with the Minister, as in this clause? If regulators are to be involved, will further legislation be needed? I will not repeat evidence from the Royal Pharmaceutical Society concerning the legal arrangement, but I will refer to evidence submitted by Máire Stapleton, a pharmacist with more than 30 years’ experience in clinical governance, who made this point: “Based upon a preliminary review of current published data, it is difficult to see how the regulatory and professional standards for prescribing and dispensing unlicensed drugs can be met.” There is further evidence to that effect from the Royal Pharmaceutical Society, pharmacists and barristers. Given that there is so little on the face of the Bill and no guardrails for the use of the power that will be given to the Secretary of State, why is the negative procedure judged appropriate for something of this significance? It cannot be argued that the negative procedure is needed because the amendments might need to be made quickly and frequently—that cannot be the case, because we have not yet authorised the regime. The negative procedure would allow the Secretary of State quite unjustified ability to change these processes without any requirement for a parliamentary debate or vote. Lord Hermer, the Attorney General, has said that this new Government will take a new approach, considering the “real need to consider the balance between primary and secondary legislation, which in recent years has weighed too heavily in favour of delegated powers.” He criticised the previous Government’s “excessive reliance on delegated powers, Henry VIII clauses, or skeleton legislation,” which “upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the executive. This not only strikes at the rule of law values I have already outlined, but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty. In my view, the new Government offers an opportunity for a reset in the way that Government thinks about these issues. This means, in particular, a much sharper focus on whether taking delegated powers is justified in a given case, and more careful consideration of appropriate safeguards.” I conclude with this question to the Minister: has she considered the advice of Lord Hermer in coming to a view on the appropriateness of this clause and the way that these powers have been taken? As the Hansard Society notes, “the Government has an overriding duty of care to the statute book. As such, any powers that may accrue to Ministers because of a Private Member’s Bill must be acceptable to the Government. It must therefore take a view on the powers and their scrutiny”. Has the sponsor or the Minister consulted with the Royal Pharmaceutical Society on the sufficiency of this power? Has sufficient work been done to look at the workability and operationalisation of this clause? I hope the Committee will join me in supporting these amendments.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  It might appear a procedural issue, but does the hon. Lady acknowledge that there is a profound difference between the negative and affirmative procedure? Why is she content that the regime for the regulation of these lethal drugs, which are at the absolute core of her Bill, be subject to the discretion of the Secretary of State, without any likelihood or any real possibility of any sort of debate in Parliament? Why should this not be through the affirmative procedure?

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Let me come to the question of investigation by the police in due course, but I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman heard me clearly. I was not talking about offences that I think are rightly criminal; I was talking about offences that are not offences at all. Providing hospice care, helping people to relieve symptoms of pain or suffering and withdrawing life support are all perfectly permitted and legal in our system. The issue is that a significant proportion of the public think that those activities are what assisted dying entails. I do, however, recognise the point and the power of the testimony recited by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, to which I will come on in due course. I understand that in order to make the Bill effective, an exception must be made to section 2 of the Suicide Act. Section 1 says that someone is allowed to commit suicide; section 2 says that one cannot help somebody else to do so. I agree that such an exception is necessary if we are to pass the Bill, but I cannot follow why clause 24(1) is needed. I will be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley or the Minister can explain which other offences would necessarily be committed by a doctor properly carrying out his or her functions under the Bill. What other offences might be caught that require clause 24(1)? Clause 18 will forbid a doctor from engaging in euthanasia. One criminal law from which an exemption is not necessary is the law on murder, yet ostensibly subsection (1) has no such limitation. I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation that subsection (1) will not afford a defence when the charge is murder. I presume that that is not the intention. What about manslaughter, and particularly gross negligence manslaughter? Under the Bill, a pharmacist performing the function of prescribing or dispensing the legal drugs would be, to use the wording of amendment 504, “performing” a “function under this Act”. If a pharmacist makes a grossly negligent mistake and mislabels a drug, which is then sent to another patient who takes it and dies, that would quite clearly be gross negligence manslaughter. Can the Minister explain why clause 24(1), as amended by amendment 504, would not allow someone to benefit from an immunity in respect of gross negligence manslaughter? To be clear, I agree that if the pharmacist intentionally mislabelled the drug, he could not be described as “performing any other function under this Act”, so he would not have that defence. However, in a case where, in good faith, he had made a fatal and grossly negligent mistake, surely he would have been performing such a function, albeit performing it very badly. Can the Minister clearly set out the reasoning to explain why there is no chance of such a defence under the clause? Of course the hon. Member for Spen Valley does not intend to exempt from criminal liability a pharmacist acting in that grossly negligent way, but I am trying to make sense of the drafting of the amendment. If there is any criminal offence, other than in the Suicide Act, that requires an exemption, it would be best to say so clearly in the Bill rather than relying on a catch-all term, as subsection (1) does. I concur with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and will not repeat them, but I do find it interesting that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has chosen to retain the offence of assisting and encouraging suicide. This is because two arguments made by proponents of the Bill lead to the logical conclusion that the offence should either be repealed entirely or limited to self-conduct, as is the case in Switzerland. Let us look at the two arguments in turn. The first argument relates to autonomy. If an autonomous individual with capacity decides to end their own life and requests the assistance of another person, why should that other person be criminalised? After all, that person is simply helping another person to do something to their own body that the law has not prohibited since 1961, so surely it is a violation of