Danny Kruger MP: speeches

Speeches

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I want to give Professor Shakespeare the chance to respond to the point that we have heard. I am interested in whether you recognise that many disabled people—in fact, not just disabled people, but anybody who declines treatment that keeps them alive—would qualify as terminally ill under the terms of the Bill? What protections we could give to prevent that? Professor Shakespeare: First of all, a terminal illness is defined as a “condition which cannot be reversed by treatment” I know that that does not mean a cure; you are not aiming at a cure—but it says, “cannot be reversed”. Surely that would not include things like HIV and diabetes because they can be reversed. They cannot be cured; they are still there, but they can be reversed with insulin, antiretrovirals or whatever. I think, yes, terminally ill people are disabled people almost always, but that does not mean that all disabled people are terminally ill. Even if you have a disease or a condition—like Miro does or like other people do—that will probably result in your death eventually, you are not going to die tomorrow or in six months. You may die in 16 years or whatever. It is very difficult to define terminal illness, and that is why six months, I think, is used in this Bill. Very recently, my aunt died. She was unconscious for the last month or so of having cancer and then she finally died. She would not have been able to express her will and her preference to have assisted dying, even if she wanted it. Therefore, I think six months when you can have capacity, you can anticipate, you know you are going to die but you want to have control in the manner of your death, is more useful than seven days or less, when you might be unconscious and you might not be able to express a will or preference.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q It does, very helpfully. Can I come back to you quickly? You point out that to suffer is essentially a subjective experience, so it is very difficult for somebody from the outside to determine whether somebody else is suffering to a certain threshold. By that reasoning, it should simply be the case that people who feel that they are suffering intolerably should be eligible. Why do you not think that that is what we should have in the law? Dr Fellingham: In our law, in Western Australia, one of our eligibility criteria is that a person is suffering intolerably, in a manner that they consider intolerable, and that we have taken all reasonable steps to alleviate. The important thing about suffering is that it is a personal experience. It is not mine to judge as a clinician; it is mine to delicately and expertly tease out of a patient and to attempt to mitigate and treat to the best of my ability. Yes, suffering absolutely is what the patient says it is, and these laws are designed to honour individual patients who are dying. They are not designed for us as practitioners or clinicians looking in from the outside; they are designed to be supportive of an individual patient’s illness journey, and only they can know what the experience of that is. Dr McLaren: It is a very good question, Mr Kruger. I think one of the distinctions is where the point of hope is and where the point of no return may be for that suffering. If you were to say that patients or people may apply for this or self-confess suffering in the absence of an end-of-life condition, that leads to questions about whether it applies to a 21-year-old with a decompensated mood disorder that could be treated or improved. When we are talking about patients within the last six months of their life, that suffering is very hard to come back from in the time that is given to them. It is about that recognition of the point of difference between hope for the future and a different type of hope—hope for improvement in symptoms or control of the situation, but not for physical improvement or a return to normal function or living. That is the real difference between legislating purely on the basis of suffering, versus in the context of suffering that will not get significantly better. The point is that the line must be drawn somewhere. We have seen patients who have been ineligible under our laws where we have found immense suffering, and that is a difficult space to navigate in its own right, but those cases are going to happen regardless of where the line is drawn, and it needs to be in a place where people are comfortable to navigate on one side or the other. That is where the clinical education comes into the process, in terms of how we best manage that, recognise the suffering in the individual, try to make things better and work hand in hand with palliative care and other colleagues to try to improve symptoms for the patients who are not eligible under these laws. Dr Mewett: As a palliative care physician, I spend all my professional life addressing people’s suffering in the context of an advanced, progressing, incurable illness. Palliative care, of course, approaches that from a range of different angles. I see VAD—assisted dying, voluntary —as an end-of-life choice among a range of end-of-life choices that people may or may not make. A minority of our patients will take that choice and have some control. They require and should have excellent palliative care up to the time that they die, whichever way they decide to die. I think we should understand that despite the best palliative care in the world, there are still patients who suffer uncontrollably, unremittingly and intolerably. I believe that it is that small minority of patients who should have a legal option to take control of that stage when it is irreparable. It is not incompatible with palliative care; it is part of palliative care and an end-of-life choice, and not the philosophy of care that palliative care is.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Indeed. Lastly, I am very interested in your suggestions about a separate service and about the importance of protecting the rights of professionals who do not want to be involved. I was very conscious of the plight of care home workers in the pandemic, and I regretted my vote to mandate the vaccine to them. Do you think—I cannot decide for myself what the answer is—it should be possible for a care home director to exempt their whole service, that care home and the people who work in that care home, from being involved in assisted dying? That is where people live, after all. If somebody is having it there, it could affect the entire atmosphere of the place, and the work that all of the people there have to do. Do you think they should be protected as an organisation? Professor Ranger: Particularly for nursing homes, I think that would be difficult. How and where people end their life probably needs further thought and further explanation. There is something about being really clear— if you are the leader of that nursing home, we would have to explore your ability to be able to advocate for the care that you want to be able to give in that nursing home. All of these practical things need further exploration. It is difficult, because for someone who wants to end their life, if that is their home, they may want to be there. It is all of these practical things that probably need further thought and exploration, because I think it could be argued either way.