Dan Jarvis MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am happy to do that. If my hon. Friend bears with me for just a couple of moments, I will provide him with the information that he has requested. In the latter category especially—where deprivation is conducive to the public good—deprivation is used against some of the most dangerous individuals, including terrorists, extremists, and serious and organised criminals. Someone in the UK who has been deprived of their British citizenship no longer has any immigration status, steps may be taken to remove them from the UK, and they may be held in an immigration detention in the interim. If they are overseas, they cannot re-enter the UK using a British passport. In both circumstances, this is clearly an effective way to disrupt the threat posed by dangerous individuals.

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not agree with my hon. Friend’s second point. This Bill has been very carefully and narrowly drafted, and I do not think it does the things that she has said it does. As to why the Government would seek to use these powers, I hope she understands that we will do everything we possibly can—as I am sure the previous Government did—to keep the public safe and protect them from high-harm individuals such as extremists, terrorists, and serious and organised criminals, and that this Government, as was the case with the previous Government, consider that this is an appropriate, necessary and proportionate way in which to do that. I hope that the public and the House will understand why we are progressing in the way that we are. The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) made a very thoughtful speech. He has clearly thought about this matter long and hard, and he has done the House a great service with his contribution. I want to reflect briefly on the contribution made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). I enjoy debating these matters with him, and I am genuinely grateful for his contribution. He suggested at one point that he might be an old romantic. I couldn’t possibly comment—but I could possibly say that he has advanced some interesting points. They are not points that the Government agree with, and I hope he does not mind me saying that they are not points that the majority of Members of this House agree with, but he has ensured that this debate has been richer than it would otherwise have been had he not made those contributions. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that the Government are acting in good faith in order to ensure that we are best placed to keep the country safe. I know that he is not satisfied with the measures that we have brought forward and does not agree with them. That is absolutely his right. I respect his right to make the case in the way that he has, but I would ask him briefly to consider an alternative scenario in which the Government of the day, regardless of their political party, did not put in place the necessary powers to keep the public safe. One can only imagine the criticism that any Government would face, were they not to do that.

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, as I always am, and he is absolutely right that it is necessary to close this particular loophole, and that is the purpose of the Bill. He has raised a very interesting example, and I am grateful to him for saying he is happy for me to come back to him. If he lets me reflect on it further, I will respond to him when I make my concluding remarks at the end of the debate.

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. Of all the duties of Government, none matters more than keeping our country safe. It is an awesome task, and one to which we attach the utmost significance, as this House and the public would expect. For people to flourish, they must have confidence that they are safe as they go about their lives. For a society to excel, its values must be protected from harm and its laws upheld. For a nation to thrive, its leaders must be unrelenting in the pursuit of these critical aims. That is why the Prime Minister has made national security a foundation of the plan for change, and it is why we work around the clock with our partners in policing and the security services to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe. In the face of a complex and evolving threat picture, it is essential that we keep the powers, tools and measures available to us under constant review. Where steps are needed to maintain the safety and security of our country, this Government will not hesitate to act. It is with that intention that we have brought forward this Bill, which, although narrow in its scope and intent, is vital to our ongoing efforts to protect the United Kingdom. Before I come to the detail of the Bill, I will provide a little bit of background. The British Nationality Act 1981 provides for the removal of an individual’s British citizenship. This is also known as a deprivation of citizenship. Deprivation is an important and effective tool to maintain public safety and preserve national security. It is used in two different situations: where citizenship has been obtained by fraud, or where deprivation is conducive to the public good, which means that it is in the public interest to deprive a person of British citizenship because of their conduct and/or the threat that they pose to the United Kingdom.

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I always enjoy our debates. He says that the Government are moving the goalposts, but does he accept that we are ensuring that we have the same powers to deprive that he had when he was a Home Office Minister?

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  Again, if the right hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will come to his specific point in a moment, and if he is not satisfied that I have responded adequately then, I am happy to give way again. I will make some progress. Deprivation decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and lawyers, and in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually. Decisions to deprive, where it is conducive to the public good, are personally taken by the Home Secretary. The power is used sparingly. It complies with the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, and always comes with a right of appeal. Turning to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell), let me give the House a sense of the frequency with which deprivation powers are used. From 2018 to 2023, on average 12 people a year were deprived of their citizenship where it was conducive to the public good. The available period for fraud-related deprivations is slightly different, but from 2018 to 2022 there were an average of 151 cases per year in that category. Let me turn to the Bill, dealing first with why it is required; I hope this will go some way to responding to the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). In a recent case, the Supreme Court decided that, if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, the initial deprivation order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be a British citizen. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before further avenues of appeal have been exhausted by the Home Secretary.

