Daniel Francis MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The one thing that covid taught me was what my hon. Friend is alluding to. Hon. Members heard yesterday a bit about my family situation. I have a child who will never walk, will always be in nappies, will always need to be fed, and will always need to be dressed. During that period, no carer was allowed in the house, and as people know, my wife was also having chemotherapy —thankfully, she successfully recovered. As the carer, who everyone is reliant on, I saw that power imbalance. Everybody in my house was reliant on me during those three months—no one was allowed in the house, my wife was having chemo and my daughter needed round-the-clock care, so to speak. That is the position, which is why I understand this wording. That is the imbalance, whereby somebody could realise that this change in the law now gives them the power to release the burden of their loved one, not for any other reason—that they want their suffering to end—but because they want their loved one to have their life back. I do not know whether my hon. Friend has any comments on that.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to bring us back to the points raised by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire. I may have misread this, but I understand that, under the current law and under the law as it would stand if this legislation were introduced, it would remain an offence to encourage somebody to commit suicide with a 12-month diagnosis—perhaps someone with motor neurone disease or Parkinson’s disease, who may still be a loved one. I do not understand the counter-argument about not using the word “encouraged”: it would remain a criminal offence, unless I am mistaken, to encourage someone to take that decision if they had a diagnosis of longer than six months left to live.

• 12 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  From what I understand from the promoter of the Bill, the argument is that we should put these measures in place to protect from coercion people who have less than six months to live, but we would not put those protections in place for people who have nine or 12 months to live. If we are putting the measures in place for someone with six months to live, why are we not doing so for someone with nine or 12 months to live?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Member in charge for her comments. That is the conversation we had when she invited me to join the Committee, and we will continue to have conversations as amendments come forward. My concern is about some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, which was not written for these scenarios, and the hon. Member for Richmond Park talked in particular about the statutory principles in it. I am not an expert on these issues, and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud behind me is more of an expert on some of them. However, there is no obligation in the code of practice under the Act to consult carers involved in a person’s life. The code says: “if it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”. Therefore, given the way the Act and the code of practice are worded, there is no obligation in the scenarios I am discussing. There is another issue I was going to raise before I took that intervention. Mencap does considerable hard work. At my local branch, there are many people whose parents are in their 70s and 80s and have cared for their child all their life. I am not being rude, but their child, who is in their 40s or 50s, does feel like a burden to their parents. They know the obligation their parents have to care for them for their whole life. I ask Members to consider what the Mental Capacity Act says: those adults are at a level of capacity to make decisions, but they have been supported in those decisions all their lives and do not—

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Ms McVey. Yesterday, members of the Committee received notification that, in the last week, we have received a further 242 pieces of written evidence and 159 pieces of correspondence. Last week, I had read every word of the original 110 pieces of written evidence and 56 pieces of correspondence, as well as studying all the amendments and tabling amendments of my own. As I said, however, more than 400 pieces of evidence and correspondence have been uploaded during the past week, with no deadline by which further such evidence needs to be submitted. Given the large number of evidence submissions every day, Members may well struggle to keep abreast of it and be able to say that they have read every piece of correspondence before the tweaking of the Bill. I find it difficult to believe that any member of the Committee has been able to read all the evidence submitted since last Tuesday. For instance, the written evidence submitted by the chief executive of my local hospice, which she blind-copied me into on 20 January, was available for members of this Committee to read on 7 February, 17 days after she submitted it. That suggests that, as well as Members struggling to keep up, the Clerks are struggling to keep up. Given the sheer volume of evidence, we will not be able to consider it fully before line-by-line scrutiny. I therefore seek your advice, Ms McVey, on how we can reasonably expected to begin line-by-line scrutiny when in the last week we have been presented with more than 400 documents, in addition to new amendments.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am hearing that that amendment will need some rewording, but it would address some of my concerns. I am working with Mencap, and further amendments will be tabled to later clauses of the Bill. I understand that one of our colleagues has also tabled amendments, which I welcome. However, I would still have concerns about the interpretation—and there are different interpretations—of the current code of practice when it comes to the involvement of carers and loved ones. Those concerns brought me to the place I came to on Second Reading. I did not seek to be the person standing here; indeed, a year ago, not only did I not believe that I would be a Member of Parliament, but I did not believe that I would be on this side of this argument. It is this particular point that has driven me to this position. I will talk a little about evidence. The Law Society has a neutral position on the Bill, but it has said that, before the provisions become law, a comprehensive consultation should be undertaken to allow resident experts to share views on the appropriate definition of capacity for the purposes of the Bill. That is the position of the Law Society.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Mental Capacity Act is written to enable people to carry out day-to-day scenarios, such as buying a coffee or doing their banking, so that they are not challenged in every transaction in their life. It is therefore a very low bar to be deemed to have capacity. Does the hon. Member believe that it was written for this kind of scenario?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I welcome that commitment and look forward to that discussion in due course. Dr Hussain went on to say: “Ultimately, I do not think the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.] Professor Owen said: “That conveys questionable confidence in the consent processes, of which mental capacity is part, in relation to the decision to end one’s life. It is significant evidence about the confidence that is out there among experienced practitioners.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 228, Q290.] Dr Price said: “I…refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 268, Q349.]