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Mark, I have a question about the end, or “the final act” as I think it is called in the Bill. Do you think there needs to be more specific guidance in the Bill about what should happen in the case of complications—if the death is taking a long time? It can take up to an hour quite commonly in other countries. There may be complications. Again, that happens. What would happen if a doctor were to intervene to genuinely assist the patient to die, if something was going wrong? Are you worried about the legal implications for doctors in those circumstances? Mark Swindells: I would agree with you that there certainly needs to be really clear guidance for doctors on that scenario. We have not taken a view on whether that needs to be in the Bill, in regulation or in the statutory code of practice. What I would say is that we would be willing to participate in the setting of that. It would be very important to listen to the view of doctors and indeed patients who might be interested in taking such a course of action, to understand their issues.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I understand—thank you. I have a question for you, Dr Green, on the delivery of the service if it is brought into law. Is it your understanding that the Bill mandates the NHS to provide an assisted dying service? I appreciate that it is not clear in the Bill. Nevertheless, it does authorise the Government to pay for it and it establishes this right. My question to you is this: is this a medical procedure that we are proposing to legalise, and should the NHS provide it? If the answer is yes, should that be a separate service within the NHS or should it just be part of general practice? Dr Green : We have not taken a view as to whether it should be inside or outside the NHS. That is not for us to take. We do believe that it should not be any part of any doctor’s normal job to provide assisted dying. In other words, it should be set up through a separate service with a degree of separation. We believe that is important for patients, because it would reassure patients who may be anxious about the service that it would not just be part of their normal care. It would reassure patients that the service they were going into had proper quality and proper audit attached to it. It would reassure doctors, because doctors who did not want to have any part would not feel that it was part of their normal job, whereas the doctors who wanted to go ahead would be assured of having support, emotional support and proper training. Also, it should, hopefully, reassure the providers, who would then be assured that it would not be expected of them just as part of their normal duty. We believe a degree of separation is very important.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q It is noteworthy that in Australia and New Zealand, palliative care professionals are very keen on retaining that safeguard, to ensure that it is not suggested to patients that they might have an assisted death unless they have brought it up themselves. I would like a quick clarification from Dr Green. In terms of the survey, my understanding is that the British Medical Association’s official position is to be neutral. The majority in favour of neutrality—moving away from an opposed position—were junior doctors and those not working with the elderly and the dying, whereas the great majority of doctors who work in palliative care and work with dying people remain firmly opposed to a change in the law. Is that your understanding? Dr Green : There were some variations between specialities; that is true, but within all specialities, there was a wide variety of opinion. It is that wide variety of opinion that the BMA has based its policy on.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Very quickly on that last point, it is not totally clear what kind of medical professional would be in attendance at the end. Do you think it should be a fully trained doctor? Should there be some separate professional in that role? How should that work? Mark Swindells : I am not trying to duck the question, but because we do not take a general view on whether the Bill should pass or not, we have not taken an established view on the delivery mechanism for it.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Just to be clear, do you think it is possible for every patient who needs it to get the palliative care that they should have? Professor Ranger: I do not think it is as good as it needs to be. We know that it is sometimes hard for people to access care. We know the struggles regarding hospices. We know far too many people die in hospital. We know there are real challenges in social care and the health service. I cannot say it is not without challenge.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q So somebody could request assisted dying because of the absence of adequate palliative care. Professor Ranger: When you put it like that, it could be possible, but we would want to strive to have a system that does not leave anyone in distress.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q What are the implications for resources? I appreciate that that is your view, and I recognise that it makes very good sense. Are you concerned about the resourcing of that service, in terms of whether there might be implications for other parts of the NHS if it was to be a separate service? Dr Green : I think we are always concerned about resourcing, and I can only back up what Dr Whitty said about the importance of palliative care.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q You have done this very powerful report, the “Last Shift”, and talked about the moral injuries—a very powerful phrase—felt by nurses in the light of shortages in care in the NHS and social care. What should a nurse, or indeed any health professional, do in circumstances where a patient is requesting assisted dying and qualifies for it, when that professional thinks that what they really need is palliative care, but that is not available because of the shortages in the palliative care system? Professor Ranger: It is difficult, but in my experience there are ways to try and get people palliative care, whether that is, as was said earlier, via other organisations outside the NHS and within hospice care. There are ways through the current routes to get people the care that they need.