• 30 Jun 2025 · Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is absolutely right about the point of due process. I can say to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Southall that these powers are used very sparingly. Each and every individual case is decided on by the Home Secretary. I know that this Home Secretary has—and I am sure previous Home Secretaries have—taken these responsibilities incredibly seriously. Decisions are made carefully, on advice and in accordance with international law, and I am happy to give the hon. Member and others that assurance.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. With your indulgence, before I address the draft order I want to take the opportunity briefly to congratulate the Treasurer of His Majesty’s Household, my right hon. Friend the Member for Alyn and Deeside, on being awarded a knighthood in the recent birthday honours list. It is hugely well deserved recognition of a quarter of a century of service, and I am sure that the whole Committee will join me in congratulating him. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Driving down money laundering is critical to the Government’s key missions to deliver safer streets and economic growth, and I am determined that the Government will do all they can to bring justice to those seeking to wash their illicit funds through the UK. Close working with the private sector is integral to delivering on that objective. As our first line of defence, the private sector plays a fundamental role both in preventing the UK financial system from being exploited for criminal gain and in detecting suspicious activity where it has occurred. I am proud that the UK was one of the first countries to establish a financial crime public-private partnership and has set the international standard in this area. Part of a successful public-private partnership is honestly reviewing what has worked in tackling money laundering and what needs to change for us to be more effective. With that objective in mind, and as part of “Economic Crime Plan 2”, the Government, law enforcement and the private sector have worked together to consider how public-private resource can be better directed to maximise our collective impact against the threat. The draft order is one of the first outputs of that work. It raises the existing financial threshold for two exemptions that apply to principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 from £1,000 to £3,000. The uplift in the threshold will enable law enforcement resource to be focused on higher priority reports that provide greater opportunities for asset denial and disruption of criminal activity. It will also free up businesses’ resource to be redirected towards high-value activity that may have a greater impact on the threat. The measure is further expected to reduce the impact on banking customers by reducing instances of legitimate customers being unable to access their accounts, in particular where no further action is taken. The first exemption applies to acts in operation of an account, such as paying expenses, by deposit-taking bodies, which are essentially banks and building societies, and electronic money and payment institutions. The second exemption applies in the instance of a business in the anti-money laundering regulated sector ending a relationship with a customer and paying away any money or property to the customer. This means that for transactions below the threshold, businesses in the anti-money laundering regulatory sector do not need to submit defence against money laundering suspicious activity reports, known as DAML SARs. A DAML SAR is submitted to the National Crime Agency by a person proposing to deal with suspected criminal property, which may make them liable for one of the principal money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act. By submitting a DAML, a person can avoid committing one of the principal money laundering offences by obtaining consent, or deemed consent, for the act they propose to carry out—for example, a customer’s transaction to pay their mortgage. The DAML provides information to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit housed in the National Crime Agency and prevents the business from carrying out the activity referenced in the request until the UKFIU gives a consent decision or seven working days pass, after which the business can assume that it has consent. In 2023, the threshold was raised to £1,000 due to the rising volume of DAMLs and the regulatory burdens on businesses to submit a DAML SAR, as well as burdens on law enforcement to review and the delay to customers, who must often wait seven days for their transaction to be processed. While the £1,000 threshold has likely contributed to a reduction in DAMLs, evidence shows that the UKFIU continues to receive a large number of low-value DAMLs, only a small proportion of which lead to asset denial opportunities. Between January and December 2024, approximately 23,000 DAMLs relating to transactions between £1,000 and £3,000 were submitted. Of those, only 182 were refused, equating to 0.1% of all assets denied because of DAMLs in that year. To prevent the loss of information, businesses must still submit an information-only suspicious activity report to the UKFIU where they suspect any and all involvement in money laundering. That duty will not be affected by the draft order. Having, I hope, covered the key points, I commend the draft order to the Committee.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. As a very experienced Member, he will understand that the Home Office is responsible for the Proceeds of Crime Act, and although of course we have conversations with other Departments about other matters, the matter that he mentions is not one that sits within my area of responsibility. No doubt colleagues in the Department that I think he is referring to will listen carefully to his remarks; I am sure that they will be as grateful for them as I am. I am grateful for all the contributions to the debate. SARs intelligence is a critical tool in our ability to identify, disrupt and recover the money that underpins the most serious and organised crime in the UK. Increasing the threshold to reflect the current landscape is an important step as we seek to improve the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system, prioritise resources, enable greater disruption of criminal activity and prevent criminals from enjoying the proceeds of their illicit activities. Once again, therefore, I commend the draft order to the Committee. Question put and agreed to .