autonomy to criminalise such conduct of assisting in suicide. Lord Mance, a former justice of the Supreme Court, put the matter as follows on Second Reading of the Meacher Bill in the other place: “Suicide is decriminalised, yet assisting suicide remains criminal—probably a unique exception to the principle that you can only be an accomplice to an act that is itself criminal.” It is bizarre that the act is not itself criminal but being an accomplice to it is. Lord Mance went on to say: “If a person may choose freely to commit suicide, what justifies a refusal to allow them to obtain willing assistance?” —[ Official Report, House of Lords, 22 October 2021; Vol. 815, c. 408.] I believe in the value of a prohibition on assistance, but the logic of the argument from autonomy—that someone should be allowed to request assistance to help them to die—surely obviates the distinction. I do not see why we have kept section 2 at all, and I would be interested in hearing from the supporters of the Bill what the limiting principle is. Why do they think assisted suicide should remain a crime, despite its being a limitation on autonomy, outside the scheme created by the Bill? Why are we simply creating a scheme within the Bill? The second argument given, which I think relates to the intervention from the hon. Member for Sunderland Central and to the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, is based on the fact that the current law requires people to travel to Switzerland. The argument against the current system comes in three forms. One stresses the toll that it places on families to know that the people who assist have committed a criminal offence and could be investigated by the police, even though the chances of prosecution are remote. I fully recognise and share all the concerns among Members about the terrible distress faced by people who may in any way have assisted their loved one to take their own life. The second objection to the status quo makes the point about the unfairness that the situation creates. The hon. Member for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) said on Second Reading: “I do not want choice to be available only to those who can afford to pay. That is not just or equitable.” —[ Official Report , 29 November 2024; Vol. 797, c. 1073.] The suggestion is that to have to pay to go to Switzerland is a violation of equality. The third is a constitutional argument. It is said that it is constitutionally improper for the Director of Public Prosecutions to have effectively decriminalised assisted suicide for people who travel to Switzerland. But the point I am trying to make is that under the Bill, anyone helping their relative to travel to Switzerland, or any other country, would still be committing an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act. Research from My Death, My Decision, a campaign group pushing for a wider Bill than the current one—it supports the Bill but clearly wants it to go further—has found that 50% of cases going to Dignitas would not be eligible under the Bill. It helps to make my point, which is that I am afraid that if the Bill were passed we would still have stories like the very moving testimony read out by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. In fact, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said, there is a significant likelihood that there would be more prosecutions. If the Bill were enacted, the conclusion of the Crown Prosecution Service and the police might well be that, given the existence of an assisted dying regime within the UK, assisting one’s relative to go to Switzerland should be subject to a greater likelihood of prosecution. That is a legitimate concern.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to quickly explain that my amendment 523 is consequential on amendment 447, but there is drafting issue. I will not go into the details but, if amendment 447 is made, as I understand it will be, my amendment 523 is not necessary. I would be grateful for the Minister’s guidance: if he has been advised by parliamentary counsel that the clause as amended by amendment 447 is okay and there is no need for amendment 523, I do not propose to press it to a vote.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 522, in clause 29, page 17, line 14, leave out subsection (1). In a letter to the editor of The Telegraph , the former chief coroner of England and Wales, Thomas Teague KC, wrote that clause 29 “would prohibit a coroner from investigating any death where the duty to do so arises only because the deceased died as a consequence of the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. But for that clause, the coroner would be under a statutory duty to investigate such a death and, if satisfied at inquest that the deceased had used an approved lethal substance to end his or her life with the intention of doing so, would be obliged to record a conclusion of suicide. Since the coroner’s jurisdiction affords a powerful deterrent against misfeasance, the public may wonder why the Bill proposes to abandon such a robust safeguard. The approval of the High Court is no substitute as it would be given in advance of death and could offer no assurance” —we have scrapped the approval of the High Court, but it would have been no substitute, and it will be the same for the panel system— “that the assistance had been provided in strict compliance with the law or that the circumstances of the case had not changed following the court’s declaration. If the Bill becomes law, who will provide the necessary posthumous judicial scrutiny of these unnatural deaths?” That is a powerful suggestion from the former chief coroner.

• 19 Mar 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am grateful. With great respect to other members of the Committee, I think the hon. Gentleman is the most honest advocate of assisted dying among us, because he genuinely recognises that autonomy demands the widest possible range of eligibility. It might be that other Members feel that we have the balance exactly right. I recognise the force of his argument that if we are going to introduce a new human right, it is very difficult to circumscribe its boundaries. He himself thinks that there should be some boundaries: he proposed an amendment that specified 12 months, and he thinks that only certain people should be able to ask someone else to perform assisted death to them. Nevertheless, he is acknowledging that if we believe in autonomy, the Bill would not satisfy some people. I think it would be intellectually coherent and more logical for proponents of the Bill to want to repeal section 2 of the Suicide Act, and I do not understand why they are not doing so. We could certainly continue to insist on prohibitions against any form of coercion, persuasion or inducement to take one’s own life, but if somebody is clearly in their right mind and wants to receive assistance to kill themselves, that is the principle of the Bill. It would be neater if we amended the Suicide Act accordingly. The fact that proponents do not want to do so suggests that they see some value in the law and that they consider that that value trumps concerns about autonomy and the impact of the law on family members of someone who wishes to travel to Switzerland to end their life. I agree that there are such principles—namely, the intrinsic value of life and the protection of the vulnerable—but I do not see why proponents of the Bill consider that such principles trump autonomy when it comes to terminally ill adults in England.