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q You do not agree. In that case, this Bill would be worse for somebody with your condition because it does not address your condition and it would put your relatives at greater risk if they did assist you—but you do not think there is a danger of prosecution. Sir Nicholas Mostyn: I think it is unlikely. I am sorry for interrupting you. I always used to say, “Don’t interrupt”, so I am sorry about that. I fear that I will be one of the people, referred to by the lady who asked the first question, who has to go to Dignitas—frankly, I could afford to do that—because the Bill is not ever going to provide an assisted death for me. I will not be graphic about what the advanced stages of Parkinson’s are like, but the medical Members among you will be able to describe what is likely—not definitely; I do not want to say definitely—to await me. I am choosing my words carefully. It is either going to be a poor death here or to go somewhere like Dignitas. If my children took me as far as Calais, and then helped me after Calais—assistance only applies to within the jurisdiction—and drove me on to Zurich, I would be extremely surprised if any prosecution ensued.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I have a quick question for each of you. Sir Max, as you point out, the Bill does not repeal the ban on assisted suicide. It would still be illegal to assist someone to go to Switzerland. Alex Goodman KC, giving an opinion on behalf of Dignity in Dying, the campaign group that champions the Bill, thinks it is more likely that there would be prosecutions for people who assist their relatives to go to Switzerland once this Bill is passed. Do you share that view? Sir Max Hill: I am not sure about that. I would always default to the code for Crown prosecutors and the two tests that the prosecution must go through, regardless of the crime that is being investigated. The evidential stage test sets out what it is necessary to be able to prove—some people say to a reasonable level—to afford a reasonable prospect of conviction. One can well imagine that, in Dignitas cases, that hurdle or test is often satisfied. It was often satisfied in the cases that I considered, and could often be satisfied in the future, but the evidential stage test being satisfied does not always mean that a prosecution results. That is because prosecutors must then go to the public interest stage and consider the non-exhaustive list of factors that are set out in the public interest stage test together with other policy, which, in this area of law, has developed since the legal case of Purdy in 2009. In common with many other forms of crime, there are some legal policy considerations that a prosecutor is entitled to consider. They start at the very obvious—for example, what is the age of the suspect? Here, one is not thinking about the deceased who has gone to Dignitas. What is the age of the suspect? What are their characteristics? Have they ever committed a criminal offence before? What is their proximity to the case? What motivation did they have, emotional or otherwise, to lend assistance that technically means they have committed the offence? I am going through that because, as I said, a proportion of the cases I considered were Dignitas cases, and it was often at the public interest stage that I determined that a public prosecution was not necessary. That is because, after full investigation, it transpired that the surviving relative had acted wholly out of compassion and, may I say, love for the deceased and was not seeking any gain for themselves—far from there being any dishonesty before or after the fact. That would still remain the case. It does not follow that, were this Bill to pass and were people then to take elderly relatives to Dignitas, they would necessarily face prosecution, but the premise of your question is “Could they?” and the answer to that is yes.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I will just jump straight to my final question. Dr Kaan, you said that you felt that people who felt they might be a burden were exercising their autonomy, and it was a perfectly appropriate reason to seek an assisted death. Is that right, and do you think there is anything more we should do to make it easier for people to access this right? Do you think they should be asserting anything other than their wish to do so? Dr Kaan: You characterised it correctly in that I think that for people who have capacity, and who are making the decision to have this as an option, a part of their reasoning is that they want to save their family from an onerous caregiving experience. I think that is their right and it is part of their value system. Of course, if that is the only reason, we are going to be exploring that. As Dr Spielvogel has said, that is a red flag. We are going to be exploring that, and exploring whether acceptable alternatives exist and what are the resources that the person may not be aware of. That is always part of the discussion. These discussions are always broad and multifactorial. But I think it is appropriate and okay for somebody to say, “I do not want my family to experience what I myself had to experience when I was caregiving for my elderly parents with dementia.” I have heard that many, many times. I do think people who have capacity should have their autonomy respected, in terms of the values that are driving them to make this decision. We always want to work towards improving the social support for caregiving that exists in our society. There is certainly a lack of it here in the US, and probably there in the UK as well. Hand in hand with allowing people to make an informed decision about the option of having an assisted death, you should also be a strong advocate for social support and caregiving services at the end of life, because those really are important and needed.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I wanted to follow up further, but because time is tight I will jump to Mr Ruck Keene. Can you explain a little bit about your concerns about the Mental Capacity Act and its interaction with the Bill? Do you think the threshold of capacity, as set out, is adequate? Alex Ruck Keene: I think there are two different questions. First, is any idea of capacity sufficient at all? I think that is an existential question that I am just going to park. Turning to the Mental Capacity Act itself, it is important to understand that there are three different bits of that Act in play. We have a set of principles: the presumption of capacity; the presumption that you have to provide all practicable support before you find someone to lack capacity; and the idea that you cannot, just because a decision seems unwise, say that someone lacks capacity. Then we have a functional aspect—in other words, can you understand, can you retain, can you use and weigh the relevant information, and can you communicate that decision? We also have what some people call the diagnostic element—in other words, is there an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain? These are the three separate things, all of which we make work—more or less—in everyday practice. I say “more or less”, because yesterday