• 17 Jun 2025 · Draft Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) (Threshold Amount) (Amendment) Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for the constructive way that she has approached the draft order. These are not contentious or party political matters, and it is right that we debate them in that spirit. I am grateful for her support for the measures and I completely agree with her about the importance of ensuring that we target them, and our resource, as effectively as possible. The shadow Minister asked, entirely reasonably, about monitoring and review. As she might remember from her own time working at the Home Office, there are processes in place to ensure that these activities are kept under very close watch. I can assure her that, following on from the work done by the previous Government, we will continue to keep these matters under very close review. Given that I have referenced the previous Government, I want to take the opportunity to commend the right hon. Member for Salisbury for the work that he did and the leadership that he showed in this policy area during his time in government. In particular, I thank him for his work to introduce the economic crime levy. I am sure that he knows this, but it is worth repeating that the levy raises around £100 million per year from the anti-money laundering sector, and it has provided extremely valuable and long-term, sustainable resource for funding measures to tackle money laundering. I am grateful to him for the work that he did in government. I reiterate in response to the shadow Minister that we will monitor these matters on a regular basis. She will understand why I will not say too much about the technical detail of the work that is done to spot suspicious activity that falls beneath the threshold, but I am sure that she will remember from her time in the Home Office that there are mechanisms in place that seek to prevent people from bending or breaking the rules by behaving in a certain way in relation to transactions below the threshold. I think that she knows what I am referring to. My hon. Friend the Member for Brent West raised an important point, but I am struggling to remember precisely what it was. Perhaps he will briefly remind me.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I genuinely welcome the challenge offered by the right hon. Gentleman; he is right to press us on this. I assure him that there are specific operational reasons why ambulance trusts may wish to retain and use this power. One reason why we have proceeded in the way that we have is that removing public authorities that did not respond to the Home Office’s correspondence from schedule 4 could risk operational errors—for example, ambulance trusts, unaware that they were no longer listed in schedule 4, could continue to make requests for CD without the necessary authorisation. I broadly agree with his points, and I accept that there is a case for further tidying up. I assure the Committee that we will continue to do that, and ensure that the right public authorities, which are using the powers for genuine operational reasons, are listed in schedule 4. I assure him that there are genuine operational reasons—if he will forgive me, I will not go into specific detail—why an ambulance trust might want to exercise these powers. However, I accept his basic point that we will need to look carefully at this and do any further tidying up of the four.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  Again, I am grateful to the hon. Member, because it is an entirely fair challenge. I assure the Committee that the Home Office works very closely with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—I will say a little more about that in response to the questions of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire—to ensure that all the entries in schedule 4 remain up to date and reflect those with a requirement or compelling need for the use of CD powers. The consideration of a public authority’s addition to the schedule is entirely based on the operational case, its proposed approach to compliance and its understanding of the appropriate, necessary and proportionate use of the powers. We give these matters very careful consideration, but I will happily reflect further on the point made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam with regard to the single ambulance trust. Let me turn to the points made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire about proportionality, which he was right to raise. He will know from his time in government, both as deputy mayor and as a Home Office Minister, about the vital requirement for these powers. As I said in my introductory remarks, communications data is routinely used as evidence in upwards of 95%—that is probably a conservative estimate—of serious organised crime investigations. That is a key statistic. That data has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade. It provides vital evidence in both criminal and national security investigations. At the same time, he is right to make the point that we need to be proportionate in its use: strong powers, yes, but with an absolute requirement for strong oversight as well. I completely understand and am genuinely pleased about what he has said. It is not that often that we get the opportunity to debate these niche but important matters about the role of the commissioner. The commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, does an outstanding job. Anyone who knows him is aware that he is, by any metric, an extraordinary character and a true public servant with a wisdom and integrity that are a huge credit to the work that he does. He is incredibly well supported by an excellent team who work hard to ensure appropriate levels of oversight for this regime. We would not be able to operate without the independent oversight that he and his team have carried out for the previous Government and this Government, and will carry out for the next one, without fear or favour. All that said, it continues to be right, of course, for us to look carefully at the structural arrangements in place and, as a still relatively new Government, to satisfy ourselves that they are fit for purpose, that they are appropriately resourced and that the right people are doing what is a difficult and important job. I give the right hon. Gentleman an absolute assurance that the Home Secretary and I personally take these matters very seriously. I meet Sir Brian and his team regularly, who look carefully at the work we do. But if the right hon. Gentleman or any other Member has any thoughts about how the regime could be tweaked or improved, I will happily have that conversation.