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I say, I am not an expert on this matter from a legal or medical background, but those are the concerns that have driven me to the place that I am in. Dan Scorer, from Mencap—as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley knows, I was adamant that Mencap would give evidence to us—said: “building on the previous question about the adequacy of the Mental Capacity Act, there is a question about the adequacy of training, awareness and compliance with that Act now.” –– [ Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee , 30 January 2025; c. 269, Q350.] He clearly cited what many people know occurred during covid, with “do not resuscitate” orders and decisions being made on people’s behalf. That is what has driven me to this place, and that is why I will support the amendment. I also have further amendments on this issue later on down the line. I completely understand what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said about training in relation to these decisions and scenarios. At the end of life, people should have autonomy and choice, but if that comes at the price of one person, in a borderline capacity decision that is made on their behalf, it will be one death too many.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge knows I am an ally on many of these issues, but I will humbly disagree with her on some matters. I am not a lawyer or a doctor, but like many people here I speak from lived experience. I speak as the parent of a learning-disabled child, so I see the kinds of decisions that have to be made day to day, and the kinds of arguments and conversations that have to be had with people who presume that my child has more or less capacity than she has. Believe me, that is a constant, daily battle for me and my wife. My daughter has 12 words and a severe sight impairment, which makes it very difficult for her to make some of her decisions, as well as other complexities—predominantly her cerebral palsy, which caused a brain injury at birth. Therefore, in my own way, although I am not a lawyer or a doctor, I have become a bit of an expert on some of the capacity issues that people encounter day by day. This morning, as I do most mornings, I read to her the three choices for her breakfast. I give her a bit of time to think about them and then I repeat them. We get yes or no to those three choices, and that is the choice she makes. Because of her severe sight impairment, when I put those three options in front of her, I have to lift them up in front of my face so that she can see them; if I put them much lower down, she would not be able to see them and make a choice. She would be able to make the choice through pointing if it was within a certain range. I have doctors calling my wife and me all the time, asking to have a conversation with my daughter, despite their having read the notes saying that she is an 11-year-old with 12 words and a severe sight impairment. I therefore query—I will refer to some of the oral evidence in a moment—how well some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act are currently being carried out. Equally, I deal with people who suggest that she has a greater level of capacity than she does. I accept—I have had this conversation with the hon. Member for Spen Valley on a number of occasions—that this legislation would not be applicable to my daughter. However, we heard in evidence from Mencap that the vast majority of people with learning disabilities in this country are not in the same position. They are living their day-to-day lives, living in supported accommodation and making the kinds of decision we have discussed in this debate, such as buying coffee and going to the bank. As a result of my 20 years as a councillor, and in the last 11 years since our children were born, I have become involved with a number of local disability charities, and I know the decisions that people make when their child is at that transition age. They are trying to understand the complexity of taking a power of attorney for a child, as well as other decision-making issues. I spend a lot of time with parents who do not put those measures in place, because they do not understand the complexity in terms of age. We could therefore have a young adult relying on doctors who do not know them and on a judge—I have not seen an amendment on that issue, so I am still talking about a judge—to make a decision about capacity.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  The NHS South East London integrated care board provides services to my constituents, and I have discussed some ways in which we could better deliver services by redeveloping the Erith community hospital site in Northumberland Heath. Is the Minister able to provide an outline of the Government’s plan to provide capital funding for expanding community services like those at Erith hospital?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I absolutely accept what my hon. Friend says about training. I know we have separately discussed places in the Bill where we could replace the word “may” for “must” to make the safeguards stronger. However, I come back to the same points as I made to the Minister. The Mental Capacity Act code of practice, which I presume is what we will be relying on, says: “If it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”. However, it does not say “must”, and for adults with learning disabilities particularly, that remains a principal concern. Chapter 2 of the code of practice says: “It is important to do everything practical...to help a person make a decision for themselves before concluding that they lack capacity to do so.” I know this is not my hon. Friend’s intention, but that is the wording that would lead a doctor to have to help somebody make this decision. My question is: how will we overcome that issue?