I was on the advisory group for a project funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research, which was funded in 2022 to try and increase the quality of mental capacity assessments in healthcare settings. We need to be under no illusions about how well we are doing it at the moment, but we make it work, more or less. The Mental Capacity Act works more or less in the healthcare context, because every time we reach the view that someone cannot make a decision, we have an alternative—we can think about best interests. What we are asking the idea of mental capacity to do here is different, because there is no suggestion that, if you cannot support someone to make a decision, you will ever make a best interest decision in their name to assist death. It is also not obvious that the idea of a presumption of capacity should apply. If I doubt that you have capacity to make the decision to take your own life, or end your life, but I cannot prove it, is it logical or are we required to proceed on the basis that you do? Also, it is not immediately obvious that it is right that the diagnostic test applies in this context. In other words, I think you cannot understand the information, but I cannot prove the reason that you cannot understand it is that you have an impairment or disturbance. That is where my concern came in when I was explaining it in my written evidence. I want to be absolutely and totally crystal clear: as far as I am concerned, at this stage, this is policy development. I am so glad that evidence is being taken and the public is thinking about this, but a Bill of this nature needs to be drafted by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel. I am really trying to get across the policy line, which to me is about what doctors need to be interrogating—or anyone else, as I would love it if other people were involved—is, can the person understand the information? Can they retain it? Can they use and weigh it? Can they communicate their decision? If they cannot, we do not need to start mucking around with, “Why not?” It is just that they cannot, and that is the central idea of capacity. It is the functional idea, but it is tooled for use in the Bill rather than, as it stands at the moment, just being cross-referred out to the Mental Capacity Act, raising a whole series of additional complexities. My only other observation is that I spend an awful lot of my life trying to improve Mental Capacity Act practice more broadly. I would be massively concerned were a knock-on effect of the Bill’s seeking to deal with a very specific group of people to be that it starts inadvertently—it would be inadvertent—interfering with how we think about healthcare decision making more broadly in the context of those people with impaired decision-making capacity. It is an insulation point, a making sure you have the right tools for the job point, and a not having a knock-on effect on thinking about things more broadly point. Sorry for the long answer.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I have four very quick questions. I would be grateful if you could try to answer them quickly, because we have to let everybody else in before the end of the session. Dr Spielvogel, I was struck by you saying that nine out of 10 patients to whom you have suggested this option were not aware of it. How many people who did not know about it before and to whom you might have suggested assisted dying as an option do you think have taken it up? How many people do you think benefited from you telling them about the option? Dr Spielvogel: A lot. I have actually been quite surprised. Everybody is different. This is the whole point: different people have different goals, objectives and values. I have mentioned it to people who say, “No, I would never do that,” and I never bring it up to them again.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Thank you very much. I was also concerned by what you said about what you called family coercion, which is people trying to stop their relatives taking this option. Do you think we can do anything to prevent that happening? Dr Spielvogel: Yes. I think it could be made into a misdemeanour, a felony or whatever the equivalent is over there—sorry, I do not have the terminology. You could make it illegal to interfere with a patient’s right to make this choice. We stopped short of that in our most recent addendum to our law here, but I think that was a lost opportunity.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q Sir Nicholas, do you want to comment? I have another question for you as well, but is it the case that prosecutions will be more likely? Maybe you disagree. Sir Nicholas Mostyn: I do not agree.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Q I will ask you one quick question, Dr Cox. Dr Clarke said that the capacity assessment was poorly conducted. Do you think that the threshold is appropriate, using the Mental Capacity Act 2005? Assuming that we could conduct these assessments adequately, do you think that the threshold is safe? Dr Cox: I and my colleagues have concerns about the safeguards in the Bill. It is not just the capacity assessment; we also acknowledge that prognosis is incredibly difficult to assess accurately. I would say that you cannot always identify coercion. You can identify it when it is very obvious and extreme, but when it is very subtle, we cannot always identify it. After the event, there is nobody to tell us about coercion, so it is very difficult to monitor. The other thing that concerns me is that we are putting all these assessments on the shoulders of two doctors individually, followed up by a High Court judge. In any other clinical practice, when we are making very serious decisions, we know that shared decisions are much better quality, much more robust and much safer. In clinical practice, we make all these decisions in multi-professional teams. I would never make these decisions independently of my team, because the perspective they bring can help me to understand things that I am not seeing. The thing that I am really concerned about is how it is possible for these doctors, even with training, to have a good understanding of all illnesses in order that they can identify prognosis—neurological, cancer and every other. How is it possible for them to really understand capacity when capacity is not an absolute; it does change and it is very complex to assess? How is it possible for them to see all cases of coercion, which can be invisible? In addition to that, are those doctors going to be looking out for opportunities to refer to palliative care when they see somebody who has suffering that could be addressed and may change their mind? Are they looking out for untreated depression? We know that treatment of depression can result in people changing their minds about wanting to die. It is a lot to ask these individual doctors to do, and that really concerns me.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Sorry, but how many do you think?