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  First, let me thank the hon. Member for South West Devon for her remarks, which are much appreciated, not least for the constructive tone in which she delivered them. It is important that we ensure there is broad political support for the investigatory powers regime. These are vital powers for our intelligence services, law enforcement and, as we have heard, a number of public authorities. It is absolutely right that we debate these matters and that they are subject to scrutiny in this House. On that basis, I welcome the challenge from Opposition Members, because it behoves the Government to justify the continued need of these powers in the way that we seek. I will say a little more about that in a moment. The hon. Member for South West Devon asked about the use of powers and consultation with public authorities. She asked for an assurance that adequate, appropriate resources are in place to support the use of the powers, which I can give her. I also say to her that the Home Office, as I am sure was the case under the previous Government, takes such matters incredibly seriously, both in terms of ministerial oversight and the work of officials in the Department. We look very carefully to ensure that the use of powers is necessary, proportionate and appropriate. I assure her that there has been an appropriate level of consultation leading up to these regulations. I am grateful for her broad support of the regulations and of the investigatory powers regime more generally. The hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam specifically asked about ambulance trusts. I can tell him that the six English ambulance trusts being removed, as well as the Scottish ambulance service and the Welsh ambulance service, made a direct request to the Home Office for removal from schedule 4. For the purposes of clarity, the remaining four English ambulance trusts—the West Midlands ambulance service, the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service—and the Northern Ireland ambulance service have not requested removal and therefore remain listed in schedule 4. Only one ambulance trust, the West Midlands ambulance service, responded to object to its removal. I assure him that the Government will continue to review the necessity of communications data powers for all public authorities listed in schedule 4, including these ambulance trusts, to ensure that their inclusion in the schedule remains justified. Basically, we do not want organisations to be listed in the schedule if they are not using the powers.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The regulations are enabled by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The IPA provides a framework for the use and oversight of investigatory powers by our intelligence services, law enforcement and other public authorities. It is designed to protect the public by giving law enforcement the tools it needs to prevent and prosecute crime. In this context, it also safeguards the privacy of individuals by setting stringent controls over the way IPA powers are authorised and overseen. Part 3 of the IPA sets out the public authorities that are permitted to acquire communications data, or CD, and under what statutory purposes CD may be acquired. CD reveals the who, where, when and how of a communication, but not its content, such as what was written or said. CD is routinely used as evidence in upwards of 95% of serious organised crime investigations and has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade. The data is vital evidence in criminal and national security investigations. The relevant public authorities that are permitted to use CD powers, and that therefore have the authority to make a request to compel CD from telecommunication and postal operators, are listed in schedule 4 to the IPA. As technology and society’s use of technology change, it is important that we adapt and equip public authorities with the capability to prevent criminals from exploiting technology features, hiding their identity, evading detection and putting the public at risk. The regulations will update the public authorities listed in schedule 4. Updating the schedule ensures that only those public authorities that need powers to acquire CD remain listed in the schedule. In addition to this safeguard, the communications data code of practice provides guidance on the processes associated with making an application to use the power, as well as the safeguards and oversight arrangements that will ensure that the power is used in the intended manner: in a targeted way, and only when necessary and proportionate. The CD code has statutory force, and individuals exercising functions to which the code relates must have regard to it. Eleven entries will be added to the schedule. The entries relate to the Intellectual Property Office, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Transport; the Security Industry Authority, an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by the Home Office; NHS Counter Fraud Service Wales, an organisation hosted by the Velindre University NHS Trust; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team in the Department for Business and Trade; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; and the counter fraud and investigation team in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The following ambulance services will also be added: the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service, the West Midlands ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service. Except for the four ambulance trusts I have just mentioned, the public authorities to be added are entirely new entries to the schedule and CD powers. Following their addition to schedule 4, the seven newly added public authorities will be able to apply for an independently approved authorisation via the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office that, if granted, can be used to compel telecommunications and postal operators to disclose CD for the purposes set out within their designation in schedule 4. They will not be given the power to internally authorise CD applications. The four entries relating to the English ambulance trusts were previously designated in schedule 4 under the umbrella definition of “An ambulance trust in England”, which included a total of 10 English ambulance trusts. That definition has been removed and replaced with the four individual entries. Therefore, six English ambulance trusts will be removed from schedule 4 having confirmed with the Home Office that they no longer require CD powers. The four English ambulance trusts remaining in the schedule are the South East Coast ambulance service, the North West ambulance