• 11 Feb 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  To go back to the point I made this morning—I am happy to stand corrected, but nobody has disputed it—two issues continue to concern me in relation to the Mental Capacity Act and the code of conduct. The first is that the doctor would have a choice, under chapter 5 of the guidance, as to whether it is practical and appropriate to consult other people—with regard to learning disability, for instance. Also, we have not discussed principle 2 in chapter 2, which says that the doctor has to do everything practicable to try to help the person to make the decision for themselves, before concluding that they do not have the capacity to do so. The principal concern for some Members remains those issues in relation to the Mental Capacity Act, which have not been considered for this scenario. I would like the Minister to address them and the fact that that Act, which was written 20 years ago, was not written for this scenario.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Chair may cut you off, but I am happy for you to continue if she allows it.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My question is to Claire Williams and follows on from Dr Opher’s question. Clause 18(9) says that once the person has self-administered the approved substance, the doctor must stay with them until they have died, or until it has been determined by the co-ordinating doctor that the procedure has failed. We know from overseas that, in a very small number of cases, the procedure may take three or four days, so clearly the doctor cannot stay with them the whole time. Subsection (10) says that the doctor need not be in the same room as the person to whom the assistance is provided. I want to understand how that could be strengthened in terms of safeguarding. The clause says that the doctor must stay with them but, first, it is clearly not practical for the doctor to stay with them for a number of days, and, secondly, it goes on to say that the doctor need not be in the same room. Claire Williams: Again, I can only apologise, as my evidence is about a committee-based, panel approach to decision making rather than what happens at that point of end of life. I do not know whether somebody else is able to come in. Professor Preston: I can take that if you want.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Professor Preston. Sorry—if you agree, Mrs Harris.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To elaborate on that point, Professor Owen, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out the principles that a person must be assumed to have capacity, that a person cannot be treated as lacking capacity unless all practicable steps have been taken to support them and that a person cannot be treated as lacking capacity merely because their decision is unwise. Is it those issues that are causing you concern about capacity, or is it something else? Professor Owen: It is a bit more fundamental than that, actually. If you look at how mental capacity features in the Bill, the test or the concept that clause 1 rightly invites us to consider—rightly, I think—is the capacity to decide to end one’s own life. The Mental Capacity Act comes in at clause 3. I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience of the decision to end one’s own life. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground. The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts you into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity question under consideration. It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that. I can talk about the Mental Capacity Act in detail if you like, but that is the main point that I want to make.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My question is to Dan Scorer. In the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the definition of “capacity” means that many people with a learning disability are presumed to have capacity. We have heard comments from others on the panel, and I am trying to understand whether you feel that the existing provisions in that Act would cover those with a learning disability or whether you would need that greater advocacy, as you discussed, or something different from the Act. Do you have any comments on the fact that family members—lifelong carers, in many cases—would have no requirement, under the Bill or the Act, to be involved in the decision or to comment on their family member’s capacity? Dan Scorer: The Mental Capacity Act starts from the principle of presuming capacity. The question would be whether, when someone who is terminally ill puts themselves forward for assisted dying, doubts start to emerge about whether they actually have the ability to make that decision in terms of whether they can understand, retain or weigh the information and communicate their intentions. As I mentioned earlier, our concern is how those discussions around assisted dying are initiated. For many people with a learning disability who are terminally ill and in an incredibly vulnerable position, doctors are very important and influential figures. Having a doctor come to you and say, “What do you think about assisted dying—is that something you might want to consider?” could move them towards or into potentially accepting a course of action that they had never considered before. That is why I was saying that it is about having advocacy support around that discussion and, as you were saying, about the role of families. Individuals should be able to choose who supports them with those discussions, whether it is friends or family members or an independent advocate—that would probably be our preference—who is specifically trained to support people with a learning disability who are considering their end-of-life options. There is a lot that could be done in addition to what is in the Bill already to potentially much better support people who are considering end-of-life options and to have other professionals who could input into multidisciplinary discussions, potentially around capacity assessment.

