Danny Chambers MP: speeches

Speeches

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clauses 3 to 5 are related to the publication of risk assessments of contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside the UK. They would place a duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic, UK-based suppliers in the case of technology systems and contracts involving the handling of NHS patient data, and place restrictions on the signing of such contracts with non-UK-based suppliers. New clause 5 would require the Government to publish an NHS digital sovereignty strategy setting out how they intend to address risks to relevant information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies. We had a Westminster Hall debate on this subject recently. The lack of transparency in how some contracts are awarded is one of the central concerns about Palantir’s involvement with the NHS. We are particularly concerned about the national security considerations of offshoring the whole of our nation’s health data to any foreign company, which makes us vulnerable to political and economic changes in other countries, but especially to companies of questionable integrity in an increasingly authoritarian jurisdiction with little respect for privacy and sovereignty. We should all be worried that our health data has been so closely linked with such an organisation, which has shown itself all too eager to work closely with Donald Trump’s Administration. We know that his Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has been using health data to identify people’s immigration status, and there is a lot of concern that people are not coming forward for medical treatment as a result. Doctors and patients have already voted with their feet and shown that they do not trust Palantir and its system for this very reason, which is also a key reason for the limited uptake of the federated data platform so far. As such, we have tabled various new clauses to try to address those concerns, to ensure that they do not plague the single patient record, which we absolutely support and want to help the Government to deliver, along with any other vital technology or data system. New clause 3 would ensure that a risk assessment is conducted of all non-UK tech and data suppliers, with particular regard for national security. It is centrally important that doctors and patients trust the systems that hold their health data and that, as a country, we trust them to be safe and secure. We should not trust rogue actors with our nation’s health information. New clause 5 deals with how we mitigate that risk. It would require the Government to publish an NHS digital sovereignty strategy, setting out how they intend to address the risks of foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies. Our potential answer to both those questions lies in new clause 4, which would prioritise domestic suppliers that handle sensitive or confidential NHS data. We recognise that that will not always be possible, but where domestic capability does not exist and it is therefore necessary to work with foreign suppliers, to ensure the transparency and effective oversight of a contract with a foreign supplier, it must be brought before Parliament. Should a contract be signed with a non-UK supplier, it would also be subject to consultation with patient groups, national security experts and staff unions to make sure that the system is onside. If it is not, uptake of it will be stunted, as we have seen with the federated data platform.