service, the West Midlands ambulance service and the East Midlands ambulance service. Those trusts will retain their CD powers, including the ability to authorise internal applications. The Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust and the Scottish ambulance service board will also be removed from schedule 4, having confirmed with the Home Office that they no longer need to retain their CD powers. The regulations make no change to the Northern Ireland ambulance service or its designation in the schedule. The regulations will amend the Insolvency Service’s designation to include the Department for Business and Trade, following machinery of Government changes. There is no change to the Insolvency Service’s ability to acquire CD for the purposes already listed in schedule 4. As part of our effort to ensure the continued operational utility of the IPA, the regulations will make necessary and vital changes to schedule 4. To conclude, the changes will enable various public authorities to carry out and fulfil their essential statutory duties, including safeguarding the public from national security threats and criminal activity. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I am genuinely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, because he raises some important points. Some of us were here a week ago debating a not dissimilar statutory instrument. I had a very constructive debate with a former security Minister on his Benches—the right hon. Gentleman knows him well—and we repeated some of the debate that we had during the passage of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024 in the previous Parliament. We debated precisely the issues that the right hon. Gentleman raises. I do not disagree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman said, but let me seek to give him a bit of assurance. First, we definitely do not do fishing exercises—as the Minister, I would not consider that remotely appropriate—and we do not do mission creep either. We need to be really careful to ensure that all the public authorities listed have an absolute operational requirement to use the powers. The right hon. Gentleman’s raised the Intellectual Property Office in his earlier remarks, and helpfully did so again just a moment ago. The Intellectual Property Office engages with law enforcement agencies and other Departments to tackle intellectual property crimes, including those relating to patents, designs, trademarks and copyright, via a multi-agency approach. It also supports investigations to tackle serious organised crime, such as countering counterfeit goods, illegal streaming and associated money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I take his point, but I hope that in the specific example he raises I am able to assure him that the powers vested in that organisation are necessary and proportionate. I further assure him that I will continue to look very carefully at these matters to satisfy myself that all the public authorities listed have that operational requirement. Finally, I thought the right hon. Gentleman made a reasonable point about authorisation. I assure him that very careful consideration is given to matters relating to authorisation—I am sure he remembers that from his time in the Department. He raised an interesting example, but I assure him that, as a Minister, I have looked very carefully at the details of this, as have officials. We will satisfy ourselves that matters relating to authorisation are designated at an appropriately senior level. He is right to raise that point. I assure him that the regulations are appropriate, but I will look carefully at them to further satisfy myself that that is the case. I hope that I have responded reasonably to all the questions, and that I have illustrated the importance of the regulations, which I commend to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  Let me first thank the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings for his comments and questions. He said at the outset that he was proud of the role that he played in introducing this important piece of legislation, which dates back to 2016. He is absolutely right to be proud of his work on it, as it continues to deliver very real operational benefits on behalf of the country. I have greatly enjoyed our exchanges on these matters over the years, both inside and outside the Chamber, not least because while they are incredibly important matters that underpin our national security, they are also quite detailed and complicated. They therefore require a significant amount of knowledge and understanding to comment on in the way that the right hon. Gentleman is able to because of his previous experience and his interest in them. The right hon. Gentleman made an interesting point about the authority and responsibility vested in the Prime Minister, and I think he nodded towards a process of delegation. I know he will understand that I am incredibly limited in what I can say about that in this forum, although I would be happy to have a further conversation with him on Privy Council terms. With your indulgence, Ms McVey, I will reflect briefly on some of the conversations and the thinking around the 2024 Act, as there were various discussions about what could and should be done, should the Prime Minister of the day either be temporarily unavailable—potentially through ill health or through travel—or be conflicted because of a personal matter. In truth, we never got into the detail of those slightly difficult but important debates on the Floor of the House. Perhaps that was a good thing, and perhaps it was the most appropriate way to proceed. However, I can give the right hon. Gentleman an absolute assurance that, as he would expect, this Government, this Prime Minister, this Security Minister and this Home Secretary take these matters incredibly seriously, and we will ensure that the relevant delegations are in place so that where difficult decisions need to be made, we can make them in the most timely and effective way. The right hon. Gentleman made some helpful remarks about the importance of this legislation, and I completely agree with him. He will know from his time in government of the exceptional work that our intelligence services and law enforcement do on our behalf. We owe them a debt of gratitude, and it is on us—as Ministers, as shadow Ministers and as parliamentarians—to ensure that an appropriate legislative framework is in place so that whatever technological advances there are, we can continue to ensure that our law enforcement agencies and our security services do not just have parity with our opponents, but enjoy a competitive advantage. I am grateful to him for the work that he has