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mrs Harris. Yesterday, we heard evidence about the impact of the Bill on different groups with protected characteristics, including age, disability, race and sexual orientation. We heard from the EHRC, an arm’s length body of the Government, that it strongly recommends that a full impact assessment, a human rights assessment and a delegated powers memorandum be undertaken before the Committee begins line-by-line scrutiny. We have also heard from witnesses about the impact that the Bill will have on disabled people, from Disability Rights UK and others, on black and minority ethnic people, from Dr Jamilla Hussain, from LGBT people, from Baroness Falkner, and on those from a low-income background, from Sam Royston of Marie Curie. We heard from Dr Sarah Cox and Dr Jamilla Hussain that evidence from their work shows that this Bill has a higher probability of pushing minority groups further away from seeking healthcare, while inequality pre-exists. As observed through the pandemic and from available data, minority groups do not always trust that their interests will be best represented in institutions that would enable the facilitation of someone’s death, should this Bill become law. I therefore believe that on the basis of that advice, so as not to inadvertently widen health inequalities through Bill, it is essential to have health impact assessments. I appreciate that an equality impact assessment will be produced for Report stage, it will not be available for detailed line-by-line scrutiny. When we agreed the timetable for line-by-line scrutiny last Tuesday, we were not aware that this assessment would be produced, given it was first reported to the House during the money resolution last Wednesday. There is a risk that there will be a bigger impact on people with protected characteristics, and this will not be understood fully until the Government have produced the equality impact assessment. As things stand, that means that we will move into line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill on 11 February without a full understanding from the assessment of the impact of the Bill. I am therefore minded to request a short Adjournment of the Committee so that, as advised, we can receive the assessments before we progress to line-by-line scrutiny. Please will you advise me, Mrs Harris, how I could secure such a motion to adjourn the Committee until we are in receipt of the evidence, as advised by the witnesses yesterday?

• 30 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I want to ask about capacity. Chloe, I think you said patients are sometimes given the drug some time before they die, so I want to understand where capacity assessments are taken and at what stage during the process. Dr Furst: Capacity assessments are taken every time a doctor sees the patient. In my state, that would be at first assessment—first request—then a consulting doctor would come and do another hour-long assessment of the patient and assesses capacity at that stage, and then I would come back as the co-ordinating doctor for a second or third assessment of the patient, and assess capacity. They would then be given their drug, if it is self-administered. We assume and hope that they retain capacity, and we strongly advise patients and families that, should they lose capacity, they will have voided their permit and they cannot take the drug, but there is less oversight of that. However, we know that the majority—over 80%—of these patients are connected with palliative care, so we often have community teams going in and seeing them, and we are still touching base with them, maybe more peripherally, and checking capacity as we are having conversations or as we are coming and doing home visits from a palliative care perspective. If it were deemed that the patient is quite delirious, the permit would be voided and we would remove the substance from the house. If it is practitioner administration, we are also, obviously, testing capacity right at the moment that we are administering the substance.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q My question is to both Dr Mullock and Professor House. In your written evidence, you both refer to clause 18(9) and issues regarding the obligations of the doctor if the procedure either fails or if there is a long-delayed death. I accept that it is a small number, but we know from elsewhere that there are cases where the death takes some days—three to four days in some cases—or where the procedure fails. The Bill says that the doctor must stay with the person for the entirety ofthat time. I am trying to understand from your written evidence how you feel that measure should be amended to make it stronger, because at the moment there is no mention what the doctor should do to intervene, and clearly it is not practical for a doctor to stay for three to four days. What are your views on how that could be amended?