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  On a point of order, Mr Dowd. I wonder, given the fact that we have had so many really helpful conversations and questions but not enough time for everybody to ask everything they wanted, whether it would be appropriate for Members who want to write to witnesses to ask for follow-up information or further questions could do so through the Committee, rather than us all deluging the witnesses with our own messages, some of which will duplicate each other. I appreciate that there is a capacity question for the Clerks, but it might be appropriate to ask the Speaker for a bit more resource to enable that to happen. I think that the hon. Member for Spen Valley broadly supports the idea; I do not know if others do, as well.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I apologise. Dr Spielvogel: No problem. To answer your question more directly, I have had several people over the past couple of years who had no idea that it was an option and said, “That’s what I want to do.” They then went through the process with me.

• 22 Jan 2025 · Listed Places of Worship Scheme · Hansard source

  More

  I am very pleased my hon. Friend has secured this debate. He mentions the trifling sum the tax could bring to the Exchequer, but does he recognise the enormous, quantifiable economic value—billions of pounds—that church buildings bring to our communities? I particularly reference the work that Bishop Andrew Rumsey, the Bishop of Ramsbury in my constituency, is leading for the Church of England on this issue. Does my hon. Friend agree that the economic value outweighs the receipts that the Treasury would get?

• 21 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I look forward very much to the process of this Committee and to working with hon. Members to do what we can to ensure that a good Bill is presented back to the House. I very much respect the points made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley. Nevertheless, I do have some real objections to the motion, which I encourage Members to oppose. The fact is that this debate was due to be held in public—in fact, people have travelled here in the expectation that they would be able to attend and observe our debate on the sittings motion—but last night, for reasons we do not fully understand, a decision was clearly made to table a motion that we sit in private. I would be grateful to understand why that decision was made so late. My general point is that there is a clear public interest case. The public should understand why witnesses have been chosen and why other people have not, and if there are concerns about the witnesses, they should be aired publicly. This is the only time that the public are being consulted—that experts from outside Parliament have a chance to contribute to our deliberations. I fail to understand why those discussions cannot be held in public. The only argument that I can imagine—and the hon. Member for Spen Valley made it—is that Members might for some reason be uncivil or speak disrespectfully about potential witnesses, which I do not for a moment believe. I am sure that you, Sir Roger, or the other Chairs will keep us in order throughout our proceedings. We are here to talk about the overall balance and particular qualifications of the witness list. Looking at the witness list that was presented this morning by the hon. Lady, I have very serious concerns, which should be aired publicly, about the list. It includes eight witnesses from foreign jurisdictions, who are being called to give evidence from abroad; all are supporters of assisted dying in their jurisdictions. There are no people speaking against the operations of assisted dying laws internationally. There are nine lawyers on the list—all of them, with the exception of three who appear to be neutral, in favour of a change in the law. There is not a single lawyer against this Bill. Sir James Munby was suggested, but I understand he has been removed. There might be a perfectly good reason for that, but he has spoken against the Bill. There is nobody on the list from deaf or disabled people’s organisations, but the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities recognises the importance of engaging with such organisations in laws of this nature. With the exception of Dr Jamilla Hussain, there is no one on the witness list who can speak to the equality impacts of assisted dying.

• 21 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Well, it had a significant input.