done, and for the support and advice that he provides. I think the right hon. Gentleman asked me about the part 7A code of practice. Just to confirm, the code sets out how the new regime provided for under part 7A of the IPA should be implemented, and it provides further detail about the use of bulk personal datasets. As I hope the right hon. Gentleman knows, I would be very happy to discuss any of these matters with him in more detail. I am also grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for her comments and questions. I know that she speaks with real interest and authority on these matters from her own time working with Government, and I am grateful for the support from her and the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) on these matters. The shadow Minister rightly and understandably raised an important question about the tech companies. As she knows, we take that relationship incredibly seriously. The Government’s preference is always to work closely with technology companies to ensure public safety, but we must also make sure that we have the powers in place for when collaboration is not sufficient; I think she knows what I am talking about. In addition, private companies should not be able to unilaterally remove the use of powers to investigate terrorists when they change how their technology works. She summarised very well and effectively, in a way that I hope we can all agree on, the balance that must be struck between freedom of speech and privacy, and ensuring that the Government always have the tools necessary to keep the public safe. The shadow Minister made two other helpful and constructive points. The first was on parliamentary oversight, which she was right to raise. If I were seeking to be slightly mischievous—I am not—I would perhaps be tempted to reflect on the lack of prime ministerial leadership in recent years with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings serves on and knows well. The Prime Minister must send a clear signal about the ISC’s importance. It has crucial work to do on behalf of Parliament to scrutinise the work of our intelligence services. By its nature, that detailed work requires Committee members to study the activities of our security services carefully and discreetly. I can absolutely give the hon. Lady an assurance that the Government take that work very seriously, while respecting the independence of the Committee, which answers to Parliament, not the Government. The shadow Minister’s final point on the process of review was very important. The investigatory powers regime operates in a rapidly changing world. The alarmingly quick rate of technological change means that, as a Government, we have to make sure that the legislative framework continues to adapt to the changing nature of the threat that we face. As part of that process, as she knows, it is incredibly important that we work closely with our allies, including our Five Eyes partners, but the Government have an absolute responsibility to ensure that the investigatory powers regime is fit for purpose. We keep a close eye to ensure that it is, and where we think that updates are required, we will introduce them. I hope very much that that will be a collaborative process, because it is important to me and, I hope, to Opposition Members that we do this in a non-partisan, collaborative way. I am grateful for Opposition Members’ contributions, and I thank the Committee for its consideration of the regulations. I hope I have set out reasonably clearly that they are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the UK’s investigatory powers framework, and I commend them to the Committee once more. Question put and agreed to.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. Before I address the content of this statutory instrument, I will briefly provide some background. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, known as the IPA, provides a framework for the use and oversight of investigatory powers by the intelligence services, law enforcement and other public authorities. It helps to safeguard people’s privacy by setting out stringent controls over the way that these powers are authorised and overseen. The IPA was intentionally drafted in a technology-neutral manner to ensure that public authorities could continue to acquire operationally relevant data as technology evolved. Although that approach has largely withstood, a combination of new communications technologies and the changing threat landscape continues to challenge the effective operation of the IPA. To ensure the legislative regime remained fit for purpose, the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024 was introduced by the previous Government and received Royal Assent in April last year. The 2024 Act made a series of targeted changes to the IPA to enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to tackle a range of evolving threats in the face of new technologies and increasingly sophisticated terrorist and criminal groups. I do not intend to cover the changes made by the 2024 Act in detail, as they have already been debated extensively by both Houses. However, I will outline the purpose of the statutory instrument we are debating. It will bring into force three new and five revised codes of practice that provide operational guidance for public authorities to have regard to when exercising their functions under the IPA. As well as including minor updates to ensure consistency, the codes of practice have been revised to reflect the various changes made by the 2024 Act. The statutory instrument and the codes of practice have been informed by a 12-week public consultation, which closed in January this year. The new codes of practice on bulk personal datasets with a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy and on third-party bulk personal datasets relate to new regimes introduced by the 2024 Act. The new code on the notices regime consolidates guidance from various existing codes into one place. This instrument also contains several provisions relating to the IPA’s notices regime, including the following: defining “relevant change” for the purpose of the new notification notices; introducing timelines for the review of technical capability, data retention, and national security notices; and amending existing regulations in relation to membership of the technical advisory board. The 2024 Act was designed to uphold national security and to ensure that prevention and detection of the most serious crimes continued to be underpinned by an effective investigatory powers framework. These regulations are an important and necessary step in the implementation of that Act. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