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Ms Hadi, we heard evidence this morning that the majority of disabled people support the Bill. I would like to hear your comments on that. What analysis do you have on whether the majority of disabled people support the Bill? Baroness Falkner, based on what we have just heard, if we had had the equality impact assessment before oral evidence was sought and before line-by-line scrutiny, would you have supported the approach more? Baroness Falkner: My answer will be very brief. Every additional piece of analysis is helpful, because there are gaps in the analysis. The problem is that because we have not had a consultation, and because the process of deliberation was not transparent—it never will be with a private Member’s Bill—there is a sense of not knowing quite enough as to the reasoning behind—

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Yesterday, we heard from some clinicians from the USA, who outlined how they have reviewed the scheme in practice. They said that their waiting period between the two clinician appointments has been reduced from 14 days to 48 hours, and that in some cases the second clinician has been removed and replaced by a nurse practitioner. Have you undertaken a similar review? Have you made any changes as a result? Dr McLaren: We are undergoing our review at the moment. It was meant to commence after the first five years of operation of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act in Victoria. That review has yet to be tabled or published. Certainly, the recommendations that we have submitted to it involve reducing or removing the so-called grace period, or waiting period. My experience, and that of an almost homogeneous group of practitioners, is that patients serve their own lock-out periods, grace periods and periods of reflection, as I believe you have called them, before applying. Subsequently, there are several logistical pauses throughout the process, which also instigate their own grace periods. The addition of further periods for reflection is, I think, superfluous and unnecessary. Secondary to that, in all our Bills and Acts, we have an ability to bypass those waiting periods. Forgive me if I am wrong, but I did not see the capability to bypass any of those in your current Bill. If the person has a prognosis of less than seven days, they should be able to be expedited and not serve that time. I do not see the purpose of putting extra time on these people to apply for this. I always say that people do not know that they have six months to live until they have six weeks to live. We as oncologists do not know that either. In a matter of one CT scan, we can change a person’s prognosis from 18 months to three months. All of a sudden, they start thinking about how they see their life ending, and then they have to engage in a process of application. Out of that three-month period, it might take a month to apply. My recommendation has always been to increase the prognostic eligibility criteria from six months to 12 months and to remove waiting periods, which patients will place on themselves regardless of the legislative requirements.

• 29 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Could I clarify whether there is also a review of keeping two clinicians in the process? We heard yesterday that that is not the case elsewhere. Dr Mewett: One has to understand that although there are some broad similarities, there are a number of differences state by state, and now the Australian Capital Territory has legislation. In the ACT, they have passed legislation, although it has yet to come into practice, whereby one of the two assessing practitioners could be a suitably qualified nurse practitioner. In all the other states of Australia, each of the assessing practitioners has to be medically trained. Different states have different requirements. There is also, in some states, the ability for a suitably qualified nurse practitioner to be the administering practitioner in the case of practitioner-administered voluntary assisted dying.

• 28 Jan 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I hear what you have said already regarding capacity. Of course, the Mental Capacity Act relies on the capacity principles. They include the presumption of capacity, the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity unless all practicable steps have been taken to support them to make a decision, and the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity merely because the decision is unwise. I also heard what you said about the scaling of decision making, but within the Bill, in some of those scenarios there is no mandating; the word “may” is used rather than “must”. I want to understand your viewpoint on whether it would provide stronger safeguards if those parts of the Bill were tightened to include “must” rather than “may”, and if the reference to capacity were replaced with a separate definition of “ability”, as proposed in our amendments. Professor Whitty: I am probably not the best person to ask about the exact drafting of the Bill in terms of “may” and “must”, but I can answer the second part of your question, which is really important. If there were no Mental Capacity Act, there would be an argument, which has been used for a long time, that the Bill would have to define what was meant with a fair degree of clarity. It would not be able to do that with just one clause; there would have to be quite a lot of clauses, if I am honest. All systems of this sort are going to be imperfect. The reason why I think it is sensible to base yourself on the Mental Capacity Act is that it is well used and well understood in practice by practitioners every day. Having a system with two completely separate groups of assessment, one of which has never been tested in the courts or used outwith this Bill, would lead to a whole set of potential complications and ambiguities, which are not there at the moment because we have a well-tested mechanism through the Mental Capacity Act. People should move away from the Mental Capacity Act with some caution, because I think that will cause as many problems as it solves. It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that, given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision. That is the foundation of some of the disquiet that people have had, but it is central to how the Mental Capacity Act works in practice.