• 2 Jun 2025 · Fraud · Hansard source

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  I know that the right hon. Gentleman takes these matters seriously, but I gently remind the House that under the last Government, Lord Agnew, then Minister with responsibility for countering fraud, literally resigned at the Dispatch Box. Among other things, he accused the Treasury of having “little interest” in the consequences of fraud for our society. It is precisely because of the important points that the right hon. Gentleman raises that a national fraud squad of some 400 new specialist investigators is being recruited. That will be led by the National Crime Agency’s national economic crime centre, working closely with the City of London police. We will do all we can to protect the public from fraud.

• 2 Jun 2025 · Fraud · Hansard source

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  The Online Safety Act 2023 will require tech companies to take measures to prevent fraudulent content on their platforms or face significant fines. Under the Act, the largest firms will be required to do all they can to prevent fraudulent advertising from appearing on their platforms.

• 2 Jun 2025 · Fraud · Hansard source

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  Stability and security remain key to ensuring the health and growth of the UK economy; protecting investors and consumers is central to that. We are continually evolving our capabilities, including by working closely with industry partners to ensure that security is front and centre of the UK’s framework for the crypto sector.

• 2 Jun 2025 · Fraud · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right to raise concerns; the numbers that she references are deeply concerning. Combating fraud and beating scammers requires raising public awareness, and I am grateful for the work that she has done on this. I can tell her that the Home Office is working closely with the banking, telecoms, digital and tech sectors to improve systems and share data faster with law enforcement. Over 60 stakeholders from across industry are involved in the development of our new fraud strategy. Public communications, targeted support for the most vulnerable and AI are key parts of our strategy.

• 2 Jun 2025 · Fraud · Hansard source

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  We monitor fraud trends very closely. Fraud is a growing transnational threat that requires urgent action. That is why the Government are developing a new fraud strategy, which covers better collaboration with industry, improved public awareness and improved collaboration with international partners.

• 13 May 2025 · Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  First, let me offer my thanks for two very helpful, constructive and pertinent contributions from the Opposition, and also more generally for the collegiate atmosphere in which these instruments have been discussed today. That is important, and it does make a difference, because the presence of a cross-party consensus on matters relating to national security does send a powerful message to our adversaries that we are united in our determination to root out and repel their hostile activities. I am grateful, therefore, for the broad support that has been shown for FIRS today, and on previous occasions when it has been discussed in this House. I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for her broad welcome for these regulations. Let me take a moment to pay tribute to the work that was done by the previous Government in the previous Parliament. The 2023 Act was a landmark piece of legislation; as Security Ministers today, we feel the benefit of the work that was done in the previous Parliament. I have mentioned this to the shadow Minister previously, but I say it again for the benefit of the House: this Government are grateful for the efforts of all those who went before who put in place this legislative framework, which is now delivering real operational benefit for the United Kingdom. I join her in the comments that she made about Russia and Iran. The work that we are doing with the implementation of FIRS will make a difference in terms of ensuring that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for these countries, and all—all—activities carried out under the direction of the Russian or the Iranian state will require registration. That is to ensure that the scheme provides assurance for the full range of activities that those two countries are directing at the United Kingdom. For reasons that I understand, the shadow Minister also asked about China. Let me say to her—this will come as no great surprise—that countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier, and it would not be appropriate for me today to speculate about whether other countries might be added to the enhanced tier in the future. On the issue of China more broadly, I think it is absolutely fair to say that this Government have been crystal clear about what our approach to China will be. We are taking a consistent, long-term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relationship with China. We will co-operate where we can, compete where we need to and challenge where we must, including on issues relating to national security. We want a consistent and robust relationship with China that works in the best interests of the United Kingdom, but that cannot be boiled down to one word or one decision. We are not naive to the challenges that China poses to the UK, but FIRS is not a tool to formally designate particular countries as being a threat to the UK interests or to our security. It is designed to create transparency around the influence of foreign powers in the UK. Let me end my responses to the shadow Minister’s comments on what I hope is a point of consensus. She rightly said that there can be absolutely no compromise with regard to national security, and that is absolutely right: that is absolutely the approach of this Government, and I can give her that categorical assurance that national security will always come first. It is always very good to hear from the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire and he knows that his part of the world and his constituency has a special place in my heart. I do not know whether I have been around this place for too long, but I did mention to officials that he might ask me about North Korea, and I am pleased that he did not disappoint. Decisions are made on a country-by-country basis. We very carefully consider these matters and we keep these under close review, but we have not made any specific decision with regard to North Korea. However, I am very happy to debate these points with him, today or on any other occasion. Let me finally join the right hon. Gentleman in agreeing with the characterisation that he made, and has made previously, about the terrible attack that took place in Salisbury in 2018. These are the most repugnant and unacceptable acts. He is absolutely right to say—he is much closer to it than I am and knows better than I do—that these matters are still raw for the people of Salisbury. They are not matters that we will ever forget and we take them incredibly seriously. With that, there is nothing more to add other than to commend the regulations to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 Resolved, That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025.— (Dan Jarvis.) Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 Resolved , That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025.— (Dan Jarvis.) Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025 Resolved, That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025.— (Dan Jarvis .)

• 13 May 2025 · Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025.

• 13 May 2025 · Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I beg leave to speak for slightly longer than is customary, as we are debating four separate statutory instruments today. On 1 April, I announced that FIRS—the foreign influence registration scheme—would go live on 1 July 2025, with Russia and Iran specified on the enhanced tier of the scheme. FIRS, which is contained in part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, will be an invaluable tool for deterring and disrupting state threats and providing transparency of foreign power influence in our democracy. The scheme serves three principal aims. The first aim is transparency: the scheme will require those carrying out certain activities for foreign powers to declare them, and details of any political influence activities will be included on a public register. The second aim is deterrence: those carrying out malign activities for foreign powers will need either to cease their activities or to register them with the Government. The third aim is disruption: those who fail to declare their links to foreign powers will be at risk of criminal penalties. The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations specify the entirety of the Iranian and Russian states on the enhanced tier of the scheme. For Iran, that includes the Supreme Leader, the whole of the Government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran and the judiciary of Iran. For Russia, it includes the President of Russia, Cabinet Ministers, Government Ministries, regional governments, the judiciary and the legislature. As I set out in a statement to the House on 4 March, the Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. There is also a long-standing pattern of Jewish and Israeli people being targeted internationally by the Iranian intelligence services. Russia also poses an acute threat to UK security: in recent years, its hostile acts have ranged from the use of a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson and cyber-attacks, including the targeting of UK parliamentarians through spear-phishing campaigns. Specifying Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier will mean that anyone acting for the Russian or Iranian state in the UK will face a choice: either they declare their activities to the UK Government, or they will face up to five years’ imprisonment. Both instruments include a statutory five-year review period and a grace period for those who are in ongoing arrangements at the point of the scheme going live, to allow them to register arrangements without an impact on legitimate activities. The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations introduce four new exemptions to the scheme. These exemptions, as well as those contained in primary legislation, are designed to ensure the proportionality of the scheme by reducing the amount of routine activity, and activity which is already transparent, that needs to be registered with the scheme. First, the instrument introduces an exemption from the political influence tier of the scheme for foreign power investment funds, which is intended to cover sovereign wealth funds and certain public pension funds. Secondly, it introduces an exemption for funded study arrangements, such as foreign Government scholarships. Thirdly, it introduces an exemption from the enhanced tier for activities related to Government administrative and technical services, such as nationality, immigration and tax-related services. Finally, it introduces an exemption from an enhanced tier for public bodies and arrangements to which they are a party. All these exemptions have been carefully crafted to ensure that they apply only to a narrow set of activities to avoid creating loopholes that could be exploited for malign purposes. For example, Russian or Iranian students under scholarship programmes will be exempt only in relation to activities related to their course of study. Any other activity that they carry out for the Russian or Iranian states must be registered. The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations sets out how the public register will work. The register is essential to achieving the transparency aims of the scheme. This instrument sets out details about what categories of registered information will be published, limited to that which is necessary to achieve the scheme’s transparency aims, while protecting individuals’ privacy. Registrations under the scheme that relate to political influence activities will, by default, be included on the public register. Wider registrations under the enhanced tier that go beyond political influence activities will not be published. It is important to point out that those who register with the scheme and those who appear on the public register are doing the right thing and supporting transparency through the scheme. The instrument sets out that the information will be retained on the public register for 10 years after the end date of activities to enable trends and patterns of foreign influence to be monitored over time, and to achieve the scheme’s transparency objectives. The instrument also sets out that information may not appear on the register where it has been demonstrated that publication would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, or to the prevention of a crime, a criminal investigation, or criminal proceedings; where it would put an individual’s safety at risk; and where it could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Under this Government, national security will always come first, because nothing matters more than keeping our country and our people safe. In this era of growing and evolving state-based threats, it is a task that requires unflinching vigilance and constant renewal of the tools available to our world-class police and intelligence services. That is why we have placed national security at the heart of our plan for change; and it is why we are acting to operationalise the foreign influence registration scheme, including through the measures that we are debating. I hope and trust that we will have the support of all Members in this critical endeavour. I commend the instruments to the Committee.